Vanum enim dicitur quod non habet stabilitatem seu firmitatem. Solus autem Deus de se est immutabilis. Mal. III, 6: ego Deus et non mutor. Et ideo tunc solum mens humana est a vanitate libera quando Deo innititur. Cum autem, praetermisso Deo, innititur cuicumque creaturae, incurrit vanitatem. Sap. XIII, 1: vani sunt omnes homines in quibus non subest scientia Dei, etc.; Ps. XCIII, 11: Dominus scit cogitationes hominum quoniam vanae sunt. In cogitationibus suis evanuerunt, in quantum in seipsis, et non in Deo, fiduciam habebant, sibi et non Deo bona sua adscribentes, secundum illud Ps. XI, 5: labia nostra, etc. For something is futile when it lacks stability or firmness. But God alone is changeless: I, the Lord, do not change (Mal 3:6). Consequently, the human mind is free of futility only when it leans on God. But when God is rejected and the mind rests in creatures, it incurs futility: for all men who were ignorant of God were foolish and could not know God from the good things which are seen (Wis 13:1); the Lord knows the thoughts of man, that they are vain (Ps 94:11). In their thoughts they became vain, because they put their trust in themselves and not in God, ascribing their blessings not to God but to themselves, as the Psalmist says: our lips are with us; who is our master? (Ps 11:4). 130. Secundo ponit ignorantiam subsecutam dicens et obscuratum est; id est, per hoc quod obscuratum est, factum est cor eorum insipiens, id est lumine sapientiae privatum, per quam homo vere Deum cognoscit. Sicut enim qui oculos corporales a sole materiali avertit, obscuritatem corporalem incurrit, ita ille qui a Deo avertitur, de seipso praesumens et non de Deo, spiritualiter obscuratur. Prov. XI, 2: ubi humilitas, per quam scilicet homo se Deo subiicit, ibi sapientia; ubi superbia, ibi contumelia. Matth. XI, 25: abscondisti haec a sapientibus, secundum quod scilicet eis videbatur, et revelasti ea parvulis, id est humilibus. Et de his habetur Eph. IV, 17 s.: gentes ambulant in vanitate sensus sui, tenebris obscuratum habentes intellectum. 130. Second, he mentions the ignorance which followed, when he says was darkened, i.e., by the fact that their foolish heart was darkened, i.e., deprived of the light of wisdom, through which man truly knows God. For just as a person who turns his bodily eyes from the sun is put in darkness, so one who turns from God, presuming on himself and not on God, is put in spiritual darkness: where there is humility, which subjects a man to God, there is wisdom; where there is pride, there is a disgrace (Prov 11:2); you have hidden these things from the wise, as they seemed to themselves, and revealed them to babes, i.e., to the humble (Matt 11:25); the gentiles live in the futility of their mind; they are darkened in their understanding (Eph 4:17). 131. Deinde cum dicit dicentes exponit quod dixerat. 131. Then when he says professing themselves he explains his statement. Et, primo, qualiter in cogitationibus suis evanuerunt, cum dicit dicentes se esse sapientes, stulti facti sunt. Dicentes, id est sapientiam sibi a seipsis adscribentes. Is. V, 21: vae qui sapientes estis in oculis vestris. Is. XIX, 11: quomodo dicetis Pharaoni: filius sapientium ego, filius regum antiquorum? Etc. And first, how they became futile in their thinking, when he says professing themselves to be wise, they became fools. Professing themselves, i.e., ascribing wisdom to themselves as of themselves: woe to those who are wise in their own eyes (Isa 5:21); how can you say to Pharaoh: I am the son of the wise, a son of ancient kings? Where now are your wise men? (Isa 19:11). Secundo, exponit quod dixerat et obscuratum est insipiens cor, cum dicit stulti facti sunt, quasi contra divinam sapientiam agentes. Ier. X, 14: stultus factus est omnis homo a scientia sua, de qua scilicet praesumebat. Second, he explains his statement that their foolish heart was darkened when he says they became fools to the point of acting contrary to divine wisdom: every man is stupid and without knowledge of his own on which he presumed (Jer 10:14). 132. Deinde cum dicit et mutaverunt gloriam, ponit peccatum impietatis gentilium. 132. Then when he says and they changed the glory, he mentions the punishment for the gentiles’ sin of ungodliness. Et primo quanto ad hoc quod peccaverunt contra Dei gloriam, First, in regard to sinning against God’s glory; secundo quomodo contra veritatem naturae ipsius, ibi qui commutaverunt veritatem. second, how they sinned against the truth of nature itself, at who changed the truth. Circa primum duo facit: In regard to the first he does two things: primo ponit impietatis culpam, first, he sets forth the sin of ungodliness; secundo poenam, ibi propter quod tradidit. second, the punishment, at wherefore, God gave them up. 133. Culpa quidem eorum fuit quod, quantum in ipsis erat, honorem divinum in alium transtulerunt, secundum illud Ier. II, 11: populus meus mutavit gloriam suam in idolum. 133. Their sin, indeed, was that, so far as in them lay, they transferred divine honor to something else: my people have changed their glory for that which does not profit (Jer 2:11). Primo ergo ponit id quod mutaverunt, First, therefore, he mentions what they changed; secundo id in quod mutaverunt, ibi in similitudinem. second, that into which they changed it, at into the likeness. 134. Circa primum, tria sunt attendenda ex parte Dei. 134. In regard to the first, three things should be noted on the part of God. Primo, quidem ipsius gloriam, quam tangit dicens et mutaverunt gloriam, quod potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo de gloria qua homo Deum glorificat, ei cultum latriae exhibendo. I Tim. I, 17: soli Deo honor. Hanc igitur mutaverunt, cum cultum Deo debitum exhibuerunt aliis. Alio modo potest intelligi de gloria qua Deus in se gloriosus est, quae est incomprehensibilis et infinita. Prov. XXV, 27: perscrutator maiestatis opprimetur a gloria. Quae quidem gloria, nihil est aliud quam ipsa claritas divinae naturae; lucem enim inhabitat inaccessibilem, I Tim. Ult. First, his glory, which he mentions when he says and they changed the glory. This can be interpreted in two ways: first, as referring to the glory with which man gives glory to God by rendering him the worship of latria: to the only God be honor and glory (1 Tim 1:17). They exchanged this, when they paid to others the worship due to God. Second, as referring to the glory with which God is glorious, which is incomprehensible and infinite: he that is a searcher of majesty shall be overwhelmed by glory (Prov 25:27). This glory, of course, is nothing less than the brilliance of the divine nature; for he dwells in unapproachable light (1 Tim 6:16). Hanc autem mutaverunt, dum eam aliis attribuerunt. Incommunicabile enim nomen lignis et lapidibus imposuerunt, ut dicitur Sap. XIV, 21. This glory they exchanged, when they attributed it to other things, for men gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood (Wis 14:21). Secundo, notatur incorruptibilitas, cum dicit incorruptibilis. Ipse enim solus perfecte incorruptibilis est, qui est omnino immutabilis; omnis enim mutatio quaedam corruptio est. Unde dicitur I Tim. ult.: solus habet immortalitatem. Second, his immortality is noted when he says incorruptible. For he alone is perfectly incorruptible who is entirely unchangeable; for every change is a form of ceasing to be. Hence, it is said: he alone has immortality (1 Tim 6:16). Tertio, notatur naturae sublimitas, cum dicitur Dei, ut enim in Ps. XLVII, 2 dicitur: Deus magnus Dominus. Third, he notes the sublimity of his nature, when he says God, for it is said: great is the Lord (Ps 48:1). 135. Ex parte vero eius in quod mutaverunt, tria correspondentia ponuntur. Nam, contra gloriam dicit in similitudinem imaginis, id est in similitudinem alicuius rei per modum imaginis ab aliquo expressae. Manifestum enim est quod similitudo imaginis est posterior illa re cuius est imago. Gloria autem, sive claritas Dei, est principium omnis speciei et formae; et sic dum Dei gloriam in similitudinem imaginis mutaverunt, converterunt primum in ultimum. Sap. XIV, 15: acerbo luctu dolens pater, cito sibi rapti filii fecit imaginem. 135. On the part of that into which they exchanged it, three corresponding things are mentioned. For in contrast to glory he says into the likeness of the image, i.e., for a likeness of something produced in the form of an image. For it is plain that the likeness in an image is subsequent to the thing whose image it is. But God’s glory or brilliance is the principle of every nature and form; consequently, when they exchanged God’s glory for images, they put the first being in last place: for a father consumed with grief made an image of his child, who had been suddenly taken from him (Wis 14:15). Contra id quod dixerat incorruptibilis, dicit corruptibilis. Ps. XXIX, 10: quae utilitas in sanguine meo dum descendo in corruptionem? Scilicet quod est amplius iam corruptum sive mortuum? Sap. XV, 17: cum sit mortalis, mortuum fingit, manibus iniquis. In contrast to immortal he says corruptible: what profit is there in my blood, if I go down to the pit? (Ps 30:9), i.e., what good is a dead thing? He is mortal, and what he makes with lawless hands is dead (Wis 15:17). Contra id quod dixit Dei, ponit hominis. Iob XXXII, 21: non accipiam personam viri et Deum homini non aequabo. In contrast to God he says man: I will not show partiality to any man and I will not equate God with man (Job 32:21). Et, quod est abominabilius, homo gloriam Dei transtulit non solum in hominem, qui est ad imaginem Dei sed etiam ad ea quae sunt infra hominem, unde subdit et volucrum quantum ad volatilia, et quadrupedum quantum ad gressibilia, et serpentium quantum ad reptilia. Praetermittit autem pisces tamquam magis ab humana conversatione seiunctos. Haec autem omnia sunt a Deo homini supposita. Ps. VIII, 8: omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius. Ez. VIII, 9: ingredere et vide abominationes pessimas quas isti faciunt hic. Et ingressus vidi; et ecce omnis similitudo reptilium et animalium et cetera. But what is more abominable, man exchanged God’s glory not only for man, who is made to the image of God, but even for things inferior to man. Hence, he adds of birds, things that fly, and of fourfooted beasts, things that walk, and of creeping things, things that crawl. He omits fish as being less familiar to ordinary human life. Now all these things were put under man by God: you have put all things under his feet (Ps 8:8); go in and see the vile abominations that they are committing here. So I went in and saw; and there, portrayed upon the wall round about were all kinds of creeping things and loathsome beasts (Ezek 8:9). 136. Est autem notandum quod, sicut dicit Glossa, ab adventu Aeneae consueverunt in Italia imagines hominum coli, puta Iovis, Herculis et similium. Sed tempore Caesaris Augusti, devicta Aegypto, eorum cultum Romani assumpserunt qui imagines animalium colebant, propter figuras animalium, quae notantur in caelo, quibus Aegypti, tamquam astrologiae dediti, cultum divinitatis impendebant. Unde et Dominus filios Israel in Aegypto nutritos ab huiusmodi cultu removet dicens Deut. IV, 19: ne forte elevatis oculis ad coelum videas solem et lunam et omnia astra caeli, etc. 136. It might be mentioned, as a Gloss says, that from the time of Aeneas’ arrival in Italy, images of men were cultivated, e.g., Jupiter, Hercules, and so on. But after the conquest of Egypt during the reign of Caesar Augustus, the Romans took up the worship of animal images (on account of the figures of animals discovered in the sky), to which the Egyptians, given to astrology, rendered divine worship. Hence, the Lord himself instructed the children of Israel raised in Egypt against such worship, when he said: beware lest you lift up your eyes to heaven and when you see the sun and the moon and the stars, you be drawn away and worship them (Deut 4:19). 137. Deinde cum dicit propter quod tradidit, ponit poenam huiusmodi culpae respondentem. 137. Then when he says wherefore, God gave them up he mentions the punishment for such a sin. Circa quod considerandum est quod homo medium locum obtinet inter Deum et animalia bruta, et cum utroque extremorum communicat: cum Deo quidem, secundum intellectualitatem; cum animalibus vero brutis, secundum sensualitatem. Sicut igitur homo, id quod est Dei, mutavit usque ad bestias, ita Deus, id quod est divinum in homine secundum rationem, subdidit ei quod est brutale in ipso, scilicet desiderio sensualitatis, secundum illud Ps. XLVIII, 21: homo cum in honore esset non intellexit, similitudinem scilicet divinae imaginis propter rationem, comparatus est iumentis insipientibus. Hoc est ergo quod dicit propter quod tradidit illos Deus in desideria cordis, ut eorum ratio subderetur desideriis cordis, scilicet sensualis affectus, de quibus dicitur infra XIII, 14: carnis curam ne feceritis in desideriis. Quod quidem est contra naturalem ordinem hominis, secundum quem ratio appetitui sensibili dominatur. Gen. IV, 7: sub te erit appetitus eius, et tu dominaberis illius. Here it should be noted that man holds a place midway between God and the beasts and has something in common with both: with God, intellectuality; with animals, sensibility. Therefore, just as man exchanged that which was of God for what is bestial, so God subjected the divine in man, namely reason, to what is of the beast in him, his sensual desire, as it is stated: man cannot abide in his pomp (Ps 49:20), i.e., understand the likeness of the divine image in him through reason, he is like the beasts that perish. This, therefore, is why he says wherefore, God gave them up to the desires of their heart, so that their reason would be ruled by the desires of the heart, namely, lustful affections, about which he says below: make not provision for the flesh in its concupiscences (Rom 13:14). But this is contrary to man’s natural order, in which reason dominates the sense appetites: its desire is under you and you must master it (Gen 4:7). Inducit ergo homines in desideria cordis eorum sicut in manu dominorum crudelium. Is. XIX, 4: tradam Aegyptum in manu dominorum crudelium. Consequently, he releases men to the desires of the heart as to cruel masters: I will give over the Egyptians into the hand of a hard master (Isa 19:4). 138. Praecipue tamen circa appetitum sensitivum bestialis quaedam deordinatio pertinet ad peccata carnalia. Nam delectationes tactus, circa quas sunt gula et luxuria, manifeste sunt communes nobis et brutis. Et ideo sunt magis exprobrabiles quasi magis brutales, ut dicit Philosophus in III Ethicorum. 138. It is chiefly with respect to the sense appetite that a certain bestial derangement is present in carnal sins. For the pleasures of touch, which delight gluttony and lust, are common to us and to beasts. Hence, they are more detestable, being more brutish, as the Philosopher says in Ethics III. Et hoc designatur cum subdit in immunditiam quae ad peccata carnalia pertinet, secundum illud Eph. V, 5: omnis fornicator aut immundus, quia scilicet homo, per huiusmodi peccata, maxime convertitur et trahitur ad id quod est infra ipsum. Unumquodque enim dicitur esse impurum sive immundum ex commixtione vilioris, sicut argentum ex commixtione plumbi. Unde exponens subdit ut contumeliis, id est turpibus et immundis actibus, afficiant, id est inficiant, corpora sua in semet ipsis, id est non quasi ab aliis coacti, puta a barbaris, sed a semetipsis hoc agunt, propria sponte. Infra IX, 21: an non habet potestatem figulus luti ex eodem luto facere aliud vas in honorem, aliud in contumeliam? Scilicet in turpem usum. This is designated when he says unto uncleanness, which refers to sins of the flesh, as is clear from Ephesians: every fornicator or impure man (Eph 5:5); because it is especially through such sins that man turns to and is drawn to what is beneath him. For a thing is said to be impure or tainted from being mixed with something base, as silver mixed with lead. Hence, in explanation he continues: to dishonor, by base and unclean acts, their own bodies among themselves, i.e., not as though compelled by others, for example, by savages, but they do this among themselves spontaneously. Below: has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vase for honor and another for dishonor? (Rom 9:21). Namely, for menial use. 139. Sed cum huiusmodi immunditia sit peccatum, videtur quod Deus in eam homines non tradat, quia, ut dicitur Iac. I, 13: Deus intentator malorum est. 139. But since impurity of this kind is a sin, it seems that God would not give men over to it: God himself tempts no one to evil (Jas 1:13). Dicendum est quod Deus non dicitur tradere homines in immunditiam directe, inclinando affectum hominis ad malum, quia Deus omnia ordinat in seipsum, Prov. XVI, 4: universa propter se operatus est Dominus, peccatum autem est aliquid per aversionem ab eo. Sed indirecte tradit homines in peccatum, in quantum iuste subtrahit gratiam per quam homines continebantur ne peccarent; sicut si aliquis alicuius substentaculum tolleret, diceretur facere casum eius. Et per hunc modum primum peccatum est causa sequentis peccati, sequens vero est poena prioris. The answer is that God does not give men over to impurity directly, as though inclining a man’s affection toward evil, because God ordains all things to himself: the Lord has made everything for himself (Prov 16:4), whereas something is sinful through its turning from him. But he gives men over to sin indirectly, inasmuch as he justly withdraws the grace through which men are kept from sinning, just as a person would be said to cause another to fall, if he removed the ladder supporting him. In this way, one’s first sin is a cause of the next, which is at the same time a punishment for the first one. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est quod unum peccatum potest esse causa alterius indirecte et directe. Directe quidem, in quantum ex uno peccato inclinatur ad aliud, quod fit tripliciter. Uno modo secundum rationem causae finalis; sicut cum quis ex avaritia vel invidia incitatur ad homicidium committendum. Secundo, secundum rationem causae materialis; sicut gula inducit ad luxuriam, ministrando materiam. Tertio, secundum rationem causae moventis; sicut cum ex multis actibus alicuius peccati generatur habitus ad simile peccatum inducens. To understand this it should be noted that one sin can be the cause of another directly or indirectly: directly, inasmuch as from one sin he is inclined to another in any of three ways. In one way, when it acts as a final cause; for example, when someone from greed or envy is incited to commit murder. Second, when it acts as a material cause, as gluttony leads to lust by administering the material. Third, when it acts as a moving cause, as when many repetitions of the same sin produce a habit inclining a person to repeat the sin. Indirecte autem, sicut primum peccatum meretur exclusionem gratiae, qua subtracta, homo ruit in aliud peccatum. Et sic primum peccatum est causa secundi indirecte sive per accidens, sicut removens prohibens. Indirectly, when the first sin merits the exclusion of grace, so that once it is removed, a man falls into another sin. In this way the first sin is the cause of the second indirectly or incidentally, inasmuch as it removes the preventative. 140. Sed notandum est quod peccatum, in quantum huiusmodi, non potest esse poena, quia poenam contra voluntatem patimur, peccatum autem est voluntarium, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed quia peccatum habet quaedam adiuncta, quae sunt contra voluntatem peccantis, ratione eorum peccatum dicitur poena praecedentis peccati. Hoc autem est, uno modo, aliquid praecedens peccatum, sicut subtractio gratiae ex qua sequitur ut homo peccet. Alio modo, est aliquid adiunctum ipsi peccato, vel interius sicut est inordinatio animi, unde Augustinus dicit in I Confessionum: iussisti Domine, et sic est ut poena sibi sit omnis inordinatus animus; sive quantum ad exteriores actus, quibus difficultates ac labores adiunguntur, secundum illud quod dicunt impii Sap. V, 7: ambulavimus vias difficiles, etc. Tertio, quantum ad id quod sequitur peccatum sicut est remorsus conscientiae, infamia et similia. 140. It should be borne in mind, however, that sin as such cannot be a punishment, because we suffer punishment against our will, whereas sin is voluntary, as Augustine says. But because sin has certain features contrary to the will of the sinner, it is by reason of them that a sin is called a punishment of a previous sin. One of these features is something preceding the sin, as the withdrawal of grace, from which it follows that a man sins. Another is something that accompanies the sin either interiorly, as that the mind is disarranged; hence Augustine says in Confessions I: you have commanded it, O Lord, and so it comes to pass that every disarranged mind is a punishment to itself; or in regard to its outward acts, which involve difficulties and labors, as sinners aver: we journeyed through trackless deserts (Wis 5:7). The third feature is something that follows the sin, such as remorse of conscience, bad reputation, and so on. 141. Deinde cum dicit commutaverunt, ponit culpam impietatis quam commiserunt contra veritatem divinae naturae. 141. Then, when he says who changed the truth, he mentions the sin of ungodliness committed against the truth of the divine nature. Et primo ponit culpam, First, he mentions the sin;