Caput 4 Chapter 4 Quod veritas divinorum ad quam naturalis ratio pertingit convenienter hominibus credenda proponitur That the truth about divine things which is attainable by reason is fittingly proposed to man as an object of belief Duplici igitur veritate divinorum intelligibilium existente, una ad quam rationis inquisitio pertingere potest, altera quae omne ingenium humanae rationis excedit, utraque convenienter divinitus homini credenda proponitur. While, then, the truth of the intelligible things of God is twofold—one to which the inquiry of reason can attain, the other which surpasses the whole range of human reason—both are fittingly proposed by God to man as an object of belief. Hoc autem de illa primo ostendendum est quae inquisitioni rationis pervia esse potest: ne forte alicui videatur, ex quo ratione haberi potest, frustra id supernaturali inspiratione credendum traditum esse. Sequerentur autem tria inconvenientia si huiusmodi veritas solummodo rationi inquirenda relinqueretur. We must first show this with regard to that truth which is attainable by the inquiry of reason, lest it appear to some that, since it can be attained by reason, it is useless to make it an object of faith by supernatural inspiration. Now, there would be three unsuitable consequences if this truth were left solely to the inquiry of reason. Unum est quod paucis hominibus Dei cognitio inesset. A fructu enim studiosae inquisitionis, qui est inventio veritatis, plurimi impediuntur tribus de causis. One is that few men would have knowledge of God. For very many are hindered from gathering the fruit of diligent inquiry, which is the discovery of truth, for three reasons. Quidam siquidem propter complexionis indispositionem, ex qua multi naturaliter sunt indispositi ad sciendum: unde nullo studio ad hoc pertingere possent ut summum gradum humanae cognitionis attingerent, qui in cognoscendo Deum consistit. Quidam vero impediuntur necessitate rei familiaris. Oportet enim esse inter homines aliquos qui temporalibus administrandis insistant, qui tantum tempus in otio contemplativae inquisitionis non possent expendere ut ad summum fastigium humanae inquisitionis pertingerent, scilicet Dei cognitionem. Quidam autem impediuntur pigritia. Ad cognitionem enim eorum quae de Deo ratio investigare potest, multa praecognoscere oportet: cum fere totius philosophiae consideratio ad Dei cognitionem ordinetur; propter quod metaphysica, quae circa divina versatur, inter philosophiae partes ultima remanet addiscenda. Sic ergo non nisi cum magno labore studii ad praedictae veritatis inquisitionem perveniri potest. Quem quidem laborem pauci subire volunt pro amore scientiae, cuius tamen mentibus hominum naturalem Deus inservit appetitum. Some, indeed, on account of an indisposition of temperament, from which many are naturally indisposed to knowledge, so that no efforts of theirs would enable them to reach to the attainment of the highest degree of human knowledge, which consists in knowing God. Some are hindered by the needs of household affairs. For there must be among men some that devote themselves to the conduct of temporal affairs, who would be unable to devote so much time to the leisure of contemplative research as to reach the summit of human inquiry, namely, the knowledge of God. And some are hindered by laziness. For in order to acquire the knowledge of God in those things which reason is able to investigate, one must have a previous knowledge of many things. For almost the entire consideration of philosophy is directed to the knowledge of God, on account of which metaphysics, which is about divine things, is the last of the parts of philosophy to be studied. Thus it is not possible to arrive at the inquiry about the aforesaid truth except after a most laborious study, and few are willing to take upon themselves this labor out of the love of knowledge, even though God has instilled natural desire for it in the minds of men. Secundum inconveniens est quod illi qui ad praedictae veritatis inventionem pervenirent, vix post longum tempus pertingerent. Tum propter huius veritatis profunditatem, ad quam capiendam per viam rationis non nisi post longum exercitium intellectus humanus idoneus invenitur. Tum etiam propter multa quae praeexiguntur, ut dictum est. Tum etiam propter hoc quod tempore iuventutis, dum diversis motibus passionum anima fluctuat, non est apta ad tam altae veritatis cognitionem, sed in quiescendo fit prudens et sciens, ut dicitur in VII Physic. Remaneret igitur humanum genus, si sola rationis via ad Deum cognoscendum pateret, in maximis ignorantiae tenebris: cum Dei cognitio, quae homines maxime perfectos et bonos facit, non nisi quibusdam paucis, et his etiam post temporis longitudinem proveniret. The second inconvenience is that those who would arrive at the discovery of the aforesaid truth would scarcely succeed in doing so after a long time. First, because this truth is so profound that the human intellect is only enabled to grasp it by reason after long practice. Second, because many things are required beforehand, as stated above. Third, because the mind is not fit for the knowledge of so sublime a truth at the time of youth, when tossed about by the various movements of the passions, but calm gives prudence and knowledge, as it says in 7 Physics 3, 7. Hence mankind would remain in the deepest darkness of ignorance if the path of reason were the only available way to the knowledge of God, because the knowledge of God, which especially makes men perfect and good, would be acquired only by the few, and by these only after a long time. Tertium inconveniens est quod investigationi rationis humanae plerumque falsitas admiscetur, propter debilitatem intellectus nostri in iudicando, et phantasmatum permixtionem. Et ideo apud multos in dubitatione remanerent ea quae sunt etiam verissime demonstrata, dum vim demonstrationis ignorant; et praecipue cum videant a diversis qui sapientes dicuntur, diversa doceri. Inter multa etiam vera quae demonstrantur, immiscetur aliquando aliquid falsum, quod non demonstratur, sed aliqua probabili vel sophistica ratione asseritur, quae interdum demonstratio reputatur. Et ideo oportuit per viam fidei fixam certitudinem et puram veritatem de rebus divinis hominibus exhiberi. The third inconvenience is that much falsehood is mingled with the investigations of human reason, on account of our intellect’s weakness in forming judgments, and the admixture of phantasms. Consequently, many would remain in doubt about those things even which are most truly demonstrated while ignoring the force of the demonstration, especially when they perceive that different things are taught by the various men who are called wise. Moreover, among the many demonstrated truths there is sometimes a mixture of falsehood, which is not demonstrated but asserted for some probable or sophistical reason which at times is mistaken for a demonstration. Therefore, it was necessary that definite certainty and pure truth about divine things should be offered to man by the way of faith. Salubriter ergo divina providit clementia ut ea etiam quae ratio investigare potest, fide tenenda praeciperet: ut sic omnes de facili possent divinae cognitionis participes esse et absque dubitatione et errore. Therefore, the divine clemency helpfully provides that even some things which reason is able to investigate are held by faith, so that all may share in the knowledge of God easily, and without doubt or error. Hinc est quod Ephes. 4:17 dicitur: iam non ambuletis sicut et gentes ambulant in vanitate sensus sui, tenebris obscuratum habentes intellectum. Et Isaiae 54:13: ponam universos filios tuos doctos a domino. Thus it is written, you must no longer live as the gentiles do, in the futility of their minds; they are darkened in their understanding (Eph 4:17–18), and: all your sons shall be taught by the Lord (Isa 54:13). Caput 5 Chapter 5 Quod ea quae ratione investigari non possunt convenienter fide tenenda hominibus proponuntur That those things which cannot be investigated by reason are fittingly proposed to man as an object of faith Videtur autem quibusdam fortasse non debere homini ad credendum proponi illa quae ratio investigare non sufficit cum divina sapientia unicuique secundum modum suae naturae provideat. Et ideo demonstrandum est quod necessarium sit homini divinitus credenda proponi etiam illa quae rationem excedunt. It may appear to some that those things which cannot be investigated by reason ought not to be proposed to man as an object of faith, because divine wisdom provides for each thing according to the mode of its nature. We must, therefore, prove that it is also necessary for those things which surpass reason to be proposed by God to man as an object of faith. Nullus enim desiderio et studio in aliquid tendit nisi sit ei praecognitum. Quia ergo ad altius bonum quam experiri in praesenti vita possit humana fragilitas, homines per divinam providentiam ordinantur, ut in sequentibus investigabitur, oportuit mentem evocari in aliquid altius quam ratio nostra in praesenti possit pertingere, ut sic disceret aliquid desiderare, et studio tendere in aliquid quod totum statum praesentis vitae excedit. Et hoc praecipue Christianae religioni competit, quae singulariter bona spiritualia et aeterna promittit: unde et in ea plurima humanum sensum excedentia proponuntur. Lex autem vetus, quae temporalia promissa habebat, pauca proposuit quae humanae rationis inquisitionem excederent. Secundum etiam hunc modum philosophis cura fuit, ad hoc ut homines a sensibilium delectationibus ad honestatem perducerent, ostendere esse alia bona his sensibilibus potiora, quorum gustu multo suavius qui vacant activis vel contemplativis virtutibus delectantur. For no man tends to do a thing by his desire and endeavor unless it be previously known to him. Thus, since man is directed by divine providence to a higher good than human frailty can attain in the present life, as we shall show in the sequel (bk. III), his mind had to be bidden to something higher than those things to which our reason can reach in the present life, so that he might learn to aspire and to tend by his endeavors to something surpassing the whole state of the present life. And this is especially true about the Christian religion, which alone promises spiritual and eternal goods, for which reason it proposes many things surpassing the thought of man. But the old law, which contained promises of temporal things, proposed few things above human inquiry. It was with this motive that the philosophers, to wean men from sensible pleasures to virtue, took care to show that there are other goods of greater account than those which appeal to the senses, the taste of which things affords much greater delight to those who devote themselves to active or contemplative virtues. Est etiam necessarium huiusmodi veritatem ad credendum hominibus proponi ad Dei cognitionem veriorem habendam. Tunc enim solum Deum vere cognoscimus quando ipsum esse credimus supra omne id quod de Deo cogitari ab homine possibile est: eo quod naturalem hominis cognitionem divina substantia excedit, ut supra ostensum est. Per hoc ergo quod homini de Deo aliqua proponuntur quae rationem excedunt, firmatur in homine opinio quod Deus sit aliquid supra id quod cogitare potest. Again, this truth needed to be proposed to man as an object of faith so that he may have truer knowledge of God. For we only know God truly when we believe that he is far above all that man can possibly think of God, for the divine essence surpasses man’s natural knowledge, as stated above (ch. 3). Thus, by the fact that certain things about God are proposed to man which surpass his reason, he is strengthened in his opinion that God is far above what he is able to think. Alia etiam utilitas inde provenit, scilicet praesumptionis repressio, quae est mater erroris. Sunt enim quidam tantum de suo ingenio praesumentes ut totam rerum naturam se reputent suo intellectu posse metiri, aestimantes scilicet totum esse verum quod eis videtur et falsum quod eis non videtur. Ut ergo ab hac praesumptione humanus animus liberatus ad modestam inquisitionem veritatis perveniat, necessarium fuit homini proponi quaedam divinitus quae omnino intellectum eius excederent. Another advantage results from this, namely, the checking of presumption, which is the mother of error. For there are some who presume so far on their wits that they think themselves capable of measuring the whole nature of things by their intellect, namely, thinking all things are true that seem so to them, and false which do not. Accordingly, so that man’s mind might be freed from this presumption and seek the truth humbly, it was necessary that God should propose to man certain things far surpassing his intellect. Apparet etiam alia utilitas ex dictis Philosophi in X Ethicor. Cum enim Simonides quidam homini praetermittendam divinam cognitionem persuaderet et humanis rebus ingenium applicandum, oportere inquiens humana sapere hominem et mortalia mortalem; contra eum Philosophus dicit quod homo debet se ad immortalia et divina trahere quantum potest. Unde in XI De animal. dicit, quod, quamvis parum sit quod de substantiis superioribus percipimus, tamen illud modicum est magis amatum et desideratum omni cognitione quam de substantiis inferioribus habemus. Dicit etiam in II Cael. et mund. quod cum de corporibus caelestibus quaestiones possint solvi parva et topica solutione, contingit auditori ut vehemens sit gaudium eius. Ex quibus omnibus apparet quod de rebus nobilissimis quantumcumque imperfecta cognitio maximam perfectionem animae confert. Yet another advantage is made apparent by the words of the Philosopher. For when a certain Simonides maintained that man should neglect the knowledge of God and apply his mind to human affairs, and declared that a man ought to relish human things, and a mortal, mortal things, the Philosopher contradicted him, saying that a man ought to devote himself to immortal and divine things as much as he can (10 Ethics 7, 8). Hence he says (in 11 On the Parts of Animals 1, 5) that though we perceive but little of higher substances, yet that little is more loved and desired than all the knowledge we have of lower substances. He also says (in 2 On the Heavens and the Earth 12, 1) that when questions about the heavenly bodies can be answered by a short and probable solution, the hearer rejoices greatly. All this shows that however imperfect the knowledge of the highest things may be, it bestows very great perfection on the soul. Et ideo, quamvis ea quae supra rationem sunt ratio humana plene capere non possit, tamen multum sibi perfectionis acquiritur si saltem ea qualitercumque teneat fide. And consequently, although human reason is unable to fully grasp things above reason, it nevertheless acquires much perfection if at least it hold things, in any way whatever, by faith. Et ideo dicitur Eccli. 3:25: plurima supra sensum hominis ostensa sunt tibi. Et 1 Cor. 2:10 quae sunt Dei nemo novit nisi spiritus Dei; nobis autem revelavit Deus per spiritum suum. Thus it is written, matters too great for human understanding have been shown you (Sir 3:25), and: the things that are of God no man knows, but the Spirit of God: but to us God hath revealed them by his Spirit (1 Cor 2:10). Caput 6 Chapter 6 Quod assentire his quae sunt fidei non est levitatis quamvis supra rationem sint That it is not a mark of levity to assent to the things that are of faith although they are above reason Huiusmodi autem veritati, cui ratio humana experimentum non praebet, fidem adhibentes non leviter credunt, quasi indoctas fabulas secuti, ut 2 Petr. 1:16, dicitur. Now those who believe this truth, of which reason affords no proof believe not lightly, as though following foolish fables (2 Pet 1:16). Haec enim divinae sapientiae secreta ipsa divina sapientia, quae omnia plenissime novit, dignata est hominibus revelare: quae sui praesentiam et doctrinae et inspirationis veritatem, convenientibus argumentis ostendit, dum ad confirmandum ea quae naturalem cognitionem excedunt, opera visibiliter ostendit quae totius naturae superant facultatem; videlicet in mirabili curatione languorum, mortuorum suscitatione, caelestium corporum mirabili immutatione; et, quod est mirabilius, humanarum mentium inspiratione, ut idiotae et simplices, dono spiritus sancti repleti, summam sapientiam et facundiam in instanti consequerentur. For divine wisdom himself, who knows all things most fully, deigned to reveal to man the secrets of God’s wisdom (Job 11:6), and by suitable arguments proves his presence, and the truth of his doctrine and inspiration, by performing works surpassing the capability of the whole of nature, namely, the wondrous healing of the sick, the raising of the dead to life, a marvellous control over the heavenly bodies, and, what excites yet more wonder, the inspiration of human minds, so that unlettered and simple persons are filled with the Holy Spirit, and in one instant are endowed with the most sublime wisdom and eloquence. Quibus inspectis, praedictae probationis efficacia, non armorum violentia, non voluptatum promissione, et, quod est mirabilissimum, inter persecutorum tyrannidem, innumerabilis turba non solum simplicium, sed sapientissimorum hominum, ad fidem Christianam convolavit, in qua omnem humanum intellectum excedentia praedicantur, voluptates carnis cohibentur et omnia quae in mundo sunt contemni docentur; quibus animos mortalium assentire et maximum miraculorum est, et manifestum divinae inspirationis opus, ut, contemptis visibilibus, sola invisibilia cupiantur. And after considering these arguments, convinced by the strength of the proof, and not by the force of arms, nor by the promise of delights, but—and this is the greatest marvel of all—amidst the tyranny of persecutions, a countless crowd of not only simple but also of the wisest men, embraced the Christian faith, which inculcates things surpassing all human understanding, curbs the pleasures of the flesh, and teaches contempt of all worldly things. That the minds of mortal beings should assent to such things is both the greatest of miracles, and the evident work of divine inspiration, seeing that they despise visible things and desire only those that are invisible. Hoc autem non subito neque a casu, sed ex divina dispositione factum esse, manifestum est ex hoc quod hoc se facturum Deus multis ante prophetarum praedixit oraculis, quorum libri penes nos in veneratione habentur, utpote nostrae fidei testimonium adhibentes. And that this happened not suddenly nor by chance, but by the disposition of God, is shown by the fact that God foretold that he would do so by the manifold oracles of the prophets, whose books we hold in veneration as bearing witness to our faith. Huius quidem confirmationis modus tangitur Hebr. 2:3 quae, scilicet humana salus, cum initium accepisset enarrari per dominum, ab eis qui audierunt in nos confirmata est, contestante Deo signis et portentis et variis spiritus sancti distributionibus. This particular kind of proof is alluded to in Hebrews 2:3–4: which, namely the salvation of mankind, having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed with us by them that heard him, God also bearing witness by signs and wonders, and diverse distributions of the Holy Spirit. Haec autem tam mirabilis mundi conversio ad fidem Christianam indicium certissimum est praeteritorum signorum: ut ea ulterius iterari necesse non sit, cum in suo effectu appareant evidenter. Esset enim omnibus signis mirabilius si ad credendum tam ardua, et ad operandum tam difficilia, et ad sperandum tam alta, mundus absque mirabilibus signis inductus fuisset a simplicibus et ignobilibus hominibus. Quamvis non cesset Deus etiam nostris temporibus, ad confirmationem fidei, per sanctos suos miracula operari. Now, such a wondrous conversion of the world to the Christian faith is a most indubitable proof that such signs did take place, so that there is no need to repeat them when they are so evidently apparent from their effect. For it would be the most wondrous sign of all if, without any wondrous signs, the world were persuaded by simple and lowly men to believe things so arduous, to accomplish things so difficult, and to hope for things so sublime. (Although even in our time God does not cease to work miracles through his saints in confirmation of the faith.) Hi vero qui sectas errorum introduxerunt processerunt via contraria: ut patet in Mahumeto qui carnalium voluptatum promissis, ad quorum desiderium carnalis concupiscentia instigat, populus illexit. Praecepta etiam tradidit promissis conformia, voluptati carnali habenas relaxans, in quibus in promptu est a carnalibus hominibus obediri. Documenta etiam veritatis non attulit nisi quae de facili a quolibet mediocriter sapiente naturali ingenio cognosci possint: quin potius vera quae docuit multis fabulis et falsissimis doctrinis immiscuit. Signa etiam non adhibuit supernaturaliter facta, quibus solis divinae inspirationi conveniens testimonium adhibetur, dum operatio visibilis quae non potest esse nisi divina, ostendit doctorem veritatis invisibiliter inspiratum: sed dixit se in armorum potentia missum, quae signa etiam latronibus et tyrannis non desunt. Ei etiam non aliqui sapientes, in rebus divinis et humanis exercitati, a principio crediderunt: sed homines bestiales in desertis morantes, omnis doctrinae divinae prorsus ignari, per quorum multitudinem alios armorum violentia in suam legem coegit. Nulla etiam divina oracula praecedentium prophetarum ei testimonium perhibent: quin potius quasi omnia veteris et novi testamenti documenta fabulosa narratione depravat, ut patet eius legem inspicienti. Unde astuto consilio libros veteris et novi testamenti suis sequacibus non reliquit legendos, ne per eos falsitatis argueretur. Et sic patet quod eius dictis fidem adhibentes leviter credunt. On the other hand, those who introduced the errors of the sects proceeded in contrary fashion, as is clear from Mohammed, who enticed peoples with the promise of carnal pleasures, to the desire of which the concupiscence of the flesh instigates. He also delivered commandments in keeping with his promises, by giving the reins to carnal pleasure, in which it is easy for carnal men to obey. Also, the lessons of truth which he inculcated were only such as can be easily known to any man of average wisdom by his natural powers—in fact, he mingled the truths which he taught with many fables and most false doctrines. Nor did he add any signs of supernatural agency, which alone are a fitting witness to divine inspiration, since a visible work that can only be from God proves the teacher of truth to be invisibly inspired, but he asserted that he was sent in the power of arms, which sign is not lacking even to robbers and tyrants. Again, those who believed in him from the outset were not wise men practiced in things divine and human, but bestial men who dwelt in the deserts, utterly ignorant of all divine teaching, and it was by a multitude of such men and the force of arms that he compelled others to submit to his law. Lastly, no divine oracles of prophets in a previous age bore witness to him; rather, he corrupted almost all the teaching of the Old and New Testaments by a narrative replete with fables, as one may see by a perusal of his law. Hence, by a cunning device, he did not commit the reading of the Old and New Testament books to his followers, lest he should thereby be convicted of falsehood. Thus it is evident that those who believe his words believe lightly. Caput 7 Chapter 7 Quod veritati fidei Christianae non contrariatur veritas rationis That the truth of reason is not in opposition to the truth of the Christian faith Quamvis autem praedicta veritas fidei Christianae humanae rationis capacitatem excedat, haec tamen quae ratio naturaliter indita habet, huic veritati contraria esse non possunt. Now, though the aforesaid truth of the Christian faith surpasses the ability of human reason, nevertheless those things which are naturally instilled in human reason cannot be opposed to this truth. Ea enim quae naturaliter rationi sunt insita, verissima esse constat: in tantum ut nec esse falsa sit possibile cogitare. Nec id quod fide tenetur, cum tam evidenter divinitus confirmatum sit, fas est credere esse falsum. Quia igitur solum falsum vero contrarium est, ut ex eorum definitionibus inspectis manifeste apparet, impossibile est illis principiis quae ratio naturaliter cognoscit, praedictam veritatem fidei contrariam esse. For it is clear that those things which are implanted in reason by nature are most true, so much so that it is impossible to think them to be false. Nor is it lawful to deem false that which is held by faith, since it is so evidently confirmed by God. Seeing, then, that the false alone is opposed to the true (as is obvious if we examine their definitions), it is impossible for the aforesaid truth of faith to be contrary to those principles which reason knows naturally. Item. Illud idem quod inducitur in animam discipuli a docente, doctoris scientia continet: nisi doceat ficte, quod de Deo nefas est dicere. Principiorum autem naturaliter notorum cognitio nobis divinitus est indita: cum ipse Deus sit nostrae auctor naturae. Haec ergo principia etiam divina sapientia continet. Quicquid igitur principiis huiusmodi contrarium est, divinae sapientiae contrariatur. Non igitur a Deo esse potest. Ea igitur quae ex revelatione divina per fidem tenentur, non possunt naturali cognitioni esse contraria. Again. The same thing which the disciple’s mind receives from its teacher is contained in the knowledge of the teacher—unless he teach fictitiously, which is wicked to say of God. Now, the knowledge of naturally known principles is instilled into us by God, since God himself is the author of our nature. Therefore, the divine wisdom also contains these principles. Consequently, whatever is contrary to these principles is contrary to the divine wisdom. Therefore, it cannot be from God. Therefore, those things which are received by faith from divine revelation cannot be contrary to our natural knowledge. Adhuc. Contrariis rationibus intellectus noster ligatur, ut ad veri cognitionem procedere nequeat. Si igitur contrariae cognitiones nobis a Deo immitterentur, ex hoc a veritatis cognitione noster intellectus impediretur. Quod a Deo esse non potest. Moreover. Contrary arguments bind our intellect so that it cannot advance to the knowledge of truth. Therefore, if conflicting knowledges were instilled into us by God, our intellect would thereby be hindered from knowing the truth. And this cannot be ascribed to God. Amplius. Ea quae sunt naturalia mutari non possunt, natura manente. Contrariae autem opiniones simul eidem inesse non possunt. Non igitur contra cognitionem naturalem aliqua opinio vel fides homini a Deo immittitur. Furthermore. Things that are natural are unchangeable so long as nature remains. Now, contrary opinions cannot be together in the same subject. Therefore, God does not instil into man any opinion or belief contrary to natural knowledge. Et ideo apostolus dicit, Rom. 10:8: prope est verbum in corde tuo et in ore tuo: hoc est verbum fidei, quod praedicamus. Sed quia superat rationem, a nonnullis reputatur quasi contrarium. Quod esse non potest. Hence the Apostle says: the word is near you, on your lips and in your heart: this is the word of faith which we preach (Rom 10:8). Yet, because it surpasses reason, some look upon it as though it were contrary to reason; which is impossible.