Caput 2 Chapter 2 Quae sit in hoc opere auctoris intentio The author’s intention in this work Inter omnia vero hominum studia sapientiae studium est perfectius, sublimius, utilius et iucundius. Perfectius quidem, quia inquantum homo sapientiae studium dat, intantum verae beatitudinis iam aliquam partem habet unde sapiens dicit, beatus vir qui in sapientia morabitur, Eccli. 14, 22. Sublimius autem est quia per ipsum homo praecipue ad divinam similitudinem accedit, quae omnia in sapientia fecit: unde, quia similitudo causa est dilectionis, sapientiae studium praecipue Deo per amicitiam coniungit; propter quod Sap. 7, 14 dicitur quod sapientia infinitus thesaurus est hominibus, quo qui usi sunt, facti sunt participes amicitiae Dei. Utilius autem est quia per ipsam sapientiam ad immortalitatis regnum pervenitur: concupiscentia enim sapientiae deducet ad regnum perpetuum, Sap. 6, 21. Iucundius autem est quia non habet amaritudinem conversatio illius nec taedium convictus illius, sed laetitiam et gaudium, Sap. 8, 16. Now of all human pursuits, that of wisdom is the most perfect, the most sublime, the most profitable, and the most delightful. It is the most perfect, since a man already shares in true happiness in proportion as he devotes himself to the pursuit of wisdom. Thus the wise man says, blessed is the man who meditates on wisdom (Sir 14:20). It is the most sublime because by it man especially approaches to a likeness to God, who made all things in wisdom (Ps 104[103]:24). Thus, since likeness is the cause of love, the pursuit of wisdom especially unites man to God by friendship: hence it is said that wisdom is an unfailing treasure for men; those who use it obtain friendship with God (Wis 7:14). It is the most profitable, because by wisdom itself man is brought to the kingdom of immortality, for the desire of wisdom leads to the everlasting kingdom (Wis 6:21). And it is the most delightful because companionship with her has no bitterness, and life with her has no pain, but gladness and joy (Wis 8:16). Assumpta igitur ex divina pietate fiducia sapientis officium prosequendi, quamvis proprias vires excedat, propositum nostrae intentionis est veritatem quam fides Catholica profitetur, pro nostro modulo manifestare, errores eliminando contrarios: ut enim verbis Hilarii utar, ego hoc vel praecipuum vitae meae officium debere me Deo conscius sum, ut eum omnis sermo meus et sensus loquatur. Therefore, assuming the office of the wise man with confidence from God’s loving kindness, although it surpasses our own powers, the purpose we have in view is, in our own weak way, to declare the truth which the Catholic faith professes, while weeding out contrary errors; for, in the words of Hilary, I acknowledge that I owe my life’s chief occupation to God, so that every word and every thought of mine may speak of him (On the Trinity 1, 37). Contra singulorum autem errores difficile est procedere, propter duo. Primo, quia non ita sunt nobis nota singulorum errantium dicta sacrilega ut ex his quae dicunt possimus rationes assumere ad eorum errores destruendos. Hoc enim modo usi sunt antiqui doctores in destructionem errorum gentilium quorum positiones scire poterant quia et ipsi gentiles fuerant, vel saltem inter gentiles conversati et in eorum doctrinis eruditi. But it is difficult to refute the errors of each individual, for two reasons. First, because we do not know the sacrilegious assertions of each erring individual well enough to refute their errors with arguments from what they say. For the doctors of old used this method to confute the errors of the heathens, whose opinions they were able to know since they had been heathens themselves, or at least had lived among heathens and were conversant with their teachings. Secundo, quia quidam eorum, ut Mahumetistae et Pagani, non conveniunt nobiscum in auctoritate alicuius Scripturae, per quam possint convinci, sicut contra Iudaeos disputare possumus per vetus testamentum, contra haereticos per novum. Hi vero neutrum recipiunt. Unde necesse est ad naturalem rationem recurrere, cui omnes assentire coguntur. Quae tamen in rebus divinis deficiens est. Second, because some of them, like the Mohammedans and pagans, do not agree with us as to the authority of any Scripture by which they may be convinced in the same way as we are able to dispute with the Jews by means of the Old Testament, and with heretics by means of the New. But the former accept neither. Thus we need to have recourse to natural reason, to which all are compelled to assent. And yet this is deficient in the things of God. Simul autem veritatem aliquam investigantes ostendemus qui errores per eam excludantur: et quomodo demonstrativa veritas, fidei Christianae religionis concordet. But while we are occupied in the inquiry about a particular truth, we shall show what errors are excluded thereby, and how demonstrable truth is in agreement with the faith of the Christian religion. Fides et ratio Faith and reason Caput 3 Chapter 3 Quis modus sit possibilis divinae veritatis manifestandae In what way it is possible to make known the divine truth Quia vero non omnis veritatis manifestandae modus est idem; disciplinati autem hominis est tantum de unoquoque fidem capere tentare, quantum natura rei permittit, ut a Philosopho, optime dictum Boetius introducit, necesse est prius ostendere quis modus sit possibilis ad veritatem propositam manifestandam. Since, however, not every truth should be made known in the same way, and it is the part of an educated man to seek for conviction in each subject only so far as the nature of the subject allows (1 Ethics 3, 4) as the Philosopher most rightly observes, as quoted by Boethius (On the Trinity 2), it is necessary to show first of all in what way it is possible to make known the aforesaid truth. Est autem in his quae de Deo confitemur duplex veritatis modus. Quaedam namque vera sunt de Deo quae omnem facultatem humanae rationis excedunt, ut Deum esse trinum et unum. Quaedam vero sunt ad quae etiam ratio naturalis pertingere potest, sicut est Deum esse, Deum esse unum, et alia huiusmodi; quae etiam philosophi demonstrative de Deo probaverunt, ducti naturalis lumine rationis. Now, in those things which we hold about God there is truth in two ways. For certain things that are true about God wholly surpass the capability of human reason: for instance, that God is three and one. But there are certain things to which even natural reason can attain, for instance, that God is, that God is one, and others like these, which even the philosophers, being guided by the light of natural reason, proved demonstratively about God. Quod autem sint aliqua intelligibilium divinorum quae humanae rationis penitus excedant ingenium, evidentissime apparet. That certain divine truths wholly surpass the capability of human reason is most clearly evident. Cum enim principium totius scientiae quam de aliqua re ratio percipit, sit intellectus substantiae ipsius, eo quod, secundum doctrinam Philosophi demonstrationis principium est quod quid est; oportet quod secundum modum quo substantia rei intelligitur, sit modus eorum quae de re illa cognoscuntur. Unde si intellectus humanus, alicuius rei substantiam comprehendit, puta lapidis vel trianguli, nullum intelligibilium illius rei facultatem humanae rationis excedet. Quod quidem nobis circa Deum non accidit. Nam ad substantiam ipsius capiendam intellectus humanus naturali virtute pertingere non potest: cum intellectus nostri, secundum modum praesentis vitae, cognitio a sensu incipiat; et ideo ea quae in sensu non cadunt, non possunt humano intellectu capi, nisi quatenus ex sensibilibus earum cognitio colligitur. Sensibilia autem ad hoc ducere intellectum nostrum non possunt ut in eis divina substantia videatur quid sit: cum sint effectus causae virtutem non aequantes. Ducitur tamen ex sensibilibus intellectus noster in divinam cognitionem ut cognoscat de Deo quia est, et alia huiusmodi quae oportet attribui primo principio. Sunt igitur quaedam intelligibilium divinorum quae humanae rationi sunt pervia; quaedam vero quae omnino vim humanae rationis excedunt. For, since the principle of all the knowledge which the reason acquires about a thing is the understanding of that thing’s essence—because, according to the Philosopher’s teaching (2 Posterior Analytics 3, 9) the principle of a demonstration is what a thing is—it follows that our knowledge about a thing will be in proportion to our understanding of its essence. Therefore, if the human intellect comprehends the essence of a particular thing, such as a stone or a triangle, no truth about that thing will surpass the capability of human reason. But this does not happen to us in relation to God, because the human intellect is incapable by its natural power of attaining to the comprehension of his essence. For our intellect’s knowledge, according to the mode of the present life, originates from the senses: and thus things which are not objects of sense cannot be comprehended by the human intellect except insofar as knowledge of them is gathered from sensibles. Now sensibles cannot lead our intellect to see in them what God is, because they are effects unequal to the power of their cause. And yet our intellect is led by sensibles to the divine knowledge so as to know about God that he is, and other such truths which need to be ascribed to the first principle. Accordingly, some divine truths are attainable by human reason, while others altogether surpass the power of human reason. Adhuc ex intellectuum gradibus idem facile est videre. Duorum enim quorum unus alio rem aliquam intellectu subtilius intuetur, ille cuius intellectus est elevatior, multa intelligit quae alius omnino capere non potest: sicut patet in rustico, qui nullo modo philosophiae subtiles considerationes capere potest. Intellectus autem angeli plus excedit intellectum humanum quam intellectus optimi philosophi intellectum rudissimi idiotae: quia haec distantia inter speciei humanae limites continetur, quos angelicus intellectus excedit. Cognoscit quidem angelus Deum ex nobiliori effectu quam homo: quanto ipsa substantia angeli, per quam in Dei cognitionem ducitur naturali cognitione, est dignior rebus sensibilibus et etiam ipsa anima, per quam intellectus humanus in Dei cognitionem ascendit. Multoque amplius intellectus divinus excedit angelicum quam angelicus humanum. Ipse enim intellectus divinus sua capacitate substantiam suam adaequat, et ideo perfecte de se intelligit quid est, et omnia cognoscit quae de ipso intelligibilia sunt: non autem naturali cognitione angelus de Deo cognoscit quid est, quia et ipsa substantia angeli, per quam in Dei cognitionem ducitur, est effectus causae virtutem non adaequans. Unde non omnia quae in seipso Deus intelligit, angelus naturali cognitione capere potest: nec ad omnia quae angelus sua naturali virtute intelligit, humana ratio sufficit capienda. Sicut igitur maximae amentiae esset idiota qui ea quae a philosopho proponuntur falsa esse assereret propter hoc quod ea capere non potest, ita, et multo amplius, nimiae stultitiae est homo si ea quae divinitus angelorum ministerio revelantur falsa esse suspicatur ex hoc quod ratione investigari non possunt. Again, the same is easy to see from the degrees of intellects. For if one of two men perceives a thing with his intellect with greater subtlety, the one whose intellect is of a higher degree understands many things which the other is altogether unable to grasp, as instanced in a yokel who is utterly incapable of grasping the subtleties of philosophy. Now the angelic intellect surpasses the human intellect more than the intellect of the cleverest philosopher surpasses that of the most ignorant idiot: becuase this distance is contained within the limits of the human species, which the angelic intellect surpasses. For an angel knows God through a more excellent effect than does man, as much as the angel’s essence, through which he is led to know God by natural knowledge, is more excellent than sensible things, even than the soul itself, by which the human intellect mounts to the knowledge of God. And the divine intellect surpasses the angelic intellect much more than the angelic surpasses the human. For the divine intellect by its capacity equals the divine essence: hence God perfectly understands of himself what he is, and he knows all things that can be understood about him. But the angel does not know what God is by his natural knowledge, because the angel’s essence, by which he is led to the knowledge of God, is an effect unequal to the power of its cause. Consequently, an angel is unable to grasp by his natural knowledge all that God understands about himself, neither is human reason capable of grasping all that an angel understands by his natural power. Accordingly, just as a man would show himself to be a most insane fool if he declared the assertions of a philosopher to be false because he was unable to understand them, much more so would a man would be exceedingly foolish if he were to suspect of falsehood the things revealed by God through the ministry of his angels, because they cannot be the object of reason’s investigations. Adhuc idem manifeste apparet ex defectu quem in rebus cognoscendis quotidie experimur. Rerum enim sensibilium plurimas proprietates ignoramus, earumque proprietatum quas sensu apprehendimus rationes perfecte in pluribus invenire non possumus. Multo igitur amplius illius excellentissimae substantiae omnia intelligibilia humana ratio investigare non sufficit. Furthermore, the same is made abundantly clear by the deficiency which we experience every day in our knowledge of things. For we are ignorant of many of the properties of sensible things, and in many cases we are unable to discover the nature of those properties which we perceive by our senses. Much less, therefore, is human reason capable of investigating all the truths about that most sublime essence. Huic etiam consonat dictum Philosophi, qui in II Metaphys. asserit quod intellectus noster se habet ad prima entium, quae sunt manifestissima in natura, sicut oculus vespertilionis ad solem. This agrees with the saying of the Philosopher, where he says that our intellect is like the eye of a bat in relation to the sun in relation to those primary things which are most evident in nature (1a Metaphysics 1, 2). Huic etiam veritati sacra Scriptura testimonium perhibet. Dicitur enim Iob 11:7: forsitan vestigia Dei comprehendes, et omnipotentem usque ad perfectum reperies? Et 36:26: ecce, Deus magnus, vincens scientiam nostram. Et 1 Cor. 13:9: ex parte cognoscimus. To this truth Holy Writ also bears witness. For it is written: can you find out the deep things of God? Can you find out the limit of the Almighty? (Job 11:7), and: behold, God is great, exceeding our knowledge (Job 36:26), and: we know in part (1 Cor 13:9). Non igitur omne quod de Deo dicitur, quamvis ratione investigari non possit, statim quasi falsum abiiciendum est, ut Manichaei et plures infidelium putaverunt. Therefore, all that is said about God, though it cannot be investigated by reason, must not be immediately rejected as false, as the Manicheans and many unbelievers have thought. Caput 4 Chapter 4 Quod veritas divinorum ad quam naturalis ratio pertingit convenienter hominibus credenda proponitur That the truth about divine things which is attainable by reason is fittingly proposed to man as an object of belief Duplici igitur veritate divinorum intelligibilium existente, una ad quam rationis inquisitio pertingere potest, altera quae omne ingenium humanae rationis excedit, utraque convenienter divinitus homini credenda proponitur. While, then, the truth of the intelligible things of God is twofold—one to which the inquiry of reason can attain, the other which surpasses the whole range of human reason—both are fittingly proposed by God to man as an object of belief. Hoc autem de illa primo ostendendum est quae inquisitioni rationis pervia esse potest: ne forte alicui videatur, ex quo ratione haberi potest, frustra id supernaturali inspiratione credendum traditum esse. Sequerentur autem tria inconvenientia si huiusmodi veritas solummodo rationi inquirenda relinqueretur. We must first show this with regard to that truth which is attainable by the inquiry of reason, lest it appear to some that, since it can be attained by reason, it is useless to make it an object of faith by supernatural inspiration. Now, there would be three unsuitable consequences if this truth were left solely to the inquiry of reason. Unum est quod paucis hominibus Dei cognitio inesset. A fructu enim studiosae inquisitionis, qui est inventio veritatis, plurimi impediuntur tribus de causis. One is that few men would have knowledge of God. For very many are hindered from gathering the fruit of diligent inquiry, which is the discovery of truth, for three reasons. Quidam siquidem propter complexionis indispositionem, ex qua multi naturaliter sunt indispositi ad sciendum: unde nullo studio ad hoc pertingere possent ut summum gradum humanae cognitionis attingerent, qui in cognoscendo Deum consistit. Quidam vero impediuntur necessitate rei familiaris. Oportet enim esse inter homines aliquos qui temporalibus administrandis insistant, qui tantum tempus in otio contemplativae inquisitionis non possent expendere ut ad summum fastigium humanae inquisitionis pertingerent, scilicet Dei cognitionem. Quidam autem impediuntur pigritia. Ad cognitionem enim eorum quae de Deo ratio investigare potest, multa praecognoscere oportet: cum fere totius philosophiae consideratio ad Dei cognitionem ordinetur; propter quod metaphysica, quae circa divina versatur, inter philosophiae partes ultima remanet addiscenda. Sic ergo non nisi cum magno labore studii ad praedictae veritatis inquisitionem perveniri potest. Quem quidem laborem pauci subire volunt pro amore scientiae, cuius tamen mentibus hominum naturalem Deus inservit appetitum. Some, indeed, on account of an indisposition of temperament, from which many are naturally indisposed to knowledge, so that no efforts of theirs would enable them to reach to the attainment of the highest degree of human knowledge, which consists in knowing God. Some are hindered by the needs of household affairs. For there must be among men some that devote themselves to the conduct of temporal affairs, who would be unable to devote so much time to the leisure of contemplative research as to reach the summit of human inquiry, namely, the knowledge of God. And some are hindered by laziness. For in order to acquire the knowledge of God in those things which reason is able to investigate, one must have a previous knowledge of many things. For almost the entire consideration of philosophy is directed to the knowledge of God, on account of which metaphysics, which is about divine things, is the last of the parts of philosophy to be studied. Thus it is not possible to arrive at the inquiry about the aforesaid truth except after a most laborious study, and few are willing to take upon themselves this labor out of the love of knowledge, even though God has instilled natural desire for it in the minds of men. Secundum inconveniens est quod illi qui ad praedictae veritatis inventionem pervenirent, vix post longum tempus pertingerent. Tum propter huius veritatis profunditatem, ad quam capiendam per viam rationis non nisi post longum exercitium intellectus humanus idoneus invenitur. Tum etiam propter multa quae praeexiguntur, ut dictum est. Tum etiam propter hoc quod tempore iuventutis, dum diversis motibus passionum anima fluctuat, non est apta ad tam altae veritatis cognitionem, sed in quiescendo fit prudens et sciens, ut dicitur in VII Physic. Remaneret igitur humanum genus, si sola rationis via ad Deum cognoscendum pateret, in maximis ignorantiae tenebris: cum Dei cognitio, quae homines maxime perfectos et bonos facit, non nisi quibusdam paucis, et his etiam post temporis longitudinem proveniret. The second inconvenience is that those who would arrive at the discovery of the aforesaid truth would scarcely succeed in doing so after a long time. First, because this truth is so profound that the human intellect is only enabled to grasp it by reason after long practice. Second, because many things are required beforehand, as stated above. Third, because the mind is not fit for the knowledge of so sublime a truth at the time of youth, when tossed about by the various movements of the passions, but calm gives prudence and knowledge, as it says in 7 Physics 3, 7. Hence mankind would remain in the deepest darkness of ignorance if the path of reason were the only available way to the knowledge of God, because the knowledge of God, which especially makes men perfect and good, would be acquired only by the few, and by these only after a long time. Tertium inconveniens est quod investigationi rationis humanae plerumque falsitas admiscetur, propter debilitatem intellectus nostri in iudicando, et phantasmatum permixtionem. Et ideo apud multos in dubitatione remanerent ea quae sunt etiam verissime demonstrata, dum vim demonstrationis ignorant; et praecipue cum videant a diversis qui sapientes dicuntur, diversa doceri. Inter multa etiam vera quae demonstrantur, immiscetur aliquando aliquid falsum, quod non demonstratur, sed aliqua probabili vel sophistica ratione asseritur, quae interdum demonstratio reputatur. Et ideo oportuit per viam fidei fixam certitudinem et puram veritatem de rebus divinis hominibus exhiberi. The third inconvenience is that much falsehood is mingled with the investigations of human reason, on account of our intellect’s weakness in forming judgments, and the admixture of phantasms. Consequently, many would remain in doubt about those things even which are most truly demonstrated while ignoring the force of the demonstration, especially when they perceive that different things are taught by the various men who are called wise. Moreover, among the many demonstrated truths there is sometimes a mixture of falsehood, which is not demonstrated but asserted for some probable or sophistical reason which at times is mistaken for a demonstration. Therefore, it was necessary that definite certainty and pure truth about divine things should be offered to man by the way of faith. Salubriter ergo divina providit clementia ut ea etiam quae ratio investigare potest, fide tenenda praeciperet: ut sic omnes de facili possent divinae cognitionis participes esse et absque dubitatione et errore. Therefore, the divine clemency helpfully provides that even some things which reason is able to investigate are held by faith, so that all may share in the knowledge of God easily, and without doubt or error. Hinc est quod Ephes. 4:17 dicitur: iam non ambuletis sicut et gentes ambulant in vanitate sensus sui, tenebris obscuratum habentes intellectum. Et Isaiae 54:13: ponam universos filios tuos doctos a domino. Thus it is written, you must no longer live as the gentiles do, in the futility of their minds; they are darkened in their understanding (Eph 4:17–18), and: all your sons shall be taught by the Lord (Isa 54:13). Caput 5 Chapter 5 Quod ea quae ratione investigari non possunt convenienter fide tenenda hominibus proponuntur That those things which cannot be investigated by reason are fittingly proposed to man as an object of faith Videtur autem quibusdam fortasse non debere homini ad credendum proponi illa quae ratio investigare non sufficit cum divina sapientia unicuique secundum modum suae naturae provideat. Et ideo demonstrandum est quod necessarium sit homini divinitus credenda proponi etiam illa quae rationem excedunt. It may appear to some that those things which cannot be investigated by reason ought not to be proposed to man as an object of faith, because divine wisdom provides for each thing according to the mode of its nature. We must, therefore, prove that it is also necessary for those things which surpass reason to be proposed by God to man as an object of faith. Nullus enim desiderio et studio in aliquid tendit nisi sit ei praecognitum. Quia ergo ad altius bonum quam experiri in praesenti vita possit humana fragilitas, homines per divinam providentiam ordinantur, ut in sequentibus investigabitur, oportuit mentem evocari in aliquid altius quam ratio nostra in praesenti possit pertingere, ut sic disceret aliquid desiderare, et studio tendere in aliquid quod totum statum praesentis vitae excedit. Et hoc praecipue Christianae religioni competit, quae singulariter bona spiritualia et aeterna promittit: unde et in ea plurima humanum sensum excedentia proponuntur. Lex autem vetus, quae temporalia promissa habebat, pauca proposuit quae humanae rationis inquisitionem excederent. Secundum etiam hunc modum philosophis cura fuit, ad hoc ut homines a sensibilium delectationibus ad honestatem perducerent, ostendere esse alia bona his sensibilibus potiora, quorum gustu multo suavius qui vacant activis vel contemplativis virtutibus delectantur. For no man tends to do a thing by his desire and endeavor unless it be previously known to him. Thus, since man is directed by divine providence to a higher good than human frailty can attain in the present life, as we shall show in the sequel (bk. III), his mind had to be bidden to something higher than those things to which our reason can reach in the present life, so that he might learn to aspire and to tend by his endeavors to something surpassing the whole state of the present life. And this is especially true about the Christian religion, which alone promises spiritual and eternal goods, for which reason it proposes many things surpassing the thought of man. But the old law, which contained promises of temporal things, proposed few things above human inquiry. It was with this motive that the philosophers, to wean men from sensible pleasures to virtue, took care to show that there are other goods of greater account than those which appeal to the senses, the taste of which things affords much greater delight to those who devote themselves to active or contemplative virtues. Est etiam necessarium huiusmodi veritatem ad credendum hominibus proponi ad Dei cognitionem veriorem habendam. Tunc enim solum Deum vere cognoscimus quando ipsum esse credimus supra omne id quod de Deo cogitari ab homine possibile est: eo quod naturalem hominis cognitionem divina substantia excedit, ut supra ostensum est. Per hoc ergo quod homini de Deo aliqua proponuntur quae rationem excedunt, firmatur in homine opinio quod Deus sit aliquid supra id quod cogitare potest. Again, this truth needed to be proposed to man as an object of faith so that he may have truer knowledge of God. For we only know God truly when we believe that he is far above all that man can possibly think of God, for the divine essence surpasses man’s natural knowledge, as stated above (ch. 3). Thus, by the fact that certain things about God are proposed to man which surpass his reason, he is strengthened in his opinion that God is far above what he is able to think. Alia etiam utilitas inde provenit, scilicet praesumptionis repressio, quae est mater erroris. Sunt enim quidam tantum de suo ingenio praesumentes ut totam rerum naturam se reputent suo intellectu posse metiri, aestimantes scilicet totum esse verum quod eis videtur et falsum quod eis non videtur. Ut ergo ab hac praesumptione humanus animus liberatus ad modestam inquisitionem veritatis perveniat, necessarium fuit homini proponi quaedam divinitus quae omnino intellectum eius excederent. Another advantage results from this, namely, the checking of presumption, which is the mother of error. For there are some who presume so far on their wits that they think themselves capable of measuring the whole nature of things by their intellect, namely, thinking all things are true that seem so to them, and false which do not. Accordingly, so that man’s mind might be freed from this presumption and seek the truth humbly, it was necessary that God should propose to man certain things far surpassing his intellect. Apparet etiam alia utilitas ex dictis Philosophi in X Ethicor. Cum enim Simonides quidam homini praetermittendam divinam cognitionem persuaderet et humanis rebus ingenium applicandum, oportere inquiens humana sapere hominem et mortalia mortalem; contra eum Philosophus dicit quod homo debet se ad immortalia et divina trahere quantum potest. Unde in XI De animal. dicit, quod, quamvis parum sit quod de substantiis superioribus percipimus, tamen illud modicum est magis amatum et desideratum omni cognitione quam de substantiis inferioribus habemus. Dicit etiam in II Cael. et mund. quod cum de corporibus caelestibus quaestiones possint solvi parva et topica solutione, contingit auditori ut vehemens sit gaudium eius. Ex quibus omnibus apparet quod de rebus nobilissimis quantumcumque imperfecta cognitio maximam perfectionem animae confert. Yet another advantage is made apparent by the words of the Philosopher. For when a certain Simonides maintained that man should neglect the knowledge of God and apply his mind to human affairs, and declared that a man ought to relish human things, and a mortal, mortal things, the Philosopher contradicted him, saying that a man ought to devote himself to immortal and divine things as much as he can (10 Ethics 7, 8). Hence he says (in 11 On the Parts of Animals 1, 5) that though we perceive but little of higher substances, yet that little is more loved and desired than all the knowledge we have of lower substances. He also says (in 2 On the Heavens and the Earth 12, 1) that when questions about the heavenly bodies can be answered by a short and probable solution, the hearer rejoices greatly. All this shows that however imperfect the knowledge of the highest things may be, it bestows very great perfection on the soul.