Nec obviat huic rationi quod forte aliquis posset dicere quod eius quod ponitur movere seipsum, pars non potest quiescere; et iterum quod partis non est quiescere vel moveri nisi per accidens; ut Avicenna calumniatur. Quia vis rationis in hoc consistit, quod, si aliquid seipsum moveat primo et per se, non ratione partium, oportet quod suum moveri non dependeat ab aliquo; moveri autem ipsius divisibilis, sicut et eius esse, dependet a partibus; et sic non potest seipsum movere primo et per se. Non requiritur ergo ad veritatem conclusionis inductae quod supponatur partem moventis seipsum quiescere quasi quoddam verum absolute: sed oportet hanc conditionalem esse veram, quod, si quiesceret pars, quod quiesceret totum. Quae quidem potest esse vera etiam si antecedens sit impossibile: sicut ista conditionalis est vera, si homo est asinus, est irrationalis. Nor is this argument negated by what might be said: supposing a thing moves itself, it is impossible for a part of it to be at rest. Nor again by the statement that to be at rest or in motion does not belong to a part except accidentally, as Avicenna quibbles (2 Suffic. 1). For the force of the argument lies in this, that if a thing moves itself primarily and of itself, not by reason of its parts, it follows that its being moved does not depend on anything; whereas with a divisible thing, being moved depends on its parts, as does its existence, so that it cannot move itself primarily and of itself. Therefore, the truth of the conclusion drawn does not require that we suppose as an absolute truth that a part of that which moves itself is at rest, but that this conditional statement be true: if a part were at rest, the whole would be at rest. Which statement can be true even if the antecedent be false, even as this conditional proposition is true: if a man is an ass, then he is irrational. Secundo, probat per inductionem, sic. Omne quod movetur per accidens, non movetur a seipso. Movetur enim ad motum alterius. Similiter neque quod movetur per violentiam: ut manifestum est. Neque quae moventur per naturam ut ex se mota, sicut animalia, quae constat ab anima moveri. Nec iterum quae moventur per naturam ut gravia et levia. Quia haec moventur a generante et removente prohibens. Omne autem quod movetur, vel movetur per se, vel per accidens. Et si per se, vel per violentiam, vel per naturam. Et hoc, vel motum ex se, ut animal; vel non motum ex se, ut grave et leve. Ergo omne quod movetur, ab alio movetur. Second, he proves it by induction in this way (8 Physics 4). A thing is not moved by itself if it is moved accidentally, since its motion is occasioned by the motion of something else. Nor again if it is moved by force, as is manifest. Nor if it is moved by its nature, like those things whose movement proceeds from themselves, such as animals, which clearly are moved by their souls. Nor if it is moved by nature, as heavy and light things are, since these are moved by their generating cause and by that which removes the obstacle to their movement. Now, all things that are in motion are moved either in themselves or accidentally; and if in themselves, either by force or by nature; and if the latter, either by something in them, as in the case of animals, or not by something in them, as in the case of heavy and light bodies. Therefore, whatever is in motion is moved by another. Tertio, probat sic. Nihil idem est simul actu et potentia respectu eiusdem. Sed omne quod movetur, inquantum huiusmodi, est in potentia: quia motus est actus existentis in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi. Omne autem quod movet est in actu, inquantum huiusmodi: quia nihil agit nisi secundum quod est in actu. Ergo nihil est respectu eiusdem motus movens et motum. Et sic nihil movet seipsum. Third (8 Physics 5, 8), he proves his point thus. Nothing is at the same time in act and in potency in respect of the same thing. Now whatever is in motion, as such, is in potency, because motion is the act of that which is in potency, as such (3 Physics 1, 6). In contrast, whatever moves, as such, is in act, for nothing acts except insofar as it is in act. Therefore, nothing is both mover and moved in respect of the same movement. Hence nothing moves itself. Sciendum autem quod Plato qui posuit omne movens moveri, communius accepit nomen motus quam Aristoteles. Aristoteles enim proprie accepit motum secundum quod est actus existentis in potentia secundum quod huiusmodi: qualiter non est nisi divisibilium et corporum, ut probatur in VI Physic. Secundum Platonem autem movens seipsum non est corpus: accipiebat enim motum pro qualibet operatione, ita quod intelligere et opinari sit quoddam moveri; quem etiam modum loquendi Aristoteles tangit in III de anima. Secundum hoc ergo dicebat primum movens seipsum movere quod intelligit se et vult vel amat se. Quod in aliquo non repugnat rationibus Aristotelis: nihil enim differt devenire ad aliquod primum quod moveat se, secundum Platonem; et devenire ad primum quod omnino sit immobile, secundum Aristotelem. We must observe, however, that Plato (Phoedrus 24). who asserted that every mover is moved, employed the term ‘movement’ in a more general sense than Aristotle. For Aristotle took movement in its strict sense, for the act of a thing that is in potency as such, in which sense it applies only to divisible things and bodies, as is proved in 6 Physics. But, according to Plato, that which moves itself is not a body: for he took movement for any operation, so that to understand or to think is a kind of movement, to which manner of speaking Aristotle alludes in 3 De Anima 7. In this sense, then, he said that the first mover moves itself, inasmuch as it understands, desires, and loves itself. This, in a certain respect, is not in contradiction with the arguments of Aristotle; for it makes no difference whether with Plato we come to a first mover that moves itself, or with Aristotle to something first which is altogether immovable. Aliam autem propositionem, scilicet quod in moventibus et motis non sit procedere in infinitum, probat tribus rationibus. He proves the other proposition (namely, that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in movers and things moved) by three arguments. Quarum prima talis est. Si in motoribus et motis proceditur in infinitum, oportet omnia huiusmodi infinita corpora esse: quia omne quod movetur est divisibile et corpus, ut probatur in VI Physic. Omne autem corpus quod movet motum, simul dum movet movetur. Ergo omnia ista infinita simul moventur dum unum eorum movetur. Sed unum eorum, cum sit finitum, movetur tempore finito. Ergo omnia illa infinita moventur tempore finito. Hoc autem est impossibile. Ergo impossibile est quod in motoribus et motis procedatur in infinitum. The first (7 Physics) of these is as follows. If one were to proceed to infinity in movers and things moved, all this infinite number of things would necessarily be bodies, since whatever is moved is divisible and corporeal, as is proved in 6 Physics. Now every body that moves through being moved is moved at the same time as it moves. Therefore, all this infinite number of things are moved at the same time as one of them is moved. But one of them, since it is finite, is moved in a finite time. Therefore, all this infinite number of things are moved in a finite time. But this is impossible. Therefore, it is impossible to proceed to infinity in movers and things moved. Quod autem sit impossibile quod infinita praedicta moveantur tempore finito, sic probat. Movens et motum oportet simul esse: ut probat inducendo in singulis speciebus motus. Sed corpora non possunt simul esse nisi per continuitatem vel contiguationem. Cum ergo omnia praedicta moventia et mota sint corpora, ut probatum est, oportet quod sint quasi unum mobile per continuationem vel contiguationem. Et sic unum infinitum movetur tempore finito. Quod est impossibile, ut probatur in VI physicorum. That it is impossible for the aforesaid infinite number of things to be moved in a finite time, he proves thus (7 Physics 1, 2). Mover and moved must be simultaneous, as he proves by induction from each species of movement. But bodies cannot be simultaneous except by continuity or contact. Therefore, since all the aforesaid movers and things moved are bodies, as proved, they must be as one movable thing through their continuity or contact. And thus one infinite thing would be moved in a finite time, which is shown to be impossible in 6 Physics 7. Secunda ratio ad idem probandum talis est. In moventibus et motis ordinatis, quorum scilicet unum per ordinem ab alio movetur, hoc necesse est inveniri, quod, remoto primo movente vel cessante a motione, nullum aliorum movebit neque movebitur: quia primum est causa movendi omnibus aliis. Sed si sint moventia et mota per ordinem in infinitum, non erit aliquod primum movens, sed omnia erunt quasi media moventia. Ergo nullum aliorum poterit moveri. Et sic nihil movebitur in mundo. The second argument (8 Physics 5) in proof of the same statement is as follows. In an ordinate series of movers and things moved—namely, where throughout the series one is moved by the other—we must find that if the first mover be taken away or cease to move, none of the others will move or be moved, because the first is the cause of movement in all the others. Now if an ordinate series of movers and things moved proceed to infinity, there will be no first mover, but all will be like intermediate movers. Therefore, it will be impossible for any of them to be moved: and thus nothing in the world will be moved. Tertia probatio in idem redit, nisi quod est ordine transmutato, incipiendo scilicet a superiori. Et est talis. Id quod movet instrumentaliter, non potest movere nisi sit aliquid quod principaliter moveat. Sed si in infinitum procedatur in moventibus et motis, omnia erunt quasi instrumentaliter moventia, quia ponentur sicut moventia mota, nihil autem erit sicut principale movens. Ergo nihil movebitur. The third argument (8 Physics 5) amounts to the same, except that it proceeds in the reverse order, namely, by beginning from above. It is as follows. That which moves instrumentally cannot move unless there be something that moves principally. But if we proceed to infinity in movers and things moved, they will all be like instrumental movers, because they will be alleged to be moved movers, and there will be nothing by way of principal mover. Therefore, nothing will be moved. Et sic patet probatio utriusque propositionis quae supponebatur in prima demonstrationis via, qua probat Aristoteles esse primum motorem immobilem. We have thus clearly proved both statements which were supposed in the first process of demonstration by which Aristotle proved the existence of a first immovable mover. Secunda via talis est. Si omne movens movetur, aut haec propositio est vera per se, aut per accidens. Si per accidens, ergo non est necessaria: quod enim est per accidens verum, non est necessarium. Contingens est ergo nullum movens moveri. Sed si movens non movetur, non movet: ut adversarius dicit. Ergo contingens est nihil moveri: nam, si nihil movet, nihil movetur. Hoc autem habet Aristoteles pro impossibili, quod scilicet aliquando nullus motus sit. Ergo primum non fuit contingens: quia ex falso contingenti non sequitur falsum impossibile. Et sic haec propositio, omne movens ab alio movetur, non fuit per accidens vera. The second way (8 Physics 5) is as follows. If every mover is moved, this statement is true either in itself or accidentally. If accidentally, it follows that it is not necessary: for that which is accidentally true is not necessary. Therefore, it is a contingent proposition that no mover is moved. But if a mover be not moved, it does not move, as the opponent asserts. Therefore, it is contingent that nothing is moved, since, if nothing moves, nothing is moved. Now Aristotle holds this to be impossible (8 Physics 1), namely, that at any time there be no movement. Therefore, the first proposition was not contingent, because a false impossibility does not follow from a false contingency. And therefore this proposition, ‘every mover is moved by another,’ was not accidentally true. Item, si aliqua duo sunt coniuncta per accidens in aliquo; et unum illorum invenitur sine altero, probabile est quod alterum absque illo inveniri possit: sicut, si album et musicum inveniuntur in Socrate, et in Platone invenitur musicum absque albo, probabile est quod in aliquo alio possit inveniri album absque musico. Si igitur movens et motum coniunguntur in aliquo per accidens, motum autem invenitur in aliquo absque eo quod moveat, probabile est quod movens inveniatur absque eo quod moveatur. Nec contra hoc potest ferri instantia de duobus quorum unum ab altero dependet: quia haec non coniunguntur per se, sed per accidens. Again, if any two things are found accidentally united in a certain subject, and one of them is to be found without the other, it is probable that the latter can be found without the former: thus if ‘white’ and ‘musical’ are found in Socrates, and ‘musical’ without ‘white’ is found in Plato, it is probable that ‘white’ could be found without ‘musical’ in some subject. Accordingly, if mover and moved be united together in some subject accidentally, and it be found that a certain thing is moved without its being a mover, it is probable that a mover is to be found that is not moved. Nor can one urge against this the case of two things, one of which depends on the other; because those in question are united not per se but accidentally. Si autem praedicta propositio est vera per se, similiter sequitur impossibile vel inconveniens. Quia vel oportet quod movens moveatur eadem specie motus qua movet, vel alia. Si eadem, ergo oportebit quod alterans alteretur, et ulterius quod sanans sanetur, et quod docens doceatur, et secundum eandem scientiam. Hoc autem est impossibile: nam docentem necesse est habere scientiam, addiscentem vero necesse est non habere; et sic idem habebitur ab eodem et non habebitur, quod est impossibile. Si autem secundum aliam speciem motus movetur, ita scilicet quod alterans moveatur secundum locum, et movens secundum locum augeatur, et sic de aliis; cum sint finita genera et species motus, sequetur quod non sit abire in infinitum. Et sic erit aliquod primum movens quod non movetur ab alio. Nisi forte aliquis dicat quod fiat reflexio hoc modo quod, completis omnibus generibus et speciebus motus, iterum oporteat redire ad primam: ut, si movens secundum locum alteretur et alterans augeatur, iterum augens moveatur secundum locum. Sed ex hoc sequetur idem quod prius: scilicet quod id quod movet secundum aliquam speciem motus, secundum eandem moveatur, licet non immediate sed mediate. If, however, the aforesaid proposition is true in itself, again there follows something impossible or unfitting. For the mover must be moved either by the same kind of movement or by another kind. If by the same kind, it follows that whatever causes alteration must itself be altered, and furthermore that the healer must be healed, that the teacher must be taught, and in respect of the same science. But this is impossible: for the teacher must have science, while the learner must not have it, and thus one thing will be both possessed and not possessed by the same person, which is impossible. And if it be moved by another kind of movement—namely, so that what causes alteration be moved in respect of place, and that which moves in respect of place be increased, and so on—it will follow that we cannot go on indefinitely, since the genera and species of movement are finite in number. And thus there will be some first mover that is not moved by another. Unless someone happens to say that a recurrence takes place in this way: when all the genera and species of movement have been exhausted, a return must be made to the first. For instance, if that which moves in respect of place be altered, and that which causes alteration be increased, then again that which is increased be moved in respect of place. But the consequence of this will be the same as before, namely, that which moves by one kind of movement is itself moved by the same kind, although mediately and not immediately. Ergo relinquitur quod oportet ponere aliquod primum quod non movetur ab alio exteriori. It remains, therefore, that we must postulate some first mover that is not moved by anything outside itself. Quia vero, hoc habito quod sit primum movens quod non movetur ab alio exteriori, non sequitur quod sit penitus immobile, ideo ulterius procedit Aristoteles, dicendo quod hoc potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo, ita quod illud primum sit penitus immobile. Quo posito, habetur propositum: scilicet, quod sit aliquod primum movens immobile. Alio modo, quod illud primum moveatur a seipso. Et hoc videtur probabile: quia quod est per se, semper est prius eo quod est per aliud; unde et in motis primum motum rationabile est per seipsum moveri, non ab alio. Since, however, it does not follow that a first mover that is not moved by anything outside itself is absolutely immovable, Aristotle proceeds further, saying that this may happen in two ways. First, so that this first mover is absolutely immovable. And if this is granted, our point is established, namely, that there is a first immovable mover. Second, that this first mover is moved by itself. And this seems probable, because what is of itself is always prior to what is of another. Hence it is likewise logical in things moved that what is moved first is moved by itself and not by another. Sed, hoc dato, iterum idem sequitur. Non enim potest dici quod movens seipsum totum moveatur a toto: quia sic sequerentur praedicta inconvenientia, scilicet quod aliquis simul doceret et doceretur, et similiter in aliis motibus; et iterum quod aliquid simul esset in potentia et actu, nam movens, inquantum huiusmodi, est actu, motum vero in potentia. Relinquitur igitur quod una pars eius est movens tantum et altera mota. Et sic habetur idem quod prius: scilicet quod aliquid sit movens immobile. But, if this be granted, the same consequence follows (8 Physics). For it cannot be said that the whole of what moves itself is moved by its whole self, because then the absurd consequences mentioned above would follow, namely, that a person might teach and be taught at the same time, and in like manner as to other kinds of movement. And again, a thing would be at the same time in act and in potency, since a mover, as such, is in act, while that which is moved is in potency. It remains, therefore, that one part thereof is mover only, and the other part moved. And thus we have the same conclusion as before, namely, that there is something that moves and is itself immovable. Non autem potest dici quod utraque pars moveatur, ita quod una ab altera; neque quod una pars moveat seipsam et moveat alteram; neque quod totum moveat partem; neque quod pars moveat totum: quia sequerentur praemissa inconvenientia, scilicet quod aliquid simul moveret et moveretur secundum eandem speciem motus; et quod simul esset in potentia et actu; et ulterius quod totum non esset primo movens se, sed ratione partis. Relinquitur ergo quod moventis seipsum oportet unam partem esse immobilem et moventem aliam partem. And it cannot be said that both parts are moved, so that one is moved by the other; nor that one part moves both itself and the other; nor that the whole moves a part; nor that part moves the whole, since the above absurdities would follow—namely, that something would both move and be moved by the same kind of movement, and that it would be at the same time in potency and in act, and (finally) that the whole would move itself not primarily, but by reason of its part. It remains, therefore, that in whatever moves itself, one part must be immovable, and must move the other part. Sed quia in moventibus se quae sunt apud nos, scilicet in animalibus, pars movens, scilicet anima, etsi sit immobilis per se, movetur tamen per accidens; ulterius ostendit quod primi moventis seipsum pars movens non movetur neque per se neque per accidens. Since, however, in those things among us which move themselves (namely, animals), the part which moves (namely, the soul), though immovable of itself, is nevertheless moved accidentally, he goes on to show that in the first mover, the part which moves is not moved neither of itself nor accidentally (8 Physics 6). Moventia enim se quae sunt apud nos, scilicet animalia, cum sint corruptibilia, pars movens in eis movetur per accidens. Necesse est autem moventia se corruptibilia reduci ad aliquod primum movens se quod sit sempiternum. Ergo necesse est aliquem motorem esse alicuius moventis seipsum qui neque per se neque per accidens moveatur. For in those things which among us move themselves (namely animals), the part which moves is moved accidentally since they are corruptible. Now those corruptible things which move themselves must be reducible to some first self-mover that is everlasting. Therefore, that which moves itself must have a mover, which is moved neither of itself nor accidentally. Quod autem necesse sit, secundum suam positionem, aliquod movens se esse sempiternum, patet. Si enim motus est sempiternus, ut ipse supponit, oportet quod generatio moventium seipsa quae sunt generabilia et corruptibilia, sit perpetua. Sed huius perpetuitatis non potest esse causa aliquod ipsorum moventium se: quia non semper est. Nec simul omnia: tum quia infinita essent; tum quia non simul sunt. Relinquitur igitur quod oportet esse aliquod movens seipsum perpetuum, quod causat perpetuitatem generationis in istis inferioribus moventibus se. Et sic motor eius non movetur neque per se neque per accidens. It is clear that, in accordance with his hypothesis, some self-mover must be everlasting. For if, as he supposes, movement is everlasting, the production of these self-movers that are subject to generation and corruption must be everlasting. But no one of these self-movers, since it does not always exist, can be the cause of this everlastingness. Nor can all of them together, both because they would be infinite and because they do not exist all together. It follows, therefore, that there must be an everlasting self-mover, that causes the everlastingness of generation in these lower self-movers. And thus its mover is not moved, neither of itself nor accidentally. Item, in moventibus se videmus quod aliqua incipiunt de novo moveri propter aliquem motum quo non movetur a seipso animal, sicut cibo digesto aut aere alterato: quo quidem motu ipse motor movens seipsum movetur per accidens. Ex quo potest accipi quod nullum movens seipsum movetur semper cuius motor movetur per se vel per accidens. Sed primum movens seipsum movetur semper: alias non posset motus esse sempiternus, cum omnis alius motus a motu primi moventis seipsum causetur. Relinquitur igitur quod primum movens seipsum movetur a motore qui non movetur neque per se neque per accidens. Again, we observe that in self-movers some begin to be moved anew on account of some movement whereby the animal is not moved by itself, for instance, by the digestion of food or a change in the atmosphere. By this movement, the mover that moves itself is moved accidentally. From this, we may gather that no self-mover whose mover is moved essentially or accidentally is always moved. But the first self-mover is always in motion, else movement could not be everlasting, since every other movement is caused by the movement of the first self-mover. It follows, therefore, that the first self-mover is moved by a mover who is not moved, neither essentially nor accidentally. Nec est contra hanc rationem quod motores inferiorum orbium movent motum sempiternum, et tamen dicuntur moveri per accidens. Quia dicuntur moveri per accidens non ratione sui ipsorum, sed ratione suorum mobilium, quae sequuntur motum superioris orbis. Nor is this argument rebutted by the fact that the movers of the lower spheres cause an everlasting movement, and yet are said to be moved accidentally. For they are said to be moved accidentally not by reason of themselves, but by reason of the things subject to their motion, which follow the motion of the higher sphere. Sed quia Deus non est pars alicuius moventis seipsum, ulterius Aristoteles, in sua metaphysica, investigat ex hoc motore qui est pars moventis seipsum, alium motorem separatum omnino, qui est Deus. Cum enim omne movens seipsum moveatur per appetitum, oportet quod motor qui est pars moventis seipsum, moveat propter appetitum alicuius appetibilis. Quod est eo superius in movendo: nam appetens est quodammodo movens motum; appetibile autem est movens omnino non motum. Oportet igitur esse primum motorem separatum omnino immobilem, qui Deus est. Since, however, God is not part of a self-mover, Aristotle goes on in his Metaphysics 11, 7, to trace from this motor that is part of a self-mover, another mover altogether separate, which is God. For, since every self-mover is moved through its appetite, it follows that the motor which is part of a self-mover moves on account of the appetite for some appetible object. And this object is above the motor in moving, because the one desiring is a moved mover, whereas the appetible is a mover altogether unmoved. Therefore, there must be a first mover separate and altogether immovable, and this is God. Praedictos autem processus duo videntur infirmare. Quorum primum est, quod procedunt ex suppositione aeternitatis motus: quod apud Catholicos supponitur esse falsum. Now two things would seem to weaken the above arguments. The first of these is that they proceed from the supposition of the eternity of movement, and among Catholics this is supposed to be false. Et ad hoc dicendum quod via efficacissima ad probandum Deum esse est ex suppositione aeternitatis mundi, qua posita, minus videtur esse manifestum quod Deus sit. Nam si mundus et motus de novo incoepit, planum est quod oportet poni aliquam causam quae de novo producat mundum et motum: quia omne quod de novo fit, ab aliquo innovatore oportet sumere originem; cum nihil educat se de potentia in actum vel de non esse in esse. To this we reply that the most effective way to prove God’s existence is from the supposition of the eternity of the world: when this is supposed, God’s existence seems less manifest. For if the world and movement had a beginning, it is clear that we must suppose some cause to have produced the world and movement, because whatever becomes anew must take its origin from some cause of its becoming, since nothing evolves itself from potency to act, or from non-being to being. Secundum est, quod supponitur in praedictis demonstrationibus primum motum, scilicet corpus caeleste, esse motum ex se. Ex quo sequitur ipsum esse animatum. Quod a multis non conceditur. The second is that the aforesaid arguments suppose that the first moved thing, namely, the heavenly body, has its motive principle in itself, from which it follows that it is animated. Many do not grant this. Et ad hoc dicendum est quod, si primum movens non ponitur motum ex se, oportet quod moveatur immediate a penitus immobili. Unde etiam Aristoteles sub disiunctione hanc conclusionem inducit: quod scilicet oporteat vel statim devenire ad primum movens immobile separatum, vel ad movens seipsum, ex quo iterum devenitur ad movens primum immobile separatum. To this we reply that if the first mover is not supposed to have its motive principle in itself, it follows that it is immediately moved by something altogether immovable. Hence also Aristotle draws this conclusion with an alternative, namely, that either we must come at once to a first mover immovable and separate, or to a self-mover from which again we come to a first mover immovable and separate (8 Physics 5, 12). Procedit autem Philosophus alia via in II Metaphys., ad ostendendum non posse procedi in infinitum in causis efficientibus, sed esse devenire ad unam causam primam: et hanc dicimus Deum. Et haec via talis est. In omnibus causis efficientibus ordinatis primum est causa medii, et medium est causa ultimi: sive sit unum, sive plura media. Remota autem causa, removetur id cuius est causa. Ergo, remoto primo, medium causa esse non poterit. Sed si procedatur in causis efficientibus in infinitum, nulla causarum erit prima. Ergo omnes aliae tollentur, quae sunt mediae. Hoc autem est manifeste falsum. Ergo oportet ponere primam causam efficientem esse. Quae Deus est. The Philosopher proceeds in a different way in 2 Metaphysics to show that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in efficient causes, but that we must come to one first cause: and this we call God. This is how he proceeds. In all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate, whether the intermediate be one or several. Now if the cause be removed, that which it causes is removed. Therefore, if we remove the first, the intermediate cannot be a cause. But if we go on to infinity in efficient causes, no cause will be first. Therefore, all the others which are intermediate will be removed. Now this is clearly false. Therefore, we must suppose the existence of a first efficient cause: and this is God. Potest etiam alia ratio colligi ex verbis Aristotelis. In II enim Metaphys. ostendit quod ea quae sunt maxime vera, sunt et maxime entia. In IV autem Metaphys. ostendit esse aliquid maxime verum, ex hoc quod videmus duorum falsorum unum altero esse magis falsum, unde oportet ut alterum sit etiam altero verius; hoc autem est secundum approximationem ad id quod est simpliciter et maxime verum. Ex quibus concludi potest ulterius esse aliquid quod est maxime ens. Et hoc dicimus Deum. Another reason can be drawn from the words of Aristotle. For in 2 Metaphysics 1, 5, he shows that those things which excel as true excel as beings, and in 4 Metaphysics 3, 4, 27-28, he shows that there is something supremely true because we see that of two false things one is falser than the other, from which it follows that one is also truer than the other. Now this is by its approximation to that which is simply and supremely true. Therefore, we may further conclude that there is something that is supremely being. And this we call God. Ad hoc etiam inducitur a Damasceno alia ratio sumpta ex rerum gubernatione: quam etiam innuit Commentator in II physicorum. Et est talis. Impossibile est aliqua contraria et dissonantia in unum ordinem concordare semper vel pluries nisi alicuius gubernatione, ex qua omnibus et singulis tribuitur ut ad certum finem tendant. Sed in mundo videmus res diversarum naturarum in unum ordinem concordare, non ut raro et a casu, sed ut semper vel in maiori parte. Oportet ergo esse aliquem cuius providentia mundus gubernetur. Et hunc dicimus Deum. Another argument in support of this conclusion is adduced by Damascene (On the Orthodox Faith 1, 3) from the government of things, and the same reasoning is indicated by the Commentator in 2 Physics. It runs as follows. It is impossible for contrary and discordant things to accord in one order always or frequently except by someone’s governance, through which each and all are made to tend to a definite end. Now we see that in the world things of different natures accord in one order, not seldom and fortuitously, but always or for the most part. Therefore, it follows that there is someone by whose providence the world is governed. And this we call God. Caput 14 Chapter 14 Quod ad cognitionem Dei oportet uti via remotionis That to acquire knowledge of God one must use the way of remotion Ostenso igitur quod est aliquod primum ens, quod Deum dicimus, oportet eius conditiones investigare. Accordingly, having proved that there is a first being which we call God, we must inquire into his nature. Est autem via remotionis utendum praecipue in consideratione divinae substantiae. Nam divina substantia omnem formam quam intellectus noster attingit, sua immensitate excedit: et sic ipsam apprehendere non possumus cognoscendo quid est. Sed aliqualem eius habemus notitiam cognoscendo quid non est. Tantoque eius notitiae magis appropinquamus, quanto plura per intellectum nostrum ab eo poterimus removere. Tanto enim unumquodque perfectius cognoscimus, quanto differentias eius ad alia plenius intuemur: habet enim res unaquaeque in seipsa esse proprium ab omnibus aliis rebus distinctum. Unde et in rebus quarum definitiones cognoscimus, primo eas in genere collocamus, per quod scimus in communi quid est; et postmodum differentias addimus, quibus a rebus aliis distinguatur; et sic perficitur substantiae rei completa notitia. Now in treating of the divine essence the principal method to be followed is that of remotion. For the divine essence by its immensity surpasses every form to which our intellect reaches; and thus we cannot apprehend it by knowing what it is. But we have some knowledge of it by knowing what it is not, and we come closer to the knowledge of it insofar as we can remove a greater number of things from it by our intellect. For the more completely we see how a thing differs from others, the more perfectly we know it, since each thing has in itself its own being distinct from all other things. Thus, when we know the definition of a thing, first we place it in a genus, by which we know in general what it is, and afterwards we add differences to mark its distinction from other things, and thus we arrive at the complete knowledge of a thing’s essence. Sed quia in consideratione substantiae divinae non possumus accipere quid, quasi genus; nec distinctionem eius ab aliis rebus per affirmativas differentias accipere possumus, oportet eam accipere per differentias negativas. Sicut autem in affirmativis differentiis una aliam contrahit, et magis ad completam designationem rei appropinquat secundum quod a pluribus differre facit; ita una differentia negativa per aliam contrahitur, quae a pluribus differre facit. Sicut, si dicamus Deum non esse accidens, per hoc ab omnibus accidentibus distinguitur; deinde si addamus ipsum non esse corpus, distinguemus ipsum etiam ab aliquibus substantiis; et sic per ordinem ab omni eo quod est praeter ipsum, per negationes huiusmodi distinguetur; et tunc de substantia eius erit propria consideratio cum cognoscetur ut ab omnibus distinctus. Non tamen erit perfecta: quia non cognoscetur quid in se sit. Since, however, we are unable in treating of the divine essence to take ‘what’ as a genus, nor can we express its distinction from other things by affirmative differences, we must express it by negative differences. Now, just as in affirmative differences one restricts another, and brings us the nearer to a complete description of the thing according as it makes it differ from more things, so one negative difference is restricted by another that marks a distinction from more things. Thus, if we say that God is not an accident, we thereby distinguish him from all accidents; then if we add that he is not a body, we shall distinguish him also from certain substances, and thus in gradation he will be differentiated by suchlike negations from all beside himself. And then, when he is known as distinct from all things, we shall arrive at a proper consideration of him. It will not, however, be perfect, because we shall not know what he is in himself. Ad procedendum igitur circa Dei cognitionem per viam remotionis, accipiamus principium id quod ex superioribus iam manifestum est, scilicet quod Deus sit omnino immobilis. Quod etiam auctoritas sacrae Scripturae confirmat. Dicitur enim Malach. 3:6: ego Deus, et non mutor; Iac. 1:17: apud quem non est transmutatio; et Num. 23:19: non est Deus quasi homo, ut mutetur. Therefore, in order to proceed by the way of remotion about the knowledge of God, let us take as principle that which is already made manifest by what we have said above (ch. 13), namely, that God is altogether unchangeable. This is also confirmed by the authority of Sacred Scripture. For it is said: I am God and I do not change (Mal 3:6); with whom there is no change (Jas 1:17); and: God is not as a man that he should be changed (Num 23:19).