Caput 38 Chapter 38 Quod Deus est ipsa bonitas That God is goodness itself Ex his autem haberi potest quod Deus sit sua bonitas. From the above we are able to conclude that God is his own goodness. Esse enim actu in unoquoque est bonum ipsius. Sed Deus non solum est ens actu, sed est ipsum suum esse, ut supra ostensum est. Est igitur ipsa bonitas, non tantum bonus. For to be in act is for every thing its own good. Now, God is not only being in act, but is his own being, as proved above (ch. 22). Therefore, he is goodness itself and not merely good. Praeterea. Perfectio uniuscuiusque est bonitas eius, ut ostensum est. Perfectio autem divini esse non attenditur secundum aliquid additum supra ipsum, sed quia ipsum secundum seipsum perfectum est, ut supra ostensum est. Bonitas igitur Dei non est aliquid additum suae substantiae, sed sua substantia est sua bonitas. Further. The perfection of a thing is its goodness, as we have shown above (ch. 37). Now the perfection of the divine being does not consist in something added to it, but in its being perfect in itself, as proved above (ch. 28). Therefore, God’s goodness is not something added to his essence, but his essence is his goodness. Item. Unumquodque bonum quod non est sua bonitas, participative dicitur bonum. Quod autem per participationem dicitur, aliquid ante se praesupponit, a quo rationem suscipit bonitatis. Hoc autem in infinitum non est possibile abire: quia in causis finalibus non proceditur in infinitum, infinitum enim repugnat fini; bonum autem rationem finis habet. Oportet igitur devenire ad aliquod bonum primum, quod non participative sit bonum per ordinem ad aliquid aliud, sed sit per essentiam suam bonum. Hoc autem Deus est. Est igitur Deus sua bonitas. Again. Any good that is not its own goodness is good by participation. Now that which is by participation presupposes something antecedent to itself, from which it derives the nature of goodness. But it is not possible to continue thus to infinity, for in final causes there is no proceeding to infinity, since the infinite is inconsistent with finality, and the good has the nature of a final cause. We must, therefore, come to some first good that is good not by participation in relation to something else, but by its essence. Now this is God. Therefore, God is his own goodness. Item. Id quod est participare aliquid potest, ipsum autem esse nihil: quod enim participat potentia est, esse autem actus est. Sed Deus est ipsum esse, ut probatum est. Non est igitur bonus participative, sed essentialiter. Again. That which exists can participate in something, but being itself can participate in nothing, for that which participates is potency, whereas being is act. Now God is being itself, as we have proved (ch. 22). Therefore, he is good not by participation, but essentially. Amplius. Omne simplex suum esse et id quod est unum habet: nam, si sit aliud et aliud, iam simplicitas tolletur. Deus autem est omnino simplex, ut ostensum est. Igitur ipsum esse bonum non est aliud quam ipse. Est igitur sua bonitas. Moreover. In every simple thing, ‘being’ and ‘that which is’ are one: for if they are distinct, there is no longer simplicity (ch. 18). Now, God is absolutely simple, as we have proved. Therefore, that he is good is not distinct from himself. Therefore, he is his own goodness. Per eadem etiam patet quod nullum aliud bonum est sua bonitas. Propter quod dicitur Matth. 19:17: nemo bonus nisi solus Deus. These same arguments show that nothing else is its own goodness. Hence it is said: none is good but God alone (Matt 19:17). Caput 39 Chapter 39 Quod in Deo non potest esse malum That no evil can be in God Ex hoc autem manifeste apparet quod in Deo non potest esse malum. Hence it is manifestly apparent that evil cannot be in God. Esse enim et bonitas, et omnia quae per essentiam dicuntur, nihil praeter se habent admixtum: licet id quod est vel bonum possit aliquid praeter esse et bonitatem habere. Nihil enim prohibet quod est uni perfectioni suppositum, etiam alii supponi, sicut quod est corpus potest esse album et dulce: unaquaeque autem natura suae rationis termino concluditur, ut nihil extraneum intra se capere possit. Deus autem est bonitas, non solum bonus, ut ostensum est. Non potest igitur in eo esse aliquid non bonitas. Et ita malum in eo omnino esse non potest. For ‘being’ and ‘goodness’ and all essential predicates have nothing besides themselves added to them, although ‘that which is’ or ‘the good’ may have something besides being or goodness. For nothing hinders the subject of one perfection being the subject of another besides: thus that which is a body may be white and sweet. But every nature is confined within the bounds of its essence, so that it admits of nothing extraneous within itself. Now God is goodness, and not merely good, as we have proved above (ch. 38). Therefore, nothing that is not goodness can be in him, and consequently evil can in no way be in him. Amplius. Id quod est oppositum essentiae alicuius rei, sibi omnino convenire non potest dum manet: sicut homini non potest convenire irrationalitas vel insensibilitas nisi homo esse desistat. Sed divina essentia est ipsa bonitas, ut ostensum est. Ergo malum, quod est bono oppositum, in eo locum habere non potest nisi esse desisteret. Quod est impossibile: cum sit aeternus, ut supra ostensum est. Moreover. As long as a thing remains, that which is contrary to its essence is altogether incompatible with it: thus irrationality or insensibility is incompatible with man, unless he ceases to be man. Now the divine essence is goodness itself, as we have proved (ch. 38). Therefore, evil (which is contrary to good) can have no place in God unless he ceases to be God, which is impossible, since he is eternal, as was proved above (ch. 15). Adhuc. Cum Deus sit suum esse, nihil participative de ipso dici potest, ut patet ex ratione supra inducta. Si igitur malum de ipso dicatur; non dicetur participative, sed essentialiter. Sic autem malum de nullo dici potest ut sit essentia alicuius: ei enim esse deficeret, quod bonum est, ut ostensum est; in malitia autem non potest esse aliquid extraneum admixtum, sicut nec in bonitate. Malum igitur de Deo dici non potest. Again. Since God is his own being, nothing can be said of him by participation, as is clear from the argument given above (ch. 38). If, then, evil were predicated of him, it would be a predicate not by participation, but by essence. But evil cannot be predicated of any thing in such a way as to be the essence of that thing, for it would lack being, which is a good, as we have shown above (ch. 37). And in evil there can be no extraneous admixture, as neither can there be in goodness. Therefore, evil cannot be predicated of God. Item. Malum bono oppositum est. Ratio autem boni in perfectione consistit. Ergo ratio mali in imperfectione. Defectus autem vel imperfectio in Deo, qui est universaliter perfectus, esse non potest, ut supra ostensum est. In Deo igitur malum esse non potest. Again. Evil is opposed to good. But the notion of good consists in perfection (ch. 37). And therefore the notion of evil consists in imperfection. Now defect or imperfection cannot be in God, since he is completely perfect, as shown above (ch. 28). Therefore, evil cannot be in God. Praeterea. Perfectum est aliquid secundum quod est actu. Ergo imperfectum erit secundum quod est deficiens ab actu. Ergo malum vel privatio est, vel privationem includit. Privationis autem subiectum est potentia. Haec autem in Deo esse non potest. Igitur nec malum. Further. A thing is perfect according as it is in act (ch. 28). Therefore, it will be imperfect according as it is deficient in act. Therefore, evil is either privation or includes privation. Now the subject of privation is a potency. But this cannot be in God (ch. 16). Consequently, neither can evil. Praeterea. Si bonum est quod ab omnibus appetitur, igitur malum unaquaeque natura refugit inquantum huiusmodi. Quod autem inest alicui contra motum naturalis appetitus, est violentum et praeter naturam. Malum igitur in unoquoque est violentum et praeter naturam secundum quod est ei malum: etsi possit ei esse naturale secundum aliquid eius in rebus compositis. Deus autem compositus non est, nec aliquid esse potest in eo violentum vel praeter naturam, ut ostensum est. Malum igitur in Deo esse non potest. Moreover. If good is what is desired by all, it follows that evil as such is shunned by every nature. Now that which is in a thing against the mode of its natural appetite is violent and unnatural. Therefore, evil in a thing is violent and unnatural insofar as it is an evil to that thing (although in composite things it may be natural in respect of some part). But God is not composite, nor can anything be violent or unnatural in him, as shown above (ch. 18, 19). Therefore, evil cannot be in God. Hoc etiam sacra Scriptura confirmat. Dicitur enim prima canonica Ioannis: Deus lux est, et tenebrae in eo non sunt ullae. Et in Iob 34:10: absit a Deo impietas, et ab omnipotente iniquitas. This is moreover confirmed by Sacred Scripture. For it is written in the first canonical epistle of John: God is light and in him is no darkness at all (1 John 1:5); and: far be it from God that he should do wickedness, and from the Almighty that he should do wrong (Job 34:10). Caput 40 Chapter 40 Quod Deus est omnis boni bonum That God is the good of every good Ostenditur etiam ex praedictis quod Deus sit omnis boni bonum. It is also proved from the foregoing that God is the good of every good. Bonitas enim uniuscuiusque est perfectio ipsius, ut dictum est. Deus autem, cum sit simpliciter perfectus, sua perfectione omnes rerum perfectiones comprehendit, ut ostensum est. Sua igitur bonitas omnes bonitates comprehendit. Et ita est omnis boni bonum. For the goodness of a thing is its perfection, as we have stated (ch. 37). Now, since God is simply perfect, he contains in his perfection the perfections of all things, as we have shown (ch. 28). Therefore, his goodness contains all goodnesses, and consequently he is the good of every good. Item. Quod per participationem dicitur aliquale, non dicitur tale nisi inquantum habet quandam similitudinem eius quod per essentiam dicitur: sicut ferrum dicitur ignitum inquantum quandam similitudinem ignis participat. Sed Deus est bonus per essentiam, omnia vero alia per participationem, ut ostensum est. Igitur nihil dicetur bonum nisi inquantum habet aliquam similitudinem divinae bonitatis. Est igitur ipse bonum omnis boni. Again. A thing is not said to have a quality by participation, except insofar as it bears some resemblance to that which is said to have that quality essentially. Thus iron is said to be ‘fiery’ insofar as it partakes of a resemblance to fire. Now, God is good essentially, while everything else is good by participation, as we have proved (ch. 38). Therefore, nothing is said to be good except insofar as it bears some resemblance to the divine goodness. Therefore, he is the good of every good. Adhuc. Cum unumquodque appetibile sit propter finem; boni autem ratio consistat in hoc quod est appetibile: oportet quod unumquodque dicatur bonum vel quia est finis, vel quia ordinatur ad finem. Finis igitur ultimus est a quo omnia rationem boni accipiunt. Hoc autem Deus est, ut infra probabitur. Est igitur Deus omnis boni bonum. Further. Since a thing is desirable for the sake of an end, and the aspect of good consists in its being desirable (ch. 37), it follows that a thing is said to be good either because it is an end, or because it is directed to an end. Therefore, the last end is that from which all things take the aspect of good. Now this is God, as we shall prove further on (bk. III, ch. 17). Therefore, God is the good of every good. Hinc est quod dominus, suam visionem Moysi promittens, dicit, Exodi 33:19: ego ostendam tibi omne bonum. Et Sap. 8, dicitur de divina sapientia: venerunt mihi omnia bona pariter cum illa. Hence the Lord, in promising Moses that he should see him, said: I will make all my goodness pass before you (Exod 33:19). And it is said of divine wisdom: all good things came to me along with her (Wis 7:11). Caput 41 Chapter 41 Quod Deus sit summum bonum That God is the highest good Ex hoc autem ostenditur quod Deus sit summum bonum. From this it is proved that God is the highest good. Nam bonum universale praeminet cuilibet bono particulari, sicut bonum gentis est melius quam bonum unius: bonitas enim totius et perfectio praeminet bonitati et perfectioni partis. Sed divina bonitas comparatur ad omnia alia sicut universale bonum ad particulare: cum sit omnis boni bonum, ut ostensum est. Est igitur ipse summum bonum. For the universal good stands far above any particular good, even as the good of the nation is greater than the good of an individual: for the goodness and perfection of the whole stand above the goodness and perfection of the part. Now the divine goodness of God is compared to all other things as the universal good to the particular, for he is the good of every good, as we have proved (ch. 40). Therefore, he is the highest good. Praeterea. Id quod per essentiam dicitur, verius dicitur quam id quod est per participationem dictum. Sed Deus est bonus per suam essentiam, alia vero per participationem, ut ostensum est. Est igitur ipse summum bonum. Moreover. That which is predicated essentially is said more truly than that which is predicated by participation. Now God is good by his essence, and other things by participation, as shown above (ch. 38). Therefore, he is the highest good. Item. Quod est maximum in unoquoque genere est causa aliorum quae sunt in illo genere: causa enim potior est effectu. Ex Deo autem omnia habent rationem boni, ut ostensum est. Est igitur ipse summum bonum. Again. The greatest in any genus is the cause of others in that genus: for the cause is greater than its effect. Now all things derive their aspect of goodness from God, as we have shown (ch. 40). Therefore, he is the highest good. Amplius. Sicut albius est quod est nigro impermixtius, ita melius est quod est malo impermixtius. Sed Deus est maxime malo impermixtus: quia in eo nec actu nec potentia malum esse potest, et hoc ei ex sua natura competit, ut ostensum est. Est igitur ipse summum bonum. Moreover. Just as that is more white which has less admixture of black, so that is better which has less admixture of evil. Now God is most of all unmixed with evil, since in him there can be no evil (neither in act nor in potency), and this becomes him by his very nature, as we have proved (ch. 39). Therefore, he is the highest good. Hinc est quod dicitur 1 Reg. 2:2: non est sanctus ut est dominus. Hence it is said: there is none holy like the Lord (1 Sam 2:2). Caput 42 Chapter 42 Quod Deus est unus That God is one