Caput 18 Chapter 18 Quod in Deo nulla est compositio That in God there is no composition Ex praemissis autem concludi potest quod in Deo nulla sit compositio. From the foregoing we are able to conclude that there is no composition in God. Nam in omni composito oportet esse actum et potentiam. Non enim plura possunt simpliciter unum fieri nisi aliquid sit ibi actus, et aliud potentia. Quae enim actu sunt, non uniuntur nisi quasi colligata vel congregata, quae non sunt unum simpliciter. In quibus etiam ipsae partes congregatae sunt sicut potentia respectu unionis: sunt enim unitae in actu postquam fuerint in potentia unibiles. In Deo autem nulla est potentia. Non est igitur in eo aliqua compositio. For in every composite thing there must be act and potency, since several things cannot become one simply, unless there be something actual there and something else potential. For those things that are in act are not united except as an assemblage or group, which are not one simply. Also, in these the very parts that are gathered together are as a potency with respect to the union: for they are actually united after being potentially unitable. But in God there is no potency (ch. 16). Therefore, in him there is no composition. Item. Omne compositum posterius est suis componentibus. Primum ergo ens, quod Deus est, ex nullis compositum est. Again. Every composite comes after its components. Therefore, the first being, which is God (ch. 14), has no component parts. Adhuc. Omne compositum est potentia dissolubile, quantum est ex ratione compositionis: licet in quibusdam sit aliquid aliud dissolutioni repugnans. Quod autem est dissolubile, est in potentia ad non esse. Quod Deo non competit: cum sit per se necesse esse. Non est igitur in eo aliqua compositio. Further. Every composite is potentially dissoluble, so far as its composite nature is concerned, although in some there is something else incompatible with dissolution. Now that which is dissoluble is in potency to non-being. But this cannot be said of God, since he necessarily exists by his very essence. Therefore, there is no composition in him. Amplius. Omnis compositio indiget aliquo componente: si enim compositio est, ex pluribus est; quae autem secundum se sunt plura, in unum non convenirent nisi ab aliquo componente unirentur. Si igitur compositus esset Deus, haberet componentem: non enim ipse seipsum componere posset, quia nihil est causa sui ipsius; esset enim prius seipso, quod est impossibile. Componens autem est causa efficiens compositi. Ergo Deus haberet causam efficientem. Et sic non esset causa prima, quod supra habitum est. Moreover. Every composition requires a compounder, for if there is composition, it results from several things, and things that are several in themselves would not combine together unless they were united by a compounder. If, then, God were composite, he would have a compounder, for he could not compound himself, since no thing is its own cause, for it would precede itself, which is impossible. Now the compounder is the efficient cause of the composite. Therefore, God would have an efficient cause: and thus he would not be the first cause, which was proved above (ch. 13). Item. In quolibet genere tanto aliquid est nobilius quanto simplicius: sicut in genere calidi ignis, qui non habet aliquam frigidi permixtionem. Quod igitur est in fine nobilitatis omnium entium, oportet esse in fine simplicitatis. Hoc autem quod est in fine nobilitatis omnium entium, dicimus Deum, cum sit prima causa: causa enim est nobilior effectu. Nulla igitur compositio ei accidere potest. Again. In any genus, the more simple a thing is, the more excellent it is. For example, in the genus of hot things is fire, which has no admixture of cold. Therefore, whatever is the most noble of all things must be the height of simplicity. Now that which obtains the summit of nobility in things is what we call God, since he is the first cause, because the cause is more excellent than its effect. Therefore, there can be no composition in him. Praeterea. In omni composito bonum non est huius vel illius partis, sed totius, et dico bonum secundum illam bonitatem quae est propria totius et perfectio eius: nam partes sunt imperfectae respectu totius: sicut partes hominis non sunt homo, partes etiam numeri senarii non habent perfectionem senarii, et similiter partes lineae non perveniunt ad perfectionem mensurae quae in tota linea invenitur. Si ergo Deus est compositus, perfectio et bonitas eius propria invenitur in toto, non autem in aliqua eius partium. Et sic non erit in eo pure illud bonum quod est proprium ei. Non est ergo ipse primum et summum bonum. Furthermore. In every composite thing the good does not belong to this or that part, but to the whole (and I speak of good in reference to that goodness which is proper to, and is the perfection of, the whole). Thus the parts are imperfect in relation to the whole: for example, the parts of a man are not a man, nor do the parts of the number six have the perfection of six, nor do the parts of a line come to the perfection of the measure found in the whole line. Therefore, if God is composite, his proper perfection and goodness are found in the whole of God but not in any of his parts. And thus the good that is proper to him will not be purely in him; and consequently he will not be the first and supreme good. Item. Ante omnem multitudinem oportet invenire unitatem. In omni autem composito est multitudo. Igitur oportet id quod est ante omnia, scilicet Deum, omni compositione carere. Further. Before every multitude it is necessary to find unity. Now in every composite there is multitude. Therefore, that which is before all things, namely God, must be devoid of all composition. Caput 19 Chapter 19 Quod in Deo nihil est violentum neque praeter naturam That in God there is nothing violent or beside nature Ex hoc autem Philosophus concludit quod in Deo nihil potest esse violentum neque extra naturam. Hence the Philosopher concludes that in God there cannot be anything violent or outside nature. Omne enim illud in quo aliquid violentum et praeter naturam invenitur, aliquid sibi additum habet: nam quod est de substantia rei non potest esse violentum neque praeter naturam. Nullum autem simplex habet in se aliquid additum: ex hoc enim compositio relinqueretur. Cum igitur Deus sit simplex, ut ostensum est, nihil in eo potest esse violentum neque praeter naturam. For whatever has in itself anything violent or beside nature has something added to itself, since that which belongs to a thing’s essence cannot be violent or beside nature. Now no simple thing has in itself anything that is added, for this would mean it is composite. Since, then, God is simple, as shown above (ch. 18), there can be nothing in him that is violent or beside nature. Amplius. Necessitas coactionis est necessitas ex alio. In Deo autem non est necessitas ex alio, sed est per seipsum necessarium, et causa necessitatis aliis. Igitur nihil in eo est coactum. Further. The necessity of compulsion is a necessity imposed by another. But in God there is no necessity imposed by another, for he is necessary of himself, and the cause of necessity in other things (ch. 15). Therefore, nothing is compulsory in him. Adhuc. Ubicumque est aliquid violentum, ibi potest esse aliquid praeter id quod rei per se convenit: nam violentum contrariatur ei quod est secundum naturam. Sed in Deo non est possibile esse aliquid praeter id quod secundum se ei convenit: cum secundum se sit necesse esse, ut ostensum est. Non potest igitur in eo esse aliquid violentum. Moreover. Wherever there is violence, there can be something other than what belongs to a thing by its very nature, since violence is contrary to that which is according to nature. But it is not possible for anything to be in God that does not belong to him according to his nature, since by his very nature he exists necessarily, as shown above (ch. 15). Therefore, there can be nothing violent in him. Item. Omne in quo est aliquid violentum vel innaturale, natum est ab alio moveri: nam violentum est cuius principium est extra nil conferente vim passo. Deus autem est omnino immobilis, ut ostensum est. Igitur non potest in eo esse aliquid violentum vel innaturale. Again. Everything that is compelled or unnatural is naturally apt to be moved by another, because that which is done by compulsion has an external principle, without any concurrence on the part of the patient. Now God is altogether immovable, as shown above (ch. 13). Therefore, nothing in him can be violent or unnatural. Caput 20 Chapter 20 Quod Deus non est corpus That God is not a body Ex praemissis etiam ostenditur quod Deus non est corpus. From the foregoing we are also able to prove that God is not a body. Omne enim corpus, cum sit continuum, compositum est et partes habens. Deus autem non est compositus, ut ostensum est. Igitur corpus non est. For, since every body is a continuous substance, it is composite and has parts. Now God is not composite, as we have shown (ch. 18). Therefore, he is not a body. Praeterea. Omne quantum est aliquo modo in potentia: nam continuum est potentia divisibile in infinitum; numerus autem in infinitum est augmentabilis. Omne autem corpus est quantum. Ergo omne corpus est in potentia. Deus autem non est in potentia, sed actus purus, ut ostensum est. Ergo Deus non est corpus. Further. Every quantitative substance is somehow in potency: for that which is continuous is potentially divisible to infinity, and number can be infinitely augmented. Now every body is a quantitative substance. Therefore, every body is in potency. But God is not in potency, but is pure act, as shown above (ch. 16). Therefore, God is not a body. Adhuc. Si Deus est corpus, oportet quod sit aliquod corpus naturale: nam corpus mathematicum non est per se existens, ut Philosophus probat, eo quod dimensiones accidentia sunt. Non autem est corpus naturale: cum sit immobilis, ut ostensum est; omne autem corpus naturale mobile est. Deus igitur non est corpus. Again. If God were a body, he would have to be a physical body: for a mathematical body does not exist by itself, as the Philosopher proves (2 Metaphysics 5), since dimensions are accidents. Now, he is not a physical body: for he is immovable, as we have proved (ch. 13), and every physical body is movable. Therefore, God is not a body. Amplius. Omne corpus finitum est: quod tam de corpore circulari quam de recto probatur in I caeli et mundi. Quodlibet autem corpus finitum intellectu et imaginatione transcendere possumus. Si igitur Deus est corpus, intellectus et imaginatio nostra aliquid maius Deo cogitare possunt. Et sic Deus non est maior intellectu nostro. Quod est inconveniens. Non est igitur corpus. Moreover. Every body is finite, which is proved in regard both to spherical and to rectilinear bodies in 1 Coeli et Mundi 5. Now we are able by our intellect and imagination to soar above any finite body. Therefore, if God were a body, our intellect and imagination would be able to think of something greater than God, and thus God would not exceed our intellect, which is inadmissible. Therefore, he is not a body. Adhuc. Cognitio intellectiva certior est quam sensitiva. Invenitur autem aliquid subiectum sensui in rerum natura. Igitur et intellectui. Sed secundum ordinem obiectorum est ordo potentiarum, sicut et distinctio. Ergo super omnia sensibilia est aliquid intelligibile in rerum natura existens. Omne autem corpus in rebus existens est sensibile. Igitur super omnia corpora est aliquid accipere nobilius. Si igitur Deus est corpus, non erit primum et maximum ens. Furthermore. Intellective knowledge is more certain than sensitive. Now, among natural things we find some that are objects of sense; therefore, there are also some that are objects of intellect. But the order of powers is according to the order of objects, in the same way as their distinction. Therefore, above all sensible objects there is an intelligible object existing in natural things. But every body that exists among things is sensible. Therefore, above all bodies it is possible to find something more excellent. Therefore, if God were a body, he would not be the first and supreme being. Praeterea. Quolibet corpore non vivente res vivens est nobilior. Quolibet autem corpore vivente sua vita est nobilior: cum per hoc habeat supra alia corpora nobilitatem. Id igitur quo nihil est nobilius, corpus non est. Hoc autem est Deus. Igitur non est corpus. Again. A living thing is more excellent than any body devoid of life. Now, the life of a living body is more excellent than that body, since by it, it excels all other bodies. Therefore, that which is excelled by nothing is not a body. But such is God. Therefore, he is not a body. Item. Inveniuntur rationes philosophorum ad idem ostendendum procedentes ex aeternitate motus, in hunc modum. In omni motu sempiterno oportet quod primum movens non moveatur neque per se neque per accidens, sicut ex supra dictis patet. Corpus autem caeli movetur circulariter motu sempiterno. Ergo primus motor eius non movetur neque per se neque per accidens. Nullum autem corpus movet localiter nisi moveatur: eo quod oportet movens et motum esse simul; et sic corpus movens moveri oportet, ad hoc quod sit simul cum corpore moto. Nulla etiam virtus in corpore movet nisi per accidens moveatur: quia, moto corpore, movetur per accidens virtus corporis. Ergo primus motor caeli non est corpus neque virtus in corpore. Hoc autem ad quod ultimo reducitur motus caeli sicut ad primum movens immobile, est Deus. Deus igitur non est corpus. Moreover. We find the philosophers proving the same conclusion by arguments based on the eternity of movement, as follows. In all everlasting movement, the first mover must not be moved neither essentially nor accidentally, as we have proved above (ch. 13). Now, the body of the heavens is moved in a circle with an everlasting movement. Therefore, its first mover is not moved either essentially or accidentally. Now, no body causes local movement unless itself be moved, because moved and mover must be simultaneous; and thus the body that causes movement must be itself moved so it can be simultaneous with the body that is moved. Moreover, no power in a body causes movement unless it is moved accidentally, since, when the body is moved, the power of that body is moved accidentally. Therefore, the first mover of the heavens is neither a body nor a power residing in a body. Now, God is that to which the movement of the heavens is ultimately reduced as to the first immovable mover. Therefore, God is not a body. Adhuc. Nulla potentia infinita est potentia in magnitudine. Potentia primi motoris est potentia infinita. Ergo non est in aliqua magnitudine. Et sic Deus, qui est primus motor, neque est corpus neque est virtus in corpore. Again. No infinite power is a power residing in a magnitude. But the power of the first mover is an infinite power. Therefore, it does not reside in a magnitude. And thus God, who is the first mover, is neither a body nor a power residing in a body. Prima sic probatur. Si potentia magnitudinis alicuius est infinita, aut ergo erit magnitudinis finitae; aut infinitae. Magnitudo infinita nulla est, ut probatur in III Physic. et in I caeli et mundi. Magnitudinis autem finitae non est possibile esse potentiam infinitam. Et sic in nulla magnitudine potest esse potentia infinita. The first proposition is proved as follows. If a power residing in a magnitude be infinite, this magnitude is either finite or infinite. But there is no infinite magnitude, as proved in 3 Physics 5 and 1 Coeli et Mundi 5. And it is not possible for a finite magnitude to have an infinite power. Therefore, in no magnitude can there be an infinite power. Quod autem in magnitudine finita non possit esse potentia infinita, sic probatur. Aequalem effectum quem facit potentia minor in tempore maiori, facit potentia maior in tempore minori: qualiscumque sit ille effectus, sive sit secundum alterationem, sive secundum motum localem, sive secundum quemcumque alium motum. Sed potentia infinita est maior omni potentia finita. Ergo oportet quod in minori perficiat effectum, velocius movendo, quam potentia quaecumque finita. Nec potest esse quod in minori quod sit tempus. Relinquitur igitur quod hoc erit in indivisibili temporis. Et sic movere et moveri et motus erunt in instanti. Cuius contrarium demonstratum est in VI physicorum. That there cannot be an infinite power in a finite magnitude is proved thus. A great power produces in less time the same effect which a lesser power produces in more time, whatever kind this effect may be, whether of alteration, of local movement, or of any other kind of movement. Now, an infinite power surpasses every finite power. It follows, therefore, that it produces its effect more rapidly by causing a more rapid movement than any finite power. Nor can this greater rapidity be one of time. Therefore, it follows that the effect is produced in an indivisible point of time. And thus moving, being moved, and movement will be instantaneous, the contrary of which has been proved in 6 Physics 3. Quod autem non possit potentia infinita magnitudinis finitae movere in tempore, sic iterum probatur. Sit potentia infinita quae est a. Accipiatur pars eius quae est ab. Pars igitur ista movebit in tempore maiori. Oportebit tamen esse aliquam proportionem huius temporis ad tempus in quo movet tota potentia: cum utrumque tempus sit finitum. Sint igitur haec duo tempora in decupla proportione se ad invicem habentia: non enim quantum ad hanc rationem differt istam vel aliam proportionem dicere. Si autem addatur ad potentiam praedictam finitam, diminui oportebit de tempore secundum proportionem additionis ad potentiam: cum maior potentia in minori tempore moveat. Si ergo addatur decuplum, illa potentia movebit in tempore quod erit decima pars temporis in quo movebat prima pars accepta infinitae potentiae, scilicet ab. Et tamen haec potentia quae est decuplum eius, est potentia finita: cum habeat proportionem determinatam ad potentiam finitam. Relinquitur igitur quod in aequali tempore movet potentia finita et infinita. Quod est impossibile. Non igitur potentia infinita magnitudinis finitae potest movere in tempore aliquo. That an infinite power of a finite magnitude cannot cause movement in time is proved thus. Let A be an infinite power, and AB a part thereof. Therefore, this part will cause movement in more time. And yet there must be proportion between this time and the time in which the whole power causes movement, since both times are finite. Suppose, then, these two times to be in proportion as 1 to 10 (for it does not affect this argument whether we take this or any other ratio). Now, if we increase the aforesaid finite power, we must decrease the time in proportion to the increase of the power, since a greater power causes movement in less time. If, therefore, we increase it tenfold, that power will cause movement in a time which will be one-tenth of the time occupied by the first part that we took of the infinite power (namely, AB). And yet, this power which is ten times the aforesaid power is a finite power, since it has a fixed proportion to a finite power. It follows, therefore, that a finite power and an infinite power cause movement in an equal time, which is impossible. Therefore, an infinite power of a finite magnitude cannot cause movement in any time. Quod autem potentia primi motoris sit infinita, sic probatur. Nulla potentia finita potest movere tempore infinito. Sed potentia primi motoris movet in tempore infinito: quia motus primus est sempiternus. Ergo potentia primi motoris est infinita. Prima sic probatur. Si aliqua potentia finita alicuius corporis movet tempore infinito, pars illius corporis, habens partem potentiae, movebit in tempore minori: quia quanto aliquid est maioris potentiae, tanto in maiori tempore motum continuare poterit; et sic pars praedicta movebit tempore finito, maior autem pars in maiori tempore movere poterit. Et sic semper, secundum quod addetur ad potentiam motoris, addetur ad tempus secundum eandem proportionem. Sed additio aliquoties facta perveniet ad quantitatem totius, vel etiam excedet. Ergo et additio ex parte temporis perveniet ad quantitatem temporis in quo movet totum. Tempus autem in quo totum movebat, dicebatur esse infinitum. Ergo tempus finitum metietur tempus infinitum. Quod est impossibile. That the power of the first mover is infinite is proved thus. No finite power can cause movement in an infinite time. Now, the power of the first mover causes movement in an infinite time, since the first movement is eternal. Therefore, the power of the first mover is infinite. The first proposition is proved thus. If any finite power of a body causes movement in infinite time, a part of that body (having a part of that power) will cause movement during less time, since a thing will be able to continue a movement for a length of time proportionate to its power: and thus the aforesaid part will cause movement in finite time, and a greater part will be able to cause movement during more time. And so always: we increase the time in the same proportion as we increase the power of the mover. But if this increase be made a certain number of times we shall come to the quantity of the whole, or even go beyond it. Therefore, also the increase on the part of the time will reach the quantity of time in which the whole causes movement. And yet the time in which the whole causes movement was supposed to be infinite. Consequently, a finite time will measure an infinite time, which is impossible. Sed contra hunc processum plures sunt obiectiones. However, there are several objections to this chain of reasoning. Quarum una est, quia potest poni quod illud corpus quod movet primum motum, non est divisibile: sicut patet de corpore caelesti. Praedicta autem probatio procedit ex divisione eius. One of these is that it could be held that the body which moves the first thing moved is not divisible, as is the case of a heavenly body. But the argument given above supposes it to be divided. Sed ad hoc dicendum quod conditionalis potest esse vera cuius antecedens est impossibile. Et si quid est quod destruat veritatem talis conditionalis, est impossibile: sicut, si aliquis destrueret veritatem huius conditionalis, si homo volat, habet alas, esset impossibile. Et secundum modum hunc intelligendus est processus probationis praedictae. Quia haec conditionalis est vera, si corpus caeleste dividitur, pars eius erit minoris potentiae quam totum. Huius autem conditionalis veritas tollitur si ponatur primum movens esse corpus, propter impossibilia quae sequuntur. Unde patet hoc esse impossibile. Et similiter potest responderi si fiat obiectio de augmento potentiarum finitarum. Quia non est accipere in rerum natura potentias secundum omnem proportionem quam habet tempus ad tempus quodcumque. Est tamen conditionalis vera, qua in praedicta probatione indigetur. To this we reply that a conditional clause may be true even if its antecedent is impossible. And if there is anything to disprove such a conditional, the antecedent is impossible. For example, if anyone disprove this conditional: ‘If a man flies, he has wings,’ the antecedent would be impossible. It is in this way that we are to understand the process of the aforesaid reasoning. For this conditional is true: ‘If a heavenly body be divided, its part will have less power than the whole.’ But this conditional is disproved if we suppose that the first mover is a body, on account of the impossibilities that follow. Therefore, it is clear that this is impossible. We can reply in the same way if there is an objection to the increase of finite powers. For it is impossible in natural things to find powers according to any proportion that there is between one time and any other time. And yet the conditional required in the aforesaid argument is true. Secunda obiectio est quia, etsi corpus dividitur, aliqua virtus potest esse alicuius corporis quae non dividitur diviso corpore: sicut anima rationalis non dividitur diviso corpore. The second objection is that, even if a body is divided, it is possible for a power of a body not to be divided when the body is divided: for example, the rational soul is not divided when the body is divided.