Articulus 1
Article 1
De matrimonio
On matrimony
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mulier quae post votum continentiae emissum, in facie Ecclesiae contraxit cum aliquo, possit ei postmodum absque peccato carnaliter commisceri.
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that a woman who contracted matrimony with someone in the face of the Church after uttering a vow of continence can afterwards be united carnally to him without sin.
Quod enim fit auctoritate Ecclesiae, caret peccato, cum fiat auctoritate Christi, secundum illud Apostoli, II ad Corinthios II: nam et ego quod donavi, si quid donavi, propter vos in persona Christi; sed praedicta mulier ex hoc ipso quod in facie Ecclesiae contraxit matrimonium, auctoritate Ecclesiae potestatem accepit ad matrimonii actum, qui est carnalis copula; ergo non peccat, si viro suo carnaliter commisceatur.
Obj. 1: For that which is done by the authority of the Church lacks sin since it is done by the authority of Christ, according to that line of the Apostle: for what I have given, if I have given anything, on account of you have I given it in the person of Christ (2 Cor 2:10). But the abovementioned woman by the very fact that she has contracted matrimony in the face of the Church, has received by the authority of the Church power for the act of matrimony, which is carnal union. Therefore, she does not sin if she unites to her husband carnally.
Sed contra. Votum continentiae est excellentius quam votum abstinentiae, quia non est digna ponderatio continentis animae, ut dicitur Ecclesiastici XXVI; sed qui facit contra votum abstinentiae, peccat mortaliter, puta si aliquis frangeret ieiunium sextae feriae, qui semper se in sexta feria ieiunaturum vovisset; ergo multo magis semper peccat mortaliter persona quae contra votum continentiae emissum alteri personae carnaliter commiscetur.
On the contrary (2): A vow of continence is more excellent than a vow of abstinence, because there is no worthy weight of the continent soul (Sir 26:20). But he who acts against a vow of abstinence sins mortally: for example, if someone were to break the fast of Friday who had vowed that he always would fast on Friday. Therefore, much more does a person always sin mortally who is united carnally to another person against an uttered vow of continence.
Responsio. Dicendum quod votum continentiae est duplex: simplex scilicet et solemne. Solemne autem votum continentiae impedit matrimonium contrahendum et dirimit iam contractum, id est facit ut non sit matrimonium quod contrahitur post votum solemne; unde manifestum est quod post votum solemne non excusatur a peccato si quis matrimonium in facie Ecclesiae de facto contrahat et carnali copula utatur.
I answer that a vow of continence is twofold: namely, simple and solemn. Yet a solemn vow of continence impedes the contracting of matrimony and breaks that already contracted, that is, it makes it that there is not matrimony which is contracted after the solemn vow. Hence it is clear that someone is not excused from sin if after a solemn vow he contracts matrimony in the face of the Church and enjoys carnal union.
Votum vero simplex impedit quidem matrimonium contrahendum, sed non dirimit iam contractum: non enim facit quod matrimonium sequens sit nullum, sed solum quod matrimonium contrahens mortaliter peccat. Matrimonio autem existente, mulier non habet sui corporis potestatem, sed vir, et similiter e converso; nullus autem potest alteri denegare quod eius est, et ideo mulier matrimonio iuncta, etiam si simplex votum praecesserit, non potest denegare viro sui corporis usum, praecipue postquam fuerit matrimonium per carnalem copulam consummatum; nemo autem faciens quod debet, peccat; unde communiter ab omnibus dicitur quod mulier quae post votum simplex continentiae matrimonium contractum carnali copula iam consummavit, non peccat reddendo debitum viro. Sed an peccet exigendo debitum, dubium videtur, quibusdam dicentibus quod etiam absque peccato exigere potest, ne intolerabile sit sibi matrimonii onus; sed verius dici videtur quod non peccat reddendo, quia hoc necessitatis est, peccat autem exigendo, quia hoc est voluntatis, quae tenetur astricta per obligationem praecedentis voti.
Whereas a simple vow indeed impedes the contracting of matrimony, but does not break that already contracted: for it does not make it that there is no matrimony following, but only that one contracting matrimony sins mortally. Yet with matrimony existing, a woman does not have the power of her own body, but the man, and similarly conversely. Yet no one can deny another that which is his, and for this reason, a woman joined in matrimony, even if a simple vow preceded, cannot deny her husband the use of her body, especially after the matrimony has been consummated through carnal union. Yet no one doing that which he ought, sins. Hence it is said commonly by all that a woman who after a simple vow of continence already has consummated a matrimony contracted by carnal union does not sin by rendering the debt to her husband. But whether she sins by demanding the debt seems doubtful, with certain men saying that even without sin she can demand it lest the burden of matrimony be intolerable for her. But it seems more truly said that she does not sin by rendering, because this is of necessity, yet she sins by demanding, because this is of the will, which is held bound through the obligation of the preceding vow.
Huius autem diversitatis ratio est quia votum solemne habet promissionem cum quadam traditione (unde votum continentiae non solemnizatur nisi vel per susceptionem ordinis sacri, per quem homo actualiter divino cultui mancipatur, vel per professionem ad certam regulam et susceptionem habitus professorum, quia sic etiam homo actualiter mancipatur ad serviendum Deo in religione); votum autem simplex habet promissionem sine traditione. Manifestum est autem quod, postquam aliquis rem quae erat suae potestatis, alicui non solum promittit, sed etiam tradit, non potest eam ulterius alteri dare, puta equum vel vestem aut similia, et, si postmodum alteri donare voluerit, secunda donatio non valet; unde, postquam aliquis per votum solemne continentiae corpus suum Deo non solum promisit, sed etiam tradidit ad caelibem vitam agendam, non potest illud ulterius coniugi tradere, ut sic ex necessitate reddere debitum teneatur. Qui vero promittit aliquid alicui, nondum tamen tradit illud, unde, si postmodum alteri actualiter illud tradat, licet promissionis fidem frangat, tamen secunda donatio valet, ita quod ille cui datur potest re data uti ut vult; sic igitur persona quae per simplex votum Deo corpus suum promisit ad caelibem vitam ducendam, si postmodum corporis sui potestatem actualiter tradat coniugi per matrimonium consummatum, peccat quidem frangens fidem voti, tamen donatio tenet et coniux habet in eius corpore potestatem, unde non peccat debitum reddens.
Yet the reason for this diversity is that a solemn vow has a promise with a certain handing over (hence a vow of continence is not solemnized except either through the reception of sacred orders, through which a man actually is surrendered to the divine cult, or through profession unto a fixed rule and the reception of the habit of profession, because thus also a man actually is surrendered unto serving God in religion). Yet a simple vow has a promise without a handing over. Yet it is clear that, after someone not only promises to someone a thing which is of his power, but even hands it over, he cannot further give it to another, for example a horse or garment or similar things, and if afterwards he desires to give it to another, the second giving does not prevail. Hence, after someone through a solemn vow of continence not only has promised his body to God, but even has handed it over unto living a celibate life, he cannot further hand it over to a wife such that he is held to render the debt out of necessity. Whereas he who promises something to someone and nevertheless does not yet hand it over, if afterwards he actually does hand it over to another, the second donation nevertheless prevails even though he breaks the faith of the promise, such that the one to whom it is given can use the thing given as he wills. Thus, therefore, a person who through a simple vow has promised his body to God unto leading a celibate life, if afterwards he actually hands over the power of his body to a wife through the consummation of matrimony, he sins indeed by breaking the faith of the vow. Nevertheless, the giving holds and his wife has the power over his body. Hence he does not sin rendering the debt.
Unde oportet ad utrumque respondere.
Hence it is necessary to respond to both.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod mulier quae emisit votum continentiae, contrahens in facie Ecclesiae, non accipit ab Ecclesiae auctoritate <potestatem> ut carnali copula utatur, quia, si Ecclesiae constaret de voto emisso, matrimonium inhiberet. Si autem sciret et dispensaret in voto simplici continentiae auctoritate Apostolica, post dispensationem non peccaret mulier neque exigendo neque reddendo debitum.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that a woman who has uttered a vow of continence, when she contracts in the face of the Church does not receive from the authority of the Church the power that she should enjoy carnal union, because if the uttered vow were known to the Church, the Church would impede the matrimony. Yet if the Church were to know and were to dispense by apostolic authority the simple vow of continence, the woman would not sin after the dispensation either by demanding or by rendering the debt.
Ad secundum, quod est in contrarium, dicendum quod eadem ratio est et in voto continentiae et in voto abstinentiae. Sicut enim persona quae post votum simplex continentiae emissum sui ipsius potestatem coniugi tradit, absque peccato carnali copula utitur debitum reddens, ita, si post votum abstinentiae sui ipsius potestatem alteri tradat religionem intrando, absque peccato potest ieiunium solvere secundum obedientiam praelati et observantiam religionis, per quod votum solemnizatum ab aliis votis absolvitur.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the same reason applies to a vow of continence and to a vow of abstinence. For just as a person who, after uttering a simple vow of continence, hands over the power of himself to a spouse, he enjoys carnal union without sin when rendering the debt. Thus, if after a vow of abstinence, he hands over the power of himself to another by entering religion, he can break the fast without sin according to the obedience of the prelate and the observance of religion, through which solemnized vow he is absolved from other vows.
Articulus 2
Article 2
De usura
On usury
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod quicquid aliquis de pecunia usuraria lucratus fuerit, reddere teneatur.
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that someone is held to return whatever he gains from usurious money.
Dicit enim Apostolus ad Romanos XI: si radix sancta, et rami; ergo et e contrario, si radix infecta, et rami; sed radix huius lucri est infecta et usuraria; ergo totum est infectum et usurarium; non ergo potest licite huiusmodi lucrum retinere.
Obj. 1: For the Apostle says in Romans 11:16: if the root is holy, also the branch. Therefore, conversely, if the root is infected, so too is the branch; but the branch of this gain is infected and usurious. Therefore, the whole is infected and usurious. Therefore, he cannot licitly retain gain of this sort.
Sed contra. Quilibet potest licite tenere id quod legitime acquisivit; sed id quod acquiritur de pecunia usuraria, interdum legitime acquiritur; ergo licite potest retineri.
On the contrary: Anyone licitly can retain what he has acquired legitimately. But that which is acquired from usurious money is sometimes acquired legitimately. Therefore, licitly it can be retained.
Responsio. Dicendum quod huius quaestionis veritas poterit apparere, si consideretur ratio quare usuram accipere sit peccatum. Non enim est peccatum solum quia est prohibitum, sed quia est contra rationem naturalem, ut etiam Philosophus dicit in I Politicae.
I answer that the truth of this question could be apparent if the reason why usury is a sin were to be considered. For it is not only a sin because it is prohibited, but because it is against the natural order, as even the Philosopher says in the first book of the Politics.
Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum quod rerum in usum hominis venientium quaedam sunt quorum usus non est ipsius rei consumptio, et, si contingat rem deteriorari vel consumi per usum, hoc est per accidens; sicut domus, vestis, equus, liber et huiusmodi: non enim uti libro est delere ipsum, neque uti domo est destruere ipsam. Et in talibus aliud est dare usum rei et aliud est dare substantiam rei, et propter hoc, quando per accommodationem usus talis rei alteri conceditur, non propter hoc dominium rei transfertur; et propter hoc etiam potest vendi usus rei, dominio rei remanente apud dominum, sicut patet in conductione et locatione, qui sunt contractus liciti.
For the proof of this, it must be considered that certain things coming into the use of man are those whose use is not the consumption of the thing itself, and it is incidental if the thing is deteriorated or consumed through use, for example a house, a garment, a horse, a book, and things of this sort. For to use a book is not to blot it out, nor is to use a house to destroy it. And in such things to give the use of the thing is one thing and to give the substance of the thing is another. On account of this, when through accommodation the use of such a thing is granted to another, the ownership of the thing is not transferred because of this. On account of this, the use of the thing also can be sold, with the ownership of the thing remaining with the lord, just as is clear in renting and letting, which are licit contracts.
Quaedam vero res sunt quarum usus nihil est aliud quam consumptio ipsarum rerum, sicut pecunia qua utimur expendendo, vinum quo utimur bibendo, et sic de aliis huiusmodi, in quibus uti re nihil est aliud quam consumere ipsam. Et ideo in talibus quando conceditur usus rei per mutuum, transfertur etiam rei dominium. Quia igitur usus rei non est separabilis ab ipsa re, quicumque vendit usum talium rerum retinendo sibi obligationem ad sortem reddendam, manifestum est quod idem vendit bis, quod est contra naturalem iustitiam, et ideo exigere usuram est secundum se iniustum.
Whereas certain things are those whose use is nothing else than the consumption of the things themselves, such as money which we use by spending, wine which we use by drinking, and other things of this sort, in which to use a thing is nothing else than to consume it. And for this reason, in such things, when the use of the thing mutually is conceded, there is transferred also the ownership of the thing. Therefore, because the use of the thing is not separable from the thing itself, whoever sells the use of such things by retaining an obligation to himself unto returning the capital, it is clear that the same man is selling both, which is against natural justice, and for this reason, to demand usury is according to itself unjust.
Tenetur ergo aliquis id quod accipit ultra sortem restituere, quia iniuste accepit, et per consequens damna et interesse. Sed, cum ipsius pecuniae usurariae non sit alius usus quam ipsa eius substantia, ratione iam dicta, patet consequenter quod, ex quo pecuniam usurariam reddit, de usu pecuniae nihil reddere tenetur. Teneretur autem reddere aliquis id quod lucratus esset de domo aliena vel equo vel aliquo huiusmodi, etiam postquam res huiusmodi reddidisset, quia in talibus appreciatur res et usus rei.
Therefore, someone must be held to return what he receives beyond the capital, because he receives it unjustly, and consequently also to take part in the losses. But since there is not another use of his usurious money than its very substance, by the reasoning already explained it is clear consequently that from the fact that he returns the usurious money, he is not held to return anything for the use of the money. Yet someone would be held to return what he gained from another’s home or horse or something of this sort, even after he had returned things of this sort, because in such things the thing and the use of the thing is valued.
Ad illud ergo quod in contrarium obicitur, dicendum quod pecunia usuraria non se habet per modum radicis ad lucrum quod de ea fit, sed solum per modum materiae. Radix enim aliqualiter habet virtutem causae activae, in quantum ministrat alimentum toti plantae; unde in humanis actibus voluntas et intentio comparantur radici, qua, si perversa fuerit, opus erit perversum. Non autem hoc est necessarium in eo quod est materiale: potest enim aliquis interdum malo bene uti.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that usurious money does not exist in the way of a root for the gain made from it, but only through the way of a material. For a root somehow has the power of an active cause, inasmuch as it ministers nourishment to the whole plant. Hence in human acts the will and intention are compared to the root, by which, if it is perverse, the work will be perverse. Yet this is not necessary in that which is material: for sometimes someone can use evil well.
Quaedam pertinentia communiter ad omnes homines
Certain things pertaining commonly to all men
Quantum ad animam
Regarding the soul
Quaestio 8
Question 8
Quantum ad substantiam
Regarding the substance of the soul
Deinde quaesitum est de his quae pertinent communiter ad omnes homines;
Then there were questions that pertain commonly to all men:
et primo quantum ad animam;
and first, regarding the soul;
secundo, quantum ad corpus;
second, regarding the body;
tertio, quantum ad actum hominis.
third, regarding the act of man.
Circa animam quaesita sunt tria:
About the soul there were three questions:
primo, quantum ad substantiam eius, utrum sit composita ex materia et forma;
first, regarding its substance, whether it is composed of matter and form;
secundo, quantum ad cognitionem eius;
second, regarding its knowledge;
tertio, quantum ad poenam ipsius.
third, regarding its punishment.
Articulus unicus
Article 1
Utrum sit composita ex materia et forma
Whether the soul is composed of matter and form
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima sit composita ex materia et forma.
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the soul is composed of matter and form.