Caput 10 Chapter 10 De opinione dicentium quod Deum esse demonstrari non potest cum sit per se notum Of the opinion of those who say it cannot be demonstrated that there is a God, since this is self-evident Haec autem consideratio qua quis nititur ad demonstrandum Deum esse, superflua fortasse quibusdam videbitur, qui asserunt quod Deum esse per se notum est, ita quod eius contrarium cogitari non possit, et sic Deum esse demonstrari non potest. Quod quidem videtur ex his. It may seem useless to some to endeavor to show that there is a God: they say that it is self-evident that God is, so that it is impossible to think the contrary, and thus it cannot be demonstrated that there is a God. The reasons for this view are as follow. Illa enim per se esse nota dicuntur quae statim notis terminis cognoscuntur: sicut, cognito quid est totum et quid est pars, statim cognoscitur quod omne totum est maius sua parte. Huiusmodi autem est hoc quod dicimus Deum esse. Nam nomine Dei intelligimus aliquid quo maius cogitari non potest. Hoc autem in intellectu formatur ab eo qui audit et intelligit nomen Dei: ut sic saltem in intellectu iam Deum esse oporteat. Nec potest in intellectu solum esse: nam quod in intellectu et re est, maius est eo quod in solo intellectu est; Deo autem nihil esse maius ipsa nominis ratio demonstrat. Unde restat quod Deum esse per se notum est, quasi ex ipsa significatione nominis manifestum. Those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known; thus, as soon as it is known what is a whole, and what is a part, it is known that the whole is greater than its part. Now such is the statement ‘God is’. For by this word ‘God’ we understand a thing than which a greater cannot be thought of. This is what a man conceives in his mind when he hears and understands this word ‘God’: so that God must already be at least in his mind. Nor can he be in the mind alone, for that which is both in the mind and in reality is greater than that which is in the mind only. And the very signification of the word shows that nothing is greater than God. Therefore, it follows that God’s existence is self-evident, since it is made clear from the very signification of the word. Item. Cogitari quidem potest quod aliquid sit quod non possit cogitari non esse. Quod maius est evidenter eo quod potest cogitari non esse. Sic ergo Deo aliquid maius cogitari posset, si ipse posset cogitari non esse. Quod est contra rationem nominis. Relinquitur quod Deum esse per se notum est. Again. It is possible to think that there is a thing which cannot be thought not to exist, and such a thing is evidently greater than that which can be thought not to exist. Therefore, if God can be thought not to exist, it follows that something can be thought greater than God, and this is contrary to the signification of the term. Therefore, it remains that God’s existence is self-evident. Adhuc. Propositiones illas oportet esse notissimas in quibus idem de seipso praedicatur, ut, homo est homo; vel quarum praedicata in definitionibus subiectorum includuntur, ut, homo est animal. In Deo autem hoc prae aliis invenitur, ut infra ostendetur, quod suum esse est sua essentia, ac si idem sit quod respondetur ad quaestionem quid est, et ad quaestionem an est. Sic ergo cum dicitur, Deus est, praedicatum vel est idem subiecto, vel saltem in definitione subiecti includitur. Et ita Deum esse per se notum erit. Further. Those propositions are most evident in which the selfsame thing is predicated of itself, such as: ‘man is man’; or in which the predicate is included in the definition of the subject, for instance: ‘man is an animal.’ Now, as we shall show further on (ch. 22), in God alone do we find that his being is his essence: so that the answer is the same to the question, ‘What is he?’ as to the question, ‘Is he?’ Accordingly, when we say, ‘God is,’ the predicate is either identified with the subject, or at least is included in the definition of the subject. And thus it will be self-evident that God is. Amplius. Quae naturaliter sunt nota, per se cognoscuntur: non enim ad ea cognoscenda inquisitionis studio pervenitur. At Deum esse naturaliter notum est: cum in Deum naturaliter desiderium hominis tendat sicut in ultimum finem, ut infra patebit. Est igitur per se notum Deum esse. Moreover. Things that are known naturally are self-evident, for it is not by a process of research that they become evident. Now it is naturally known that God is, since man’s desire tends naturally to God as his last end, as we shall show further on (bk. III, ch. 25). Therefore, it is self-evident that God is. Item. Illud per se notum oportet esse quo omnia alia cognoscuntur. Deus autem huiusmodi est. Sicut enim lux solis principium est omnis visibilis perceptionis, ita divina lux omnis intelligibilis cognitionis principium est: cum sit in quo primum maxime lumen intelligibile invenitur. Oportet igitur quod Deum esse per se notum sit. Again. That by which all things are known must be self-evident. Now God is such. For just as the light of the sun is the principle of all visual perception, so the divine light is the principle of all intellectual knowledge, because it is in it that the first and greatest intellectual light is found. Therefore, it must be self-evident that God is. Ex his igitur et similibus aliqui opinantur Deum esse sic per se notum existere ut contrarium mente cogitari non possit. On account of these and similar arguments some are of the opinion that God’s existence is so self-evident that the mind cannot think the contrary. Caput 11 Chapter 11 Reprobatio praemissae opinionis et solutio rationum praemissarum Refutation of the foregoing opinion and solution of the aforesaid arguments Praedicta autem opinio provenit. Partim quidem ex consuetudine qua ex principio assueti sunt nomen Dei audire et invocare. Consuetudo autem, et praecipue quae est a puero, vim naturae obtinet: ex quo contingit ut ea quibus a pueritia animus imbuitur, ita firmiter teneat ac si essent naturaliter et per se nota. The foregoing opinion arose from their being accustomed from the beginning to hear and call upon the name of God. Now custom, especially if it dates from our childhood, acquires the force of nature, from which it happens that the mind holds those things with which it was imbued from childhood as firmly as though they were self-evident. Partim vero contingit ex eo quod non distinguitur quod est notum per se simpliciter, et quod est quoad nos per se notum. Nam simpliciter quidem Deum esse per se notum est: cum hoc ipsum quod Deus est, sit suum esse. Sed quia hoc ipsum quod Deus est mente concipere non possumus, remanet ignotum quoad nos. Sicut omne totum sua parte maius esse, per se notum est simpliciter: ei autem qui rationem totius mente non conciperet, oporteret esse ignotum. Et sic fit ut ad ea quae sunt notissima rerum, noster intellectus se habeat ut oculus noctuae ad solem, ut II Metaphys. dicitur. It is also a result of failing to distinguish between what is self-evident simply, and that which is self-evident to us. For it is simply self-evident that God is, because God’s essence is his existence. But since we are unable to conceive mentally what God is, it remains unknown in regard to us. Thus it is self-evident simply that every whole is greater than its part, but to one who fails to conceive mentally the meaning of a whole, it must be unknown. And so it happens that those things which are most evident of all are to the intellect what the sun is to the eye of an owl, as stated in 2 Metaphysics 1, 2. Nec oportet ut statim, cognita huius nominis Deus significatione, Deum esse sit notum, ut prima ratio intendebat. Primo quidem, quia non omnibus notum est, etiam concedentibus Deum esse, quod Deus sit id quo maius cogitari non possit: cum multi antiquorum mundum istum dixerint Deum esse. Nec etiam ex interpretationibus huius nominis Deus, quas Damascenus ponit, aliquid huiusmodi intelligi datur. Deinde quia, dato quod ab omnibus per hoc nomen Deus intelligatur aliquid quo maius cogitari non possit, non necesse erit aliquid esse quo maius cogitari non potest in rerum natura. Eodem enim modo necesse est poni rem, et nominis rationem. Nor does it follow, as the first argument alleged, that as soon as the meaning of the word ‘God’ is understood, it is known that God is. First, because it is not known to all, even to those who grant that there is a God, that God is that thing than which no greater can be thought of, since many of the ancients asserted that this world is God. Nor can any such conclusion be gathered from the significations which Damascene assigns to this word ‘God’ (On the Orthodox Faith 1, 9). Second, even granted that everyone understands this word ‘God’ to signify something than which a greater cannot be thought of, it does not follow that something than which a greater cannot be thought of exists in reality. For we must allege a thing in the same way as we allege the signification of its name. Ex hoc autem quod mente concipitur quod profertur hoc nomine Deus, non sequitur Deum esse nisi in intellectu. Unde nec oportebit id quo maius cogitari non potest esse nisi in intellectu. Et ex hoc non sequitur quod sit aliquid in rerum natura quo maius cogitari non possit. Et sic nihil inconveniens accidit ponentibus Deum non esse: non enim inconveniens est quolibet dato vel in re vel in intellectu aliquid maius cogitari posse, nisi ei qui concedit esse aliquid quo maius cogitari non possit in rerum natura. Now from the fact that we conceive mentally that which the word ‘God’ is intended to convey, it does not follow that God is otherwise than in the mind. Therefore, neither will it follow that the thing than which a greater cannot be thought of is otherwise than in the mind. And thence it does not follow that there exists in reality something than which a greater cannot be thought of. Hence this is no argument against those who assert that there is no God, since there is nothing to prevent a person from thinking of something greater than whatever is granted to exist either in reality or in the mind, unless he grants that there is in reality something than which a greater cannot be thought of. Nec etiam oportet, ut secunda ratio proponebat, Deo posse aliquid maius cogitari si potest cogitari non esse. Nam quod possit cogitari non esse, non ex imperfectione sui esse est vel incertitudine, cum suum esse sit secundum se manifestissimum: sed ex debilitate nostri intellectus, qui eum intueri non potest per seipsum, sed ex effectibus eius, et sic ad cognoscendum ipsum esse ratiocinando perducitur. Nor does it follow, as the second argument pretended, that if it is possible to think that God is not, it is possible to think of something greater than God. For the possibility of thinking that he does not exist is not on account of the imperfection of his being, or the uncertainty of it—since in itself his being is supremely manifest—but is the result of the weakness of our mind, which is able to see him only in his effects and not in himself, so that it is led by reasoning to know that he is. Ex quo etiam tertia ratio solvitur. Nam sicut nobis per se notum est quod totum sua parte sit maius, sic videntibus ipsam divinam essentiam per se notissimum est Deum esse, ex hoc quod sua essentia est suum esse. Sed quia eius essentiam videre non possumus, ad eius esse cognoscendum non per seipsum, sed per eius effectus pervenimus. From this the third argument is also solved. For just as it is self-evident to us that a whole is greater than its part, so is it most evident to those who see the very essence of God that God exists, since his essence is his existence. But because we are unable to see his essence, we come to know his existence not in himself, but in his effects. Ad quartam etiam patet solutio. Sic enim homo naturaliter Deum cognoscit sicut naturaliter ipsum desiderat. Desiderat autem ipsum homo naturaliter inquantum desiderat naturaliter beatitudinem, quae est quaedam similitudo divinae bonitatis. Sic igitur non oportet quod Deus ipse in se consideratus sit naturaliter notus homini, sed similitudo ipsius. Unde oportet quod per eius similitudines in effectibus repertas in cognitionem ipsius homo ratiocinando perveniat. The solution to the fourth argument is also clear. For man knows God naturally in the same way as he desires him naturally. Now man desires him naturally insofar as he naturally desires happiness, which is a likeness of the divine goodness. Hence it does not follow that God considered in himself is naturally known to man, but that his likeness is. Therefore, man must come by reasoning to know God in the likenesses to him which he discovers in God’s effects. Ad quintam etiam de facili patet solutio. Nam Deus est quidem quo omnia cognoscuntur, non ita quod alia non cognoscantur nisi eo cognito, sicut in principiis per se notis accidit: sed quia per eius influentiam omnis causatur in nobis cognitio. It is also easy to reply to the fifth argument. For God is that in which all things are known, not so that other things are unknown unless he is known, as happens in self-evident principles, but because all knowledge is caused in us by his outpouring. Caput 12 Chapter 12 De opinione dicentium quod Deum esse demonstrari non potest sed sola fide tenetur Of the opinion of those who say that the existence of God cannot be proved and that it is held by faith alone Est autem quaedam aliorum opinio praedictae positioni contraria, per quam etiam inutilis redderetur conatus probare intendentium Deum esse. Dicunt enim quod Deum esse non potest per rationem inveniri, sed per solam viam fidei et revelationis est acceptum. The position that we have taken is also assailed by the opinion of certain others, by which the efforts of those who endeavor to prove that there is a God would again be rendered futile. For they say that it is impossible by means of the reason to discover that God exists, and that this knowledge is acquired solely by means of faith and revelation. Ad hoc autem dicendum moti sunt quidam propter debilitatem rationum quas aliqui inducebant ad probandum Deum esse. In making this assertion some were moved by the weakness of the arguments which certain people employed to prove the existence of God. Posset tamen hic error fulcimentum aliquod falso sibi assumere ex quorundam philosophorum dictis, qui ostendunt in Deo idem esse essentiam et esse, scilicet id quod respondetur ad quid est, et ad quaestionem an est. Via autem rationis perveniri non potest ut sciatur de Deo quid est. Unde nec ratione videtur posse demonstrari an Deus sit. Possibly, however, this error might falsely seek support from the statements of certain philosophers, who show that in God essence and existence are the same, namely, that which answers to the question, ‘What is he?’ and that which answers to the question, ‘Is he?’ Now it is impossible by the process of reason to acquire the knowledge of what God is. Therefore, it seems likewise impossible to prove by reason whether God is. Item. Si principium ad demonstrandum an est, secundum artem Philosophi, oportet accipere quid significet nomen; ratio vero significata per nomen est definitio, secundum Philosophum, in IV Metaph.; nulla remanebit via ad demonstrandum Deum esse, remota divinae essentiae vel quidditatis cognitione. Again. If, as required by the system of the Philosopher (2 Posterior Analytics 9, 1) in order to prove whether a thing is we must take as principle the signification of its name, and since according to the Philosopher, the signification of a name is its definition (4 Metaphysics 3, 3, 4) there will remain no means of proving the existence of God, seeing that we lack knowledge of the divine essence or quiddity. Item. Si demonstrationis principia a sensu cognitionis originem sumunt, ut in posterioribus ostenditur, ea quae omnem sensum et sensibilia excedunt, videntur indemonstrabilia esse. Huiusmodi autem est Deum esse. Est igitur indemonstrabile. Again. If the principles of demonstration become known to us originally through the senses, as is proved in the Posterior Analytics 1, 18, those things which transcend all sense and sensible objects are seemingly indemonstrable. Now such is the existence of God. Therefore, it cannot be demonstrated. Huius autem sententiae falsitas nobis ostenditur, tum ex demonstrationis arte, quae ex effectibus causas concludere docet. Tum ex ipso scientiarum ordine. Nam, si non sit aliqua scibilis substantia supra substantiam sensibilem, non erit aliqua scientia supra naturalem, ut dicitur in IV Metaph. Tum ex philosophorum studio, qui Deum esse demonstrare conati sunt. Tum etiam apostolica veritate asserente, Rom. 1:20: invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur. The falseness of this opinion is shown to us first by the art of demonstration, which teaches us to conclude causes from effects. Second, by the order itself of sciences: for if no substance above sensible substance can be an object of science, there will be no science above physics, as stated in 4 Metaphysics 3, 7, 9. Third, by the efforts of the philosophers who have endeavored to prove the existence of God. Fourth, by the apostolic truth, which asserts that the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made (Rom 1:20). Nec hoc debet movere, quod in Deo idem est essentia et esse, ut prima ratio proponebat. Nam hoc intelligitur de esse quo Deus in seipso subsistit, quod nobis quale sit ignotum est, sicut eius essentia. Non autem intelligitur de esse quod significat compositionem intellectus. Sic enim esse Deum sub demonstratione cadit, dum ex rationibus demonstrativis mens nostra inducitur huiusmodi propositionem de Deo formare qua exprimat Deum esse. Nor should we be moved by the consideration that in God essence and existence are the same, as the first argument contended. For this is to be understood of the existence by which God subsists in himself, of which we are ignorant as to what kind of a thing it is, even as we are ignorant of his essence. But it is not to be understood of that existence which is signified by the composition of the mind. For in this way it is possible to prove the existence of God, when our mind is led by demonstrative arguments to form a proposition stating that God is. In rationibus autem quibus demonstratur Deum esse, non oportet assumi pro medio divinam essentiam sive quidditatem, ut secunda ratio proponebat: sed loco quidditatis accipitur pro medio effectus, sicut accidit in demonstrationibus quia; et ex huiusmodi effectu sumitur ratio huius nominis Deus. Nam omnia divina nomina imponuntur vel ex remotione effectuum divinorum ab ipso, vel ex aliqua habitudine Dei ad suos effectus. Now, in those arguments by which we prove the existence of God, it is not necessary that the divine essence or quiddity be employed as the middle term, as the second argument supposed, but instead of the quiddity we take his effects as middle term, as is the case in a posteriori reasoning. From these effects we take the signification of this word ‘God’. For all the divine names are taken either from the remoteness of God’s effects from himself, or from some relationship between God and his effects. Patet etiam ex hoc quod, etsi Deus sensibilia omnia et sensum excedat, eius tamen effectus, ex quibus demonstratio sumitur ad probandum Deum esse, sensibiles sunt. Et sic nostrae cognitionis origo in sensu est etiam de his quae sensum excedunt. It is also evident from the fact that, although God transcends all sensibles and senses, his effects, from which we take the proof that God exists, are sensible objects. Hence our knowledge, even of things which transcend the senses, originates from the senses. Caput 13 Chapter 13 Rationes ad probandum Deum esse Arguments in proof of God’s existence Ostenso igitur quod non est vanum niti ad demonstrandum Deum esse, procedamus ad ponendum rationes quibus tam philosophi quam doctores Catholici Deum esse probaverunt. Having shown, then, that endeavoring to prove the existence of God is not futile, we may proceed to set forth the reasons by which both philosophers and Catholic doctors have proved that there is a God. Primo autem ponemus rationes quibus Aristoteles procedit ad probandum Deum esse. Qui hoc probare intendit ex parte motus duabus viis. In the first place, we shall give the arguments by which Aristotle sets out to prove God’s existence. He aims at proving this from movement in two ways. Quarum prima talis est: omne quod movetur, ab alio movetur. Patet autem sensu aliquid moveri, ut puta solem. Ergo alio movente movetur. Aut ergo illud movens movetur, aut non. Si non movetur, ergo habemus propositum, quod necesse est ponere aliquod movens immobile. Et hoc dicimus Deum. Si autem movetur, ergo ab alio movente movetur. Aut ergo est procedere in infinitum: aut est devenire ad aliquod movens immobile. Sed non est procedere in infinitum. Ergo necesse est ponere aliquod primum movens immobile. The first way is as follows (7 Physics 1). Whatever is in motion is moved by another. Now, it is clear to the sense that something is in motion, e.g., the sun. Therefore, it is in motion by something else moving it. Now that which moves it is itself either moved or not. If it is not moved, then the point is proved that we must postulate an immovable mover, and this we call God. If, however, it be moved, it is moved by another mover. Either, therefore, we must proceed to infinity, or we must come to an immovable mover. But it is not possible to proceed to infinity. Therefore, it is necessary to postulate an immovable mover. In hac autem probatione sunt duae propositiones probandae: scilicet, quod omne motum movetur ab alio; et quod in moventibus et motis non sit procedere in infinitum. This argument contains two propositions that need to be proved, namely, that whatever is in motion is moved by another, and that it is not possible to proceed to infinity in movers and things moved.