Caput 20 Chapter 20 Quod Deus non est corpus That God is not a body Ex praemissis etiam ostenditur quod Deus non est corpus. From the foregoing we are also able to prove that God is not a body. Omne enim corpus, cum sit continuum, compositum est et partes habens. Deus autem non est compositus, ut ostensum est. Igitur corpus non est. For, since every body is a continuous substance, it is composite and has parts. Now God is not composite, as we have shown (ch. 18). Therefore, he is not a body. Praeterea. Omne quantum est aliquo modo in potentia: nam continuum est potentia divisibile in infinitum; numerus autem in infinitum est augmentabilis. Omne autem corpus est quantum. Ergo omne corpus est in potentia. Deus autem non est in potentia, sed actus purus, ut ostensum est. Ergo Deus non est corpus. Further. Every quantitative substance is somehow in potency: for that which is continuous is potentially divisible to infinity, and number can be infinitely augmented. Now every body is a quantitative substance. Therefore, every body is in potency. But God is not in potency, but is pure act, as shown above (ch. 16). Therefore, God is not a body. Adhuc. Si Deus est corpus, oportet quod sit aliquod corpus naturale: nam corpus mathematicum non est per se existens, ut Philosophus probat, eo quod dimensiones accidentia sunt. Non autem est corpus naturale: cum sit immobilis, ut ostensum est; omne autem corpus naturale mobile est. Deus igitur non est corpus. Again. If God were a body, he would have to be a physical body: for a mathematical body does not exist by itself, as the Philosopher proves (2 Metaphysics 5), since dimensions are accidents. Now, he is not a physical body: for he is immovable, as we have proved (ch. 13), and every physical body is movable. Therefore, God is not a body. Amplius. Omne corpus finitum est: quod tam de corpore circulari quam de recto probatur in I caeli et mundi. Quodlibet autem corpus finitum intellectu et imaginatione transcendere possumus. Si igitur Deus est corpus, intellectus et imaginatio nostra aliquid maius Deo cogitare possunt. Et sic Deus non est maior intellectu nostro. Quod est inconveniens. Non est igitur corpus. Moreover. Every body is finite, which is proved in regard both to spherical and to rectilinear bodies in 1 Coeli et Mundi 5. Now we are able by our intellect and imagination to soar above any finite body. Therefore, if God were a body, our intellect and imagination would be able to think of something greater than God, and thus God would not exceed our intellect, which is inadmissible. Therefore, he is not a body. Adhuc. Cognitio intellectiva certior est quam sensitiva. Invenitur autem aliquid subiectum sensui in rerum natura. Igitur et intellectui. Sed secundum ordinem obiectorum est ordo potentiarum, sicut et distinctio. Ergo super omnia sensibilia est aliquid intelligibile in rerum natura existens. Omne autem corpus in rebus existens est sensibile. Igitur super omnia corpora est aliquid accipere nobilius. Si igitur Deus est corpus, non erit primum et maximum ens. Furthermore. Intellective knowledge is more certain than sensitive. Now, among natural things we find some that are objects of sense; therefore, there are also some that are objects of intellect. But the order of powers is according to the order of objects, in the same way as their distinction. Therefore, above all sensible objects there is an intelligible object existing in natural things. But every body that exists among things is sensible. Therefore, above all bodies it is possible to find something more excellent. Therefore, if God were a body, he would not be the first and supreme being. Praeterea. Quolibet corpore non vivente res vivens est nobilior. Quolibet autem corpore vivente sua vita est nobilior: cum per hoc habeat supra alia corpora nobilitatem. Id igitur quo nihil est nobilius, corpus non est. Hoc autem est Deus. Igitur non est corpus. Again. A living thing is more excellent than any body devoid of life. Now, the life of a living body is more excellent than that body, since by it, it excels all other bodies. Therefore, that which is excelled by nothing is not a body. But such is God. Therefore, he is not a body. Item. Inveniuntur rationes philosophorum ad idem ostendendum procedentes ex aeternitate motus, in hunc modum. In omni motu sempiterno oportet quod primum movens non moveatur neque per se neque per accidens, sicut ex supra dictis patet. Corpus autem caeli movetur circulariter motu sempiterno. Ergo primus motor eius non movetur neque per se neque per accidens. Nullum autem corpus movet localiter nisi moveatur: eo quod oportet movens et motum esse simul; et sic corpus movens moveri oportet, ad hoc quod sit simul cum corpore moto. Nulla etiam virtus in corpore movet nisi per accidens moveatur: quia, moto corpore, movetur per accidens virtus corporis. Ergo primus motor caeli non est corpus neque virtus in corpore. Hoc autem ad quod ultimo reducitur motus caeli sicut ad primum movens immobile, est Deus. Deus igitur non est corpus. Moreover. We find the philosophers proving the same conclusion by arguments based on the eternity of movement, as follows. In all everlasting movement, the first mover must not be moved neither essentially nor accidentally, as we have proved above (ch. 13). Now, the body of the heavens is moved in a circle with an everlasting movement. Therefore, its first mover is not moved either essentially or accidentally. Now, no body causes local movement unless itself be moved, because moved and mover must be simultaneous; and thus the body that causes movement must be itself moved so it can be simultaneous with the body that is moved. Moreover, no power in a body causes movement unless it is moved accidentally, since, when the body is moved, the power of that body is moved accidentally. Therefore, the first mover of the heavens is neither a body nor a power residing in a body. Now, God is that to which the movement of the heavens is ultimately reduced as to the first immovable mover. Therefore, God is not a body. Adhuc. Nulla potentia infinita est potentia in magnitudine. Potentia primi motoris est potentia infinita. Ergo non est in aliqua magnitudine. Et sic Deus, qui est primus motor, neque est corpus neque est virtus in corpore. Again. No infinite power is a power residing in a magnitude. But the power of the first mover is an infinite power. Therefore, it does not reside in a magnitude. And thus God, who is the first mover, is neither a body nor a power residing in a body. Prima sic probatur. Si potentia magnitudinis alicuius est infinita, aut ergo erit magnitudinis finitae; aut infinitae. Magnitudo infinita nulla est, ut probatur in III Physic. et in I caeli et mundi. Magnitudinis autem finitae non est possibile esse potentiam infinitam. Et sic in nulla magnitudine potest esse potentia infinita. The first proposition is proved as follows. If a power residing in a magnitude be infinite, this magnitude is either finite or infinite. But there is no infinite magnitude, as proved in 3 Physics 5 and 1 Coeli et Mundi 5. And it is not possible for a finite magnitude to have an infinite power. Therefore, in no magnitude can there be an infinite power. Quod autem in magnitudine finita non possit esse potentia infinita, sic probatur. Aequalem effectum quem facit potentia minor in tempore maiori, facit potentia maior in tempore minori: qualiscumque sit ille effectus, sive sit secundum alterationem, sive secundum motum localem, sive secundum quemcumque alium motum. Sed potentia infinita est maior omni potentia finita. Ergo oportet quod in minori perficiat effectum, velocius movendo, quam potentia quaecumque finita. Nec potest esse quod in minori quod sit tempus. Relinquitur igitur quod hoc erit in indivisibili temporis. Et sic movere et moveri et motus erunt in instanti. Cuius contrarium demonstratum est in VI physicorum. That there cannot be an infinite power in a finite magnitude is proved thus. A great power produces in less time the same effect which a lesser power produces in more time, whatever kind this effect may be, whether of alteration, of local movement, or of any other kind of movement. Now, an infinite power surpasses every finite power. It follows, therefore, that it produces its effect more rapidly by causing a more rapid movement than any finite power. Nor can this greater rapidity be one of time. Therefore, it follows that the effect is produced in an indivisible point of time. And thus moving, being moved, and movement will be instantaneous, the contrary of which has been proved in 6 Physics 3. Quod autem non possit potentia infinita magnitudinis finitae movere in tempore, sic iterum probatur. Sit potentia infinita quae est a. Accipiatur pars eius quae est ab. Pars igitur ista movebit in tempore maiori. Oportebit tamen esse aliquam proportionem huius temporis ad tempus in quo movet tota potentia: cum utrumque tempus sit finitum. Sint igitur haec duo tempora in decupla proportione se ad invicem habentia: non enim quantum ad hanc rationem differt istam vel aliam proportionem dicere. Si autem addatur ad potentiam praedictam finitam, diminui oportebit de tempore secundum proportionem additionis ad potentiam: cum maior potentia in minori tempore moveat. Si ergo addatur decuplum, illa potentia movebit in tempore quod erit decima pars temporis in quo movebat prima pars accepta infinitae potentiae, scilicet ab. Et tamen haec potentia quae est decuplum eius, est potentia finita: cum habeat proportionem determinatam ad potentiam finitam. Relinquitur igitur quod in aequali tempore movet potentia finita et infinita. Quod est impossibile. Non igitur potentia infinita magnitudinis finitae potest movere in tempore aliquo. That an infinite power of a finite magnitude cannot cause movement in time is proved thus. Let A be an infinite power, and AB a part thereof. Therefore, this part will cause movement in more time. And yet there must be proportion between this time and the time in which the whole power causes movement, since both times are finite. Suppose, then, these two times to be in proportion as 1 to 10 (for it does not affect this argument whether we take this or any other ratio). Now, if we increase the aforesaid finite power, we must decrease the time in proportion to the increase of the power, since a greater power causes movement in less time. If, therefore, we increase it tenfold, that power will cause movement in a time which will be one-tenth of the time occupied by the first part that we took of the infinite power (namely, AB). And yet, this power which is ten times the aforesaid power is a finite power, since it has a fixed proportion to a finite power. It follows, therefore, that a finite power and an infinite power cause movement in an equal time, which is impossible. Therefore, an infinite power of a finite magnitude cannot cause movement in any time. Quod autem potentia primi motoris sit infinita, sic probatur. Nulla potentia finita potest movere tempore infinito. Sed potentia primi motoris movet in tempore infinito: quia motus primus est sempiternus. Ergo potentia primi motoris est infinita. Prima sic probatur. Si aliqua potentia finita alicuius corporis movet tempore infinito, pars illius corporis, habens partem potentiae, movebit in tempore minori: quia quanto aliquid est maioris potentiae, tanto in maiori tempore motum continuare poterit; et sic pars praedicta movebit tempore finito, maior autem pars in maiori tempore movere poterit. Et sic semper, secundum quod addetur ad potentiam motoris, addetur ad tempus secundum eandem proportionem. Sed additio aliquoties facta perveniet ad quantitatem totius, vel etiam excedet. Ergo et additio ex parte temporis perveniet ad quantitatem temporis in quo movet totum. Tempus autem in quo totum movebat, dicebatur esse infinitum. Ergo tempus finitum metietur tempus infinitum. Quod est impossibile. That the power of the first mover is infinite is proved thus. No finite power can cause movement in an infinite time. Now, the power of the first mover causes movement in an infinite time, since the first movement is eternal. Therefore, the power of the first mover is infinite. The first proposition is proved thus. If any finite power of a body causes movement in infinite time, a part of that body (having a part of that power) will cause movement during less time, since a thing will be able to continue a movement for a length of time proportionate to its power: and thus the aforesaid part will cause movement in finite time, and a greater part will be able to cause movement during more time. And so always: we increase the time in the same proportion as we increase the power of the mover. But if this increase be made a certain number of times we shall come to the quantity of the whole, or even go beyond it. Therefore, also the increase on the part of the time will reach the quantity of time in which the whole causes movement. And yet the time in which the whole causes movement was supposed to be infinite. Consequently, a finite time will measure an infinite time, which is impossible. Sed contra hunc processum plures sunt obiectiones. However, there are several objections to this chain of reasoning. Quarum una est, quia potest poni quod illud corpus quod movet primum motum, non est divisibile: sicut patet de corpore caelesti. Praedicta autem probatio procedit ex divisione eius. One of these is that it could be held that the body which moves the first thing moved is not divisible, as is the case of a heavenly body. But the argument given above supposes it to be divided. Sed ad hoc dicendum quod conditionalis potest esse vera cuius antecedens est impossibile. Et si quid est quod destruat veritatem talis conditionalis, est impossibile: sicut, si aliquis destrueret veritatem huius conditionalis, si homo volat, habet alas, esset impossibile. Et secundum modum hunc intelligendus est processus probationis praedictae. Quia haec conditionalis est vera, si corpus caeleste dividitur, pars eius erit minoris potentiae quam totum. Huius autem conditionalis veritas tollitur si ponatur primum movens esse corpus, propter impossibilia quae sequuntur. Unde patet hoc esse impossibile. Et similiter potest responderi si fiat obiectio de augmento potentiarum finitarum. Quia non est accipere in rerum natura potentias secundum omnem proportionem quam habet tempus ad tempus quodcumque. Est tamen conditionalis vera, qua in praedicta probatione indigetur. To this we reply that a conditional clause may be true even if its antecedent is impossible. And if there is anything to disprove such a conditional, the antecedent is impossible. For example, if anyone disprove this conditional: ‘If a man flies, he has wings,’ the antecedent would be impossible. It is in this way that we are to understand the process of the aforesaid reasoning. For this conditional is true: ‘If a heavenly body be divided, its part will have less power than the whole.’ But this conditional is disproved if we suppose that the first mover is a body, on account of the impossibilities that follow. Therefore, it is clear that this is impossible. We can reply in the same way if there is an objection to the increase of finite powers. For it is impossible in natural things to find powers according to any proportion that there is between one time and any other time. And yet the conditional required in the aforesaid argument is true. Secunda obiectio est quia, etsi corpus dividitur, aliqua virtus potest esse alicuius corporis quae non dividitur diviso corpore: sicut anima rationalis non dividitur diviso corpore. The second objection is that, even if a body is divided, it is possible for a power of a body not to be divided when the body is divided: for example, the rational soul is not divided when the body is divided. Et ad hoc est dicendum quod per processum praedictum non probatur quod non sit Deus coniunctus corpori sicut anima rationalis corpori humano: sed quod non est virtus in corpore sicut virtus materialis, quae dividitur ad divisionem corporis. Unde etiam dicitur de intellectu humano quod non est corpus neque virtus in corpore. Quod autem Deus, non sit unitus corpori sicut anima, alterius rationis est. To this we reply that by the above argument it is not proved that God is not united to the body as the rational soul is united to the human body, but that he is not a power residing in a body like a material power, which is divided when the body is divided. Therefore, it is also said of the human intellect that it is neither a body nor a power in a body (see bk. II, ch. 56). That God is not united to the body as its soul is another question (see ch. 27). Tertia obiectio est quia, si cuiuslibet corporis est potentia finita, ut in praedicto processu ostenditur; per potentiam autem finitam non potest aliquid durare tempore infinito: sequetur quod nullum corpus possit durare tempore infinito. Et sic corpus caeleste de necessitate corrumpetur. The third objection is that if the power of every body is finite (as is proved in the above process), and if a finite power cannot make its effect to endure an infinite time, it will follow that no body can endure an infinite time, and consequently that a heavenly body will be necessarily corrupted. Ad hoc autem a quibusdam respondetur quod corpus caeleste secundum potentiam suam potest deficere, sed perpetuitatem durationis acquirit ab alio quod est potentiae infinitae. Et huic solutioni videtur attestari Plato, qui de corporibus caelestibus Deum loquentem inducit in hunc modum: natura vestra estis dissolubilia, voluntate autem mea indissolubilia: quia voluntas mea maior est nexu vestro. Some reply to this that a heavenly body in respect of its own power is defectible, but acquires everlastingness from another that has infinite power. Apparently Plato (Timaeus 41) approves of this solution, for he represents God as speaking of the heavenly bodies as follows: by your nature you are corruptible, but by my will incorruptible, because my will is greater than your necessity. Hanc autem solutionem improbat Commentator, in XI Metaph. Nam impossibile est, secundum eum, quod id quod est de se possibile non esse, acquirat perpetuitatem essendi ab alio. Sequeretur enim quod corruptibile mutetur in incorruptibilitatem. Quod est impossibile secundum ipsum. Et ideo ipse in hunc modum respondet: quod in corpore caelesti omnis potentia quae est, finita est: non tamen oportet quod habeat omnem potentiam; est enim in corpore caelesti, secundum Aristotelem, in VIII Metaph., potentia ad ubi, sed non ad esse. Et sic non oportet quod insit ei potentia ad non esse. But the Commentator refutes this solution in 11 Metaphysics. For it is impossible, according to him, that what in itself may possibly not be, should acquire everlastingness of being from another, since it would follow that the corruptible is changed into incorruptibility. And this, in his opinion, is impossible. Therefore, he replies after this fashion: in a heavenly body whatever power there is, is finite, and yet it does not follow that it has all power; for, according to Aristotle, in 8 Metaphysics 4, 6, the potency to be somewhere is in a heavenly body, but not the potency to be. And thus it does not follow that it has a potency to not be. Sciendum tamen quod haec responsio Commentatoris non est sufficiens. Quia, etsi detur quod in corpore caelesti non sit potentia quasi passiva ad esse, quae est potentia materiae, est tamen in eo potentia quasi activa, quae est virtus essendi: cum expresse Aristoteles dicat, in I caeli et mundi, quod caelum habet virtutem ut sit semper. It must be observed, however, that this reply of the Commentator is insufficient. Because, even if it is granted that in a heavenly body there is no quasi-potency to be (which potency is that of matter), there is nevertheless in it a quasi-active potency, which is the power of being, since Aristotle says explicitly in 1 Coeli et Mundi 3, 4; 12, 3 that the heaven has the power to be always. Et ideo melius dicendum est quod, cum potentia dicatur ad actum, oportet iudicare de potentia secundum modum actus. Motus autem de sui ratione quantitatem habet et extensionem: unde duratio eius infinita requirit quod potentia movens sit infinita. Esse autem non habet aliquam extensionem quantitatis: praecipue in re cuius esse est invariabile, sicut caelum. Et ideo non oportet quod virtus essendi sit infinita in corpore finito, licet in infinitum duret: quia non differt quod per illam virtutem aliquid duret in uno instanti vel tempore infinito, cum esse illud invariabile non attingatur a tempore nisi per accidens. Hence it is better to reply that, since power implies relation to act, we should judge of power according to the mode of the act. Now movement by its very nature has quantity and extension. Hence its infinite duration requires that the moving power should be infinite. On the other hand, being has no quantitative extension, especially in a thing whose being is invariable, such as the heaven. Hence it does not follow that the power of being a finite body is infinite though its duration be infinite, because it matters not whether that power make a thing to last for an instant or for an infinite time, since that invariable being is not affected by time except accidentally. Quarta obiectio est de hoc quod non videtur esse necessarium quod id quod movet tempore infinito, habeat potentiam infinitam, in illis moventibus quae movendo non alterantur. Quia talis motus nihil consumit de potentia eorum: unde non minore tempore movere possunt postquam aliquo tempore moverunt quam ante; sicut solis virtus finita est, et, quia in agendo eius virtus activa non minuitur, infinito tempore potest agere in haec inferiora, secundum naturam. The fourth objection is that the statement ‘that what causes movement in infinite time must have an infinite power', does not necessarily apply to those movers which are not altered by moving. For such a movement consumes nothing of their power; therefore, they can cause movement for no less time after they have moved for a certain time than before. Thus the power of the sun is finite, and, because its power is not diminished on account of its action, it can act on this lower world for an infinite time, according to nature. Et ad hoc dicendum est quod corpus non movet nisi motum, ut probatum est. Et ideo, si contingat corpus aliquod non moveri, sequetur ipsum non movere. In omni autem quod movetur est potentia ad opposita: quia termini motus sunt oppositi. Et ideo, quantum est de se, omne corpus quod movetur possibile est non moveri. Et quod possibile est non moveri, non habet de se ut perpetuo tempore moveatur. Et sic nec quod in perpetuo tempore moveat. To this we reply that a body does not move unless it is moved, as we have shown. Therefore, supposing a body not to be moved, it follows that it does not move. Now in anything that is moved there is potency to opposites, since the terms of movement are opposite to one another. Consequently, considered in itself, every body that is moved is possibly not moved. And that which is possibly not moved is not able of itself to be moved for an everlasting time, and consequently neither is it apt to move for a perpetual time. Procedit ergo praedicta demonstratio de potentia finita corporis finiti, quae non potest de se movere tempore infinito. Sed corpus quod de se possibile est moveri et non moveri, movere et non movere, acquirere potest perpetuitatem motus ab aliquo. Quod oportet esse incorporeum. Et ideo oportet primum movens esse incorporeum. Et sic nihil prohibet secundum naturam corpus finitum, quod acquirit ab alio perpetuitatem in moveri, habere etiam perpetuitatem in movere: nam et ipsum primum corpus caeleste, secundum naturam, potest perpetuo motu inferiora corpora caelestia revolvere, secundum quod sphaera movet sphaeram. Accordingly, the demonstration given above is based on the finite power of a finite body, which power cannot of itself move in an infinite time. But a body which of itself is possibly moved and not moved, and possibly moves and does not move, can acquire perpetual movement from some cause; and this cause must be incorporeal. Thus the first mover must be incorporeal. Hence, according to nature, nothing hinders a finite body, which acquires from another cause perpetuity in being moved, from having also perpetuity in moving: for likewise the first heavenly body, according to nature, can cause a perpetual circular movement in the lower bodies, according as one sphere moves another. Nec est inconveniens secundum Commentatorem quod illud quod de se est in potentia moveri et non moveri, acquirat ab alio perpetuitatem motus, sicut ponebatur esse impossibile de perpetuitate essendi. Nam motus est quidam defluxus a movente in mobile: et ideo potest aliquod mobile acquirere ab alio perpetuitatem motus, quam non habet de se. Esse autem est aliquid fixum et quietum in ente: et ideo quod de se est in potentia ad non esse, non potest, ut ipse dicit, secundum viam naturae acquirere ab alio perpetuitatem essendi. Nor is it impossible for that which is of itself in potency to being moved and not moved to acquire perpetual movement from something else, as the Commentator supposed it impossible as regards perpetuity of being. For movement is a kind of outflow from the mover to the thing movable, and consequently a movable thing can acquire perpetual movement from something else without having it by nature. On the other hand, ‘to be’ is something fixed and resting in a being, and consequently that which is of itself in potency to not be, cannot, as he says, in the course of nature acquire from something else perpetuity of being. Quinta obiectio est quod per praedictum processum non videtur maior ratio quare non sit potentia infinita in magnitudine quam extra magnitudinem: nam utrobique sequetur quod moveat non in tempore. The fifth objection is that, according to the above reasoning, there does not appear to be more reason why there should not be an infinite power in a magnitude than outside a magnitude: for in either case it would follow that it moves in non-time. Et ad hoc dicendum quod finitum et infinitum in magnitudine et tempore et motu inveniuntur secundum unam rationem, sicut probatur in III et in VI Physic.: et ideo infinitum in uno eorum aufert proportionem finitam in aliis. In his autem quae carent magnitudine, non est finitum et infinitum nisi aequivoce. Unde praedictus modus demonstrandi in talibus potentiis locum non habet. To this it may be replied that finite and infinite are found in a magnitude, in time, and in movement in a univocal sense, as proved in 3 Physics 4, 11 and 6 Physics 2, 8: hence the infinite in one of them removes a finite proportion in the others. But in things lacking magnitude there is neither finite nor infinite, unless equivocally. Hence the above course of reasoning has no place in such powers. Aliter autem respondetur et melius, quod caelum habet duos motores: unum proximum, qui est finitae virtutis, et ab hoc habet quod motus eius sit finitae velocitatis; et alium remotum, qui est infinitae virtutis, a quo habet quod motus eius possit esse infinitae durationis. Et sic patet quod potentia infinita quae non est in magnitudine, potest movere corpus non immediate in tempore. Sed potentia quae est in magnitudine oportet quod moveat immediate: cum nullum corpus moveat nisi motum. Unde, si moveret, sequeretur quod moveret in non tempore. But another and better answer is that the heaven has two movers. One is its proximate mover, which is of finite power, and from this its movement is of finite velocity. The other is its remote mover, which is of infinite power, from which its movement can be of infinite duration. Thus it is clear that an infinite power which is not in a magnitude can move a body not immediately in time, whereas a power which is in a magnitude must move immediately, since no body moves without itself being moved. Therefore, if it moved, it would follow that it moves in non-time. Potest adhuc melius dici quod potentia quae non est in magnitudine est intellectus, et movet per voluntatem. Unde movet secundum exigentiam mobilis, et non secundum proportionem suae virtutis. Potentia autem quae est in magnitudine non potest movere nisi per necessitatem naturae: quia probatum est quod intellectus non est virtus corporea. Et sic movet de necessitate secundum proportionem suae quantitatis. Unde sequitur, si movet, quod moveat in instanti. Better still, it may be replied that a power which is not in a magnitude is an intellect, and moves by its will. Hence it moves according to the requirement of the movable and not according to the proportion of its strength. On the other hand, a power that is in a magnitude cannot move save by natural necessity, for it has been proved that the intellect is not a bodily force. Therefore, it causes movement necessarily, according to the proportion of its quantity. Hence it follows that if it moves anything it moves it instantaneously. Secundum hoc ergo, remotis praedictis obiectionibus, procedit demonstratio Aristotelis. In this sense, then, the foregoing objections being refuted, the reasoning of Aristotle follows. Amplius. Nullus motus qui est a movente corporeo potest esse continuus et regularis: eo quod movens corporale in motu locali movet attrahendo vel expellendo; id autem quod attrahitur vel expellitur non in eadem dispositione se habet ad moventem a principio motus usque ad finem, cum quandoque sit propinquius, quandoque remotius; et sic nullum corpus potest movere motum continuum et regularem. Motus autem primus est continuus et regularis, ut probatur in VIII Physic. Igitur movens primum motum non est corpus. Moreover. No movement that proceeds from a bodily mover can be continuous and regular, because a bodily mover, in local movement, moves by attraction or repulsion, and that which is attracted or repelled is not disposed in the same way towards its mover from the beginning to the end of the movement, since at one time it is nearer to it and at another time further from it. And thus no body can cause a continuous and regular movement. On the other hand, the first movement is continuous and regular, as is proved in 8 Physics 7. Therefore, the mover of the first movement is not a body. Item. Nullus motus qui est ad finem qui exit de potentia in actum, potest esse perpetuus: quia, cum perventum fuerit ad actum, motus quiescit. Si ergo motus primus est perpetuus, oportet quod sit ad finem qui sit semper et omnibus modis in actu. Tale autem non est aliquod corpus neque aliqua virtus in corpore: cum omnia huiusmodi sint mobilia per se vel per accidens. Igitur finis primi motus non est corpus neque virtus in corpore. Finis autem primi motus est primum movens, quod movet sicut desideratum. Hoc autem est Deus. Deus igitur neque est corpus neque virtus in corpore. Again. No movement that tends towards an end which passes from potency to act can be perpetual, since, when it arrives at act, the movement ceases. If, therefore, the first movement is perpetual, it must be towards an end which is always and in every way actual. Now such is neither a body nor a power residing in a body, because these are all movable either essentially or accidentally. Therefore, the end of the first movement is not a body nor a power residing in a body. Now the end of the first movement is the first mover, which moves as the object of desire. And that is God. Therefore, God is neither a body nor a power residing in a body.