Quaestio 9 Question 9 De sacramento matrimonii On the sacrament of matrimony Circa sacramentum matrimonii quaesita sunt duo: About the sacrament of matrimony there were two questions: primo de maleficiatis; first, concerning those rendered impotent by spells; secundo de frigidis. second, concerning the feeble. Articulus 1 Article 1 De maleficiatis On those rendered impotent by spells Circa primum quaesitum est utrum maleficia impediant matrimonium? Et ostendebatur quod non. About the first there was a question whether being rendered impotent by spells impedes matrimony. And it was shown that it does not. Quia opus Dei est fortius quam opus diaboli; sed matrimonium est opus Dei, maleficium vero opus diaboli; ergo matrimonium est fortius maleficio; non ergo impeditur per ipsum. Obj. 1: Because the work of God is stronger than the work of the devil. But matrimony is a work of God, whereas bewitchment a work of the devil. Therefore, matrimony is stronger than bewitchment. Therefore, marriage is not impeded through it. Contra. Maior est potestas demonis quam potestas hominis; sed homo potest matrimonium impedire; ergo et demon. On the contrary: Greater is the power of a demon than the power of man. But man can impede matrimony. Therefore, so too can a demon. Responsio. Dicendum quod matrimonium est quasi quoddam pactum, nam per matrimonium unus tradit potestatem sui corporis alteri ad copulam carnalem; constat autem quod pactum de impossibili nullum est, cum nullus possit se obligare ad impossibile; et ideo, quando aliquis obligat per matrimonium se ad copulam carnalem, si hoc sit ei impossibile, matrimonium nullum est. Sed notandum est quod impossibilitas copulae carnalis ex aliquo impedimento proveniens potest dupliciter considerari, quia vel illud impedimentum est superveniens matrimonio iam consummato, vel praecedens; si quidem est superveniens, tunc matrimonium iam consummatum nunquam solvitur; si vero impedimentum praecedat, tunc matrimonium nondum consummatum solvitur. Item circa hoc sciendum quod impedimenta huiusmodi vel sunt perpetua vel ad tempus; si quidem perpetua sint, tunc matrimonium illud simpliciter impeditur; si vero sunt temporalia, tunc matrimonium non impeditur simpliciter, sed ad tempus, ita tamen quod impedimentum utriusque praecedat. I answer that matrimony is as it were a certain pact, for through matrimony one hands over the power of his body to another unto carnal union. Yet it is agreed that a pact concerning the impossible is null, since no one can obligate himself unto the impossible. For this reason, when someone obligates himself through matrimony unto carnal union, the matrimony is null if this is impossible for him. But it must be noted that impossibility of carnal union arising from some impediment can be considered in two ways, because either that impediment is supervening on a matrimony already consummated, or preceding. If, indeed, it is supervening, then an already consummated matrimony is never dissolved. Whereas if the impediment precedes, then a matrimony not yet consummated is dissolved. Likewise, note that impediments of this sort are either perpetual or for a time. If, indeed, they are perpetual, then that matrimony is impeded absolutely; whereas if they are temporary, then the matrimony is not impeded absolutely, but for a time, provided that the impediment of either person preceded. De maleficiis autem sciendum est quod quidam dixerunt quod maleficium nihil est; et hoc proveniebat ex infidelitate, quia volebant quod demones nihil sunt nisi in imaginatione hominum, in quantum scilicet homines imaginabantur eos, et ex ista imaginatione territi laedebantur. Fides autem Catholica vult quod demones sint aliquid et possint nocere eorum operationibus et impedire carnalem copulam. Yet concerning bewitchment it must be known that certain men say that bewitchment is nothing. But this is because of their infidelity, since these men believe that demons are only in the imagination of men, namely, inasmuch as men imagined them, they were struck, terrified by this imagination. Yet the Catholic faith believes that demons are something and can harm their activities and impede carnal union. Et ideo huiusmodi impedimenta si praecedant et sunt perpetua, ut dictum est, simpliciter impediunt matrimonium. And for this reason, impediments of this sort, if they precede and are perpetual, as has been said, impede matrimony absolutely. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod etiam diabolus est opus Dei, non solum matrimonium, et inter opera Dei unum est fortius alio et unum impeditur per aliud magis forte; unde, cum diabolus sit fortior quam matrimonium, nihil prohibet per ipsum matrimonium impediri. Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that even the devil is a work of God, not only matrimony, and among the works of God one is stronger than another and one is impeded through another more strong. Hence, since the devil is stronger than matrimony, nothing prohibits matrimony from being impeded through him. Articulus 2 Article 2 De frigidis On the feeble Circa secundum quaesitum est utrum frigiditas impediat matrimonium? Et videtur quod non. About the second there was a question whether feebleness impedes matrimony. And it seems that not. Quia senes sunt frigidi, et tamen contrahunt matrimonium. Obj. 1: Because the elderly are feeble, and, nevertheless, they contract matrimony. In contrarium est quod nullus obligat se ad impossibile; sed impossibile est frigidis carnaliter alicui copulari; ergo, si ad hoc obligant se, huiusmodi pactum nullum erit. On the contrary: No one obligates himself to the impossible. But it is impossible for the feeble to unite carnally with someone. Therefore, if they obligate themselves to this, a pact of this sort is null. Responsio. Dicendum quod frigiditas eadem ratione impedit matrimonium sicut maleficium, cum sit eadem impossibilitas in utroque. Nihilominus tamen differt frigidus et maleficiatus: frigidus est impotens simpliciter et quantum ad omnes, maleficiatus vero est quidem impotens, non tamen quo ad omnes, sed quo ad unam tantum. Nam maleficium consistit in imaginatione viri respectu unius mulieris, in quantum scilicet ex operatione demonis fit sibi horror et abominatio alicuius mulieris, quam propter horrorem refugit et respuit. I answer that feebleness impedes matrimony for the same reason as bewitchment, since there is the same impossibility in each. Still, nevertheless, the feeble and those rendered impotent by spells differ: the feeble person is completely impotent and as regards all persons, whereas the one rendered impotent by spells is indeed impotent, nevertheless not as regards all, but as regards one woman only. For bewitchment consists in the imagination of a man with respect to one woman, namely, inasmuch as from the activity of a demon there is made for him the horror and abomination of some woman, whom on account of horror he flees and rejects. Et ideo aliter impedit frigiditas et aliter maleficium. Nam frigiditas impedit aliquem ita quod oportet quod remaneat absque omni spe contrahendi, si ab una impediatur (unde, si aliquando efficitur potens, oportet reintegrare primum matrimonium); unde frigiditas solvit contractum et dirimit contrahendum. Maleficiatus vero impeditur quantum ad istam tantum (unde datur ei licentia nubendi alteri, et mulieri similiter); unde maleficium solvit contractum, sed non dirimit contrahendum, ut supra dictum est. And for this reason, feebleness impedes in one way and bewitchment in another way. For feebleness impedes someone such that it is necessary for him to remain without any hope of contracting, if he is impeded from one (hence, if at some time he is made potent, it is necessary to reintegrate the first matrimony). Hence feebleness dissolves what has been contracted and destroys what may yet be contracted. Whereas the one rendered impotent by spells is impeded as regards this woman only (hence he has permission to marry another, and similarly does the woman). Hence bewitchment dissolves what has been contracted, but does not destroy what may yet be contracted, as has been said above. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod senes sunt frigidi non quidem ad actum generationis, sed ad generationem prolis, et ideo, cum possint carnaliter copulari, non solvitur matrimonium; frigiditas vero, quae omnino carnalem copulam impedit, solvit matrimonium, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the elderly are feeble not indeed unto the act of generation, but unto the generation of offspring, and for this reason, since they can be united carnally, the matrimony is not dissolved. Whereas the feebleness which entirely impedes carnal union dissolves the matrimony, as has been said. Circa conversationem humanae vitae About the manner of human life Quaestio 10 Question 10 Per comparationem ad proximum Regarding the relationship to a neighbor Circa conversationem humanae vitae quaesita sunt About the manner of human life there were asked: quaedam per comparationem ad proximum, certain things about the relationship to a neighbor; quaedam per comparationem ad res quae in usum hominum veniunt. certain things about the relationship to the things that men use. Per comparationem autem ad proximum quaesitum est de correctione fraterna. Circa quam duo quaesita sunt. Yet about the relationship to a neighbor, there was an inquiry concerning fraternal correction. About this, there were two questions. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum debeat aliquis in publico vel in privato corrigere proximum seu fratrem suum Whether someone ought to correct his neighbor or brother in public or in private Primo, utrum debeat aliquis in publico vel in privato corrigere proximum seu fratrem suum? Et videtur quod occulte. First, should someone correct his neighbor or his brother in public or in private? And it seems that he should do so secretly. Matthaei XVIII: si peccaverit in te frater tuus, vade et corripe eum inter te et ipsum solum; videtur ergo quod occulte sit corrigendus frater delinquens. Obj. 1: Matthew 18:15: if your brother has sinned against you, go and correct him between you and him only. Therefore, it seems that a delinquent brother must be corrected secretly. Contra. Timothaei V: peccantem coram omnibus argue. On the contrary (2): Accuse the one sinning before all (1 Tim 5:20). Praeterea. Aliquae constitutiones hoc habent, ut scilicet publice corrigantur. Furthermore (3): Some constitutions require them to be corrected publicly. Responsio. Dicendum quod huiusmodi correctio ex caritate debet procedere, et inde est quod dicitur fraterna correctio; et ideo oportet ordinem fraternae correctionis sumere secundum ordinem caritatis. Ordo autem caritatis est ut quis bono proximi preferat bonum commune, item ut velit bonum proximi et conscientiae et famae, et in his magis velit bonum conscientiae, quando utrumque haberi non potest. I answer that correction of this sort ought to proceed out of charity, and hence it is called fraternal correction. For this reason, it is necessary to assume the order of fraternal correction according to the order of charity. Yet the order of charity is for someone to prefer the common good to the good of his neighbor, likewise for him to will the good of his neighbor both of conscience and of reputation, and in these he wills more the good of conscience when both cannot be had.