Caput 28 Chapter 28 De perfectione divina Of the divine perfection Licet autem ea quae sunt et vivunt, perfectiora sint quam ea quae tantum sunt, Deus tamen qui non est aliud quam suum esse, est universaliter ens perfectum. Et dico universaliter perfectum, cui non deest alicuius generis nobilitas. Now, although things that exist and live are more perfect than those which only exist, yet God, who is not distinct from his own existence, is universally perfect being. And by universally perfect I mean that he lacks not the excellence of any genus. Omnis enim nobilitas cuiuscumque rei est sibi secundum suum esse: nulla enim nobilitas esset homini ex sua sapientia nisi per eam sapiens esset, et sic de aliis. Sic ergo secundum modum quo res habet esse, est suus modus in nobilitate: nam res secundum quod suum esse contrahitur ad aliquem specialem modum nobilitatis maiorem vel minorem, dicitur esse secundum hoc nobilior vel minus nobilis. Igitur si aliquid est cui competit tota virtus essendi, ei nulla nobilitatum deesse potest quae alicui rei conveniat. Sed rei quae est suum esse, competit esse secundum totam essendi potestatem: sicut, si esset aliqua albedo separata, nihil ei de virtute albedinis deesse posset; nam alicui albo aliquid de virtute albedinis deest ex defectu recipientis albedinem, quae eam secundum modum suum recipit, et fortasse non secundum totum posse albedinis. Deus igitur, qui est suum esse, ut supra probatum est, habet esse secundum totam virtutem ipsius esse. Non potest ergo carere aliqua nobilitate quae alicui rei conveniat. For every excellence of anything whatsoever is ascribed to it in respect of its being: for no excellence would accrue to man from his wisdom unless he were wise by it, and likewise with other things. Therefore, a thing’s mode of excellence is according to its mode of being: for according as its being is drawn to some special mode of excellence more or less great, it is said to be more or less excellent. Hence, if there be a thing to which the whole possibility of being belongs, it cannot lack any excellence that belongs to anything. Now, to a thing which is its own being, being belongs according to the whole possibility of being. Thus, if there were a separate whiteness, nothing of the whole possibility of whiteness could be wanting to it: for something of the possibility of whiteness is lacking to a particular white thing through a defect in the recipient of whiteness, which receives it according to its mode and, maybe, not according to the whole possibility of whiteness. Therefore, God, who is his own being, as shown above (ch. 22), has being according to the whole possibility of being itself: consequently, he cannot lack any excellence that belongs to anything. Sicut autem omnis nobilitas et perfectio inest rei secundum quod est, ita omnis defectus inest ei secundum quod aliqualiter non est. Deus autem, sicut habet esse totaliter, ita ab eo totaliter absistit non esse: quia per modum per quem habet aliquid esse, deficit a non esse. A Deo ergo omnis defectus absistit. Est igitur universaliter perfectus. And just as every excellence and perfection is in a thing according to its being, so every defect is in a thing according as that thing, in some sense, is not. Now, just as God has being wholly, so is non-being wholly absent from him, since according as a thing has being it fails in non-being. Therefore, all defect is removed from God, and consequently he is universally perfect. Illa vero quae tantum sunt, non sunt imperfecta propter imperfectionem ipsius esse absoluti: non enim ipsa habent esse secundum suum totum posse, sed participant esse per quendam particularem modum et imperfectissimum. But those things which only exist are imperfect not on account of an imperfection in absolute being itself (for they do not have being according to its whole possibility), but because they participate in being in a particular and most imperfect way. Item. Omne imperfectum ab aliquo perfecto necesse est ut praecedatur: semen enim est ab animali vel a planta. Igitur primum ens oportet esse perfectissimum. Ostensum est autem Deum esse primum ens. Est igitur perfectissimus. Again. Every imperfect thing must be preceded by some perfect thing: for example, seed is from some animal or plant. Therefore, the first being must be supremely perfect. Now it has been shown (ch. 13) that God is the first being. Therefore, he is supremely perfect. Amplius. Unumquodque perfectum est inquantum est actu; imperfectum autem secundum quod est potentia cum privatione actus. Id igitur quod nullo modo est potentia sed est actus purus, oportet perfectissimum esse. Tale autem Deus est. Est igitur perfectissimus. Moreover. A thing is perfect insofar as it is in act, and imperfect insofar as it is in potency and void of act. Therefore, that which is no way in potency but is pure act must be most perfect. Now such is God (ch. 16). Therefore, he is most perfect. Amplius. Nihil agit nisi secundum quod est in actu. Actio igitur consequitur modum actus in agente. Impossibile est igitur effectum qui per actionem educitur, esse in nobiliori actu quam sit actus agentis: possibile est tamen actum effectus imperfectiorem esse quam sit actus causae agentis, eo quod actio potest debilitari ex parte eius in quod terminatur. In genere autem causae efficientis fit reductio ad unam primam quae Deus dicitur, ut ex dictis patet, a quo sunt omnes res, ut in sequentibus ostendetur. Oportet igitur quicquid actu est in quacumque re alia, inveniri in Deo multo eminentius quam sit in re illa, non autem e converso. Est igitur Deus perfectissimus. Further. Nothing acts except according as it is in act: therefore, action follows upon the mode of act in the agent. And consequently it is impossible for the effect that results from an action to have a more excellent act than that of the agent, although it is possible for the act of the effect to be more imperfect than that of the active cause, since action may be weakened on the part of that in which it terminates. Now in the genus of efficient cause we come at length to the one cause which is called God, as explained above (ch. 13), from whom all things proceed, as we shall show in the sequel (bk. II, ch. 15). Therefore, it follows that whatever is actual in any other thing is found in God much more eminently than in that thing, and not conversely. Therefore, God is most perfect. Item. In unoquoque genere est aliquid perfectissimum in genere illo, ad quod omnia quae sunt illius generis mensurantur: quia ex eo unumquodque ostenditur magis vel minus perfectum esse, quod ad mensuram sui generis magis vel minus appropinquat; sicut album dicitur esse mensura in omnibus coloribus, et virtuosus inter omnes homines. Id autem quod est mensura omnium entium non potest esse aliud quam Deus, qui est suum esse. Ipsi igitur nulla deest perfectionum quae aliquibus rebus conveniat: alias non esset omnium communis mensura. Again. In every genus there is some thing most perfect in that genus, by which every thing in that genus is measured, since everything is shown to be more or less perfect according as it approaches more or less to the measure of that genus. Thus white is said to be the measure in all colors, and the virtuous among all men. Now the measure of all beings can be none other than God, who is his own being. Therefore, no perfection that belongs to any thing is lacking to him, otherwise he would not be the universal measure of all. Hinc est quod, cum quaereret Moyses divinam videre faciem seu gloriam, responsum est ei a domino, ego ostendam tibi omne bonum, ut habetur Exod. 33:19, per hoc dans intelligere in se omnis bonitatis plenitudinem esse. Dionysius etiam, in V cap. de Div. Nom. dicit: Deus non quodam modo est existens, sed simpliciter et incircumscriptive totum esse in seipso accepit et praeaccepit. Hence it is that when Moses sought to see the face of God, the Lord answered him: I will make all goodness pass before you (Exod 33:19), giving thus to understand that the fullness of all good is in him. And Dionysius (On the Divine Names 5) says: God exists not in any single mode, but embraces and prepossesses all being within himself, absolutely and without limit. Sciendum tamen est quod perfectio Deo convenienter attribui non potest si nominis significatio quantum ad sui originem attendatur: quod enim factum non est, nec perfectum posse dici videtur. Sed quia omne quod fit, de potentia in actum deductum est et de non esse in esse quando factum est, tunc recte perfectum esse dicitur, quasi totaliter factum, quando potentia totaliter est ad actum reducta, ut nihil de non esse retineat, sed habeat esse completum. Per quandam igitur nominis extensionem perfectum dicitur non solum quod fiendo pervenit ad actum completum, sed id etiam quod est in actu completo absque omni factione. Et sic Deum perfectum esse dicimus, secundum illud Matth. 5:48: estote perfecti sicut et pater vester caelestis perfectus est. It must, however, be observed that perfection cannot fittingly be ascribed to God if we consider the meaning of the word in respect of its derivation, since what is not made cannot, it seems, be described as perfect. Yet since whatever is made has been brought from potency to act, and from non-being to being, when it was made; it is rightly described as perfect (that is, completely made) when its potency is completely reduced to act, so that it retains nothing of non-being, and has complete being. Accordingly, by a kind of extension of the term, ‘perfect’ is applied not only to that which has arrived at complete act through being made, but also to that which is in complete act without being made at all. It is thus that we say that God is perfect, according to Matthew 5:48: be you perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect. Caput 29 Chapter 29 De similitudine creaturarum Of the likeness of creatures Ex hoc autem quomodo in rebus possit similitudo ad Deum inveniri vel non possit, considerari potest. In sequence to the above we may consider in what way it is possible to find in things a likeness to God, and in what way it is impossible. Effectus enim a suis causis deficientes non conveniunt cum eis in nomine et ratione, necesse est tamen aliquam inter ea similitudinem inveniri: de natura enim actionis est ut agens sibi simile agat cum unumquodque agat secundum quod actu est. Unde forma effectus in causa excedente invenitur quidem aliqualiter, sed secundum alium modum et aliam rationem, ratione cuius causa aequivoca dicitur. Sol enim in corporibus inferioribus calorem causat agendo secundum quod actu est; unde oportet quod calor a sole generatus aliqualem similitudinem obtineat ad virtutem activam solis, per quam calor in istis inferioribus causatur, ratione cuius sol calidus dicitur, quamvis non una ratione. Et sic sol omnibus illis similis aliqualiter dicitur in quibus suos effectus efficaciter inducit: a quibus tamen rursus omnibus dissimilis est, inquantum huiusmodi effectus non eodem modo possident calorem et huiusmodi quo in sole invenitur. Ita etiam et Deus omnes perfectiones rebus tribuit, ac per hoc cum omnibus similitudinem habet et dissimilitudinem simul. For effects that fall short of their causes do not agree with them in name and meaning, and yet there must be some likeness between them, because it is of the nature of action that a like agent should produce a like action, since every thing acts according as it is in act. Therefore, the form of the effect is found in its transcendent cause somewhat, but in another way and with another meaning: for which reason that cause is called equivocal. For the sun causes heat in lower bodies by acting according as it is in act; therefore, the heat generated by the sun must bear some likeness to the sun’s active power by which heat is caused in those lower bodies and by reason of which the sun is said to be hot, although with a different meaning. And thus it is said to be somewhat like all those things on which it efficaciously produces its effects, and yet again it is unlike them all insofar as these effects do not possess heat and so forth in the same way as they are found in the sun. Thus also God bestows all perfections on things, and in consequence he is both like and unlike all. Et inde est quod sacra Scriptura aliquando similitudinem inter eum et creaturam commemorat, ut cum dicitur Gen. 1:26: faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram; aliquando similitudo negatur, secundum illud Isaiae 40:18: cui ergo similem fecistis Deum, aut quam imaginem ponetis ei? Et in Psalmo: Deus, quis similis erit tibi? Hence it is that Sacred Scripture sometimes recalls the likeness between him and his creatures, as when it is said: let us make man to our image and likeness (Gen 1:26): while sometimes this likeness is denied, according to the words of Isaiah: to whom then will you liken God, or what likeness compare with him? (Isa 40:18). And of the Psalm: O God, who shall be like to you? (Ps 83[82]:2). Huic autem rationi Dionysius concordat, qui in IX cap. de Div. Nom. dicit: eadem similia sunt Deo et dissimilia: similia quidem, secundum imitationem eius qui non est perfecte imitabilis, qualem in eis contingit esse; dissimilia autem, secundum quod causata habent minus suis causis. Dionysius is in agreement with this argument, for he says (On the Divine Names 9): the same things are like and unlike to God; like, according as they imitate him, as far as they can, who is not perfectly imitable; unlike, according as effects fall short of their causes. Secundum tamen hanc similitudinem convenientius dicitur Deo creatura similis quam e converso. Simile enim alicui dicitur quod eius possidet qualitatem vel formam. Quia igitur id quod in Deo perfecte est, in rebus aliis per quandam deficientem participationem invenitur, illud secundum quod similitudo attenditur, Dei quidem simpliciter est, non autem creaturae. Et sic creatura habet quod Dei est: unde et Deo recte similis dicitur. Non autem sic potest dici Deum habere quod creaturae est. Unde nec convenienter dicitur Deum creaturae similem esse: sicut nec hominem dicimus suae imagini esse similem, cui tamen sua imago recte similis enuntiatur. However, according to this likeness, it is more fitting to say that the creature is like God than vice versa. For one thing is like another when it possesses a quality or form of it. Since, then, what is in God perfectly is found in other things by way of an imperfect participation, that in which likeness is observed is God’s simply, but not the creature’s. And thus the creature has what is God’s, and therefore is rightly said to be like God. But it cannot be said in this way that God has what belongs to his creature: therefore, it is not fitting to say that God is like his creature, as neither do we say that a man is like his portrait, although we declare that his portrait is like him. Multo etiam minus proprie dicitur quod Deus creaturae similetur. Nam assimilatio motum ad similitudinem dicit et sic competit et quod ab alio accipit unde simile sit. Creatura autem accipit a Deo unde ei sit similis: non autem e converso. Non igitur Deus creaturae assimilatur, sed magis e converso. And much less properly can it be said that God is assimilated to the creature. For assimilation denotes movement towards similarity, and consequently applies to one that receives its similarity from another. But the creature receives from God its similarity to him, and not vice versa. Therefore, God is not assimilated to his creature, but rather vice versa. Caput 30 Chapter 30 Quae nomina de Deo possint praedicari What terms can be predicated of God Ex his etiam considerari potest quid de Deo dici vel non dici possit, quidve de eo tantum dicatur, quid etiam de eo simul et aliis rebus. From these, we may also consider what can and what cannot be said of God, as well as what is said of him alone, and what is said of him together with other beings. Quia enim omnem perfectionem creaturae est in Deo invenire sed per alium modum eminentiorem, quaecumque nomina absolute perfectionem absque defectu designant, de Deo praedicantur et de aliis rebus: sicut est bonitas, sapientia, esse, et alia huiusmodi. Quodcumque vero nomen huiusmodi perfectiones exprimit cum modo proprio creaturis, de Deo dici non potest nisi per similitudinem et metaphoram, per quam quae sunt unius rei alteri solent adaptari, sicut aliquis homo dicitur lapis propter duritiam intellectus. Huiusmodi autem sunt omnia nomina imposita ad designandum speciem rei creatae, sicut homo et lapis: nam cuilibet speciei debetur proprius modus perfectionis et esse. Similiter etiam quaecumque nomina proprietates rerum designant quae ex propriis principiis specierum causatur. Unde de Deo dici non possunt nisi metaphorice. Quae vero huiusmodi perfectiones exprimunt cum supereminentiae modo quo Deo conveniunt, de solo Deo dicuntur: sicut summum bonum, primum ens, et alia huiusmodi. For, since every perfection of creatures is to be found in God, though in another and more eminent way, whatever terms denote perfection absolutely and without any defect whatever are predicated of God and of other things (for instance, goodness, wisdom, and so forth). But any term that denotes such perfections with a mode proper to creatures cannot be said of God except by similitude and metaphor, by which that which belongs to one thing is applied to another (as when a man is said to be a stone on account of the hardness of his intelligence). Such are all those terms employed to denote the species of a created thing, as ‘man’ and ‘stone,’ for its proper mode of perfection and being is due to each species. So it is with whatever terms signify those properties of things that are caused by the proper principles of the species. Hence they cannot be said of God, except metaphorically. But those which express these perfections together with the mode of supereminence in which they belong to God are said of God alone (for instance, ‘the highest good,’ the ‘first being,’ and the like). Dico autem aliqua praedictorum nominum perfectionem absque defectu importare, quantum ad illud ad quod significandum nomen fuit impositum: quantum enim ad modum significandi, omne nomen cum defectu est. Nam nomine res exprimimus eo modo quo intellectu concipimus. Intellectus autem noster, ex sensibus cognoscendi initium sumens, illum modum non transcendit qui in rebus sensibilibus invenitur, in quibus aliud est forma et habens formam, propter formae et materiae compositionem. Forma vero in his rebus invenitur quidem simplex, sed imperfecta, utpote non subsistens: habens autem formam invenitur quidem subsistens, sed non simplex, immo concretionem habens. Unde intellectus noster, quidquid significat ut subsistens, significat in concretione: quod vero ut simplex, significat non ut quod est, sed ut quo est. Et sic in omni nomine a nobis dicto, quantum ad modum significandi, imperfectio invenitur, quae Deo non competit, quamvis res significata aliquo eminenti modo Deo conveniat: ut patet in nomine bonitatis et boni; nam bonitas significat ut non subsistens, bonum autem ut concretum. Et quantum ad hoc nullum nomen Deo convenienter aptatur, sed solum quantum ad id ad quod significandum nomen imponitur. Possunt igitur, ut Dionysius docet, huiusmodi nomina et affirmari de Deo et negari: affirmari quidem, propter nominis rationem; negari vero, propter significandi modum. Now, I say that some of the aforesaid terms denote perfection without defect as regards that which the term is employed to signify: for, as regards the mode of signification, every term is defective. For we express things by a term as we conceive them by the intellect. But our intellect, since its knowledge originates from the senses, does not surpass the mode which we find in sensible objects, in which the form is distinct from the subject of the form on account of the composition of form and matter. Now, in those things the form is found to be simple indeed, but imperfect, as being non-subsistent. But the subject of the form is found to be subsistent, but not simple—indeed, with concretion. Therefore, whatever our intellect signifies as subsistent, it signifies with concretion, and whatever it signifies as simple, it signifies not as subsisting, but as qualifying. Accordingly, in every term employed by us, there is imperfection as regards the mode of signification, and imperfection is unbecoming to God, although the thing signified is becoming to God in some eminent way (for example, in the term ‘goodness’ or ‘the good’). For goodness signifies by way of non-subsistence, and the good signifies by way of concretion. In this respect no term is becomingly applied to God, but only in respect of that which the term is employed to signify. Therefore, as Dionysius teaches (Celestial Hierarchy ii, 3), such terms can be either affirmed or denied of God: affirmed, on account of the signification of the term; denied, on account of the mode of signification. Modus autem supereminentiae quo in Deo dictae perfectiones inveniuntur, per nomina a nobis imposita significari non potest nisi vel per negationem, sicut cum dicimus Deum aeternum vel infinitum; vel etiam per relationem ipsius ad alia, ut cum dicitur prima causa, vel summum bonum. Non enim de Deo capere possumus quid est, sed quid non est, et qualiter alia se habeant ad ipsum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Now the mode of supereminence in which the aforesaid perfections are found in God cannot be expressed in terms employed by us except either by negation—as when we say God is eternal or infinite—or by referring him to other things—as when we say that he is the first cause or the highest good. For we are able to grasp not what God is, but what he is not, and the relations of other things to him, as explained above (ch. 14). Caput 31 Chapter 31 Quod divina perfectio et pluralitas nominum divinorum divinae simplicitati non repugnant That the divine perfection and the plurality of divine names are not inconsistent with the divine simplicity Ex praedictis etiam videri potest quod divina perfectio et plura nomina dicta de Deo ipsius simplicitati non repugnant. From what has been said we can also see that the divine perfection and the various names applied to God are not inconsistent with his simplicity. Sic enim omnes perfectiones in rebus aliis inventas Deo attribui diximus sicut effectus in suis causis aequivocis inveniuntur. Qui quidem effectus in suis causis sunt virtute, ut calor in sole. Virtus autem huiusmodi nisi aliqualiter esset de genere caloris, sol per eam agens non sibi simile generaret. Ex hac igitur virtute sol calidus dicitur, non solum quia calorem facit, sed quia virtus per quam hoc facit, est aliquid conforme calori. Per eandem autem virtutem per quam sol facit calorem, facit et multos alios effectus in inferioribus corporibus, utpote siccitatem. Et sic calor et siccitas, quae in igne sunt qualitates diversae, soli attribuuntur per unam virtutem. Ita et omnium perfectiones, quae rebus aliis secundum diversas formas conveniunt, Deo secundum unam eius virtutem attribui est necesse. Quae item virtus non est aliud a sua essentia: cum ei nihil accidere possit, ut probatum est. Sic igitur sapiens Deus dicitur non solum secundum hoc quod sapientiam efficit, sed quia, secundum quod sapientes sumus, virtutem eius, qua sapientes nos facit, aliquatenus imitamur. Non autem dicitur lapis, quamvis lapides fecerit, quia in nomine lapidis intelligitur modus determinatus essendi, secundum quem lapis a Deo distinguitur. Imitatur autem lapis Deum ut causam secundum esse, secundum bonitatem, et alia huiusmodi, sicut et aliae creaturae. For we asserted that all the perfections to be found in other things are to be ascribed to God in the same way as effects are found in their equivocal causes (ch. 29), which effects are in their causes virtually, as heat is in the sun. But the sun would not generate its like unless virtue of this sort were in the genus of heat. Therefore, by reason of this virtue the sun is said to be hot not only because it causes heat, but because the virtue by which it does this is something conformed with heat. Now, the sun causes many other effects in lower bodies (such as dryness) by this same virtue through which it causes heat. And so heat and dryness, which are distinct qualities in fire, are ascribed to the sun in respect of the one virtue. And so too the perfections of all things, which are becoming to other things in respect of various forms, must be ascribed to God in respect of his one virtue. And this virtue is not distinct from his essence, since nothing can be accidental to him, as we have proved (ch. 23). Accordingly, God is said to be wise not only because he causes wisdom, but because insofar as we are wise, we imitate in some way the virtue by which he makes us wise. He is not, however, called a ‘stone,’ although he made the stones, because by the term ‘stone’ we understand a definite mode of being, in respect of which a stone differs from God (ch. 30). But a stone imitates God as its cause, in respect of being, goodness and so forth, even as other creatures do. Huius autem simile inveniri potest in potentiis cognoscitivis et in virtutibus operativis humanis. Intellectus enim unica virtute cognoscit omnia quae pars sensitiva diversis potentiis apprehendit, et etiam alia multa. Intellectus etiam, quanto fuerit altior, tanto aliquo uno plura cognoscere potest, ad quae cognoscenda intellectus inferior non pertingit nisi per multa. Potestas etiam regia ad omnia illa extenditur ad quae diversae sub ipso potestates ordinem habent. Sic igitur et Deus per unum simplex suum esse omnimodam perfectionem possidet, quam res aliae, immo multo minorem, per quaedam diversa consequuntur. The like of this may be found in human cognitive powers and operative virtues. For the intellect by its one virtue knows all that the sensitive faculty apprehends by various powers, and many other things besides. Again, the higher the intellect is, the more things is it able to know by means of one, while an inferior intellect can arrive at the knowledge of those things only by means of many. Again, the royal power extends to all those things to which the various subordinate powers are directed. Likewise, God, by his one simple being, possesses all manner of perfections which in a much lower degree other things attain by certain various means. Ex quo patet necessitas plura nomina Deo dandi. Quia enim eum non possumus cognoscere naturaliter nisi ex effectibus deveniendo in ipsum, oportet quod nomina quibus perfectionem ipsius significamus, diversa sint, sicut et perfectiones in rebus inveniuntur diversae. Si autem ipsam essentiam prout est possemus intelligere et ei nomen proprium adaptare, uno nomine tantum eam exprimeremus. Quod promittitur his qui eum per essentiam videbunt, Zach. ult.: in die illa erit dominus unus et nomen eius unum. From this, it is clear how it is necessary to give several names to God. For, since we cannot know him naturally except by reaching him from his effects (ch. 11), it follows that the terms by which we denote his perfection must be diverse, as also are the perfections which we find in things. If, however, we were able to understand his very essence as it is, and to give him a proper name, we should express him by one name only. And this is promised to those who will see him in his essence: on that day the Lord will be one and his name one (Zech 14:9). Caput 32 Chapter 32 Quod nihil de Deo et rebus aliis univoce praedicatur That nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things Ex his autem patet quod nihil de Deo et rebus aliis potest univoce praedicari. From the above it is clear that nothing can be predicated univocally of God and other things. Nam effectus qui non recipit formam secundum speciem similem ei per quam agens agit, nomen ab illa forma sumptum secundum univocam praedicationem recipere non potest: non enim univoce dicitur calidus ignis a sole generatus, et sol. Rerum quarum Deus est causa, formae ad speciem divinae virtutis non perveniunt: cum divisim et particulariter recipiant quod in Deo simpliciter et universaliter invenitur. Patet igitur quod de Deo et rebus aliis nihil univoce dici potest. For an effect which does not receive the same form specifically as that by which the agent acts cannot receive the name derived from that form in a univocal sense: for the sun and the heat generated from the sun are not called hot univocally. Now the forms of things which God causes do not come to the species of the divine virtue, since they receive severally and particularly that which is in God simply and universally (ch. 28-29). It is evident, therefore, that nothing can be said univocally of God and other things.