Caput 39 Chapter 39 Quod in Deo non potest esse malum That no evil can be in God Ex hoc autem manifeste apparet quod in Deo non potest esse malum. Hence it is manifestly apparent that evil cannot be in God. Esse enim et bonitas, et omnia quae per essentiam dicuntur, nihil praeter se habent admixtum: licet id quod est vel bonum possit aliquid praeter esse et bonitatem habere. Nihil enim prohibet quod est uni perfectioni suppositum, etiam alii supponi, sicut quod est corpus potest esse album et dulce: unaquaeque autem natura suae rationis termino concluditur, ut nihil extraneum intra se capere possit. Deus autem est bonitas, non solum bonus, ut ostensum est. Non potest igitur in eo esse aliquid non bonitas. Et ita malum in eo omnino esse non potest. For ‘being’ and ‘goodness’ and all essential predicates have nothing besides themselves added to them, although ‘that which is’ or ‘the good’ may have something besides being or goodness. For nothing hinders the subject of one perfection being the subject of another besides: thus that which is a body may be white and sweet. But every nature is confined within the bounds of its essence, so that it admits of nothing extraneous within itself. Now God is goodness, and not merely good, as we have proved above (ch. 38). Therefore, nothing that is not goodness can be in him, and consequently evil can in no way be in him. Amplius. Id quod est oppositum essentiae alicuius rei, sibi omnino convenire non potest dum manet: sicut homini non potest convenire irrationalitas vel insensibilitas nisi homo esse desistat. Sed divina essentia est ipsa bonitas, ut ostensum est. Ergo malum, quod est bono oppositum, in eo locum habere non potest nisi esse desisteret. Quod est impossibile: cum sit aeternus, ut supra ostensum est. Moreover. As long as a thing remains, that which is contrary to its essence is altogether incompatible with it: thus irrationality or insensibility is incompatible with man, unless he ceases to be man. Now the divine essence is goodness itself, as we have proved (ch. 38). Therefore, evil (which is contrary to good) can have no place in God unless he ceases to be God, which is impossible, since he is eternal, as was proved above (ch. 15). Adhuc. Cum Deus sit suum esse, nihil participative de ipso dici potest, ut patet ex ratione supra inducta. Si igitur malum de ipso dicatur; non dicetur participative, sed essentialiter. Sic autem malum de nullo dici potest ut sit essentia alicuius: ei enim esse deficeret, quod bonum est, ut ostensum est; in malitia autem non potest esse aliquid extraneum admixtum, sicut nec in bonitate. Malum igitur de Deo dici non potest. Again. Since God is his own being, nothing can be said of him by participation, as is clear from the argument given above (ch. 38). If, then, evil were predicated of him, it would be a predicate not by participation, but by essence. But evil cannot be predicated of any thing in such a way as to be the essence of that thing, for it would lack being, which is a good, as we have shown above (ch. 37). And in evil there can be no extraneous admixture, as neither can there be in goodness. Therefore, evil cannot be predicated of God. Item. Malum bono oppositum est. Ratio autem boni in perfectione consistit. Ergo ratio mali in imperfectione. Defectus autem vel imperfectio in Deo, qui est universaliter perfectus, esse non potest, ut supra ostensum est. In Deo igitur malum esse non potest. Again. Evil is opposed to good. But the notion of good consists in perfection (ch. 37). And therefore the notion of evil consists in imperfection. Now defect or imperfection cannot be in God, since he is completely perfect, as shown above (ch. 28). Therefore, evil cannot be in God. Praeterea. Perfectum est aliquid secundum quod est actu. Ergo imperfectum erit secundum quod est deficiens ab actu. Ergo malum vel privatio est, vel privationem includit. Privationis autem subiectum est potentia. Haec autem in Deo esse non potest. Igitur nec malum. Further. A thing is perfect according as it is in act (ch. 28). Therefore, it will be imperfect according as it is deficient in act. Therefore, evil is either privation or includes privation. Now the subject of privation is a potency. But this cannot be in God (ch. 16). Consequently, neither can evil. Praeterea. Si bonum est quod ab omnibus appetitur, igitur malum unaquaeque natura refugit inquantum huiusmodi. Quod autem inest alicui contra motum naturalis appetitus, est violentum et praeter naturam. Malum igitur in unoquoque est violentum et praeter naturam secundum quod est ei malum: etsi possit ei esse naturale secundum aliquid eius in rebus compositis. Deus autem compositus non est, nec aliquid esse potest in eo violentum vel praeter naturam, ut ostensum est. Malum igitur in Deo esse non potest. Moreover. If good is what is desired by all, it follows that evil as such is shunned by every nature. Now that which is in a thing against the mode of its natural appetite is violent and unnatural. Therefore, evil in a thing is violent and unnatural insofar as it is an evil to that thing (although in composite things it may be natural in respect of some part). But God is not composite, nor can anything be violent or unnatural in him, as shown above (ch. 18, 19). Therefore, evil cannot be in God. Hoc etiam sacra Scriptura confirmat. Dicitur enim prima canonica Ioannis: Deus lux est, et tenebrae in eo non sunt ullae. Et in Iob 34:10: absit a Deo impietas, et ab omnipotente iniquitas. This is moreover confirmed by Sacred Scripture. For it is written in the first canonical epistle of John: God is light and in him is no darkness at all (1 John 1:5); and: far be it from God that he should do wickedness, and from the Almighty that he should do wrong (Job 34:10). Caput 40 Chapter 40 Quod Deus est omnis boni bonum That God is the good of every good Ostenditur etiam ex praedictis quod Deus sit omnis boni bonum. It is also proved from the foregoing that God is the good of every good. Bonitas enim uniuscuiusque est perfectio ipsius, ut dictum est. Deus autem, cum sit simpliciter perfectus, sua perfectione omnes rerum perfectiones comprehendit, ut ostensum est. Sua igitur bonitas omnes bonitates comprehendit. Et ita est omnis boni bonum. For the goodness of a thing is its perfection, as we have stated (ch. 37). Now, since God is simply perfect, he contains in his perfection the perfections of all things, as we have shown (ch. 28). Therefore, his goodness contains all goodnesses, and consequently he is the good of every good. Item. Quod per participationem dicitur aliquale, non dicitur tale nisi inquantum habet quandam similitudinem eius quod per essentiam dicitur: sicut ferrum dicitur ignitum inquantum quandam similitudinem ignis participat. Sed Deus est bonus per essentiam, omnia vero alia per participationem, ut ostensum est. Igitur nihil dicetur bonum nisi inquantum habet aliquam similitudinem divinae bonitatis. Est igitur ipse bonum omnis boni. Again. A thing is not said to have a quality by participation, except insofar as it bears some resemblance to that which is said to have that quality essentially. Thus iron is said to be ‘fiery’ insofar as it partakes of a resemblance to fire. Now, God is good essentially, while everything else is good by participation, as we have proved (ch. 38). Therefore, nothing is said to be good except insofar as it bears some resemblance to the divine goodness. Therefore, he is the good of every good. Adhuc. Cum unumquodque appetibile sit propter finem; boni autem ratio consistat in hoc quod est appetibile: oportet quod unumquodque dicatur bonum vel quia est finis, vel quia ordinatur ad finem. Finis igitur ultimus est a quo omnia rationem boni accipiunt. Hoc autem Deus est, ut infra probabitur. Est igitur Deus omnis boni bonum. Further. Since a thing is desirable for the sake of an end, and the aspect of good consists in its being desirable (ch. 37), it follows that a thing is said to be good either because it is an end, or because it is directed to an end. Therefore, the last end is that from which all things take the aspect of good. Now this is God, as we shall prove further on (bk. III, ch. 17). Therefore, God is the good of every good. Hinc est quod dominus, suam visionem Moysi promittens, dicit, Exodi 33:19: ego ostendam tibi omne bonum. Et Sap. 8, dicitur de divina sapientia: venerunt mihi omnia bona pariter cum illa. Hence the Lord, in promising Moses that he should see him, said: I will make all my goodness pass before you (Exod 33:19). And it is said of divine wisdom: all good things came to me along with her (Wis 7:11). Caput 41 Chapter 41 Quod Deus sit summum bonum That God is the highest good Ex hoc autem ostenditur quod Deus sit summum bonum. From this it is proved that God is the highest good. Nam bonum universale praeminet cuilibet bono particulari, sicut bonum gentis est melius quam bonum unius: bonitas enim totius et perfectio praeminet bonitati et perfectioni partis. Sed divina bonitas comparatur ad omnia alia sicut universale bonum ad particulare: cum sit omnis boni bonum, ut ostensum est. Est igitur ipse summum bonum. For the universal good stands far above any particular good, even as the good of the nation is greater than the good of an individual: for the goodness and perfection of the whole stand above the goodness and perfection of the part. Now the divine goodness of God is compared to all other things as the universal good to the particular, for he is the good of every good, as we have proved (ch. 40). Therefore, he is the highest good. Praeterea. Id quod per essentiam dicitur, verius dicitur quam id quod est per participationem dictum. Sed Deus est bonus per suam essentiam, alia vero per participationem, ut ostensum est. Est igitur ipse summum bonum. Moreover. That which is predicated essentially is said more truly than that which is predicated by participation. Now God is good by his essence, and other things by participation, as shown above (ch. 38). Therefore, he is the highest good. Item. Quod est maximum in unoquoque genere est causa aliorum quae sunt in illo genere: causa enim potior est effectu. Ex Deo autem omnia habent rationem boni, ut ostensum est. Est igitur ipse summum bonum. Again. The greatest in any genus is the cause of others in that genus: for the cause is greater than its effect. Now all things derive their aspect of goodness from God, as we have shown (ch. 40). Therefore, he is the highest good. Amplius. Sicut albius est quod est nigro impermixtius, ita melius est quod est malo impermixtius. Sed Deus est maxime malo impermixtus: quia in eo nec actu nec potentia malum esse potest, et hoc ei ex sua natura competit, ut ostensum est. Est igitur ipse summum bonum. Moreover. Just as that is more white which has less admixture of black, so that is better which has less admixture of evil. Now God is most of all unmixed with evil, since in him there can be no evil (neither in act nor in potency), and this becomes him by his very nature, as we have proved (ch. 39). Therefore, he is the highest good. Hinc est quod dicitur 1 Reg. 2:2: non est sanctus ut est dominus. Hence it is said: there is none holy like the Lord (1 Sam 2:2). Caput 42 Chapter 42 Quod Deus est unus That God is one Hoc autem ostenso, manifestum est Deum non esse nisi unum. Having proved the foregoing, it is manifest that there is only one God. Non enim possibile est esse duo summe bona. Quod enim per superabundantiam dicitur, in uno tantum invenitur. Deus autem est summum bonum, ut ostensum est. Deus igitur est unus. For it is impossible that there be two highest goods. For that which is ascribed to a thing by way of superabundance is to be found in one alone. Now God is the highest good, as we have shown (ch. 41). Therefore, God is one. Praeterea. Ostensum est Deum esse omnino perfectum, cui nulla perfectio desit. Si igitur sunt plures dii, oportet esse plura huiusmodi perfecta. Hoc autem est impossibile: nam si nulli eorum deest aliqua perfectio, nec aliqua imperfectio admiscetur, quod requiritur ad hoc quod aliquid sit simpliciter perfectum, non erit in quo ad invicem distinguantur. Impossibile est igitur plures deos ponere. Further. We have shown that God is absolutely perfect (ch. 28), and that he lacks no perfection. If, then, there be several gods, it follows that there are several such perfect things. But that is impossible: for if none of them lacks any perfection, nor has any admixture of imperfection (which is required for anything to be simply perfect), there will be nothing by which they can be distinguished. Therefore, it is impossible that there be several gods. Item. Quod sufficienter fit uno posito, melius est per unum fieri quam per multa. Sed rerum ordo est sicut melius potest esse: non enim potentia agentis primi deest potentiae quae est in rebus ad perfectionem. Sufficienter autem omnia complentur reducendo in unum primum principium. Non est igitur ponere plura principia. Again. That which is sufficiently done if done by one is better done by one than by many. Now the order of things is the best possible, since the potency of the first agent does not fail the potency of things for perfection. And all things are sufficiently perfected by referring them to one first principle. Therefore, a plurality of principles is inadmissible. Amplius. Impossibile est unum motum continuum et regularem a pluribus motoribus esse. Nam, si simul movent, nullus eorum est perfectus motor, sed omnes se habent loco unius perfecti motoris: quod non competit in primo motore, perfectum enim est prius imperfecto. Si autem non simul moveant, quilibet eorum est quandoque movens et quandoque non. Ex quo sequitur quod motus non sit continuus neque regularis. Motus enim continuus et unus est ab uno motore. Motor etiam qui non semper movet, irregulariter invenitur movere: sicut patet in motoribus inferioribus, in quibus motus violentus in principio intenditur et in fine remittitur, motus autem naturalis e converso. Sed primus motus est unus et continuus, ut a Philosophis probatum est. Ergo oportet eius motorem primum esse unum. Moreover. It is impossible for one continual and regular movement to proceed from several movers. For if they move together, none of them is a perfect mover, but all together take the place of one perfect mover. This does not apply to the first mover, since the perfect precedes the imperfect. If, however, they do not move together, each of them is at one time moving, and at another time not. Thus it follows that the movement is neither continuous nor regular, because movement that is continuous and one is from one mover. Moreover, a mover that is not always moving is found to move irregularly, as evidenced by movers of lower degree (in which violent movement is intense at first and slackens at the end), while natural movement is the reverse. But the first movement is one and continuous, as was proved by the philosophers. Therefore, its first mover must be one. Adhuc. Substantia corporalis ordinatur ad spiritualem sicut ad suum bonum: nam est in ista bonitas plenior, cui corporalis substantia intendit assimilari, cum omne quod est desideret optimum quantum possibile est. Sed omnes motus corporalis creaturae inveniuntur reduci ad unum primum, praeter quem non est alius primus qui nullo modo reducatur in ipsum. Ergo praeter substantiam spiritualem quae est finis primi motus, non est aliqua quae non reducatur in ipsam. Hoc autem nomine Dei intelligimus. Non est igitur nisi unus Deus. Again. Corporeal substance is directed to spiritual substance as its good, for there is in the latter a fuller goodness, to which corporeal substance seeks to be likened, since whatever exists desires to attain the greatest good as far as possible. Now, all movements of the corporeal creature are found to be reduced to one first movement, beside which there is no other first movement not reducible to it. Therefore, beside the spiritual substance which is the end of the first movement, there is no other that cannot be reduced to it. Now, by this name we understand God. Therefore, there is only one God. Amplius. Omnium diversorum ordinatorum ad invicem, ordo eorum ad invicem est propter ordinem eorum ad aliquid unum: sicut ordo partium exercitus ad invicem est propter ordinem totius exercitus ad ducem. Nam quod aliqua diversa in habitudine aliqua uniuntur, non potest esse ex propriis naturis secundum quod sunt diversa: quia ex hoc magis disiungerentur. Nec potest esse ex diversis ordinantibus: quia non posset esse quod unum ordinem intenderent ex seipsis secundum quod sunt diversi. Et sic vel ordo multorum ad invicem est per accidens: vel oportet reducere ad aliquod unum primum ordinans, qui ad finem quem intendit omnia alia ordinat. Omnes autem partes huius mundi inveniuntur ordinatae ad invicem, secundum quod quaedam a quibusdam iuvantur sicut corpora inferiora moventur per superiora, et haec per substantias incorporeas, ut ex supra dictis patet. Nec hoc est per accidens: cum sit semper vel in maiori parte. Igitur totus hic mundus non habet nisi unum ordinatorem et gubernatorem. Sed praeter hunc mundum non est alius. Non est igitur nisi unus omnium rerum gubernator, quem Deum dicimus. Moreover. The mutual order of all diverse things that are directed to each other is on account of their order towards some one thing, even as the order of an army’s parts to each other is on account of the whole army’s order to the general. For certain diverse things cannot be united together by their own natures (as distinct from one another) in some relationship, because from this there would rather result distinction among them. Nor can it result from different causes of order, because these could not aim at one order of themselves, as differing from one another. Accordingly, either the mutual order of many is accidental, or it must be reduced to one first cause of that order, who sets all in order towards the end which he intends. Now, all the parts of this world are observed to be ordered to one another insofar as certain things are aided by certain others: thus the lower bodies are moved by the higher, and the latter by incorporeal substances, as shown above (ch. 13, 20). Nor is this accidental, since it happens always or for the most part. Therefore, this world has but one director and governor. But there is no other world besides this. Therefore, there is but one governor of the universe, whom we call God. Adhuc. Si sunt duo quorum utrumque est necesse esse, oportet quod conveniant in intentione necessitatis essendi. Oportet igitur quod distinguantur per aliquid quod additur uni tantum, vel utrique. Et sic oportet vel alterum vel utrumque esse compositum. Nullum autem compositum est necesse esse, per seipsum, sicut supra ostensum est. Impossibile est igitur esse plura quorum utrumque sit necesse esse. Et sic nec plures deos. Again. If there be two things, both of which necessarily exist, they must agree in the intention of the necessity of being. It follows, therefore, that they must be differentiated by something added either to one or to both of them, and consequently that either one or both of them is composite. Now no composite thing exists necessarily in itself, as we have proved above (ch. 18). Therefore, there cannot possibly be several things each of which exists necessarily, and consequently neither can there be several gods. Amplius. Illud in quo differunt, ex quo ponuntur convenire in necessitate essendi, aut requiritur ad complementum necessitatis essendi aliquo modo, aut non. Si non requiritur, ergo est aliquid accidentale: quia omne quod advenit rei nihil faciens ad esse ipsius, est accidens. Ergo hoc accidens habet causam. Aut ergo essentiam eius quod est necesse esse, aut aliquid aliud. Si essentiam eius, cum ipsa necessitas essendi sit essentia eius, ut ex supra dictis patet, necessitas essendi erit causa illius accidentis. Sed necessitas essendi invenitur in utroque. Ergo utrumque habebit illud accidens. Et sic non distinguentur secundum illud. Si autem causa illius accidentis sit aliquid aliud, nisi ergo illud aliud esset, hoc accidens non esset. Et nisi hoc accidens esset, distinctio praedicta non esset. Ergo, nisi esset illud aliud, ista duo quae ponuntur necesse esse, non essent duo sed unum. Ergo esse proprium utriusque est dependens ab altero. Et sic neutrum est necesse esse per seipsum. Moreover. Supposing they agree in the necessity of being, that in which they differ is either required as a complement in some way to this necessity of being, or is not. If not, it follows that it is accidental, because whatever is added to a thing, having nothing to do with its being, is an accident. Therefore, this accident has a cause. And this cause is either the essence of that which exists of necessity, or something else. If it is its essence, since the very necessity of being is its essence, as shown above (ch. 22), the necessity of being will be the cause of that accident. But necessity of being is found in both. Therefore, both have that accident, and consequently are not differentiated thereby. If, however, the cause of this accident be something else, it follows that unless this something else exist, this accident would not exist. And without this accident there would not be the aforesaid distinction. Therefore, without that something else, these two things that are supposed to exist of necessity would be not two, but one. Therefore, the proper being of both is dependent on a third, and consequently neither of them exists necessarily of itself.