Articulus 2 Article 2 De usura On usury Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod quicquid aliquis de pecunia usuraria lucratus fuerit, reddere teneatur. To the second we proceed thus. It seems that someone is held to return whatever he gains from usurious money. Dicit enim Apostolus ad Romanos XI: si radix sancta, et rami; ergo et e contrario, si radix infecta, et rami; sed radix huius lucri est infecta et usuraria; ergo totum est infectum et usurarium; non ergo potest licite huiusmodi lucrum retinere. Obj. 1: For the Apostle says in Romans 11:16: if the root is holy, also the branch. Therefore, conversely, if the root is infected, so too is the branch; but the branch of this gain is infected and usurious. Therefore, the whole is infected and usurious. Therefore, he cannot licitly retain gain of this sort. Sed contra. Quilibet potest licite tenere id quod legitime acquisivit; sed id quod acquiritur de pecunia usuraria, interdum legitime acquiritur; ergo licite potest retineri. On the contrary: Anyone licitly can retain what he has acquired legitimately. But that which is acquired from usurious money is sometimes acquired legitimately. Therefore, licitly it can be retained. Responsio. Dicendum quod huius quaestionis veritas poterit apparere, si consideretur ratio quare usuram accipere sit peccatum. Non enim est peccatum solum quia est prohibitum, sed quia est contra rationem naturalem, ut etiam Philosophus dicit in I Politicae. I answer that the truth of this question could be apparent if the reason why usury is a sin were to be considered. For it is not only a sin because it is prohibited, but because it is against the natural order, as even the Philosopher says in the first book of the Politics. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum quod rerum in usum hominis venientium quaedam sunt quorum usus non est ipsius rei consumptio, et, si contingat rem deteriorari vel consumi per usum, hoc est per accidens; sicut domus, vestis, equus, liber et huiusmodi: non enim uti libro est delere ipsum, neque uti domo est destruere ipsam. Et in talibus aliud est dare usum rei et aliud est dare substantiam rei, et propter hoc, quando per accommodationem usus talis rei alteri conceditur, non propter hoc dominium rei transfertur; et propter hoc etiam potest vendi usus rei, dominio rei remanente apud dominum, sicut patet in conductione et locatione, qui sunt contractus liciti. For the proof of this, it must be considered that certain things coming into the use of man are those whose use is not the consumption of the thing itself, and it is incidental if the thing is deteriorated or consumed through use, for example a house, a garment, a horse, a book, and things of this sort. For to use a book is not to blot it out, nor is to use a house to destroy it. And in such things to give the use of the thing is one thing and to give the substance of the thing is another. On account of this, when through accommodation the use of such a thing is granted to another, the ownership of the thing is not transferred because of this. On account of this, the use of the thing also can be sold, with the ownership of the thing remaining with the lord, just as is clear in renting and letting, which are licit contracts. Quaedam vero res sunt quarum usus nihil est aliud quam consumptio ipsarum rerum, sicut pecunia qua utimur expendendo, vinum quo utimur bibendo, et sic de aliis huiusmodi, in quibus uti re nihil est aliud quam consumere ipsam. Et ideo in talibus quando conceditur usus rei per mutuum, transfertur etiam rei dominium. Quia igitur usus rei non est separabilis ab ipsa re, quicumque vendit usum talium rerum retinendo sibi obligationem ad sortem reddendam, manifestum est quod idem vendit bis, quod est contra naturalem iustitiam, et ideo exigere usuram est secundum se iniustum. Whereas certain things are those whose use is nothing else than the consumption of the things themselves, such as money which we use by spending, wine which we use by drinking, and other things of this sort, in which to use a thing is nothing else than to consume it. And for this reason, in such things, when the use of the thing mutually is conceded, there is transferred also the ownership of the thing. Therefore, because the use of the thing is not separable from the thing itself, whoever sells the use of such things by retaining an obligation to himself unto returning the capital, it is clear that the same man is selling both, which is against natural justice, and for this reason, to demand usury is according to itself unjust. Tenetur ergo aliquis id quod accipit ultra sortem restituere, quia iniuste accepit, et per consequens damna et interesse. Sed, cum ipsius pecuniae usurariae non sit alius usus quam ipsa eius substantia, ratione iam dicta, patet consequenter quod, ex quo pecuniam usurariam reddit, de usu pecuniae nihil reddere tenetur. Teneretur autem reddere aliquis id quod lucratus esset de domo aliena vel equo vel aliquo huiusmodi, etiam postquam res huiusmodi reddidisset, quia in talibus appreciatur res et usus rei. Therefore, someone must be held to return what he receives beyond the capital, because he receives it unjustly, and consequently also to take part in the losses. But since there is not another use of his usurious money than its very substance, by the reasoning already explained it is clear consequently that from the fact that he returns the usurious money, he is not held to return anything for the use of the money. Yet someone would be held to return what he gained from another’s home or horse or something of this sort, even after he had returned things of this sort, because in such things the thing and the use of the thing is valued. Ad illud ergo quod in contrarium obicitur, dicendum quod pecunia usuraria non se habet per modum radicis ad lucrum quod de ea fit, sed solum per modum materiae. Radix enim aliqualiter habet virtutem causae activae, in quantum ministrat alimentum toti plantae; unde in humanis actibus voluntas et intentio comparantur radici, qua, si perversa fuerit, opus erit perversum. Non autem hoc est necessarium in eo quod est materiale: potest enim aliquis interdum malo bene uti. Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that usurious money does not exist in the way of a root for the gain made from it, but only through the way of a material. For a root somehow has the power of an active cause, inasmuch as it ministers nourishment to the whole plant. Hence in human acts the will and intention are compared to the root, by which, if it is perverse, the work will be perverse. Yet this is not necessary in that which is material: for sometimes someone can use evil well. Quaedam pertinentia communiter ad omnes homines Certain things pertaining commonly to all men Quantum ad animam Regarding the soul Quaestio 8 Question 8 Quantum ad substantiam Regarding the substance of the soul Deinde quaesitum est de his quae pertinent communiter ad omnes homines; Then there were questions that pertain commonly to all men: et primo quantum ad animam; and first, regarding the soul; secundo, quantum ad corpus; second, regarding the body; tertio, quantum ad actum hominis. third, regarding the act of man. Circa animam quaesita sunt tria: About the soul there were three questions: primo, quantum ad substantiam eius, utrum sit composita ex materia et forma; first, regarding its substance, whether it is composed of matter and form; secundo, quantum ad cognitionem eius; second, regarding its knowledge; tertio, quantum ad poenam ipsius. third, regarding its punishment. Articulus unicus Article 1 Utrum sit composita ex materia et forma Whether the soul is composed of matter and form Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima sit composita ex materia et forma. To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the soul is composed of matter and form. Intellectus enim humanus comparatur ad substantias intellectuales superiores per recessum simplicitatis; sed omne quod recedit a simplici, incidit in aliquam compositionem, prima autem compositio est ex materia et forma; ergo anima humana est composita ex materia et forma. Obj. 1: For the human intellect is compared to superior intellectual substances by its distance from simplicity. But everything distant from the simple has some composition, and the first composition is of matter and form. Therefore, the human soul is composed of matter and form. Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in III De anima, quod species rerum materialium prout sunt in ipsis rebus non sunt intelligibiles actu quia sunt in materia; sed prout sunt in anima intellectiva humana, sunt intelligibles actu; ergo non sunt in materia; non ergo anima humana est composita ex materia et forma. On the contrary is that the Philosopher says in the third book of On the Soul that the species of material things as they are in things themselves are not intelligible actually because they are in matter. But as they are in the intellective human soul, they are intelligible actually. Therefore, they are not in matter. Therefore, the human soul is not composed of matter and form. Responsio. Dicendum quod, si materia dicatur omne illud quod est in potentia quocumque modo et forma dicatur omnis actus, necesse est ponere quod anima humana et quaelibet substantia creata sit composita ex materia et forma. Omnis enim substantia creata est composita ex potentia et actu: manifestum est enim quod solus Deus est suum esse, quasi essentialiter existens, in quantum scilicet suum esse est eius substantia, quod de nullo alio dici potest; esse enim subsistens non potest esse nisi unum, sicut nec albedo subsistens posset esse nisi una. Oportet igitur quod quaelibet alia res sit ens participative, ita quod aliud sit in eo substantia participans esse et aliud ipsum esse participatum. Omne autem participans se habet ad participatum sicut potentia ad actum. Unde substantia cuiuslibet rei creatae se habet ad suum esse sicut potentia ad actum. Sic igitur omnis substantia creata composita est ex potentia et actu, id est ex eo quod est et esse, ut Boetius dicit in libro De hebdomadibus, sicut album componitur ex eo quod est album et albedine. I answer that, if matter is anything which is in any way potential, and every act is called form, it is necessary to posit that the human soul and any created substance is composed of matter and form, since every created substance is composed of potency and act. For it is clear that only God is his own being as essentially existing, namely, inasmuch as his being is his substance, which can be said concerning no other. For subsistent being cannot be unless it is one, just as subsisting whiteness could not be unless it is one. Therefore, it is necessary that every other thing is a being by participation, such that the one thing in that substance is participating being and the other is participated being itself. Yet everything participating relates to the thing participated just as potency to act. Hence the substance of any created thing relates to its being just as potency to act. Thus, therefore, every composed created substance is out of potency and act, that is, out of that which is and being, as Boethius says in the book Hebdomads, just as a white thing is composed out of that which is white and whiteness. Si vero materia proprie accipiatur id quod est potencia tantum, sic impossibile est quod anima humana sit composita ex materia et forma. Et hoc potest manifestari dupliciter. Whereas if matter is understood properly as that which is only potency, in this way it is impossible for the human soul to be composed of matter and form. And this can be shown in two ways. Primo quidem ex eo quod est intellectualis substantia. Manifestum est enim quod intellectus in actu est intellectum in actu; intellectum autem in actu est aliquid in quantum est immateriale: est enim aliquid perfecte cognoscibile in quantum est actu, non autem in quantum est in potentia, ut dicitur in IX Metaphysicae. Unde, cum materia sit ens in potentia, forma in materia existens non potest esse perfecte cognita ut intellecta in actu. Unde sequitur quod nulla substantia intellectiva cuius perfectio est ipsum intellectum in actu, sit materialis, eo quod oportet perfectionem proportionari perfectibili. First, indeed, it can be shown from this: that it is intellectual substance. For it is clear that the intellect in act is the thing understood in act. Yet something is understood in act inasmuch as it is immaterial: for it is something perfectly knowable inasmuch as it is in act, yet not inasmuch as it is in potency, as is said in the ninth book of the Metaphysics. Hence, since matter is being in potency, form existing in matter cannot be perfectly known as understood in act. Hence it follows that no intellective substance, the perfection of which is the thing itself understood in act, is material, by this: that it is necessary that perfection be proportioned to the perfectible. Secundo apparet idem ex hoc quod anima est forma. Cum enim forma sit actus, et id quod est potentia non possit esse actus, impossibile est quod aliquid compositum ex materia et forma, secundum se totum sit forma. Si igitur anima, quae ponitur componi ex materia et forma, sit forma secundum aliquam sui partem, quae est actus cuius nulla pars est materia, sequetur quod animae pars non sit materia: hoc enim dicimus animam quod est actus corporis animati. Second, the same is clear from this: that the soul is form. For since form is act, and that which is potency cannot be act, it is impossible for something composed of matter and form, according to itself as a whole, to be form. Therefore, if the soul, which is posited to be composed of matter and form, is form according to some part of itself, which is an act and no part of which is matter, it follows that a part of the soul is not matter: for we call the soul that which is the act of an animate body. Ad id vero quod in contrarium obicitur, dicendum quod potentia et actus sunt prima principia in genere substantiae, materia autem et forma sunt prima principia in genere substantiae mobilis. Unde non oportet omnem compositionem in genere substantiae esse ex materia et forma, sed hoc solum necesse est in substantiis mobilibus. Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that potency and act are first principles in the genus of substance, yet matter and form are first principles in the genus of mobile substance. Hence it is not necessary for every composition in the genus of substance to be out of matter and form. Rather, this is necessary only in mobile substances. Quaestio 9 Question 9 Quantum ad cognitionem Regarding the knowledge of the soul Deinde quaesitum est de anima quantum ad eius cognitionem. Et circa hoc quaesita sunt duo: Then there were questions about the soul as regards its knowledge. And about this there were two questions: primo, utrum anima separata a corpore cognoscat aliam animam separatam; first, whether a soul separated from the body knows another separated soul;