Ad hoc etiam inducitur a Damasceno alia ratio sumpta ex rerum gubernatione: quam etiam innuit Commentator in II physicorum. Et est talis. Impossibile est aliqua contraria et dissonantia in unum ordinem concordare semper vel pluries nisi alicuius gubernatione, ex qua omnibus et singulis tribuitur ut ad certum finem tendant. Sed in mundo videmus res diversarum naturarum in unum ordinem concordare, non ut raro et a casu, sed ut semper vel in maiori parte. Oportet ergo esse aliquem cuius providentia mundus gubernetur. Et hunc dicimus Deum. Another argument in support of this conclusion is adduced by Damascene (On the Orthodox Faith 1, 3) from the government of things, and the same reasoning is indicated by the Commentator in 2 Physics. It runs as follows. It is impossible for contrary and discordant things to accord in one order always or frequently except by someone’s governance, through which each and all are made to tend to a definite end. Now we see that in the world things of different natures accord in one order, not seldom and fortuitously, but always or for the most part. Therefore, it follows that there is someone by whose providence the world is governed. And this we call God. Caput 14 Chapter 14 Quod ad cognitionem Dei oportet uti via remotionis That to acquire knowledge of God one must use the way of remotion Ostenso igitur quod est aliquod primum ens, quod Deum dicimus, oportet eius conditiones investigare. Accordingly, having proved that there is a first being which we call God, we must inquire into his nature. Est autem via remotionis utendum praecipue in consideratione divinae substantiae. Nam divina substantia omnem formam quam intellectus noster attingit, sua immensitate excedit: et sic ipsam apprehendere non possumus cognoscendo quid est. Sed aliqualem eius habemus notitiam cognoscendo quid non est. Tantoque eius notitiae magis appropinquamus, quanto plura per intellectum nostrum ab eo poterimus removere. Tanto enim unumquodque perfectius cognoscimus, quanto differentias eius ad alia plenius intuemur: habet enim res unaquaeque in seipsa esse proprium ab omnibus aliis rebus distinctum. Unde et in rebus quarum definitiones cognoscimus, primo eas in genere collocamus, per quod scimus in communi quid est; et postmodum differentias addimus, quibus a rebus aliis distinguatur; et sic perficitur substantiae rei completa notitia. Now in treating of the divine essence the principal method to be followed is that of remotion. For the divine essence by its immensity surpasses every form to which our intellect reaches; and thus we cannot apprehend it by knowing what it is. But we have some knowledge of it by knowing what it is not, and we come closer to the knowledge of it insofar as we can remove a greater number of things from it by our intellect. For the more completely we see how a thing differs from others, the more perfectly we know it, since each thing has in itself its own being distinct from all other things. Thus, when we know the definition of a thing, first we place it in a genus, by which we know in general what it is, and afterwards we add differences to mark its distinction from other things, and thus we arrive at the complete knowledge of a thing’s essence. Sed quia in consideratione substantiae divinae non possumus accipere quid, quasi genus; nec distinctionem eius ab aliis rebus per affirmativas differentias accipere possumus, oportet eam accipere per differentias negativas. Sicut autem in affirmativis differentiis una aliam contrahit, et magis ad completam designationem rei appropinquat secundum quod a pluribus differre facit; ita una differentia negativa per aliam contrahitur, quae a pluribus differre facit. Sicut, si dicamus Deum non esse accidens, per hoc ab omnibus accidentibus distinguitur; deinde si addamus ipsum non esse corpus, distinguemus ipsum etiam ab aliquibus substantiis; et sic per ordinem ab omni eo quod est praeter ipsum, per negationes huiusmodi distinguetur; et tunc de substantia eius erit propria consideratio cum cognoscetur ut ab omnibus distinctus. Non tamen erit perfecta: quia non cognoscetur quid in se sit. Since, however, we are unable in treating of the divine essence to take ‘what’ as a genus, nor can we express its distinction from other things by affirmative differences, we must express it by negative differences. Now, just as in affirmative differences one restricts another, and brings us the nearer to a complete description of the thing according as it makes it differ from more things, so one negative difference is restricted by another that marks a distinction from more things. Thus, if we say that God is not an accident, we thereby distinguish him from all accidents; then if we add that he is not a body, we shall distinguish him also from certain substances, and thus in gradation he will be differentiated by suchlike negations from all beside himself. And then, when he is known as distinct from all things, we shall arrive at a proper consideration of him. It will not, however, be perfect, because we shall not know what he is in himself. Ad procedendum igitur circa Dei cognitionem per viam remotionis, accipiamus principium id quod ex superioribus iam manifestum est, scilicet quod Deus sit omnino immobilis. Quod etiam auctoritas sacrae Scripturae confirmat. Dicitur enim Malach. 3:6: ego Deus, et non mutor; Iac. 1:17: apud quem non est transmutatio; et Num. 23:19: non est Deus quasi homo, ut mutetur. Therefore, in order to proceed by the way of remotion about the knowledge of God, let us take as principle that which is already made manifest by what we have said above (ch. 13), namely, that God is altogether unchangeable. This is also confirmed by the authority of Sacred Scripture. For it is said: I am God and I do not change (Mal 3:6); with whom there is no change (Jas 1:17); and: God is not as a man that he should be changed (Num 23:19). Divina natura The divine nature Caput 15 Chapter 15 Quod Deus sit aeternus That God is eternal Ex hoc autem apparet ulterius Deum esse aeternum. From the foregoing it is also clear that God is eternal. Nam omne quod incipit esse vel desinit, per motum vel mutationem hoc patitur. Ostensum autem est Deum esse omnino immutabilem. Est igitur aeternus, carens principio et fine. For whatever begins or ceases to be suffers this through movement or change. Now it has been shown (ch. 13) that God is altogether unchangeable. Therefore, he is eternal, having neither beginning nor end. Item. Illa sola tempore mensurantur quae moventur: eo quod tempus est numerus motus, ut patet in IV physicorum. Deus autem est omnino absque motu, ut iam probatum est. Tempore igitur non mensuratur. Igitur in ipso non est prius et posterius accipere. Non ergo habet esse post non esse, nec non esse post esse potest habere, nec aliqua successio in esse ipsius inveniri potest: quia haec sine tempore intelligi non possunt. Est igitur carens principio et fine, totum esse suum simul habens. In quo ratio aeternitatis consistit. Again. Only things which are moved are measured by time, because time is the measure of movement, as is clear in 4 Physics, 11, 5. Now God is absolutely without movement, as we have already proved (ch. 13). Therefore, we cannot mark before and after in him. Therefore, in him there is not being after non-being, nor can he have non-being after being, nor is it possible to find any succession in his being, because these things cannot be understood apart from time. Therefore, he is without beginning and end, and has all his being simultaneously, and in this consists the notion of eternity. Adhuc. Si aliquando non fuit et postmodum fuit, ab aliquo eductus est de non esse in esse. Non a seipso: quia quod non est non potest aliquid agere. Si autem ab alio, illud est prius eo. Ostensum autem est Deum esse primam causam. Non igitur esse incoepit. Unde nec esse desinet: quia quod semper fuit, habet virtutem semper essendi. Est igitur aeternus. Moreover. If at any time he was not and afterwards was, he was brought by someone out of non-being into being. Not by himself, because what is not cannot do anything. And if by another, this other is prior to him. Now it has been shown (ch. 13) that God is the first cause. Therefore, he did not begin to be. Therefore, neither will he cease to be, because that which always was has the power to always be. Therefore, he is eternal. Amplius. Videmus in mundo quaedam quae sunt possibilia esse et non esse, scilicet generabilia et corruptibilia. Omne autem quod est possibile esse, causam habet: quia, cum de se aequaliter se habeat ad duo, scilicet esse et non esse, oportet, si ei approprietur esse, quod hoc sit ex aliqua causa. Sed in causis non est procedere in infinitum, ut supra probatum est per rationem Aristotelis. Ergo oportet ponere aliquid quod sit necesse esse. Omne autem necessarium vel habet causam suae necessitatis aliunde; vel non, sed est per seipsum necessarium. Non est autem procedere in infinitum in necessariis quae habent causam suae necessitatis aliunde. Ergo oportet ponere aliquod primum necessarium, quod est per seipsum necessarium. Et hoc Deus est: cum sit causa prima, ut ostensum est. Est igitur Deus aeternus: cum omne necessarium per se sit aeternum. Furthermore. We observe that in the world there are certain things which can be and not be, namely, those that are subject to generation and corruption. Now all that can possibly be has a cause: for, since in itself it is equally related to two things (namely, being and not being), it follows that if it acquires being this is the result of some cause. But, as proved above (ch. 13) by Aristotle’s argument, we cannot go on to infinity in causes. Therefore, we must suppose something with necessary existence. Now every necessary thing either has a cause of its necessity from without, or has no such cause, but is necessary of itself. But we cannot go on to infinity in necessary things that have causes of their necessity from without. Therefore, we must suppose some first necessary thing which is necessary of itself: and this is God, since he is the first cause, as proved above (ch. 13). Therefore, God is eternal, since whatever is necessary of itself is eternal. Ostendit etiam Aristoteles ex sempiternitate temporis sempiternitatem motus. Ex quo iterum ostendit sempiternitatem substantiae moventis. Prima autem substantia movens Deus est. Est igitur sempiternus. Negata autem sempiternitate temporis et motus, adhuc manet ratio ad sempiternitatem substantiae. Nam, si motus incoepit, oportet quod ab aliquo movente incoeperit. Qui si incoepit, aliquo agente incoepit. Et sic vel in infinitum ibitur; vel devenietur ad aliquid quod non incoepit. Again. Aristotle proves the everlastingness of movement from the everlastingness of time (8 Physics 1, 10). And from this, he goes on to prove the everlastingness of the substance that is the cause of movement (8 Physics 6, 3). Now the first moving substance is God. Therefore, he is everlasting. And supposing the everlastingness of time and movement to be denied, there still remains the argument in proof of the everlastingness of substance. For if movement had a beginning, it must have had its beginning from some mover. And if this mover had a beginning, it had its beginning from some agent. And thus either we shall go on to infinity, or we shall come to something without a beginning. Huic autem veritati divina auctoritas testimonium perhibet. Unde Psalmus: tu autem, domine, in aeternum permanes. Et idem: tu autem idem ipse es, et anni tui non deficient. Divine authority bears witness to this truth. Thus the Psalm reads: but you, O Lord, endure forever (Ps 101:13), and again: but you are always the selfsame, and your years shall not fail (Ps 101:28). Caput 16 Chapter 16 Quod in Deo non est potentia passiva That in God there is no passive potency Si autem Deus aeternus est, necesse est ipsum non esse in potentia. Now if God is eternal, it follows of necessity that he is not in potency. Omne enim id in cuius substantia admiscetur potentia, secundum id quod habet de potentia potest non esse: quia quod potest esse, potest non esse. Deus autem secundum se non potest non esse: cum sit sempiternus. In Deo igitur non est potentia ad esse. For everything in whose substance there is an admixture of potency is possibly nonexistent as regards whatever it has of potency, for that which may possibly be may possibly not be. Now God in himself cannot not be, since he is eternal. Therefore, in God there is no potency to be. Adhuc. Quamvis id quod quandoque est in potentia quandoque actu, prius sit tempore in potentia quam in actu, tamen simpliciter actus est prior potentia: quia potentia non educit se in actum, sed oportet quod educatur in actum per aliquid quod sit in actu. Omne igitur quod est aliquo modo in potentia, habet aliquid prius se. Deus autem est primum ens et prima causa, ut ex supra dictis patet. Non igitur habet in se aliquid potentiae admixtum. Again. Although that which is sometimes potential and sometimes actual, is in point of time potential before being actual, nevertheless act is simply before potency, because potency does not bring itself into act, but needs to be brought into act by something actual. Therefore, whatever is in any way potential has something previous to it. Now God is the first being and the first cause, as stated above (ch. 13). Therefore, in him there is no admixture of potency. Item. Illud quod est per se necesse esse, nullo modo est possibile esse: quia quod est per se necesse esse, non habet causam; omne autem quod est possibile esse, habet causam, ut supra ostensum est. Deum autem est per se necesse esse. Nullo igitur modo est possibile esse. Nihil ergo potentiae in sua substantia invenitur. Again. That which of itself must necessarily exist can in no way have possible existence, since whatever of itself must necessarily exist has no cause, whereas whatever has possible existence has a cause, as proved above (ch. 15). Now God, in himself, must necessarily exist. Therefore, he can in no way have possible existence. Therefore, no potency is to be found in his essence. Item. Unumquodque agit secundum quod est actu. Quod igitur non est totus actus, non toto se agit, sed aliquo sui. Quod autem non toto se agit, non est primum agens: agit enim alicuius participatione, non per essentiam suam. Primum igitur agens, quod Deus est, nullam habet potentiam admixtam, sed est actus purus. Again. Everything acts according as it is actual. Therefore, that which is not wholly actual acts not by its whole self, but by part of itself. Now that which does not act by its whole self is not the first agent, since it acts by participation of something and not by its essence. Therefore, the first agent, which is God, has no admixture of potency, but is pure act. Adhuc. Unumquodque, sicut natum est agere inquantum est actu, ita natum est pati inquantum est potentia: nam motus est actus potentia existentis. Sed Deus est omnino impassibilis ac immutabilis, ut patet ex dictis. Nihil ergo habet de potentia, scilicet passiva. Moreover. Just as a thing is naturally apt to act insofar as it is actual, so is it natural for it to be passive insofar as it is in potency, for movement is the act of that which is in potency. Now God is altogether impassible and immovable, as stated above (ch. 13). Therefore, in him there is no potency, namely that which is passive. Item. Videmus aliquid esse in mundo quod exit de potentia in actum. Non autem educit se de potentia in actum: quia quod est potentia, nondum est; unde nec agere potest. Ergo oportet esse aliquid aliud prius, qui educatur de potentia in actum. Et iterum, si hoc est exiens de potentia in actum, oportet ante hoc aliquid aliud poni, quo reducatur in actum. Hoc autem in infinitum procedere non potest. Ergo oportet devenire ad aliquid quod est tantum actu et nullo modo in potentia. Et hoc dicimus Deum. Further. We notice in the world something that passes from potency to act. Now it does not reduce itself from potency to act, because that which is potential is not yet; hence, neither can it act. Therefore, it must be preceded by something else by which it can be brought from potency to act. And if this again passes from potency to act, it must be preceded by something else, by which it can be brought from potency to act. But we cannot go on thus to infinity. Therefore, we must come to something that is wholly actual and in no way potential. And this we call God. Caput 17 Chapter 17 Quod in Deo non est materia That in God there is no matter Apparet etiam ex hoc Deum non esse materiam. Quia materia id quod est, in potentia est. From this it follows that God is not matter. For matter, such as it is, is in potency. Item. Materia non est agendi principium: unde efficiens et materia in idem non incidunt, secundum Philosophum. Deo autem convenit esse primam causam effectivam rerum, ut supra dictum est. Ipse igitur materia non est. Again. Matter is not a principle of activity. Hence, as the Philosopher puts it, efficient and material causes do not coincide. Now, as stated above (ch. 13), it belongs to God to be the first efficient cause of things. Therefore, he is not matter. Amplius. Sequitur res naturales casu existere his qui omnia in materiam reducebant sicut in causam primam: contra quos agitur in II physicorum. Si igitur Deus, qui est prima causa, sit causa materialis rerum, sequitur omnia a casu existere. Moreover. For those who referred all things to matter as their first cause, it followed that natural things exist by chance, and against these it is argued in 2 Physics 8-9. Therefore, if God, who is the first cause, is the material cause of things, it follows that all things exist by chance. Item. Materia non fit causa alicuius in actu nisi secundum quod alteratur et mutatur. Si igitur Deus est immobilis, ut probatum est, nullo modo potest esse rerum causa per modum materiae. Further. Matter does not become the cause of an actual thing except by being altered and changed. Therefore, if God is immovable, as proved above (ch. 13), he can in no way be a cause of things as their matter. Hanc autem veritatem fides Catholica confitetur, qua Deum non de sua substantia, sed de nihilo asserit cuncta creasse. The Catholic faith professes this truth, asserting that God created all things not out of his substance, but out of nothing. In hoc autem insania David de Dinando confunditur, qui ausus est dicere Deum esse idem quod prima materia, ex hoc quod, si non esset idem, oporteret differre ea aliquibus differentiis, et sic non essent simplicia; nam in eo quod per differentiam ab alio differt, ipsa differentia compositionem facit. The ravings of David of Dinant are confounded by this, who dared to assert that God is the same as prime matter, because if they were not the same, they would need to differ by certain differences, and thus they would not be simple, since in that which differs from another thing by a difference, the very difference argues composition. Hoc autem processit ex ignorantia qua nescivit quid inter differentiam et diversitatem intersit. Differens enim, ut in X Metaph. determinatur, dicitur ad aliquid, nam omne differens aliquo est differens: diversum autem aliquid absolute dicitur, ex hoc quod non est idem. Differentia igitur in his quaerenda est quae in aliquo conveniunt: oportet enim aliquid in eis assignari secundum quod differant; sicut duae species conveniunt in genere, unde oportet quod differentiis distinguantur. In his autem quae in nullo conveniunt, non est quaerendum quo differant, sed seipsis diversa sunt. Sic enim et oppositae differentiae ab invicem distinguuntur: non enim participant genus quasi partem suae essentiae: et ideo non est quaerendum quibus differant, seipsis enim diversa sunt. Sic etiam Deus et materia prima distinguuntur, quorum unus est actus purus, aliud potentia pura, in nullo convenientiam habentes. Now this proceeded from his ignorance of the distinction between difference and diversity. For a thing is said to be different in relation to something, as is said in 10 Metaphysics 3, 6 because whatever is different differs by something, whereas things are said to be diverse absolutely from the fact that they are not the same thing. Accordingly, we must seek for a difference in things which have something in common, for we have to point to something in them whereby they differ: thus two species have a common genus from which they must be distinguished by differences. But in those things which have nothing in common, we do not have to look for their differences, for they are diverse by themselves. For thus are opposite differences distinguished from one another, because they do not participate in a genus as a part of their essence. Consequently, we must not ask in what they differ, for they are diversified by their very selves. Thus too God and prime matter are distinguished, since they have nothing in common, the one being pure act and the other pure potency. Caput 18 Chapter 18