409. Sed adhuc remanet dubitatio, quia defectus, qui ex vitiata origine trahuntur, non habent rationem culpae. Non enim merentur poenam, sed magis misericordiam, sicut Philosophus dicit de eo qui nascitur caecus, vel quocumque alio modo aliter orbatus. Et hoc ideo, quia de ratione culpae est quod sit voluntaria et in potestate hominis cui culpa imputatur. Sic igitur si aliquis defectus in nos pervenit per originem primi parentis, non videtur in nobis habere rationem culpae, sed poenae.
409. Yet a difficulty remains, because defects traced to a vitiated source do not involve guilt. For they are not deserving of punishment but rather of pity, as the Philosopher says of one born blind or in any other way defective. The reason is that it is the character of guilt that it be voluntary and in the power of the one to whom the guilt is imputed. Consequently, if any defect in us arose through origin from the first parent, it does not seem to carry with it the nature of guilt but of punishment.
Et ideo dicendum est, quod sicut peccatum actuale est peccatum personae, quia per voluntatem personae peccantis committitur, ita peccatum originale est peccatum naturae, quod per voluntatem principii humanae naturae commissum est.
Therefore, it must be admitted that as actual sin is a person’s sin, because it is committed through the will of the person sinning, so original sin is the sin of the nature committed through the will of the source of human nature.
410. Est enim considerandum quod sicut diversa corporis membra partes sunt personae unius hominis, ita omnes homines sunt partes et quasi quaedam membra humanae naturae. Unde et Porphyrius dicit quod participatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo.
410. For it must be remembered that just as the various members of the body are the parts of one human person, so all men are parts and, as it were, members of human nature. Hence Porphyry says that by sharing in the same species many men are one man.
Videmus autem quod actus peccati exercitus per aliquod membrum, puta per manum vel pedem, non habet rationem culpae ex voluntate manus vel pedis, sed ex voluntate totius hominis, a qua sicut a quodam principio derivatur motus peccati ad singula membra. Et similiter a voluntate Adae, qui fuit principium humanae naturae, tota inordinatio naturae habet culpae rationem in omnibus, ad quos pervenit quantum ad hoc quod susceptivi sunt culpae. Et sicut peccatum actuale, quod est peccatum personae, trahitur ad singula membra per aliquem actum personalem, ita peccatum originale trahitur ad singulos homines per actum naturae, qui est generatio. Et ita sicut per generationem humana natura trahitur, ita etiam per generationem traducitur defectus humanae naturae, qui est consecutus ex peccato primi parentis.
Furthermore, the act of sin performed by a member, say the hand or the foot, does not carry the notion of guilt from the hand’s or foot’s will but from the whole person’s will, from which as from a source the movement of sin is passed to the several members. Similarly, from the will of Adam, who was the source of human nature, the total disorder of that nature carries the notion of guilt in all who obtain that nature precisely as susceptible to guilt. And just as an actual sin, which is a sin of the person, is drawn to the several members by an act of the person, so original sin is drawn to each man by an act of the nature, namely, generation. Accordingly, just as human nature is obtained through generation, so, too, by generation is passed on the defect it acquired from the sin of the first parent.
Est autem hic defectus carentia originalis iustitiae, quae erat primo homini divinitus collata, non solum ut erat persona quaedam singularis, sed etiam ut erat principium humanae naturae, ut scilicet eam simul cum natura in posteros traduceret. Et ideo simili modo amissionem huius originalis iustitiae per peccatum ad posteros transmittit, habentem in eis rationem culpae, ratione iam dicta. Et ideo dicitur quod in processu originalis peccati persona infecit naturam, scilicet Adam peccans vitiavit humanam naturam, sed postmodum in aliis natura vitiata inficit personam, dum scilicet genito imputatur ad culpam naturae vitium propter voluntatem primi parentis, ut dictum est.
This defect is a lack of original justice divinely conferred on the first parent not only in his role as a definite person but also as the source of human nature—a justice that was to be passed along with human nature to his descendants. Consequently, the loss of this original justice through sin was passed on to his descendants. It is this loss that has the aspect of guilt in his descendants for the reason given. That is why it is said that in the progression of original sin a person infected the nature, namely, Adam sinning vitiated human nature; but later in others the vitiated nature affects the person in the sense that to the offspring is imputed as guilt this vitiated state of nature on account of the first parent’s will, as explained above.
411. Ex hoc autem patet quod licet primum peccatum primi parentis per originem traducatur in posteros, alia tamen eius peccata, vel etiam aliorum hominum, in filios non traducuntur, quia per solum primum peccatum sublatum est bonum naturae, quod erat per originem naturae traducendum. Per alia vero peccata subtrahitur bonum gratiae personalis, quod non transit ad alios posteros.
411. From this it is clear that although the first sin of the first parent is passed on to the descendants by generation, nevertheless his other sins, or even those of other men, are not passed on to their children, because it was only through the first sin that the good of nature, originally intended to be passed on by generation, was lost. Through all later sins the good of personal grace is lost, which does not pass on to one’s descendants.
Et inde etiam est quod quamvis peccatum Adae deletum fuerit per suam poenitentiam, iuxta illud Sap. X, 2: eduxit illum a delicto suo, non tamen eius poenitentia delere potuit peccatum posterorum, quia eius poenitentia fuit per actum personalem, quia ultra eius personam non se extendebat.
This also explains why, although Adam’s sin was removed by his repentance: she delivered him from his transgression (Wis 10:2), nevertheless his repentance could not remove the sin of descendants, because his repentance was performed by a personal act, which did not extend beyond him personally.
412. Et propter hoc est unum tantum originale peccatum, quia solus defectus consequens primum peccatum originaliter derivatur ad posteros. Et ideo Apostolus singulariter dicit per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit, non autem dixit pluraliter peccata: quod fuisset dicendum si de actualibus loqueretur.
412. Consequently, there is but one sole original sin, because the defect following upon the first sin is the only one passed on to the descendants. Therefore, the Apostle is careful to say that by one man sin entered into this world, and not sins, which he would have said, if he were speaking of actual sin.
Dicitur autem quandoque pluraliter peccata originalia, sicut in Ps. l, 7: in peccatis concepit me mater mea, quia continet virtualiter multa peccata, inquantum ex corruptione fomitis inclinamur ad multa peccata.
But sometimes it is said in the plural: and in sins did my mother conceive me (Ps 51:7) because it contains many sins virtually, insofar as the corruption of the fomes, or concupiscence, inclines one to many sins.
413. Sed videtur quod peccatum originale non intraverit in hunc mundum per unum hominem, scilicet Adam, sed magis per unam mulierem, scilicet Evam, quae primo peccavit, secundum illud Eccli. XXV, 33: a muliere factum est initium peccati, et per illam omnes morimur.
413. It seems, however, that original sin entered this world not through one man, namely, Adam, but through one woman, namely, Eve, who was the first to sin: from a woman sin had its beginning and because of her we all die (Sir 25:24).
Ad hoc respondetur in Glossa dupliciter. Uno modo, quia consuetudo Scripturae est ut genealogiae non per mulieres, sed per viros texantur, sicut patet Matth. I, 1 ss. et Lc. III, 23 ss. Et ideo Apostolus hic volens quasi genealogiam quamdam peccati ostendere, non fecit mentionem de muliere, sed solum de viro.
This is answered in a Gloss in two ways: in one way, because the custom of Scripture is to present genealogies not through the woman but through the men. Hence, the Apostle in giving, as it were, the genealogy of sin makes no mention of the woman but only of the man.
Alio modo, quia etiam mulier de viro sumpta est, et ideo quod est mulieris attribuitur viro.
In another way, because the woman was taken from the man; consequently, what is true of the woman is attributed to the man.
414. Potest etiam alio modo dici, et melius, quod cum peccatum originale traducatur simul cum natura, sicut dictum est, sicut per virtutem activam viri, muliere materiam ministrante, natura traducitur, ita et peccatum originale. Unde si Adam non peccasset, Eva peccante, non per hoc fuisset peccatum traductum ad posteros.
414. But this can be explained in another and better way, namely, that since original sin is passed on along with the nature, as has been said, then just as the nature is passed on by the active power of the man, while the woman furnishes the matter, so too original sin. Hence, if Adam had not sinned, but Eve only, sin would not have been passed on to their descendants.
Illa enim est causa quare Christus peccatum originale non traxit, quia ex sola foemina sine virili semine carnem accepit.
For Christ did not contract original sin, because he took his flesh from the woman alone without male seed.
415. Per hoc verbum Apostoli Augustinus respondet Iuliano haeretico in hunc modum quaerenti: non peccat iste qui nascitur, non peccat iste qui genuit, non peccat ille qui condidit: per quas igitur rimas, inter tot praesidia innocentiae peccatum fingis ingressum? Sed Augustinus respondet: quid quaeris latentem rimam, cum habeas apertissimam ianuam? Nam secundum Apostolum per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit.
415. Augustine uses these words from the apostle Paul to respond to the heretic Julian, who asked: the one who is born does not sin, the one who begot him does not sin, the one who bore him does not sin; through what crack, therefore, in such a garrison of innocence do you suppose sin has entered? But Augustine responds: why do you seek a crack when you have a wide open gate? For according to the Apostle, sin entered into this world through one man.
416. Consequenter tangit ingressum mortis in mundum, cum dicit et per peccatum mors, scilicet in hunc mundum intravit, secundum illud Sap. I: iniustitia mortis est acquisitio.
416. Then he touches on the entry of death into this world when he says, and by sin death entered this world: ungodliness purchases death (Wis 1:12).
Videtur autem quod mors non sit ex peccato, sed magis ex natura, utpote proveniens ex necessitate materiae. Est enim corpus humanum ex contrariis compositum. Unde est naturaliter corruptibile.
However, it seems that death does not arise from sin but from nature, being due to the presence of matter. For the human body is composed of contrary elements and, therefore, is corruptible of its very nature.
Dicendum est autem quod natura humana dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo secundum principia intrinseca, et sic mors est ei naturalis. Unde Seneca dicit in libro de remediis fortuitorum, quod mors natura est hominis, non poena.
The answer is that human nature can be considered in two ways: in one way according to its structural principles, and then death is natural. Hence Seneca says that death is natural, not penal, for man.
Alio modo potest considerari natura hominis secundum quod per divinam providentiam fuit ei per iustitiam originalem provisum. Quae quidem iustitia erat quaedam rectitudo, ut mens hominis esset sub Deo, et inferiores vires essent sub mente, et corpus sub anima, et omnia exteriora sub homine: ita scilicet, quod quamdiu mens hominis Deo subderetur, vires inferiores subderentur rationi, et corpus animae, indeficienter ab ea vitam recipiens, et exteriora homini, ut scilicet omnia servirent, et nullum ex eis nocumentum sentiret.
In another way man’s nature can be considered in the light of what divine providence had supplied it through original justice. This justice was a state in which man’s mind was under God, the lower powers of the soul under the mind, the body under the soul, and all external things under man, with the result that as long as man’s mind remained under God, the lower powers would remain subject to reason, and the body to the soul by receiving life from it without interruption, and external things to man in the sense that all things would serve man, who would never experience any harm from them.
Hoc autem providentia divina disposuit propter dignitatem animae rationalis, quae cum naturaliter sit incorruptibilis, debebatur sibi incorruptibile corpus. Sed quia corpus quod est ex contrariis compositum, oportebat esse organum sensus, et tale corpus secundum naturam suam incorruptibile esse non potest, supplevit potentia divina quod deerat naturae humanae, dans animae virtutem continendi corpus incorruptibiliter, sicut faber, si posset, daret ferro, ex quo cultellum fabricat, virtutem ut rubiginem nullam contraheret.
Divine providence planned this for man on account of the worth of the rational soul, which, being incorruptible, deserved an incorruptible body. But because the body, which is composed of contrary elements, served as an instrument for the senses, and such a body could not in virtue of its nature be incorruptible, the divine power furnished which was lacking to human nature by giving the soul the power to maintain the body incorruptible, just as a worker in metal might give the iron, from which he makes a sword, the power never to become rusty.
Sic ergo postquam mens hominis per peccatum est a Deo aversa, amisit virtutem continendi inferiores vires, et etiam corpus et exteriora, et sic incurrit mortem naturalem a causis intrinsecis, et violentam ab exterioribus nocumentis.
Thus, therefore, after man’s mind was turned from God through sin, he lost the strength to control the lower powers as well as the body and external things. Consequently, he became subject to death from intrinsic sources and to violence from external sources.
417. Deinde cum dicit et ita in omnes, etc., ostendit universalitatem huius processus et quantum ad mortem et quantum ad peccatum, ordine tamen retrogrado. Nam supra prius egit de ingressu peccati, qui est causa ingressus mortis, nunc autem prius agit de universalitate mortis, tamquam de manifestiori; et hoc est quod dicit: et ita mors, scilicet, vel peccatum primi parentis, pertransiit in omnes, quia scilicet per originem vitiatam contrahunt homines necessitatem moriendi. II Reg. XIV, 14: omnes morimur. Ps. LXXXVIII, 49: quis est homo qui vivit, et cetera.
417. Then when he says, and so death passed, he shows the universality of this process in regard both to death and to sin, but in reverse order. For above he treated first of the entry of sin, which is the cause of death’s entry; but now he deals first with the universality of death as with something more obvious. Hence he says, and so death, or the sin of the first parent, passed upon all, because men merit the necessity of dying on account of a vitiated origin: we must all die (2 Sam 14:14); what man can live and never see death? (Ps 89:48).
418. Deinde tangit universalitatem processus peccati, cum dicit in quo omnes peccaverunt, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in Glossa, potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo in quo, scilicet primo homine, vel in quo, scilicet peccato: quia scilicet eo peccante quodammodo omnes peccaverunt, inquantum in eo erant sicut in prima sua origine.
418. Then he touches on the universality of sin when he says, in whom all have sinned. According to Augustine this can be understood in two ways: in one way, in whom, i.e., in the first man, or in which, namely, in that sin; because while he was sinning, all sinned in a sense, inasmuch as all men were in him as in their first origin.
419. Sed cum Christus etiam originem ex Adam traxerit, ut patet Lc. III, 23 ss., videtur quod etiam ipse, eo peccante, peccaverit.
419. But since Christ derived his origin from Adam (Luke 3:23ff.), it seems that even he sinned in Adam’s sin.
Ad hoc respondet Augustinus Super Genesim ad litteram, quod Christus non omnimodo fuit in Adam, quo nos fuimus: nos enim fuimus et secundum corpulentam substantiam, et secundum seminalem rationem. Christus autem fuit in eo solum secundum corpulentam substantiam.
Augustine’s answer in On Genesis is that Christ was not in Adam as completely as we were, for we were in him according to bodily substance and according to seed. But Christ was in him in the first way only.
Quod quidam male intelligentes, putaverunt quod tota substantia corporum humanorum, quae pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae, fuerit actu in Adam, et per quamdam multiplicationem divina virtute factam, id est, quod sumptum est ab Adam, est in tanta corporum quantitate ampliatum.
Some who interpreted these words incorrectly supposed that the entire substance of all human bodies, which is required for a true human nature, was actually in Adam and that in virtue of a multiplication traced to God’s power, something taken from Adam was increased to form such a quantity of bodies.
Sed hoc est inconveniens opera naturae miraculo attribuere, praesertim quia videmus quod corpus humanum quantumcumque sit de veritate humanae naturae, corrumpitur et accipit aliam formam.
But this is unfitting, because it explains the works of nature by a miracle. Indeed, it is obvious that the human body, even though it is required for the integrity of human nature, corrupts and becomes a corpse.
Unde quia omne generabile est corruptibile, et e converso, oportet dicere quod materia quae ante generationem hominis sub alia forma quam humana fuit, formam humanae carnis assumpserit, et sic non totum quod est in corporibus nostris ad veritatem naturae pertinens fuit actu in eodem, sed solum secundum originem, prout scilicet effectus est in principio activo.
Hence it is better to say that, because everything generable is corruptible and vice versa, the matter which was present under some form other than human before a man is begotten, received the form proper to human flesh. Accordingly, not everything in our bodies that belongs to the integrity of human nature was in Adam actually, but only according to origin in the way that an effect is present in its active principle.
Secundum hoc ergo intelligendum est quod cum in nostra generatione sit et materia corporalis quam foemina ministrat, et vis activa quae est in semine maris; utrumque per originem ducitur ab Adam, sicut a primo principio. Et ideo dicitur in eo fuisse et secundum rationem seminalem, et secundum corpulentam substantiam: quia scilicet utrumque ab eo processit. In generatione autem Christi fuit corpulenta substantia quam traxit de virgine: loco autem rationis seminalis fuit virtus activa Spiritus Sancti, quae non derivatur ab Adam, et ideo non fuit in Adam secundum seminalem rationem, sed tantum secundum substantiam corpulentam.
According to this, therefore, there are in human generation the bodily material, which the woman proffers, and an active force, which is in the male’s seed; both are derived originally from Adam as their first principle. Hence, they are said to have been in him according to seed and according to bodily substance, inasmuch as both came forth from him. But in Christ’s generation there was the bodily substance which he obtained from the virgin; in place of the male seed was the Holy Spirit’s active power, which is not derived from Adam. Consequently, Christ was not in Adam according to his seedly power, but only according to bodily substance.
Sic igitur nos accipimus peccatum ab Adam et trahimus: atque naturam humanam ab eo accipimus; sicut a principio activo, quod est esse in eo secundum seminalem rationem, quod quidem non competit Christo, ut dictum est.
Thus, therefore, we not only receive sin from Adam and contract it; we also derive human nature from him as from an active principle—which amounts to being in him according to the power of the seed. But this is not true of Christ, as has been stated.
420. Videtur ulterius quod peccatum originale non transeat in omnes, quia baptizati a peccato originali purgantur per baptismum: et ita videtur quod non possint in posteros peccatum transmittere quod non habent.
420. Finally, it seems that original sin does not pass on to all, because the baptized are cleansed of original sin. Hence, it seems that they cannot transmit to their descendents something they do not have.
Dicendum est autem quod per baptismum homo liberatur a peccato originali quantum ad mentem, sed remanet peccati infectio quantum ad carnem; unde, infra VII, 25 dicit Apostolus: ego ipse mente servio legi Dei, carne autem legi peccati. Homo autem non generat mente carnales filios, sed carne: et ideo non transmittit novitatem Christi, sed vetustatem Adae.
The answer is that through baptism a man is freed from original sin as far as the mind is concerned, but the infection of sin remains as far as the flesh is concerned. Hence the Apostle says below: I serve the law of God with the mind, but with the flesh, the law of sin (Rom 7:25). But man does not beget children with the mind but with the flesh; consequently, he does not transmit the new life of Christ but the old life of Adam.
Regnum mortis ab Adam usque ad Moysen
Reign of death from Adam unto Moses
5:13 Usque ad legem enim peccatum erat in mundo: peccatum autem non imputabatur, cum lex non esset. [n. 421]
5:13 For until the law sin was in the world: but sin was not imputed, when the law was not. [n. 421]
5:14 Sed regnavit mors ab Adam usque ad Moysen etiam in eos qui non peccaverunt in similitudinem praevaricationis Adae, qui est forma futuri. [n. 424]
5:14 But death reigned from Adam unto Moses, even over them also who have not sinned, after the similitude of the transgression of Adam, who is a figure of him who was to come. [n. 424]