Caput 11 Chapter 11 Reprobatio praemissae opinionis et solutio rationum praemissarum Refutation of the foregoing opinion and solution of the aforesaid arguments Praedicta autem opinio provenit. Partim quidem ex consuetudine qua ex principio assueti sunt nomen Dei audire et invocare. Consuetudo autem, et praecipue quae est a puero, vim naturae obtinet: ex quo contingit ut ea quibus a pueritia animus imbuitur, ita firmiter teneat ac si essent naturaliter et per se nota. The foregoing opinion arose from their being accustomed from the beginning to hear and call upon the name of God. Now custom, especially if it dates from our childhood, acquires the force of nature, from which it happens that the mind holds those things with which it was imbued from childhood as firmly as though they were self-evident. Partim vero contingit ex eo quod non distinguitur quod est notum per se simpliciter, et quod est quoad nos per se notum. Nam simpliciter quidem Deum esse per se notum est: cum hoc ipsum quod Deus est, sit suum esse. Sed quia hoc ipsum quod Deus est mente concipere non possumus, remanet ignotum quoad nos. Sicut omne totum sua parte maius esse, per se notum est simpliciter: ei autem qui rationem totius mente non conciperet, oporteret esse ignotum. Et sic fit ut ad ea quae sunt notissima rerum, noster intellectus se habeat ut oculus noctuae ad solem, ut II Metaphys. dicitur. It is also a result of failing to distinguish between what is self-evident simply, and that which is self-evident to us. For it is simply self-evident that God is, because God’s essence is his existence. But since we are unable to conceive mentally what God is, it remains unknown in regard to us. Thus it is self-evident simply that every whole is greater than its part, but to one who fails to conceive mentally the meaning of a whole, it must be unknown. And so it happens that those things which are most evident of all are to the intellect what the sun is to the eye of an owl, as stated in 2 Metaphysics 1, 2. Nec oportet ut statim, cognita huius nominis Deus significatione, Deum esse sit notum, ut prima ratio intendebat. Primo quidem, quia non omnibus notum est, etiam concedentibus Deum esse, quod Deus sit id quo maius cogitari non possit: cum multi antiquorum mundum istum dixerint Deum esse. Nec etiam ex interpretationibus huius nominis Deus, quas Damascenus ponit, aliquid huiusmodi intelligi datur. Deinde quia, dato quod ab omnibus per hoc nomen Deus intelligatur aliquid quo maius cogitari non possit, non necesse erit aliquid esse quo maius cogitari non potest in rerum natura. Eodem enim modo necesse est poni rem, et nominis rationem. Nor does it follow, as the first argument alleged, that as soon as the meaning of the word ‘God’ is understood, it is known that God is. First, because it is not known to all, even to those who grant that there is a God, that God is that thing than which no greater can be thought of, since many of the ancients asserted that this world is God. Nor can any such conclusion be gathered from the significations which Damascene assigns to this word ‘God’ (On the Orthodox Faith 1, 9). Second, even granted that everyone understands this word ‘God’ to signify something than which a greater cannot be thought of, it does not follow that something than which a greater cannot be thought of exists in reality. For we must allege a thing in the same way as we allege the signification of its name. Ex hoc autem quod mente concipitur quod profertur hoc nomine Deus, non sequitur Deum esse nisi in intellectu. Unde nec oportebit id quo maius cogitari non potest esse nisi in intellectu. Et ex hoc non sequitur quod sit aliquid in rerum natura quo maius cogitari non possit. Et sic nihil inconveniens accidit ponentibus Deum non esse: non enim inconveniens est quolibet dato vel in re vel in intellectu aliquid maius cogitari posse, nisi ei qui concedit esse aliquid quo maius cogitari non possit in rerum natura. Now from the fact that we conceive mentally that which the word ‘God’ is intended to convey, it does not follow that God is otherwise than in the mind. Therefore, neither will it follow that the thing than which a greater cannot be thought of is otherwise than in the mind. And thence it does not follow that there exists in reality something than which a greater cannot be thought of. Hence this is no argument against those who assert that there is no God, since there is nothing to prevent a person from thinking of something greater than whatever is granted to exist either in reality or in the mind, unless he grants that there is in reality something than which a greater cannot be thought of. Nec etiam oportet, ut secunda ratio proponebat, Deo posse aliquid maius cogitari si potest cogitari non esse. Nam quod possit cogitari non esse, non ex imperfectione sui esse est vel incertitudine, cum suum esse sit secundum se manifestissimum: sed ex debilitate nostri intellectus, qui eum intueri non potest per seipsum, sed ex effectibus eius, et sic ad cognoscendum ipsum esse ratiocinando perducitur. Nor does it follow, as the second argument pretended, that if it is possible to think that God is not, it is possible to think of something greater than God. For the possibility of thinking that he does not exist is not on account of the imperfection of his being, or the uncertainty of it—since in itself his being is supremely manifest—but is the result of the weakness of our mind, which is able to see him only in his effects and not in himself, so that it is led by reasoning to know that he is. Ex quo etiam tertia ratio solvitur. Nam sicut nobis per se notum est quod totum sua parte sit maius, sic videntibus ipsam divinam essentiam per se notissimum est Deum esse, ex hoc quod sua essentia est suum esse. Sed quia eius essentiam videre non possumus, ad eius esse cognoscendum non per seipsum, sed per eius effectus pervenimus. From this the third argument is also solved. For just as it is self-evident to us that a whole is greater than its part, so is it most evident to those who see the very essence of God that God exists, since his essence is his existence. But because we are unable to see his essence, we come to know his existence not in himself, but in his effects. Ad quartam etiam patet solutio. Sic enim homo naturaliter Deum cognoscit sicut naturaliter ipsum desiderat. Desiderat autem ipsum homo naturaliter inquantum desiderat naturaliter beatitudinem, quae est quaedam similitudo divinae bonitatis. Sic igitur non oportet quod Deus ipse in se consideratus sit naturaliter notus homini, sed similitudo ipsius. Unde oportet quod per eius similitudines in effectibus repertas in cognitionem ipsius homo ratiocinando perveniat. The solution to the fourth argument is also clear. For man knows God naturally in the same way as he desires him naturally. Now man desires him naturally insofar as he naturally desires happiness, which is a likeness of the divine goodness. Hence it does not follow that God considered in himself is naturally known to man, but that his likeness is. Therefore, man must come by reasoning to know God in the likenesses to him which he discovers in God’s effects. Ad quintam etiam de facili patet solutio. Nam Deus est quidem quo omnia cognoscuntur, non ita quod alia non cognoscantur nisi eo cognito, sicut in principiis per se notis accidit: sed quia per eius influentiam omnis causatur in nobis cognitio. It is also easy to reply to the fifth argument. For God is that in which all things are known, not so that other things are unknown unless he is known, as happens in self-evident principles, but because all knowledge is caused in us by his outpouring. Caput 12 Chapter 12 De opinione dicentium quod Deum esse demonstrari non potest sed sola fide tenetur Of the opinion of those who say that the existence of God cannot be proved and that it is held by faith alone Est autem quaedam aliorum opinio praedictae positioni contraria, per quam etiam inutilis redderetur conatus probare intendentium Deum esse. Dicunt enim quod Deum esse non potest per rationem inveniri, sed per solam viam fidei et revelationis est acceptum. The position that we have taken is also assailed by the opinion of certain others, by which the efforts of those who endeavor to prove that there is a God would again be rendered futile. For they say that it is impossible by means of the reason to discover that God exists, and that this knowledge is acquired solely by means of faith and revelation. Ad hoc autem dicendum moti sunt quidam propter debilitatem rationum quas aliqui inducebant ad probandum Deum esse. In making this assertion some were moved by the weakness of the arguments which certain people employed to prove the existence of God. Posset tamen hic error fulcimentum aliquod falso sibi assumere ex quorundam philosophorum dictis, qui ostendunt in Deo idem esse essentiam et esse, scilicet id quod respondetur ad quid est, et ad quaestionem an est. Via autem rationis perveniri non potest ut sciatur de Deo quid est. Unde nec ratione videtur posse demonstrari an Deus sit. Possibly, however, this error might falsely seek support from the statements of certain philosophers, who show that in God essence and existence are the same, namely, that which answers to the question, ‘What is he?’ and that which answers to the question, ‘Is he?’ Now it is impossible by the process of reason to acquire the knowledge of what God is. Therefore, it seems likewise impossible to prove by reason whether God is. Item. Si principium ad demonstrandum an est, secundum artem Philosophi, oportet accipere quid significet nomen; ratio vero significata per nomen est definitio, secundum Philosophum, in IV Metaph.; nulla remanebit via ad demonstrandum Deum esse, remota divinae essentiae vel quidditatis cognitione. Again. If, as required by the system of the Philosopher (2 Posterior Analytics 9, 1) in order to prove whether a thing is we must take as principle the signification of its name, and since according to the Philosopher, the signification of a name is its definition (4 Metaphysics 3, 3, 4) there will remain no means of proving the existence of God, seeing that we lack knowledge of the divine essence or quiddity. Item. Si demonstrationis principia a sensu cognitionis originem sumunt, ut in posterioribus ostenditur, ea quae omnem sensum et sensibilia excedunt, videntur indemonstrabilia esse. Huiusmodi autem est Deum esse. Est igitur indemonstrabile. Again. If the principles of demonstration become known to us originally through the senses, as is proved in the Posterior Analytics 1, 18, those things which transcend all sense and sensible objects are seemingly indemonstrable. Now such is the existence of God. Therefore, it cannot be demonstrated. Huius autem sententiae falsitas nobis ostenditur, tum ex demonstrationis arte, quae ex effectibus causas concludere docet. Tum ex ipso scientiarum ordine. Nam, si non sit aliqua scibilis substantia supra substantiam sensibilem, non erit aliqua scientia supra naturalem, ut dicitur in IV Metaph. Tum ex philosophorum studio, qui Deum esse demonstrare conati sunt. Tum etiam apostolica veritate asserente, Rom. 1:20: invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur. The falseness of this opinion is shown to us first by the art of demonstration, which teaches us to conclude causes from effects. Second, by the order itself of sciences: for if no substance above sensible substance can be an object of science, there will be no science above physics, as stated in 4 Metaphysics 3, 7, 9. Third, by the efforts of the philosophers who have endeavored to prove the existence of God. Fourth, by the apostolic truth, which asserts that the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made (Rom 1:20). Nec hoc debet movere, quod in Deo idem est essentia et esse, ut prima ratio proponebat. Nam hoc intelligitur de esse quo Deus in seipso subsistit, quod nobis quale sit ignotum est, sicut eius essentia. Non autem intelligitur de esse quod significat compositionem intellectus. Sic enim esse Deum sub demonstratione cadit, dum ex rationibus demonstrativis mens nostra inducitur huiusmodi propositionem de Deo formare qua exprimat Deum esse. Nor should we be moved by the consideration that in God essence and existence are the same, as the first argument contended. For this is to be understood of the existence by which God subsists in himself, of which we are ignorant as to what kind of a thing it is, even as we are ignorant of his essence. But it is not to be understood of that existence which is signified by the composition of the mind. For in this way it is possible to prove the existence of God, when our mind is led by demonstrative arguments to form a proposition stating that God is. In rationibus autem quibus demonstratur Deum esse, non oportet assumi pro medio divinam essentiam sive quidditatem, ut secunda ratio proponebat: sed loco quidditatis accipitur pro medio effectus, sicut accidit in demonstrationibus quia; et ex huiusmodi effectu sumitur ratio huius nominis Deus. Nam omnia divina nomina imponuntur vel ex remotione effectuum divinorum ab ipso, vel ex aliqua habitudine Dei ad suos effectus. Now, in those arguments by which we prove the existence of God, it is not necessary that the divine essence or quiddity be employed as the middle term, as the second argument supposed, but instead of the quiddity we take his effects as middle term, as is the case in a posteriori reasoning. From these effects we take the signification of this word ‘God’. For all the divine names are taken either from the remoteness of God’s effects from himself, or from some relationship between God and his effects. Patet etiam ex hoc quod, etsi Deus sensibilia omnia et sensum excedat, eius tamen effectus, ex quibus demonstratio sumitur ad probandum Deum esse, sensibiles sunt. Et sic nostrae cognitionis origo in sensu est etiam de his quae sensum excedunt. It is also evident from the fact that, although God transcends all sensibles and senses, his effects, from which we take the proof that God exists, are sensible objects. Hence our knowledge, even of things which transcend the senses, originates from the senses. Caput 13 Chapter 13 Rationes ad probandum Deum esse Arguments in proof of God’s existence Ostenso igitur quod non est vanum niti ad demonstrandum Deum esse, procedamus ad ponendum rationes quibus tam philosophi quam doctores Catholici Deum esse probaverunt. Having shown, then, that endeavoring to prove the existence of God is not futile, we may proceed to set forth the reasons by which both philosophers and Catholic doctors have proved that there is a God. Primo autem ponemus rationes quibus Aristoteles procedit ad probandum Deum esse. Qui hoc probare intendit ex parte motus duabus viis. In the first place, we shall give the arguments by which Aristotle sets out to prove God’s existence. He aims at proving this from movement in two ways. Quarum prima talis est: omne quod movetur, ab alio movetur. Patet autem sensu aliquid moveri, ut puta solem. Ergo alio movente movetur. Aut ergo illud movens movetur, aut non. Si non movetur, ergo habemus propositum, quod necesse est ponere aliquod movens immobile. Et hoc dicimus Deum. Si autem movetur, ergo ab alio movente movetur. Aut ergo est procedere in infinitum: aut est devenire ad aliquod movens immobile. Sed non est procedere in infinitum. Ergo necesse est ponere aliquod primum movens immobile. The first way is as follows (7 Physics 1). Whatever is in motion is moved by another. Now, it is clear to the sense that something is in motion, e.g., the sun. Therefore, it is in motion by something else moving it. Now that which moves it is itself either moved or not. If it is not moved, then the point is proved that we must postulate an immovable mover, and this we call God. If, however, it be moved, it is moved by another mover. Either, therefore, we must proceed to infinity, or we must come to an immovable mover. But it is not possible to proceed to infinity. Therefore, it is necessary to postulate an immovable mover. In hac autem probatione sunt duae propositiones probandae: scilicet, quod omne motum movetur ab alio; et quod in moventibus et motis non sit procedere in infinitum. This argument contains two propositions that need to be proved, namely, that whatever is in motion is moved by another, and that it is not possible to proceed to infinity in movers and things moved. Quorum primum probat Philosophus tribus modis. Primo, sic. Si aliquid movet seipsum, oportet quod in se habeat principium motus sui: alias, manifeste ab alio moveretur. Oportet etiam quod sit primo motum: scilicet quod moveatur ratione sui ipsius, et non ratione suae partis, sicut movetur animal per motum pedis; sic enim totum non moveretur a se, sed sua pars, et una pars ab alia. Oportet etiam ipsum esse divisibile, et habere partes: cum omne quod movetur sit divisibile, ut probatur in VI Physic. The first of these is proved by the Philosopher in three ways. First, thus. If a thing moves itself, it must have the principle of its movement in itself; otherwise, it would clearly be moved by another. It also must be moved primarily, that is, it must be moved by reason of itself and not by reason of its part (as an animal is moved by the movement of its foot). For in the latter way not the whole but the part would be moved by itself, and one part by another. It also must be divisible and have parts, since whatever is moved is divisible, as is proved in 6 Physics 4. His suppositis sic arguit. Hoc quod a seipso ponitur moveri, est primo motum. Ergo ad quietem unius partis eius, sequitur quies totius. Si enim, quiescente una parte, alia pars eius moveretur, tunc ipsum totum non esset primo motum, sed pars eius quae movetur alia quiescente. Nihil autem quod quiescit quiescente alio, movetur a seipso: cuius enim quies ad quietem sequitur alterius, oportet quod motus ad motum alterius sequatur; et sic non movetur a seipso. Ergo hoc quod ponebatur a seipso moveri, non movetur a seipso. Necesse est ergo omne quod movetur, ab alio moveri. These things being supposed, he argues as follows. That which is stated to be moved by itself is moved primarily. Therefore, if one of its parts is at rest, it follows that the whole is at rest. For if, while one part is at rest, another of its parts were in motion, the whole itself would not be moved primarily, but its part which is in motion while another is at rest. Now nothing that is at rest while another is at rest is moved by itself: for that which is at rest as a result of another thing being at rest must be in motion as a result of the other’s motion. And hence it is not moved by itself. Hence that which was stated to be moved by itself is not moved by itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be moved by another. Nec obviat huic rationi quod forte aliquis posset dicere quod eius quod ponitur movere seipsum, pars non potest quiescere; et iterum quod partis non est quiescere vel moveri nisi per accidens; ut Avicenna calumniatur. Quia vis rationis in hoc consistit, quod, si aliquid seipsum moveat primo et per se, non ratione partium, oportet quod suum moveri non dependeat ab aliquo; moveri autem ipsius divisibilis, sicut et eius esse, dependet a partibus; et sic non potest seipsum movere primo et per se. Non requiritur ergo ad veritatem conclusionis inductae quod supponatur partem moventis seipsum quiescere quasi quoddam verum absolute: sed oportet hanc conditionalem esse veram, quod, si quiesceret pars, quod quiesceret totum. Quae quidem potest esse vera etiam si antecedens sit impossibile: sicut ista conditionalis est vera, si homo est asinus, est irrationalis. Nor is this argument negated by what might be said: supposing a thing moves itself, it is impossible for a part of it to be at rest. Nor again by the statement that to be at rest or in motion does not belong to a part except accidentally, as Avicenna quibbles (2 Suffic. 1). For the force of the argument lies in this, that if a thing moves itself primarily and of itself, not by reason of its parts, it follows that its being moved does not depend on anything; whereas with a divisible thing, being moved depends on its parts, as does its existence, so that it cannot move itself primarily and of itself. Therefore, the truth of the conclusion drawn does not require that we suppose as an absolute truth that a part of that which moves itself is at rest, but that this conditional statement be true: if a part were at rest, the whole would be at rest. Which statement can be true even if the antecedent be false, even as this conditional proposition is true: if a man is an ass, then he is irrational. Secundo, probat per inductionem, sic. Omne quod movetur per accidens, non movetur a seipso. Movetur enim ad motum alterius. Similiter neque quod movetur per violentiam: ut manifestum est. Neque quae moventur per naturam ut ex se mota, sicut animalia, quae constat ab anima moveri. Nec iterum quae moventur per naturam ut gravia et levia. Quia haec moventur a generante et removente prohibens. Omne autem quod movetur, vel movetur per se, vel per accidens. Et si per se, vel per violentiam, vel per naturam. Et hoc, vel motum ex se, ut animal; vel non motum ex se, ut grave et leve. Ergo omne quod movetur, ab alio movetur. Second, he proves it by induction in this way (8 Physics 4). A thing is not moved by itself if it is moved accidentally, since its motion is occasioned by the motion of something else. Nor again if it is moved by force, as is manifest. Nor if it is moved by its nature, like those things whose movement proceeds from themselves, such as animals, which clearly are moved by their souls. Nor if it is moved by nature, as heavy and light things are, since these are moved by their generating cause and by that which removes the obstacle to their movement. Now, all things that are in motion are moved either in themselves or accidentally; and if in themselves, either by force or by nature; and if the latter, either by something in them, as in the case of animals, or not by something in them, as in the case of heavy and light bodies. Therefore, whatever is in motion is moved by another. Tertio, probat sic. Nihil idem est simul actu et potentia respectu eiusdem. Sed omne quod movetur, inquantum huiusmodi, est in potentia: quia motus est actus existentis in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi. Omne autem quod movet est in actu, inquantum huiusmodi: quia nihil agit nisi secundum quod est in actu. Ergo nihil est respectu eiusdem motus movens et motum. Et sic nihil movet seipsum. Third (8 Physics 5, 8), he proves his point thus. Nothing is at the same time in act and in potency in respect of the same thing. Now whatever is in motion, as such, is in potency, because motion is the act of that which is in potency, as such (3 Physics 1, 6). In contrast, whatever moves, as such, is in act, for nothing acts except insofar as it is in act. Therefore, nothing is both mover and moved in respect of the same movement. Hence nothing moves itself. Sciendum autem quod Plato qui posuit omne movens moveri, communius accepit nomen motus quam Aristoteles. Aristoteles enim proprie accepit motum secundum quod est actus existentis in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi: qualiter non est nisi divisibilium et corporum, ut probatur in VI Physic. Secundum Platonem autem movens seipsum non est corpus: accipiebat enim motum pro qualibet operatione, ita quod intelligere et opinari sit quoddam moveri; quem etiam modum loquendi Aristoteles tangit in III de anima. Secundum hoc ergo dicebat primum movens seipsum movere quod intelligit se et vult vel amat se. Quod in aliquo non repugnat rationibus Aristotelis: nihil enim differt devenire ad aliquod primum quod moveat se, secundum Platonem; et devenire ad primum quod omnino sit immobile, secundum Aristotelem. We must observe, however, that Plato (Phoedrus 24). who asserted that every mover is moved, employed the term ‘movement’ in a more general sense than Aristotle. For Aristotle took movement in its strict sense, for the act of a thing that is in potency as such, in which sense it applies only to divisible things and bodies, as is proved in 6 Physics. But, according to Plato, that which moves itself is not a body: for he took movement for any operation, so that to understand or to think is a kind of movement, to which manner of speaking Aristotle alludes in 3 De Anima 7. In this sense, then, he said that the first mover moves itself, inasmuch as it understands, desires, and loves itself. This, in a certain respect, is not in contradiction with the arguments of Aristotle; for it makes no difference whether with Plato we come to a first mover that moves itself, or with Aristotle to something first which is altogether immovable. Aliam autem propositionem, scilicet quod in moventibus et motis non sit procedere in infinitum, probat tribus rationibus. He proves the other proposition (namely, that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in movers and things moved) by three arguments. Quarum prima talis est. Si in motoribus et motis proceditur in infinitum, oportet omnia huiusmodi infinita corpora esse: quia omne quod movetur est divisibile et corpus, ut probatur in VI Physic. Omne autem corpus quod movet motum, simul dum movet movetur. Ergo omnia ista infinita simul moventur dum unum eorum movetur. Sed unum eorum, cum sit finitum, movetur tempore finito. Ergo omnia illa infinita moventur tempore finito. Hoc autem est impossibile. Ergo impossibile est quod in motoribus et motis procedatur in infinitum. The first (7 Physics) of these is as follows. If one were to proceed to infinity in movers and things moved, all this infinite number of things would necessarily be bodies, since whatever is moved is divisible and corporeal, as is proved in 6 Physics. Now every body that moves through being moved is moved at the same time as it moves. Therefore, all this infinite number of things are moved at the same time as one of them is moved. But one of them, since it is finite, is moved in a finite time. Therefore, all this infinite number of things are moved in a finite time. But this is impossible. Therefore, it is impossible to proceed to infinity in movers and things moved. Quod autem sit impossibile quod infinita praedicta moveantur tempore finito, sic probat. Movens et motum oportet simul esse: ut probat inducendo in singulis speciebus motus. Sed corpora non possunt simul esse nisi per continuitatem vel contiguationem. Cum ergo omnia praedicta moventia et mota sint corpora, ut probatum est, oportet quod sint quasi unum mobile per continuationem vel contiguationem. Et sic unum infinitum movetur tempore finito. Quod est impossibile, ut probatur in VI physicorum. That it is impossible for the aforesaid infinite number of things to be moved in a finite time, he proves thus (7 Physics 1, 2). Mover and moved must be simultaneous, as he proves by induction from each species of movement. But bodies cannot be simultaneous except by continuity or contact. Therefore, since all the aforesaid movers and things moved are bodies, as proved, they must be as one movable thing through their continuity or contact. And thus one infinite thing would be moved in a finite time, which is shown to be impossible in 6 Physics 7.