Opponitur autem personarum acceptio iustitiae distributivae, per quam aliquis distribuit unicuique secundum dignitatem personarum; ergo acceptio est quando praeter dignitatem datur alicui plus vel minus. Tunc autem hoc fit praeter dignitatem, quando hoc fit non propter conditionem, sed propter personam quae facit ad causam. Hoc est enim causam accipere, scilicet quasi regulam operandi, sed propter personam, quasi ipsa persona accipiatur ut causa aliquid faciendi. Puta si aliquis det alicui propter consanguinitatem plus de bonis patrimonialibus, non est acceptio personarum, quia consanguinitas est conveniens causa propter quam de talibus bonis debeat habere. Si autem propter consanguinitatem aliquis praelatus det alicui plus de bonis ecclesiasticis, potest hoc ad acceptionem personarum pertinere, si alia idoneitas non concurrat. Non enim consanguinitas est ratio conveniens distributionis bonorum spiritualium.
Respect of persons is opposed to distributive justice, through which one distributes to each according to the person’s worth; therefore, there is respect of persons, when more is given or less is given without regard to worth. This happens when the person rather than his qualifications is accepted as a cause. In this case there is a cause, i.e., a rule of action, but the person is taken as the cause of doing something. Thus, if one gives more inheritance to another on account of a blood relationship, it is not respect of persons, because this relationship is a fitting cause why he should receive such benefits. But if a prelate gives more ecclesiastical goods to someone on account of a blood relationship, it would be respect of persons, if some other qualification were not present. For blood relationship is not a suitable reason for receiving spiritual goods.
Quia igitur Deus omnia convenientissima ratione facit, non cadit in ipsum personarum acceptio. Dicitur enim Sap. VIII, 1, quod disponit omnia suaviter.
Therefore, because God does everything for the best of reasons, respect of persons does not enter into his actions: wisdom orders all things well (Wis 8:l).
206. Sed videtur acceptor personarum, quia peccatorum quosdam in suis peccatis relinquit, quosdam ad se vocat.
206. Yet he seems to be a respecter of persons, because he abandons some sinners and calls others to himself.
Sed dicendum quod personarum acceptio opponitur iustitiae, unde locum habet in his quae dantur ex debito, quod attendit iustitia. Deus autem non ex debito, sed gratis, peccatores ad poenitentiam vocat. si enim ex operibus, iam non ex gratia, ut dicitur infra XI, 6, et Tit. III, 5: non ex operibus iustitiae quae fecimus nos, sed secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos fecit.
The answer is that respect of persons is opposed to justice; hence, it finds its sphere in the payment of debts, with which justice is concerned. But God calls sinners to repentance not from debt but as a favor: and if by grace, it is not now by works (Rom 11:6); not because of deeds done by us in justice, but in virtue of his own mercy he saved us (Titus 3:5).
In talibus autem beneficiis gratis datis non solum Deo, sed etiam homini, liberum est dare cui voluerit. Matth. XX, 15: an non licet mihi quod volo facere?
In such gifts not only God, but man too, is free to give to whom he will: am I not allowed to give what I choose with what belongs to me? (Matt 20:15).
207. Deinde cum dicit quicumque enim, exponit praedictam rationem.
207. Then when he says, for whosoever, he explains the reason.
Quod enim non sit personarum acceptio apud Deum, patet per hoc quod omnes qui peccant puniuntur. Unde primo loquitur quantum ad illos qui legem non susceperunt, dicens, quod quicumque peccaverit sine lege, scilicet Moysi, accepta a Deo, sine lege peribit, id est condemnabitur, non propter legis transgressionem. Iob IV, 20: quia nullus intelligit, in aeternum peribunt.
For if all who sinned are punished, it is clear that there is no respect of persons with God. Hence, he speaks first of those who have not received the law, saying that for whosoever has sinned without the law received from God by Moses, will perish without the law, i.e., will be condemned, but not for transgression of the law: because no one understands, they will perish forever (Job 4:20).
Secundo loquitur quantum ad illos qui legem scriptam acceperunt, et dicit quod quicumque peccaverunt in lege, id est, post legem scriptam, iudicabuntur per legem, id est, propter hoc quod transgressi sunt praeceptum legis. Io. XII, 48: sermo quem locutus sum vobis ille iudicabit eum in novissimo die.
Second, he speaks of those who received the written law, and he says that whosoever has sinned in the law, i.e., after the written law, will be judged by the law, i.e., precisely for having transgressed a precept of the law: the word which I have spoken will be his judge on the last day (John 12:48).
208. Quidam autem ex hoc modo loquendi occasionem erroris sumpserunt. Quia enim Apostolus non dicit, quicumque in lege peccaverit per legem peribit, sicut dixerat de his qui sunt sine lege quod sine lege peribunt, crediderunt quod illi qui post legem susceptam peccant, iudicentur aliqualiter, scilicet in praesenti, non tamen pereunt.
208. The Apostle’s manner of speaking here has been taken as an occasion of error by some. Because the Apostle does not say that all who sinned under the law will perish by the law, as he had said of those who are without the law that they will perish without the law, some believed that those who sin after receiving the law will be judged by some means, i.e., in the present, but will not perish.
Sed, sicut dicit Glossa quis Christianus dicat non perire Iudaeum si non credat in Christum, cum Dominus dicat quod tolerabilius erit Sodomae in die iudicii quam eis? Ut habetur Matth. X, 15. Unde Ez. XVIII, 32: nolo mortem peccatoris.
But as the Gloss says: what Christian would say that the Jew will not perish for not believing in Christ, when the Lord says that it will be more tolerable on the day of judgment for the land of Sodom than for them? (Matt 10:15). Hence it says: I have no pleasure in the death of the sinner (Ezek 18:32).
209. Utitur autem tali diversitate in loquendo, quia, ut Gregorius dicit in moralibus super illud Iob XXXVI, 6: iudicium pauperibus tribuit, quidam in futuro iudicio peribunt, sed non iudicabuntur, id est impii, qui sunt sine fide et lege Dei. Ps. I, 5: non resurgent impii in iudicio, quia scilicet non est locus disceptandi contra eum, qui totaliter alienus est a Deo. Io. III, 18: qui non credit, iam iudicatus est.
209. But the Apostle uses these different expressions because, as Gregory says on Job 36:6: he gives judgment to the poor, some will perish in the future judgment without being judged, i.e., the wicked who are without faith and the law: the wicked will not stand in the judgment (Ps 1:5), namely, because there is no basis for discussion with one entirely estranged from God: he who does not believe is condemned (John 3:18).
Alii vero, qui lege Dei et fide suscepta peccant, ita peribunt, quod etiam iudicabuntur, quasi quadam disceptatione cum eis facta. Unde Ez. XXXIV, 17 dicitur: ecce ego iudico inter pecus et pecus, arietum et hircorum. Sicut et rex, ut Gregorius dicit, hostes condemnat absque audientia, cives autem cum diligenti audientia.
But others who sin in spite of having received the law and faith will perish in such a way as also to be judged through a discussion held with them; hence, it is said: I judge between sheep and sheep, rams and he-goats (Ezek 34:17), just as a king condemns enemies without a hearing, but citizens with a careful examination, as Gregory says.
Lectio 3
Lecture 3
Factores legis
The doers of the law
2:13 Non enim auditores legis justi sunt apud Deum, sed factores legis justificabuntur. [n. 211]
2:13 For the hearers of the law are not just before God: but the doers of the law will be justified. [n. 211]
2:14 Cum autem gentes, quae legem non habent, naturaliter ea, quae legis sunt, faciunt, ejusmodi legem non habentes, ipsi sibi sunt lex: [n. 213]
2:14 For when the gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law; they, having not the law, are a law to themselves, [n. 213]
2:15 qui ostendunt opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis, [n. 218] testimonium reddente illis conscientia ipsorum, et
inter se invicem cogitationibus accusantibus, aut etiam defendentibus, [n. 219]
2:15 Who show the work of the law written in their hearts, [n. 218] their conscience bearing witness to them: and their thoughts between themselves accusing or also defending one another, [n. 219]
2:16 in die, cum judicabit Deus occulta hominum, secundum Evangelium meum per Jesum Christum. [n. 222]
2:16 In the day when God will judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ, according to my Gospel. [n. 222]
210. Postquam Apostolus confutavit humanum iudicium, quo se gentiles et Iudaei mutuo iudicabant et divinum iudicium commendavit, hic procedit ad ostendendum ea, quibus Iudaei gloriabantur, eis non sufficere ad salutem et
210. After confuting the human judgment with which the gentiles and Jews judged one another and commending God’s judgment, the Apostle now undertakes to show that the things in which the Jews gloried do not suffice for their salvation.
primo ostendit propositum,
First, he states his position;
secundo solvit ea quae in contrarium dici possent III cap., ibi quid ergo amplius, etc.
second, he answers arguments against his position, at what advantage then has the Jew? (Rom 3:1).
De duobus Iudaei gloriabantur, scilicet de lege et circumcisione, quae non erat ex lege Moysi, sed ex patribus, ut dicitur Io. VII, 22.
The Jews gloried in two things, namely, the law and circumcision, which stemmed not from the law but from the patriarchs (John 7:22).
Primo ergo ostendit quod lex audita sive recepta, non sufficiebat ad salutem.
First, therefore, he shows that the Jewish law heard or accepted was not enough for salvation;
Secundo ostendit idem de circumcisione, ibi circumcisio quidem, etc.
second, he shows the same about circumcision, at circumcision indeed (Rom 2:25).
Circa primum duo facit.
In regard to the first he does two things:
Primo proponit quod intendit,
first, he sets forth his position;
secundo manifestat propositum, ibi cum enim gentes.
second, he clarifies it, at for when the gentiles.
211. Circa primum proponit duo, unum excludendo, alterum asserendo.
211. In regard to the first he sets forth two things: one by rejecting; the other by asserting.
Excludit enim quod Iudaei opinabantur se per solum legis auditum iustificari. Unde dicit: Ita dictum est, peccantes in lege iudicentur per legem; non enim auditores legis, ex hoc ipso quod legem audiunt, iusti sunt apud Deum et si apud homines iusti reputantur. Matth. VII, 26: qui audit verba mea et non facit ea, similis est viro stulto. Iac. I, 23: si quis auditor est verbi, et non factor, etc.
For he rejects the Jewish opinion that they were made just by merely hearing the law. Hence he says: I have said that all who have sinned under the law will be judged by the law, for the hearers of the law, i.e., in virtue of having heard the law, are not just before God, even if they are deemed just before men: every one who hears these words of mine and does not do them is like a foolish man (Matt 7:26); if anyone is a hearer of the word and not a doer, he is like a man who observes his natural face in a mirror (Jas 1:23).
Secundo astruit quod factores legis sunt iusti, cum dicit sed factores legis iustificabuntur. Matth. VII, 24: omnes qui audit verba mea et facit ea, assimilabitur viro, et cetera. Iac. I, 22: estote factores verbi, et non auditores tantum et Ps. CX, 10: intellectus bonus omnibus facientibus eum.
Second, he declares that the doers of the law are righteous, when he says, but the doers of the law will be justified: everyone who hears these words of mine and does them will be like a wise man (Matt 7:24); be doers of the word and not hearers only (Jas 1:22); a good understanding have all those who practice it (Ps 111:10).
212. Sed circa secundum videtur esse quod infra III, 20, dicitur: ex operibus legis non iustificabitur omnis caro coram eo. Non ergo aliqui ex hoc quod opera legis faciunt, iustificantur.
212. But this point seems to conflict with his own statement below that by the works of the law no flesh will be justified before him (Rom 3:20). Consequently, no one is justified precisely for doing the works of the law.
Sed dicendum est quod iustificari tripliciter accipi potest. Uno modo potest accipi quantum ad reputationem, ut tunc aliquis iustificari dicatur, quando iustus reputatur. Ez. XVI, 51: iustificasti sorores tuas, scilicet per reputationem. Et secundum hoc potest intelligi factores legis iustificabuntur, id est, iusti apud Deum et homines reputabuntur.
The answer is that justification can be taken in three ways: in one way, in regard to reputation; then one is said to be justified, when he is regarded as just: you have made your sisters appear justified, i.e., by reputation (Ezek 16:51). In this sense, the doers of the law will be justified, i.e., are considered just before God and men.
Secundo, per executionem iustitiae, inquantum scilicet opera iustitiae exequuntur. Lc. XVIII, 14: descendit hic iustificatus in domum suam, quia scilicet publicamus opus iustitiae fecerat confitendo peccatum. Et hoc modo verificatur quod hic dicitur factores legis iustificabuntur, scilicet legis iustitiam exequendo.
Second, by doing what is just: this man went down to his home justified (Luke 18:14), because the publican performed a work of justice by confessing his sin. In this way is verified the statement that the doers of the law will be justified, i.e., by performing the justice of the law.
Tertio modo potest accipi iustificatio quantum ad causam iustitiae, ut scilicet ille dicatur iustificari qui iustitiam de novo accipit, sicut infra V, 1: iustificati igitur ex fide, etc. Sic autem non intelligitur hic quod factores legis iustificentur, quasi per opera legis iustitiam acquirant. Hoc quidem esse non potest neque quantum ad opera caeremonialia, quae gratiam iustificantem non conferebant; neque etiam quantum ad moralia, ex quibus habitus iustitiae non acquiritur, sed potius per habitum iustitiae infusum huiusmodi opera facimus.
In a third way justification can be considered in regard to the cause of justice, so that a person is said to be justified, when he newly receives justice: being justified therefore by faith, let us have peace with God (Rom 5:1). It must not be supposed, however, that the doers of the law are justified as though acquiring justice through the works of the law. This cannot be accomplished either by the ceremonial works, which confer no justifying grace, or by the moral works, from which the habit of justice is not acquired; rather, we do such works in virtue of an infused habit of justice.
213. Deinde cum dicit cum enim gentes, manifestat propositum.
213. Then when he says for when the gentiles, he clarifies his position.
Et primo ostendit quod factores legis, etiam si non sint auditores, iustificantur;
First, he shows that doers of the law are justified even without being hearers;