Quaestio 8
Question 8
De sacramento matrimonii
On the sacrament of matrimony
Deinde circa matrimonium quaesita sunt duo:
Then there were two questions about matrimony:
primo, si aliquis despondeat aliquam per verba de futuro et postea eam carnaliter cognoscat, non quidem quasi consentiens in matrimonium, sed solummodo volens fraudulenter subripere copulam carnalem, si postmodum contrahat cum alia per verba de presenti, utrum secunda sit uxor eius;
first, if someone betroths a woman through words of the future and afterwards knows her carnally, not, indeed, as though consenting unto matrimony, but only wanting fraudulently to snatch carnal union, if afterwards he contracts with another woman through words of the present, whether the second is his wife;
secundo, si vir accuset uxorem de adulterio occulto, utrum mulier teneatur in iudicio suum peccatum confiteri.
second, if a man accuses his wife of a secret adultery, whether the woman is held to confess her sin in judgment.
Articulus 1
Article 1
Si aliquis despondeat aliquam per verba de futuro et postea eam carnaliter cognoscat, non quidem quasi consentiens in matrimonium, sed solummodo volens fraudulenter subripere copulam carnalem, si postmodum contrahat cum alia per verba de praesenti, utrum secunda sit uxor eius
If someone betroths a woman through words of the future and knows her carnally, not as consenting unto matrimony, if afterwards he contracts with another woman through words of the present, whether the second is his wife
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ille qui cognovit carnaliter mulierem quam desponderat per verba de futuro, non possit habere uxorem illam cum qua postea contrahit per verba de praesenti.
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that a man who has known a woman carnally whom he betrothed through words of the future cannot have another woman as wife with whom afterwards he contracts through words of the present.
Iudicio enim Ecclesiae compellitur stare cum prima quam carnaliter cognovit; sed Ecclesia potest facere personas illegitimas ad contrahendum; ergo videtur quod talis non possit cum alia muliere contrahere matrimonium, et ita illa cum qua secundo contraxit per verba de praesenti, non erit uxor sua.
Obj. 1: For the judgment of the Church is compelled to stand with the first whom he knew carnally. But the Church can make persons illegitimate unto contracting. Therefore, it seems that such a man cannot contract matrimony with another woman. And thus, the woman with whom he contracted second through words of the present will not be his wife.
Sed contra est quod error hominis non preiudicat veritati matrimonii; sed ex errore hominis praesumentis esse consensum ubi fuit carnalis copula, contingit quod per iudicium Ecclesiae compellitur aliquis illam habere quam cognovit carnaliter post contractum per verba de futuro; ergo hoc non preiudicat veritati secundi matrimonii, quod est rite contractum per verba de praesenti.
On the contrary: The error of a man does not prejudice the truth of matrimony. But from the error of someone presuming there was consent where there was carnal union, it happens that through the judgment of the Church a man is compelled to have that woman whom he knew carnally after a contract through words of the future. Therefore, this does not prejudice the truth of the second matrimony, which is contracted rightly through words of the present.
Responsio. Dicendum quod, sicut Nicholaus papa dicit, causa matrimonii est consensus per verba de praesenti expressus, sine quo cetera etiam cum coitu subsecuta frustrantur.
I answer that, just as Pope Nicholas says, the cause of matrimony is consent expressed through words of the present, without which, other words, even followed with intercourse, are frustrated.
Remota autem causa removetur effectus; unde, cum in primo matrimonio ponatur non fuisse consensus, manifestum est quod non fuit matrimonium; et quia posita causa ponitur effectus, consequens est ut secundum fuerit matrimonium, in quo ponitur fuisse mutuus consensus per verba de praesenti expressus inter personas a matrimonio solutas.
Yet with the cause removed, the effect is removed. Hence, since in the first matrimony it is posited that there was not consent, it is clear that there was not matrimony. And because with a cause posited, the effect is posited, the consequence is that the second was matrimony, in which there is posited to have been mutual consent expressed through words of the present between persons unbound by matrimony.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Ecclesia in his quae ad matrimonium pertinent tripliciter se habet.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the Church conducts herself in three ways in these things pertaining to matrimony.
Uno quidem modo per modum iudicantis. Et quia homines vident ea quae apparent, secundum quod dicitur I Regum XVI, oportet quod iudex ecclesiasticus iudicet secundum ea quae sibi apparent per confessionem partium et per idoneos testes et per alia legitima documenta, quibus tamen omnibus adhibitis contingit quandoque veritatem latere, et praecipue in his quae pertinent ad interiora cordis, quae humano testimonio probari non possunt, etsi per aliqua signa exteriora de his possit aliqua coniectura haberi. Et ideo iudicium Ecclesiae circa ea quae ad matrimonium pertinent, si veritas lateat, non impedit sequens matrimonium contrahendum nec dirimit iam contractum.
One way, indeed, is in the manner of one judging. And because men see those things which are apparent (1 Sam 16:7), it is necessary for an ecclesiastical judge to judge according to what is apparent to him through the confession of the parties, and through suitable witnesses, and through other legitimate proofs. With all of these presented, nevertheless, it happens that sometimes the truth is hidden, and especially in what pertains to the interior things of the heart, which cannot be proven by human testimony, even though through some exterior signs some conjecture can be made concerning these things. And for this reason, the judgment of the Church about those things which pertain to matrimony, if the truth is hidden, does not impede a subsequent contracting of matrimony, nor does it break off one already contracted.
Alio modo se habet per modum prohibentis vel punientis. Et hoc quidem impedit matrimonium contrahendum, sed non dirimit iam contractum; puta, uxoricidae Ecclesia penam imponit ut ulterius a matrimonio abstineat; si tamen contraxerit, matrimonium non dirimitur.
In another way, the Church conducts herself in the manner of one prohibiting or punishing. And this indeed impedes the contracting of matrimony but does not break off one already contracted; for example, the Church imposes as a penalty of uxoricide that one should abstain from further matrimony. If, nevertheless, he will have contracted, the matrimony is not broken off.
Tertio modo se habet per modum statuentis, quod fit solum auctoritate summi pontificis. Et secundum hoc personae aliquae redduntur illegitimae ad contrahendum, ita quod si etiam contrahant, matrimonium dirimitur, ut patet in quibusdam gradibus consanguinitatis et affinitatis, vel etiam de adultera, cum quis dedit ei fidem de contrahendo vel cum machinatus est in mortem uxoris.
In a third way the Church conducts herself in the manner of one establishing, which is done only by the authority of the supreme pontiff. And according to this any persons are rendered illegitimate unto contracting, such that even if they do contract, the matrimony is broken off, as is clear in certain grades of consanguinity and affinity, or even concerning adultery when someone has given faith to her that he will contract matrimony, or when he has plotted for the death of his wife.
Articulus 2
Article 2
Si vir accuset uxorem de adulterio occulto, utrum mulier teneatur in iudicio suum peccatum confiteri
If a man accuses his wife of a secret adultery, whether the woman is held to confess her sin in judgment
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mulier accusata de adulterio non teneatur suum peccatum in iudicio confiteri.
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that a woman accused of adultery is not held to confess her sin in judgment.
Nullus enim tenetur suum peccatum occultum publicare; sed adulterium mulieris ponitur esse occultum, si autem in iudicio confiteretur ipsum, veniret in publicum; non igitur tenetur mulier accusata de adulterio suum peccatum in iudicio confiteri.
Obj. 1: For no one is held to publicize one’s secret sin. But the adultery of the woman is posited to be secret, yet if she were to confess it in judgment, it would come into the public. Therefore, the woman accused of adultery is not held to confess her sin in judgment.
Sed contra est quia debet praestare iuramentum de veritate dicenda; sed nullo modo debet deierare; ergo debet veritatem confiteri de suo peccato.
On the contrary: She should fulfill an oath about telling the truth. But in no way should she swear an oath. Therefore, she should confess the truth about her sin.
Responsio. Dicendum quod circa hoc est distinguendum. Si enim adulterium sit omnino occultum, non debet peccatum suum in iudicio confiteri, nec debet ab ea exigi iuramentum de veritate dicenda, quia occulta soli divino iudicio reservantur, secundum illud I ad Corinthios IV: nolite ante tempus iudicare, quousque veniat Dominus qui illuminabit abscondita tenebrarum. Sed quando de adulterio praecessit infamia vel aliqua signa evidentia apparent quae vehementem suspicionem facere possunt, vel quando est semiplene probatum, tunc debet ab ea exigi iuramentum de veritate dicenda, et ipsa tenetur confiteri veritatem.
I answer that, about this, a distinction must be made. For if the adultery is altogether secret, she should not confess her sin in judgment, nor should an oath be demanded from her concerning telling the truth, because secret judgment is reserved to the divine alone, according to 1 Corinthians 4:5: do not judge before the time, until the Lord should come who shall illumine the hidden things of darkness. But when infamy concerning the adultery precedes or any evident signs are apparent which can make a vehement suspicion, or when it is halfway proven, then there should be demanded from her an oath concerning telling the truth, and she is held to confess the truth.
Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.
Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.
On things pertaining to the virtues
Quaestio 9
Question 9
De his quae pertinent ad virtutes
On things pertaining to the virtues
Deinde circa virtutes quaesita sunt duo:
Then there were two questions about the virtues:
primo, circa iustitiam, scilicet si aliquis incidens in latrones promittat eis pecuniam pro sua liberatione, si mutuo eam accipiat ab aliquo suo amico, utrum restituere teneatur;
first, about justice, namely, if someone falling in amongst thieves promises them money for his liberation, whether he is held to restore it if he receives it on loan from some friend of his;
secundo, circa abstinentiam, utrum aliquis peccare possit nimis ieiunando vel vigilando.
second, about abstinence, whether someone can sin by fasting or by keeping vigil too much.
Articulus 1
Article 1
Circa iustitiam
About justice
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ille qui pecuniam accepit mutuo ut redimeret se a latronibus, non teneatur eam restituere.
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that a man who has received money on loan to redeem himself from thieves is not held to restore it.
Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, tempore necessitatis sunt omnia communia; sed nullus debet quasi proprium petere id quod est commune, ut Ambrosius dicit, et habetur in Decretis, d. XLVII; cum ergo ille qui in latrones incidit fuerit in maxima necessitate constitutus, utpote in periculo mortis existens, videtur quod factum sit sibi commune id quod erat alterius et ita non teneatur ei restituere qui mutuavit, ac si esset proprium eius.
Obj. 1: Because, as Augustine says, in time of necessity all things are common. But no one ought to demand as though proper that which is common, as Ambrose says, and is had in the Decretum (D. 47). Since, therefore, that man who fell in amongst thieves was constituted in greatest necessity, namely, in danger of death, it seems that there is made common to him that which was another’s, and thus he is not held to restore to him who loaned, as if it were his property.
Praeterea. Nullus tenetur facere recompensationem alicui pro eo quod ille facere tenebatur; sed iste qui mutuavit pecuniam, tenebatur proximum suum a mortis periculo liberare, secundum illud Proverbiorum XXIV: erue eos qui ducuntur ad mortem; ergo videtur quod ille qui est liberatus non teneatur ei restituere pecuniam mutuatam.
Obj. 2: No one is held to make recompense to someone for what that man was held to do. But that man who loaned money was held to liberate his neighbor from the danger of death, according to Proverbs 24:11: rescue those who are led unto death. Therefore, it seems that the man who was liberated is not held to restore to him the money loaned.
Sed contra est quod Dominus dicit Matthaei VII: omnia quae vultis ut faciant vobis homines, et vos facite illis; sed ille qui liberatus est a latronibus vellet sibi restitui, si quid mutuasset; ergo etiam ipse debet restituere quod mutuo accepit.
On the contrary: The Lord says in Matthew 7:12: all things which you will that men should do unto you, you also, do unto those. But that man who was liberated from the thieves would wish it to be restored to him if he had loaned anything. Therefore, he also ought to restore that which he received on loan.
Responsio. Dicendum quod iustitiae actus est unicuique reddere quod sibi debetur. Unde, cum ratione contractus bonae fidei qui fuit inter mutuantem et mutuo accipientem restitutio debeatur, ex iustitiae praecepto tenetur ille qui mutuo accepit pecuniam, eam reddere creditori, et tanto magis quanto in maiori necessitate creditor sibi subvenit.
I answer that the act of justice is to render to each that which is due to him. Hence, since by reason of the contract of good faith which was between the one loaning and the one receiving on loan, restitution is due out of a precept of justice, that man who received money on loan is held to return it to his creditor, and so much more as the creditor has helped him in greater necessity.