Lectio 3 Lecture 3 Peccatum et mors per Adam Sin and death through Adam ^5:12 Propterea sicut per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors, et ita in omnes homines mors pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt. [n. 406] ^5:12 Wherefore as by one man sin entered into this world and by sin death: and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned. [n. 406] 406. Postquam Apostolus ostendit quae bona per gratiam Christi consecuti sumus, hic consequenter ostendit a quibus malis per eam liberemur. 406. After indicating the benefits we obtained through Christ’s grace, the Apostle now indicates the evils from which we were set free. Et circa hoc tria facit. And concerning this he does three things. Primo enim ostendit quod per gratiam Christi liberati sumus a servitute peccati. First, he shows that through Christ’s grace we have been freed from the slavery of sin; Secundo ostendit quod per gratiam eius sumus liberati a servitute legis; cap. VII, ibi an ignoratis, fratres, et cetera. second, he shows that through his grace we have been freed from the slavery of the law, at or know you not, brethren (Rom 7:1); Tertio ostendit quod per gratiam Christi liberamur a damnatione; cap. VIII, ibi nihil nunc damnationis, et cetera. third, he shows that through his grace we have been freed from condemnation, at there is now therefore no condemnation (Rom 8:1). Circa primum duo facit. In regard to the first he does two things: Primo ostendit quod per gratiam Christi liberamur ab originali peccato praeterito; first, he shows that by Christ’s grace we are set free from original sin; secundo ostendit quod ea tuti, regimur contra peccata futura, ibi quid ergo dicemus, et cetera. second, that we are shielded against future sins, at what shall we say then (Rom 6:1). Circa primum duo facit. In regard to the first he does two things: Primo agit de processu peccati; first, he deals with the history of sin; secundo, de processu gratiae destruentis peccatum, ibi sed non sicut delictum, et cetera. second, of grace destroying sin, at but not as the offense (Rom 5:15). Circa primum duo facit. In regard to the first he does two things: Primo proponit processum peccati; first, he sets forth the origin of sin; secundo manifestat, ibi usque ad legem, et cetera. second, he manifests it, at for until the law (Rom 5:13). Circa primum duo facit. Concerning the first, he does two things: Primo proponit processum peccati; first, he sets forth the origin of sin; secundo ostendit eius universalitatem, ibi et ita in omnes, et cetera. second, its universality, at and so death passed. 407. Dicit ergo primo quod per Christum reconciliationem accepimus. 407. First, therefore, he says that we have been reconciled through Christ. Ita enim a Christo reconciliatio procedit in mundum, sicut per unum hominem, scilicet per Adam, peccatum intravit in hunc mundum. I Cor. XV, 22: sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur. For reconciliation came into the world from Christ, as by one man, namely Adam, sin entered into this world: as in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive (1 Cor 15:22). Est autem hic considerandum quod haeretici Pelagiani peccatum originale in parvulis esse negantes, haec verba Apostoli dicebant esse intelligenda de peccato actuali. Quod quidem secundum eos in hunc mundum intravit per Adam, in quantum omnes peccantes peccatum Adae imitantur, secundum illud Osee VI, 7: ipsi autem sicut Adam transgressi sunt pactum, et cetera. Here it should be noted that the Pelagian heretics, who denied the existence of original sin in infants, claim that these words of the Apostle must be understood of actual sin which, according to them, entered this world through Adam, inasmuch as all sinners imitate the sin of Adam: but like Adam they transgressed the covenant (Hos 6:7). Sed, sicut dicit Augustinus contra eos, si de introitu peccati actualis, qui est per imitationem, hic Apostolus loqueretur, non diceret peccatum per hominem in hunc mundum intrasse, sed magis per diabolum quem peccantes imitantur; secundum illud Sap. II, 24: invidia diaboli mors introivit, etc. But, as Augustine says against them, if the Apostle were speaking of the entrance of actual sin, which is through imitation, he would not have said that sin entered this world through a man but rather through the devil, whom sinners imitate: through the devil’s envy death entered the world (Wis 2:24). Est ergo intelligendum quod per Adam peccatum in hunc mundum intravit, non solum imitatione sed etiam propagatione, id est per carnis originem vitiatam, secundum illud Eph. II, 3: eramus natura filii irae, et in Ps. l, 7: ecce enim in iniquitatibus conceptus sum, et cetera. Therefore, the interpretation is that sin entered this world through Adam not only by imitation but also by propagation, i.e., by a vitiated origin of the flesh in accordance with Ephesians: we were by nature children of wrath (Eph 2:3) and the Psalm: behold, I was brought forth in iniquity (Ps 51:5). 408. Sed videtur hoc esse impossibile, quod per originem carnis peccatum ab uno in alium traducatur. 408. But it seems impossible that sin be passed from one person to another through carnal origin. Peccatum enim est in anima rationali, quae non traducitur per originem carnis, tum quia intellectus non est alicuius corporis actus, et ita non potest per virtutem corporalis seminis causari, ut Philosophus dicit in libro de Generatione animalium. Tum etiam quia cum anima rationalis sit quaedam res subsistens, ut puta per se operationem habens et corpore corrupto non corrumpatur, consequens est, quod non generetur, corpore generato, sicut aliae formae, quae non possunt per se subsistere, sed potius causatur a Deo. Consequens igitur videtur quod nec peccatum, quod est accidens animae, possit per carnis originem traduci. For sin exists in the rational soul, which is not passed on by carnal origin, not only because the intellect is not the act of any body and so cannot be caused by the power of bodily seed, as the Philosopher says in On the Generation of Animals, but also because the rational soul, being a subsistent reality (inasmuch as it can perform certain acts without using the body and is not destroyed when the body is destroyed), is not produced in virtue of the body’s being produced (unlike other forms which cannot subsist of themselves), but is caused by God. Therefore, it seems to follow that sin, too, which is an accident of the soul, cannot be passed on by carnal origin. Ad hoc autem rationabiliter respondetur, quod licet in semine non sit anima, est tamen in semine virtus dispositiva corporis ad animae receptionem, quae cum corpori infunditur, etiam ei suo modo conformatur, eo quod omne receptum est in recipiente per modum recipientis. Et exinde videmus quod filii similantur parentibus, non solum in defectibus corporalibus, sicut leprosus generat leprosum et podagricus podagricum, sed etiam in defectibus animae, sicut iracundus iracundum et amentes ex amentibus nascuntur. Quamvis enim pes, qui est subiectum podagrae, non sit in semine, nec anima quae est subiectum irae vel amentiae, est tamen in semine virtus formativa corporalium membrorum et dispositiva ad animam. The reasonable answer seems to be that although the soul is not in the seed, nevertheless there is in it a power disposing the body to receive the soul which, when it is infused into the body, is also adapted to it in its own way for the reason that everything received by something exists in it according to a mode of the recipient. That is why children resemble parents not only in bodily defects, as a leper begets a leprous child and a person with gout a gouty child, but also in defects of the soul, as an irascible parent begets irascible children and mad parents mad offspring. For although the foot subject to gout or the soul subject to anger and madness are not in the seed, nevertheless in the seed is a power which forms the bodily members and disposes them for the soul. 409. Sed adhuc remanet dubitatio, quia defectus, qui ex vitiata origine trahuntur, non habent rationem culpae. Non enim merentur poenam, sed magis misericordiam, sicut Philosophus dicit de eo qui nascitur caecus, vel quocumque alio modo aliter orbatus. Et hoc ideo, quia de ratione culpae est quod sit voluntaria et in potestate hominis cui culpa imputatur. Sic igitur si aliquis defectus in nos pervenit per originem primi parentis, non videtur in nobis habere rationem culpae, sed poenae. 409. Yet a difficulty remains, because defects traced to a vitiated source do not involve guilt. For they are not deserving of punishment but rather of pity, as the Philosopher says of one born blind or in any other way defective. The reason is that it is the character of guilt that it be voluntary and in the power of the one to whom the guilt is imputed. Consequently, if any defect in us arose through origin from the first parent, it does not seem to carry with it the nature of guilt but of punishment. Et ideo dicendum est, quod sicut peccatum actuale est peccatum personae, quia per voluntatem personae peccantis committitur, ita peccatum originale est peccatum naturae, quod per voluntatem principii humanae naturae commissum est. Therefore, it must be admitted that as actual sin is a person’s sin, because it is committed through the will of the person sinning, so original sin is the sin of the nature committed through the will of the source of human nature. 410. Est enim considerandum quod sicut diversa corporis membra partes sunt personae unius hominis, ita omnes homines sunt partes et quasi quaedam membra humanae naturae. Unde et Porphyrius dicit quod participatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo. 410. For it must be remembered that just as the various members of the body are the parts of one human person, so all men are parts and, as it were, members of human nature. Hence Porphyry says that by sharing in the same species many men are one man. Videmus autem quod actus peccati exercitus per aliquod membrum, puta per manum vel pedem, non habet rationem culpae ex voluntate manus vel pedis, sed ex voluntate totius hominis, a qua sicut a quodam principio derivatur motus peccati ad singula membra. Et similiter a voluntate Adae, qui fuit principium humanae naturae, tota inordinatio naturae habet culpae rationem in omnibus, ad quos pervenit quantum ad hoc quod susceptivi sunt culpae. Et sicut peccatum actuale, quod est peccatum personae, trahitur ad singula membra per aliquem actum personalem, ita peccatum originale trahitur ad singulos homines per actum naturae, qui est generatio. Et ita sicut per generationem humana natura trahitur, ita etiam per generationem traducitur defectus humanae naturae, qui est consecutus ex peccato primi parentis. Furthermore, the act of sin performed by a member, say the hand or the foot, does not carry the notion of guilt from the hand’s or foot’s will but from the whole person’s will, from which as from a source the movement of sin is passed to the several members. Similarly, from the will of Adam, who was the source of human nature, the total disorder of that nature carries the notion of guilt in all who obtain that nature precisely as susceptible to guilt. And just as an actual sin, which is a sin of the person, is drawn to the several members by an act of the person, so original sin is drawn to each man by an act of the nature, namely, generation. Accordingly, just as human nature is obtained through generation, so, too, by generation is passed on the defect it acquired from the sin of the first parent. Est autem hic defectus carentia originalis iustitiae, quae erat primo homini divinitus collata, non solum ut erat persona quaedam singularis, sed etiam ut erat principium humanae naturae, ut scilicet eam simul cum natura in posteros traduceret. Et ideo simili modo amissionem huius originalis iustitiae per peccatum ad posteros transmittit, habentem in eis rationem culpae, ratione iam dicta. Et ideo dicitur quod in processu originalis peccati persona infecit naturam, scilicet Adam peccans vitiavit humanam naturam, sed postmodum in aliis natura vitiata inficit personam, dum scilicet genito imputatur ad culpam naturae vitium propter voluntatem primi parentis, ut dictum est. This defect is a lack of original justice divinely conferred on the first parent not only in his role as a definite person but also as the source of human nature—a justice that was to be passed along with human nature to his descendants. Consequently, the loss of this original justice through sin was passed on to his descendants. It is this loss that has the aspect of guilt in his descendants for the reason given. That is why it is said that in the progression of original sin a person infected the nature, namely, Adam sinning vitiated human nature; but later in others the vitiated nature affects the person in the sense that to the offspring is imputed as guilt this vitiated state of nature on account of the first parent’s will, as explained above. 411. Ex hoc autem patet quod licet primum peccatum primi parentis per originem traducatur in posteros, alia tamen eius peccata, vel etiam aliorum hominum, in filios non traducuntur, quia per solum primum peccatum sublatum est bonum naturae, quod erat per originem naturae traducendum. Per alia vero peccata subtrahitur bonum gratiae personalis, quod non transit ad alios posteros. 411. From this it is clear that although the first sin of the first parent is passed on to the descendants by generation, nevertheless his other sins, or even those of other men, are not passed on to their children, because it was only through the first sin that the good of nature, originally intended to be passed on by generation, was lost. Through all later sins the good of personal grace is lost, which does not pass on to one’s descendants. Et inde etiam est quod quamvis peccatum Adae deletum fuerit per suam poenitentiam, iuxta illud Sap. X, 2: eduxit illum a delicto suo, non tamen eius poenitentia delere potuit peccatum posterorum, quia eius poenitentia fuit per actum personalem, quia ultra eius personam non se extendebat. This also explains why, although Adam’s sin was removed by his repentance: she delivered him from his transgression (Wis 10:2), nevertheless his repentance could not remove the sin of descendants, because his repentance was performed by a personal act, which did not extend beyond him personally. 412. Et propter hoc est unum tantum originale peccatum, quia solus defectus consequens primum peccatum originaliter derivatur ad posteros. Et ideo Apostolus singulariter dicit per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit, non autem dixit pluraliter peccata: quod fuisset dicendum si de actualibus loqueretur. 412. Consequently, there is but one sole original sin, because the defect following upon the first sin is the only one passed on to the descendants. Therefore, the Apostle is careful to say that by one man sin entered into this world, and not sins, which he would have said, if he were speaking of actual sin.