Caput 29 Chapter 29 De similitudine creaturarum Of the likeness of creatures Ex hoc autem quomodo in rebus possit similitudo ad Deum inveniri vel non possit, considerari potest. In sequence to the above we may consider in what way it is possible to find in things a likeness to God, and in what way it is impossible. Effectus enim a suis causis deficientes non conveniunt cum eis in nomine et ratione, necesse est tamen aliquam inter ea similitudinem inveniri: de natura enim actionis est ut agens sibi simile agat cum unumquodque agat secundum quod actu est. Unde forma effectus in causa excedente invenitur quidem aliqualiter, sed secundum alium modum et aliam rationem, ratione cuius causa aequivoca dicitur. Sol enim in corporibus inferioribus calorem causat agendo secundum quod actu est; unde oportet quod calor a sole generatus aliqualem similitudinem obtineat ad virtutem activam solis, per quam calor in istis inferioribus causatur, ratione cuius sol calidus dicitur, quamvis non una ratione. Et sic sol omnibus illis similis aliqualiter dicitur in quibus suos effectus efficaciter inducit: a quibus tamen rursus omnibus dissimilis est, inquantum huiusmodi effectus non eodem modo possident calorem et huiusmodi quo in sole invenitur. Ita etiam et Deus omnes perfectiones rebus tribuit, ac per hoc cum omnibus similitudinem habet et dissimilitudinem simul. For effects that fall short of their causes do not agree with them in name and meaning, and yet there must be some likeness between them, because it is of the nature of action that a like agent should produce a like action, since every thing acts according as it is in act. Therefore, the form of the effect is found in its transcendent cause somewhat, but in another way and with another meaning: for which reason that cause is called equivocal. For the sun causes heat in lower bodies by acting according as it is in act; therefore, the heat generated by the sun must bear some likeness to the sun’s active power by which heat is caused in those lower bodies and by reason of which the sun is said to be hot, although with a different meaning. And thus it is said to be somewhat like all those things on which it efficaciously produces its effects, and yet again it is unlike them all insofar as these effects do not possess heat and so forth in the same way as they are found in the sun. Thus also God bestows all perfections on things, and in consequence he is both like and unlike all. Et inde est quod sacra Scriptura aliquando similitudinem inter eum et creaturam commemorat, ut cum dicitur Gen. 1:26: faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram; aliquando similitudo negatur, secundum illud Isaiae 40:18: cui ergo similem fecistis Deum, aut quam imaginem ponetis ei? Et in Psalmo: Deus, quis similis erit tibi? Hence it is that Sacred Scripture sometimes recalls the likeness between him and his creatures, as when it is said: let us make man to our image and likeness (Gen 1:26): while sometimes this likeness is denied, according to the words of Isaiah: to whom then will you liken God, or what likeness compare with him? (Isa 40:18). And of the Psalm: O God, who shall be like to you? (Ps 83[82]:2). Huic autem rationi Dionysius concordat, qui in IX cap. de Div. Nom. dicit: eadem similia sunt Deo et dissimilia: similia quidem, secundum imitationem eius qui non est perfecte imitabilis, qualem in eis contingit esse; dissimilia autem, secundum quod causata habent minus suis causis. Dionysius is in agreement with this argument, for he says (On the Divine Names 9): the same things are like and unlike to God; like, according as they imitate him, as far as they can, who is not perfectly imitable; unlike, according as effects fall short of their causes. Secundum tamen hanc similitudinem convenientius dicitur Deo creatura similis quam e converso. Simile enim alicui dicitur quod eius possidet qualitatem vel formam. Quia igitur id quod in Deo perfecte est, in rebus aliis per quandam deficientem participationem invenitur, illud secundum quod similitudo attenditur, Dei quidem simpliciter est, non autem creaturae. Et sic creatura habet quod Dei est: unde et Deo recte similis dicitur. Non autem sic potest dici Deum habere quod creaturae est. Unde nec convenienter dicitur Deum creaturae similem esse: sicut nec hominem dicimus suae imagini esse similem, cui tamen sua imago recte similis enuntiatur. However, according to this likeness, it is more fitting to say that the creature is like God than vice versa. For one thing is like another when it possesses a quality or form of it. Since, then, what is in God perfectly is found in other things by way of an imperfect participation, that in which likeness is observed is God’s simply, but not the creature’s. And thus the creature has what is God’s, and therefore is rightly said to be like God. But it cannot be said in this way that God has what belongs to his creature: therefore, it is not fitting to say that God is like his creature, as neither do we say that a man is like his portrait, although we declare that his portrait is like him. Multo etiam minus proprie dicitur quod Deus creaturae similetur. Nam assimilatio motum ad similitudinem dicit et sic competit et quod ab alio accipit unde simile sit. Creatura autem accipit a Deo unde ei sit similis: non autem e converso. Non igitur Deus creaturae assimilatur, sed magis e converso. And much less properly can it be said that God is assimilated to the creature. For assimilation denotes movement towards similarity, and consequently applies to one that receives its similarity from another. But the creature receives from God its similarity to him, and not vice versa. Therefore, God is not assimilated to his creature, but rather vice versa. Caput 30 Chapter 30 Quae nomina de Deo possint praedicari What terms can be predicated of God Ex his etiam considerari potest quid de Deo dici vel non dici possit, quidve de eo tantum dicatur, quid etiam de eo simul et aliis rebus. From these, we may also consider what can and what cannot be said of God, as well as what is said of him alone, and what is said of him together with other beings. Quia enim omnem perfectionem creaturae est in Deo invenire sed per alium modum eminentiorem, quaecumque nomina absolute perfectionem absque defectu designant, de Deo praedicantur et de aliis rebus: sicut est bonitas, sapientia, esse, et alia huiusmodi. Quodcumque vero nomen huiusmodi perfectiones exprimit cum modo proprio creaturis, de Deo dici non potest nisi per similitudinem et metaphoram, per quam quae sunt unius rei alteri solent adaptari, sicut aliquis homo dicitur lapis propter duritiam intellectus. Huiusmodi autem sunt omnia nomina imposita ad designandum speciem rei creatae, sicut homo et lapis: nam cuilibet speciei debetur proprius modus perfectionis et esse. Similiter etiam quaecumque nomina proprietates rerum designant quae ex propriis principiis specierum causatur. Unde de Deo dici non possunt nisi metaphorice. Quae vero huiusmodi perfectiones exprimunt cum supereminentiae modo quo Deo conveniunt, de solo Deo dicuntur: sicut summum bonum, primum ens, et alia huiusmodi. For, since every perfection of creatures is to be found in God, though in another and more eminent way, whatever terms denote perfection absolutely and without any defect whatever are predicated of God and of other things (for instance, goodness, wisdom, and so forth). But any term that denotes such perfections with a mode proper to creatures cannot be said of God except by similitude and metaphor, by which that which belongs to one thing is applied to another (as when a man is said to be a stone on account of the hardness of his intelligence). Such are all those terms employed to denote the species of a created thing, as ‘man’ and ‘stone,’ for its proper mode of perfection and being is due to each species. So it is with whatever terms signify those properties of things that are caused by the proper principles of the species. Hence they cannot be said of God, except metaphorically. But those which express these perfections together with the mode of supereminence in which they belong to God are said of God alone (for instance, ‘the highest good,’ the ‘first being,’ and the like). Dico autem aliqua praedictorum nominum perfectionem absque defectu importare, quantum ad illud ad quod significandum nomen fuit impositum: quantum enim ad modum significandi, omne nomen cum defectu est. Nam nomine res exprimimus eo modo quo intellectu concipimus. Intellectus autem noster, ex sensibus cognoscendi initium sumens, illum modum non transcendit qui in rebus sensibilibus invenitur, in quibus aliud est forma et habens formam, propter formae et materiae compositionem. Forma vero in his rebus invenitur quidem simplex, sed imperfecta, utpote non subsistens: habens autem formam invenitur quidem subsistens, sed non simplex, immo concretionem habens. Unde intellectus noster, quidquid significat ut subsistens, significat in concretione: quod vero ut simplex, significat non ut quod est, sed ut quo est. Et sic in omni nomine a nobis dicto, quantum ad modum significandi, imperfectio invenitur, quae Deo non competit, quamvis res significata aliquo eminenti modo Deo conveniat: ut patet in nomine bonitatis et boni; nam bonitas significat ut non subsistens, bonum autem ut concretum. Et quantum ad hoc nullum nomen Deo convenienter aptatur, sed solum quantum ad id ad quod significandum nomen imponitur. Possunt igitur, ut Dionysius docet, huiusmodi nomina et affirmari de Deo et negari: affirmari quidem, propter nominis rationem; negari vero, propter significandi modum. Now, I say that some of the aforesaid terms denote perfection without defect as regards that which the term is employed to signify: for, as regards the mode of signification, every term is defective. For we express things by a term as we conceive them by the intellect. But our intellect, since its knowledge originates from the senses, does not surpass the mode which we find in sensible objects, in which the form is distinct from the subject of the form on account of the composition of form and matter. Now, in those things the form is found to be simple indeed, but imperfect, as being non-subsistent. But the subject of the form is found to be subsistent, but not simple—indeed, with concretion. Therefore, whatever our intellect signifies as subsistent, it signifies with concretion, and whatever it signifies as simple, it signifies not as subsisting, but as qualifying. Accordingly, in every term employed by us, there is imperfection as regards the mode of signification, and imperfection is unbecoming to God, although the thing signified is becoming to God in some eminent way (for example, in the term ‘goodness’ or ‘the good’). For goodness signifies by way of non-subsistence, and the good signifies by way of concretion. In this respect no term is becomingly applied to God, but only in respect of that which the term is employed to signify. Therefore, as Dionysius teaches (Celestial Hierarchy ii, 3), such terms can be either affirmed or denied of God: affirmed, on account of the signification of the term; denied, on account of the mode of signification. Modus autem supereminentiae quo in Deo dictae perfectiones inveniuntur, per nomina a nobis imposita significari non potest nisi vel per negationem, sicut cum dicimus Deum aeternum vel infinitum; vel etiam per relationem ipsius ad alia, ut cum dicitur prima causa, vel summum bonum. Non enim de Deo capere possumus quid est, sed quid non est, et qualiter alia se habeant ad ipsum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Now the mode of supereminence in which the aforesaid perfections are found in God cannot be expressed in terms employed by us except either by negation—as when we say God is eternal or infinite—or by referring him to other things—as when we say that he is the first cause or the highest good. For we are able to grasp not what God is, but what he is not, and the relations of other things to him, as explained above (ch. 14). Caput 31 Chapter 31 Quod divina perfectio et pluralitas nominum divinorum divinae simplicitati non repugnant That the divine perfection and the plurality of divine names are not inconsistent with the divine simplicity Ex praedictis etiam videri potest quod divina perfectio et plura nomina dicta de Deo ipsius simplicitati non repugnant. From what has been said we can also see that the divine perfection and the various names applied to God are not inconsistent with his simplicity. Sic enim omnes perfectiones in rebus aliis inventas Deo attribui diximus sicut effectus in suis causis aequivocis inveniuntur. Qui quidem effectus in suis causis sunt virtute, ut calor in sole. Virtus autem huiusmodi nisi aliqualiter esset de genere caloris, sol per eam agens non sibi simile generaret. Ex hac igitur virtute sol calidus dicitur, non solum quia calorem facit, sed quia virtus per quam hoc facit, est aliquid conforme calori. Per eandem autem virtutem per quam sol facit calorem, facit et multos alios effectus in inferioribus corporibus, utpote siccitatem. Et sic calor et siccitas, quae in igne sunt qualitates diversae, soli attribuuntur per unam virtutem. Ita et omnium perfectiones, quae rebus aliis secundum diversas formas conveniunt, Deo secundum unam eius virtutem attribui est necesse. Quae item virtus non est aliud a sua essentia: cum ei nihil accidere possit, ut probatum est. Sic igitur sapiens Deus dicitur non solum secundum hoc quod sapientiam efficit, sed quia, secundum quod sapientes sumus, virtutem eius, qua sapientes nos facit, aliquatenus imitamur. Non autem dicitur lapis, quamvis lapides fecerit, quia in nomine lapidis intelligitur modus determinatus essendi, secundum quem lapis a Deo distinguitur. Imitatur autem lapis Deum ut causam secundum esse, secundum bonitatem, et alia huiusmodi, sicut et aliae creaturae. For we asserted that all the perfections to be found in other things are to be ascribed to God in the same way as effects are found in their equivocal causes (ch. 29), which effects are in their causes virtually, as heat is in the sun. But the sun would not generate its like unless virtue of this sort were in the genus of heat. Therefore, by reason of this virtue the sun is said to be hot not only because it causes heat, but because the virtue by which it does this is something conformed with heat. Now, the sun causes many other effects in lower bodies (such as dryness) by this same virtue through which it causes heat. And so heat and dryness, which are distinct qualities in fire, are ascribed to the sun in respect of the one virtue. And so too the perfections of all things, which are becoming to other things in respect of various forms, must be ascribed to God in respect of his one virtue. And this virtue is not distinct from his essence, since nothing can be accidental to him, as we have proved (ch. 23). Accordingly, God is said to be wise not only because he causes wisdom, but because insofar as we are wise, we imitate in some way the virtue by which he makes us wise. He is not, however, called a ‘stone,’ although he made the stones, because by the term ‘stone’ we understand a definite mode of being, in respect of which a stone differs from God (ch. 30). But a stone imitates God as its cause, in respect of being, goodness and so forth, even as other creatures do. Huius autem simile inveniri potest in potentiis cognoscitivis et in virtutibus operativis humanis. Intellectus enim unica virtute cognoscit omnia quae pars sensitiva diversis potentiis apprehendit, et etiam alia multa. Intellectus etiam, quanto fuerit altior, tanto aliquo uno plura cognoscere potest, ad quae cognoscenda intellectus inferior non pertingit nisi per multa. Potestas etiam regia ad omnia illa extenditur ad quae diversae sub ipso potestates ordinem habent. Sic igitur et Deus per unum simplex suum esse omnimodam perfectionem possidet, quam res aliae, immo multo minorem, per quaedam diversa consequuntur. The like of this may be found in human cognitive powers and operative virtues. For the intellect by its one virtue knows all that the sensitive faculty apprehends by various powers, and many other things besides. Again, the higher the intellect is, the more things is it able to know by means of one, while an inferior intellect can arrive at the knowledge of those things only by means of many. Again, the royal power extends to all those things to which the various subordinate powers are directed. Likewise, God, by his one simple being, possesses all manner of perfections which in a much lower degree other things attain by certain various means. Ex quo patet necessitas plura nomina Deo dandi. Quia enim eum non possumus cognoscere naturaliter nisi ex effectibus deveniendo in ipsum, oportet quod nomina quibus perfectionem ipsius significamus, diversa sint, sicut et perfectiones in rebus inveniuntur diversae. Si autem ipsam essentiam prout est possemus intelligere et ei nomen proprium adaptare, uno nomine tantum eam exprimeremus. Quod promittitur his qui eum per essentiam videbunt, Zach. ult.: in die illa erit dominus unus et nomen eius unum. From this, it is clear how it is necessary to give several names to God. For, since we cannot know him naturally except by reaching him from his effects (ch. 11), it follows that the terms by which we denote his perfection must be diverse, as also are the perfections which we find in things. If, however, we were able to understand his very essence as it is, and to give him a proper name, we should express him by one name only. And this is promised to those who will see him in his essence: on that day the Lord will be one and his name one (Zech 14:9). Caput 32 Chapter 32 Quod nihil de Deo et rebus aliis univoce praedicatur That nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things Ex his autem patet quod nihil de Deo et rebus aliis potest univoce praedicari. From the above it is clear that nothing can be predicated univocally of God and other things. Nam effectus qui non recipit formam secundum speciem similem ei per quam agens agit, nomen ab illa forma sumptum secundum univocam praedicationem recipere non potest: non enim univoce dicitur calidus ignis a sole generatus, et sol. Rerum quarum Deus est causa, formae ad speciem divinae virtutis non perveniunt: cum divisim et particulariter recipiant quod in Deo simpliciter et universaliter invenitur. Patet igitur quod de Deo et rebus aliis nihil univoce dici potest. For an effect which does not receive the same form specifically as that by which the agent acts cannot receive the name derived from that form in a univocal sense: for the sun and the heat generated from the sun are not called hot univocally. Now the forms of things which God causes do not come to the species of the divine virtue, since they receive severally and particularly that which is in God simply and universally (ch. 28-29). It is evident, therefore, that nothing can be said univocally of God and other things. Amplius. Si aliquis effectus ad speciem causae pertingat, praedicationem nominis univoce non consequetur nisi secundum eundem essendi modum eandem specie formam suscipiat: non enim univoce dicitur domus quae est in arte, et in materia, propter hoc quod forma domus habet esse dissimile utrobique. Res autem aliae, etiam si omnino similem formam consequerentur, non tamen consequuntur secundum eundem modum essendi: nam nihil est in Deo quod non sit ipsum esse divinum, ut ex dictis patet, quod in aliis rebus non accidit. Impossibile est igitur aliquid univoce de Deo et rebus aliis praedicari. Further. If an effect attains to the species of its cause, the name of the latter will not be predicated of it univocally, unless it receives the same specific form according to the same mode of being. For ‘house’ in art is not univocally the same as ‘house’ in matter, since the form of house has a dissimilar existence in each. Now, other things, even though they receive entirely the same form, do not receive it according to the same mode of being: for there is nothing in God that is not the divine being itself, as shown above (ch. 23), which does not apply to other things. Therefore, it is impossible for anything to be predicated univocally of God and other things. Adhuc. Omne quod de pluribus univoce praedicatur, vel est genus, vel species, vel differentia, vel accidens aut proprium. De Deo autem nihil praedicatur ut genus nec ut differentia, ut supra ostensum est; et sic nec ut definitio, nec etiam ut species, quae ex genere et differentia constituitur. Nec aliquid ei accidere potest, ut supra demonstratum est: et ita nihil de eo praedicatur neque ut accidens neque ut proprium; nam proprium de genere accidentium est. Relinquitur igitur nihil de Deo et rebus aliis univoce praedicari. Moreover. Whatever is predicated of several things univocally is either genus, or species, or difference, or accident, or property. Now, nothing is predicated of God as genus or as difference, as we have proved above (ch. 24-25), and consequently neither as definition nor as species, which consists of genus and difference. Nor can anything be accidental to him, as was shown above (ch. 23), and consequently nothing is predicated of God either as accidental or as proper, for the proper is a kind of accident. It follows, therefore, that nothing is predicated of God and other things univocally. Item. Quod univoce de pluribus praedicatur, utroque illorum ad minus secundum intellectum simplicius est. Deo autem neque secundum rem neque secundum intellectum potest esse aliquid simplicius. Nihil igitur univoce de Deo et rebus aliis praedicatur. Again. That which is predicated univocally of several things is more simple than either of them, at least in our way of understanding. Now nothing can be more simple than God, either in reality or in our way of understanding. Therefore, nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things. Amplius. Omne quod de pluribus praedicatur univoce, secundum participationem cuilibet eorum convenit de quo praedicatur: nam species participare dicitur genus, et individuum speciem. De Deo autem nihil dicitur per participationem: nam omne quod participatur determinatur ad modum participati, et sic partialiter habetur et non secundum omnem perfectionis modum. Oportet igitur nihil de Deo et rebus aliis univoce praedicari. Further. Whatever is predicated univocally of several things belongs by participation to each of the things of which it is predicated: for the species is said to participate in the genus, and the individual in the species. But nothing is said of God by participation, since whatever is participated is confined to the mode of a participated thing, and thus is possessed partially, and not according to every mode of perfection. It follows, therefore, that nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things. Adhuc. Quod praedicatur de aliquibus secundum prius et posterius, certum est univoce non praedicari: nam prius in definitione posterioris includitur: sicut substantia in definitione accidentis secundum quod est ens. Si igitur diceretur univoce ens de substantia et accidente, oporteret quod substantia etiam poneretur in definitione entis secundum quod de substantia praedicatur. Quod patet esse impossibile. Nihil autem de Deo et rebus aliis praedicatur eodem ordine, sed secundum prius et posterius: cum de Deo omnia praedicentur essentialiter, dicitur enim ens quasi ipsa essentia, et bonus quasi ipsa bonitas; de aliis autem praedicationes fiunt per participationem, sicut Socrates dicitur homo non quia sit ipsa humanitas, sed humanitatem habens. Impossibile est igitur aliquid de Deo et rebus aliis univoce dici. Again. That which is predicated of several things according to priority and posteriority is certainly not predicated of them univocally, since that which comes first is included in the definition of what follows, as substance is in the definition of accident (considered as a being). If, therefore, we were to say ‘being’ univocally of substance and accident, it would follow that substance also should enter into the definition of being as predicated of substance, which is clearly impossible. Now, nothing is predicated in the same order of God and other things, but according to priority and posteriority, since all predicates of God are essential (for he is called ‘being’ because he is being itself, and ‘good’ because he is goodness itself), whereas predicates are applied to others by participation (thus Socrates is said to be a man not as though he were humanity itself, but because he has humanity). Therefore, it is impossible for any thing to be predicated univocally of God and other things. Caput 33 Chapter 33 Quod non omnia nomina dicuntur de Deo et creaturis pure aequivoce That not all terms applied to God and creatures are purely equivocal Ex praemissis etiam patet quod non quicquid de Deo et rebus aliis praedicatur, secundum puram aequivocationem dicitur, sicut ea quae sunt a casu aequivoca. It is also clear from what has been said that things predicated of God and other things are not all pure equivocations, as are the effects of an equivocal cause. Nam in his quae sunt a casu aequivoca, nullus ordo aut respectus attenditur unius ad alterum, sed omnino per accidens est quod unum nomen diversis rebus attribuitur: non enim nomen impositum uni significat ipsum habere ordinem ad aliud. Sic autem non est de nominibus quae de Deo dicuntur et creaturis. Consideratur enim in huiusmodi nominum communitate ordo causae et causati, ut ex dictis patet. Non igitur secundum puram aequivocationem aliquid de Deo et rebus aliis praedicatur. For in the effects of an equivocal cause we find no mutual order or relationship, and it is altogether accidental that the same name is applied to various things, for the name applied to one does not signify that it has any relationship to another. But it is not so with the terms applied to God and creatures, for, in employing these common terms, we consider the order of cause and effect, as is clear from what we have said (ch. 32). Therefore, certain things predicated of God and other things are not pure equivocations. Amplius. Ubi est pura aequivocatio, nulla similitudo in rebus attenditur, sed solum unitas nominis. Rerum autem ad Deum est aliquis modus similitudinis, ut ex supra dictis patet. Relinquitur igitur quod non dicuntur de Deo secundum puram aequivocationem. Moreover. Where there is pure equivocation, we observe no likeness of things, but merely sameness of name. Now things have some kind of likeness to God, as shown above (ch. 29). Therefore, it follows that they are not said of God by pure equivocation. Item. Quando unum de pluribus secundum puram aequivocationem praedicatur, ex uno eorum non possumus duci in cognitionem alterius: nam cognitio rerum non dependet ex vocibus, sed ex nominum ratione. Ex his autem quae in rebus aliis inveniuntur in divinorum cognitionem pervenimus, ut ex dictis patet. Non igitur secundum puram aequivocationem dicuntur huiusmodi de Deo et aliis rebus. Again. When one thing is predicated of several by pure equivocation, we cannot be led from one to the knowledge of the other, for the knowledge of things depends not on words but on the meaning of names. Now, we come to the knowledge of divine things from our observation of other things, as shown above. Therefore, such things are not pure equivocations when said of God and other things. Adhuc. Aequivocatio nominis processum argumentationis impedit. Si igitur nihil diceretur de Deo et creaturis nisi pure aequivoce, nulla argumentatio fieri posset procedendo de creaturis ad Deum. Cuius contrarium patet ex omnibus loquentibus de divinis. Further. The use of equivocal terms breaks the continuity of an argument. Therefore, if nothing were said of God and creatures except by pure equivocation, no argument could be made by proceeding to God from creatures. But the contrary is evidenced by all who speak of divine things.