Non est igitur possibile ponere plura quorum quodlibet sit necesse esse per seipsum. Therefore, it is impossible to have several things, each of which has necessary being of itself. Adhuc. Si sunt duo dii, aut hoc nomen Deus de utroque praedicatur univoce, aut aequivoce. Si aequivoce, hoc est praeter intentionem praesentem: nam nihil prohibet rem quamlibet quolibet nomine aequivoce nominari, si usus loquentium admittat. Si autem dicatur univoce, oportet quod de utroque praedicetur secundum unam rationem. Et sic oportet quod in utroque sit una natura secundum rationem. Aut igitur haec natura est in utroque secundum unum esse, aut secundum aliud et aliud. Si secundum unum, ergo non erunt duo sed unum tantum: duorum enim non est unum esse si substantialiter distinguantur. Si autem est aliud et aliud esse in utroque, ergo neutri erit sua quidditas suum esse. Sed hoc oportet in Deo ponere, ut probatum est. Ergo neutrum illorum duorum est hoc quod intelligimus nomine Dei. Sic igitur impossibile est ponere duos deos. Further. If there be two gods, this word ‘God’ is predicated of both either univocally or equivocally. If equivocally, this is beside the present question: for nothing prevents any thing receiving an equivocal name, if the usage of speech allows it. If, however, it is predicated univocally, it must be said of both in the same sense: and thus it follows that in both there is the same nature in common. Either, therefore, this nature is in both according to the same being, or else it is according to different beings. If according to one being, it follows that they are not two, but only one: for two things do not have one being if they differ substantially. If, however, there is a different being in both, the quiddity of neither will be its own being. But we must admit this to be the case in God, as we have proved (ch. 18). Therefore, neither of them is what we understand by the name of God, and consequently it is impossible to admit the existence of two gods. Amplius. Nihil eorum quae conveniunt huic signato inquantum est hoc signatum, possibile est alii convenire: quia singularitas alicuius rei non est alteri praeter ipsum singulare. Sed ei quod est necesse esse sua necessitas essendi convenit inquantum est hoc signatum. Ergo impossibile est quod alicui alteri conveniat. Et sic impossibile est quod sint plura quorum quodlibet sit necesse esse. Et per consequens impossibile est esse plures deos. Again. None of the things that belong to a particular signate thing as such, can possibly belong to another, because the singularity of a particular thing belongs to no other but the singular thing itself. Now, its necessity of being belongs to that which is of necessity inasmuch as it is this signate thing. Therefore, it cannot possibly belong to any other thing, and thus it is impossible that there be several things each of which exists of necessity. Therefore, it is impossible that there be several gods. Probatio mediae: si enim illud quod est necesse esse non est hoc signatum inquantum est necesse esse, oportet quod designatio sui esse non sit necessaria secundum se, sed ex alio dependeat. Unumquodque autem secundum quod est actu est distinctum ab omnibus aliis: quod est esse hoc signatum. Ergo quod est necesse esse dependet ab alio quantum ad hoc quod est esse in actu. Quod est contra rationem eius quod est necesse esse. Oportet igitur quod id quod est necesse esse sit necesse esse secundum hoc quod est hoc signatum. Proof of the middle proposition: if that which is of necessity is not this signate thing as being of necessity, it follows that the designation of its being is not necessary in itself, but depends on something else. Now a thing according as it is in act is distinct from all else, and this is to be this signate thing. Therefore, that which is of necessity depends on something else for being in act, and this is contrary to the notion of that which is of necessity. Therefore, that which is of necessity must be of necessity according as it is this signate thing. Adhuc. Natura significata hoc nomine Deus aut est per seipsam individuata in hoc Deo, aut per aliquid aliud. Si per aliud oportet quod sit ibi compositio. Si per seipsam, ergo impossibile est quod alteri conveniat: illud enim quod est individuationis principium, non potest esse pluribus commune. Impossibile igitur est esse plures deos. Again. The nature signified by this word ‘God’ is individualized either by itself in this God or by something else. If by something else, there must be composition in it. If by itself, it follows that it cannot be applied to another: for that which is the principle of individualization cannot be common to several. Therefore, it is impossible that there be several gods. Amplius. Si sunt plures dii, oportet quod natura deitatis non sit una numero in utroque. Oportet igitur esse aliquid distinguens naturam divinam in hoc et in illo. Sed hoc est impossibile: quia natura divina non recipit additionem neque differentiarum essentialium neque accidentium, ut supra ostensum est; nec etiam natura divina est forma alicuius materiae, ut possit dividi ad materiae divisionem. Impossibile est igitur esse plures deos. Moreover. If there be several gods, it follows that the divine nature is not identically the same in each. Therefore, there must be something to distinguish the divine nature is this one and that one. But this is impossible, since the divine nature receives no addition whether of essential or of accidental differences, as proved above (ch. 23, 24). Nor is the divine nature the form of any matter (ch. 27), so as to be divided as the matter is divided. Therefore, there cannot possibly be several gods. Item. Esse proprium uniuscuiusque rei est tantum unum. Sed ipse Deus est esse suum, ut supra ostensum est. Impossibile est igitur esse nisi unum Deum. Again. The being proper to each thing is but one. Now God is himself his very being, as shown above (ch. 22). Therefore, there can be but one God. Adhuc. Secundum hunc modum res habet esse quo possidet unitatem: unde unumquodque suae divisioni pro posse repugnat, ne per hoc in non esse tendat. Sed divina natura est potissime habens esse. Est igitur in ea maxima unitas. Nullo igitur modo in plura distinguitur. Further. A thing has being according as it has unity. Hence every thing shuns division so far as it can, lest it thus tend to non-being. But the divine nature surpasses all in having being. Therefore, there is supreme unity therein. Therefore, it is in no way divided into several. Amplius. In unoquoque genere videmus multitudinem ab aliqua unitate procedere: et ideo in quolibet genere invenitur unum primum, quod est mensura omnium quae in illo genere inveniuntur. Quorumcumque igitur invenitur in aliquo uno convenientia, oportet quod ab aliquo uno principio dependeant. Sed omnia in esse conveniunt. Oportet igitur esse unum tantum quod est rerum omnium principium. Quod Deus est. Moreover. We observe that in every genus multitude proceeds from some kind of unity: and thus in every genus we find one first thing, which is the measure of all things found in that genus. Hence whatever things we find agreeing in one point must proceed from some one principle. Now all things agree in the point of being. Therefore, that which is the principle of all things must be one only, and this is God. Item. In quolibet principatu ille qui praesidet unitatem desiderat: unde inter principatus est potissima monarchia, sive regnum. Multorum etiam membrorum unum est caput: ac per hoc evidenti signo apparet ei cui convenit principatus, unitatem deberi. Unde et Deum, qui est omnium causa, oportet unum simpliciter confiteri. Again. In every government he who presides desires unity; hence the chief form of government is a monarchy or kingdom. And of our many members there is one head, and this is an evident sign that unity is due to whom headship is becoming. Therefore, we must confess that God, who is the cause of all, is simply one. Hanc autem confessionem divinae unitatis etiam ex sacris eloquiis accipere possumus. Nam Deut. 6:4 dicitur: audi, Israel, dominus Deus tuus Deus unus est; et Exod. 20:3: non erunt tibi dii alii praeter me; et Ephes. 4:5: unus dominus, una fides, et cetera. But we can also infer this confession of the divine unity from the sacred eloquence: hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one God (Deut 6:4); and: you shall have no other gods before me (Exod 20:3); and: one Lord, one faith (Eph 4:5). Hac autem veritate repelluntur gentiles deorum multitudinem confitentes. Quamvis plures eorum unum Deum summum esse dicerent, a quo omnes alios quos deos nominabant causatos esse asserebant, omnibus substantiis sempiternis divinitatis nomen adscribentes, et praecipue ratione sapientiae et felicitatis et rerum gubernationis. Quae quidem consuetudo loquendi etiam in sacra Scriptura invenitur, dum sancti angeli, aut etiam homines vel iudices, dii nominantur; sicut illud Psalmi: non est similis tibi in diis, domine; et alibi, ego dixi, dii estis; et multa huiusmodi per varia Scripturae loca inveniuntur. By this truth the heathens, who believe in many gods, are refuted. And yet several of them affirmed the existence of one supreme god, by whom they asserted that the others whom they called gods were caused, for they ascribed the godhead to all eternal substances, especially by reason of wisdom, felicity and governance of the universe. This mode of expression is found even in Sacred Scripture, where holy angels or men or judges are called ‘gods,’ as in the words of the Psalm: there is none like you among the gods, O Lord (Ps 86[85]:8), and again: I say: you are gods (Ps 82[81]:6), and many like passages are found throughout Scripture. Unde magis huic veritati videntur contrarii Manichaei, duo prima ponentes principia, quorum alterum alterius causa non sit. Therefore, the Manicheans would seem yet more opposed to this truth, since they assert two first principles, the one of which is not the cause of the other. Hanc etiam veritatem Ariani suis erroribus impugnaverunt, dum confitentur patrem et filium non unum, sed plures deos esse: cum tamen filium verum Deum auctoritate Scripturae credere cogantur. The Arians too impugned this truth by their errors, since they asserted that the Father and the Son are not one but distinct gods, and yet were compelled by the authority of Scripture to confess that the Son is true God. Caput 43 Chapter 43 Quod Deus est infinitus That God is infinite Cum autem infinitum quantitatem sequatur, ut philosophi tradunt, non potest infinitas Deo attribui ratione multitudinis: cum ostensum sit solum unum Deum esse, nullamque in eo compositionem vel partium vel accidentium inveniri. Secundum etiam quantitatem continuam infinitus dici non potest: cum ostensum sit eum incorporeum esse. Relinquitur igitur investigare an secundum spiritualem magnitudinem esse infinitum ei conveniat. Now while the infinite is a sequel of quantity, as philosophers teach, infinity cannot be ascribed to God in respect of multitude, seeing that it has been proved that there is but one God (ch. 42), and that there is no composition either of parts or of accidents in him (ch. 18, 23). Nor may we say that he is infinite in respect of continuous quantity, since we have shown that he is incorporeal (ch. 20). It remains, therefore, to inquire whether infinity is becoming to him in respect of spiritual magnitude. Quae quidem spiritualis magnitudo quantum ad duo attenditur: scilicet quantum ad potentiam; et quantum ad propriae naturae bonitatem sive completionem. Dicitur enim aliquid magis vel minus album secundum modum quo in eo sua albedo completur. Pensatur etiam magnitudo virtutis ex magnitudine actionis vel factorum. Harum autem magnitudinem una aliam consequitur: nam ex hoc ipso quo aliquid actu est, activum est; secundum igitur modum quo in actu suo completur, est modus magnitudinis suae virtutis. Et sic relinquitur res spirituales magnas dici secundum modum suae completionis: nam et Augustinus dicit quod in his quae non mole magna sunt, idem est esse maius quod melius. This spiritual magnitude is referable to two things, namely, to power and to the goodness or perfection of a thing’s very nature. For a thing is said to be more or less white according to the degree of perfection in its whiteness. And the magnitude of power is gauged from the magnitude of deeds or of things made. Now in these things the magnitude of one follows the magnitude of the other, because from the very fact that a thing is in act it is active, and consequently the degree of magnitude in its power is according to the degree in which it is perfected in its act. And thus spiritual things are said to be great according to their degree of perfection: for Augustine says that in things which are great not by bulk, to be great is to be good. Ostendendum est igitur secundum huius magnitudinis modum Deum infinitum esse. Non autem sic ut infinitum privative accipiatur, sicut in quantitate dimensiva vel numerali: nam huiusmodi quantitas nata est finem habere; unde secundum subtractionem eius quod sunt nata habere, infinita dicuntur; et propter hoc in eis infinitum imperfectionem designat. Sed in Deo infinitum negative tantum intelligitur: quia nullus est perfectionis suae terminus sive finis, sed est summe perfectum. Et sic Deo infinitum attribui debet. Accordingly, we have to show that God is infinite according to this kind of magnitude. Not, however, so that infinite be understood privatively, as in dimensive or numeral quantity: for a quantity of this kind is naturally finite, so that we speak of infinity by subtraction of that which it has by nature, and for this reason infinity in those quantities denotes imperfection. But in God the infinite is understood only negatively, because there is no bound or end to his perfection, and he is the supremely perfect being. And it is thus that the infinite should be ascribed to God. Omne namque quod secundum suam naturam finitum est, ad generis alicuius rationem determinatur. Deus autem non est in aliquo genere, sed eius perfectio omnium generum perfectiones continet, ut supra ostensum est. Est igitur infinitus. For whatever is finite by its nature is confined to some generic notion. Now God is in no genus, and his perfection contains the perfections of all genera, as we have shown above (ch. 25, 28). Therefore, he is infinite. Amplius. Omnis actus alteri inhaerens terminationem recipit ex eo in quo est: quia quod est in altero, est in eo per modum recipientis. Actus igitur in nullo existens nullo terminatur: puta, si albedo esset per se existens, perfectio albedinis in ea non terminaretur, quominus haberet quicquid de perfectione albedinis haberi potest. Deus autem est actus nullo modo in alio existens: quia nec est forma in materia, ut probatum est; nec esse suum inhaeret alicui formae vel naturae, cum ipse sit suum esse, ut supra ostensum est. Relinquitur igitur ipsum esse infinitum. Moreover. Every act inherent to something else receives its limitation from that in which it is, since that which is in another is in it according to the mode of the recipient. Therefore, an act that exists in no subject has no limitations: for instance, if whiteness were essentially existent, the perfection of whiteness in it would not be limited from having whatever it is possible to have of the perfection of whiteness. Now God is an act in no way existing in another: for neither is he form in matter, as we have proved (ch. 26, 27), nor is his being inherent to any form or nature, since he is his own being, as we have shown above (ch. 22). Therefore, it follows that he is infinite. Adhuc. In rebus invenitur aliquid quod est potentia tantum, ut materia prima; aliquid quod est actus tantum, ut Deus, sicut supra ostensum est; aliquid quod est actu et potentia, sicut res ceterae. Sed potentia, cum dicatur ad actum, non potest actum excedere, sicut nec in unoquoque, ita nec simpliciter. Cum igitur materia prima sit infinita in sua potentialitate, relinquitur quod Deus, qui est actus purus, sit infinitus in sua actualitate. Again. In things we find something that is pure potency, as prime matter; something that is pure act, namely, God, as we have shown above (ch. 16); and something that is act and potency, namely, other things. Now as potency, since it bears relation to an act, cannot exceed that act in any particular thing, so neither can it simply. Therefore, since primary matter is infinite in its potency, it follows that God, who is pure act, is infinite in his act. Item. Tanto actus aliquis perfectior est, quanto minus habet potentiae permixtum. Unde omnis actus cui permiscetur potentia, habet terminum suae perfectionis: cui autem non permiscetur aliqua potentia, est absque termino perfectionis. Deus autem est actus purus absque omni potentia, ut supra ostensum est. Est igitur infinitus. Again. An act is the more perfect according as it is less mingled with potency. Therefore, every act that has an admixture of potency has a limit to its perfection, while the act which has no admixture of potency has no limit to its perfection. Now God is pure act without any potency, as we have proved above (ch. 16). Therefore, he is infinite. Amplius. Ipsum esse absolute consideratum infinitum est: nam ab infinitis et infinitis modis participari possibile est. Si igitur alicuius esse sit finitum, oportet quod limitetur esse illud per aliquid aliud quod sit aliqualiter causa illius esse. Sed esse divini non potest esse aliqua causa: quia ipse est necesse per seipsum. Igitur esse suum est infinitum, et ipse infinitus. Again. Being itself, considered absolutely, is infinite; for it can be participated by an infinite number of things in an infinite number of ways. Hence if we take a thing with finite being, this being must be limited by some other thing which is in some way the cause of that being. Now there can be no cause of God’s being, since he is necessary of himself (ch. 13). Therefore, he has infinite being, and himself is infinite. Adhuc. Omne quod habet aliquam perfectionem, tanto est perfectius quanto illam perfectionem plenius participat. Sed non potest esse aliquis modus, nec etiam cogitari, quo plenius habeatur aliqua perfectio quam ab eo quod per suam essentiam est perfectum et cuius essentia est sua bonitas. Hoc autem Deus est. Nullo igitur modo potest cogitari aliquid melius vel perfectius Deo. Est igitur infinitus in bonitate. Moreover. Whatever has a particular perfection is the more perfect according as it more fully participates that perfection. Now there cannot be, nor even be imagined, a way in which a perfection is possessed more fully than by that which is perfect by its essence, and whose being is its goodness: and such is God. Therefore, in no way can anything be imagined better or more perfect than God. Therefore, he is infinite in goodness. Amplius. Intellectus noster ad infinitum in intelligendo extenditur: cuius signum est quod, qualibet quantitate finita data, intellectus noster maiorem excogitare potest. Frustra autem esset haec ordinatio intellectus ad infinitum nisi esset aliqua res intelligibilis infinita. Oportet igitur esse aliquam rem intelligibilem infinitam, quam oportet esse maximam rerum. Et hanc dicimus Deum. Deus igitur est infinitus. Further. Our intellect reaches the infinite in understanding, a sign of which is that, given any finite quantity, our intellect can imagine a greater. Now, it would be to no purpose for the intellect to be thus directed to the infinite unless there were infinite intelligible being. Therefore, there must be some infinite intelligible thing, which must be the greatest of all beings: and this we call God. Therefore, God is infinite. Item. Effectus non potest extendi ultra suam causam. Intellectus autem noster non potest esse nisi a Deo, qui est prima omnium causa. Non igitur potest aliquid cogitare intellectus noster maius Deo. Si igitur omni finito potest aliquid maius cogitare, relinquitur Deum finitum non esse. Again. An effect cannot extend beyond its cause. Now our intellect cannot be but from God, who is the first cause of all things. Therefore, our intellect cannot think of anything greater than God. If, then, it is possible to think of something greater than every finite thing, it follows that God is not finite. Amplius. Virtus infinita non potest esse in essentia finita: quia unumquodque agit per suam formam, quae vel est essentia eius vel pars essentiae; virtus autem principium actionis nominat. Sed Deus non habet virtutem activam finitam: movet enim in tempore infinito, quod non potest esse nisi a virtute infinita, ut supra ostensum est. Relinquitur igitur Dei essentiam esse infinitam. Moreover. Infinite power cannot be in a finite essence, because everything acts by its form, which is either its essence or part thereof, and power denotes a principle of action. But God has not a finite active power, for he moves in infinite time, and this cannot be save from an infinite power, as we have shown above (ch. 20). Therefore, it follows that God’s essence is infinite. Haec autem ratio est secundum ponentes aeternitatem mundi. Qua non posita, adhuc magis confirmatur opinio de infinitate divinae virtutis. Nam unumquodque agens tanto est virtuosius in agendo quanto potentiam magis remotam ab actu in actum reducit: sicut maiori virtute opus est ad calefaciendum aquam quam aerem. Sed id quod omnino non est, infinite distat ab actu, nec est aliquo modo in potentia. Igitur, si mundus factus est postquam omnino prius non erat, oportet factoris virtutem esse infinitam. This argument, however, avails for those who hold to the eternity of the world. If this is not supposed, our opinion about the infinity of the divine power is confirmed yet more. For every agent is the more powerful to act according as it reduces to act a potency the further removed from act: thus a greater power is needed to heat water than air. Now that which is not at all is infinitely distant from act, nor is it in any way in potency. Therefore, if the world was made after previously not being at all, the maker’s power must be infinite. Haec autem ratio, etiam secundum eos qui ponunt aeternitatem mundi, valet ad probandum infinitatem divinae virtutis. Confitentur enim Deum esse causam mundanae substantiae, quamvis eam sempiternam arbitrentur, dicentes hoc modo Deum aeternum sempiterni mundi causam existere sicut pes ab aeterno fuisset causa vestigii si ab aeterno fuisset impressus in pulvere. Hac autem positione facta, secundum rationem praedictam nihilominus sequitur Dei virtutem esse infinitam. Nam sive ex tempore, secundum nos, sive ab aeterno, secundum eos, produxerit, nihil esse potest in re quod ipse non produxerit: cum sit universale essendi principium. Et sic, nulla praesupposita materia vel potentia, produxit. Oportet autem proportionem virtutis activae accipere secundum proportionem potentiae passivae: nam, quanto potentia passiva maior praeexistit vel praeintelligitur, tanto maiori virtute activa in actum completur. Relinquitur igitur, cum virtus finita producat aliquem effectum praesupposita potentia materiae, quod Dei virtus, quae nullam potentiam praesupponit, non sit finita, sed infinita: et ita essentia infinita. This argument, even for those who hold to the eternity of the world, is strong enough to prove the infinity of the divine power. For they confess that God is the cause of the substance of the world, although they aver that it is eternal, since they say that the eternal God is the cause of an eternal world in the same way as a foot would have been from eternity the cause of a footprint, if it had trod on the dust from eternity. Now this opinion being presupposed, it nevertheless follows from the above argument that the power of God is infinite. For whether he fashioned things from time, as we hold, or from eternity, as they maintain, there cannot be in things anything that he has not produced, since he is the universal source of being, and so he produced them without any preexisting matter or potency. Now active power must be in proportion to passive potency, because the greater the passive potency that is preexistent or presupposed, the greater the active power which completes its act. Hence it follows, since a finite power produces an effect if we presuppose the potency of matter, that God’s power, which presupposes no potency, is not finite but infinite: and that consequently his essence is infinite. Amplius. Unaquaeque res tanto est diuturnior quanto eius esse causa est efficacior. Illud igitur cuius diuturnitas est infinita, oportet quod habeat esse per causam efficaciae infinitae. Sed diuturnitas Dei est infinita: ostensum est enim supra ipsum esse aeternum. Cum igitur non habeat, aliam causam sui esse praeter seipsum, oportet ipsum esse infinitum. Moreover. A thing lasts so much the longer as its cause is more efficacious. Consequently, a thing which is of infinite duration must have being through a cause of infinite efficacy. Now God is of infinite duration, for it has been shown above (ch. 15) that he is eternal. Since, then, he has no cause of his being besides himself, it follows that he is infinite. Huic autem veritati sacrae Scripturae auctoritas testimonium perhibet. Ait namque Psalmista: magnus dominus et laudabilis nimis, et magnitudinis eius non est finis. The authority of Sacred Scripture bears witness to this truth; for the Psalmist says: great is the Lord and greatly to be praised: and of his greatness there is no end (Ps 145[144]:3). Huic etiam veritati attestantur antiquissimorum philosophorum dicta, qui omnes infinitum posuerunt primum rerum principium, quasi ab ipsa veritate coacti. Propriam enim vocem ignorabant, aestimantes, infinitatem primi principii ad modum quantitatis discretae, secundum Democritum, qui posuit atomos infinitos rerum principia, et secundum Anaxagoram, qui posuit infinitas partes consimiles principia rerum; vel ad modum quantitatis continuae, secundum illos qui posuerunt aliquod elementum, vel confusum aliquod infinitum corpus, esse primum omnium principium. Sed cum ostensum sit per sequentium philosophorum studium quod non est aliquod corpus infinitum; et huic coniungatur quod oportet esse primum principium aliquo modo infinitum: concluditur quod neque est corpus neque virtus in corpore infinitum quod est primum principium. The same truth is attested by the statements of the oldest philosophers, since all of them, compelled as it were by truth itself, asserted that the first principle of things is infinite. For they knew not what they said, believing the infinity of the first principle to be after the manner of a discrete quantity, as Democritus maintained, asserting an infinite number of atoms to be the principles of things, and as Anaxagoras held, stating that the principles of things are an infinite number of similar parts; or after the manner of continuous quantity, as those who held that some element, or some undefined infinite body, is the first principle of all. But since it was proved by the researches of subsequent philosophers that there is no infinite body, and if to this we add that the first principle must be infinite in some way, it follows that the infinite which is the first principle is neither a body nor a power residing in a body (cf. ch. 20). Scientia Dei God’s knowledge Caput 44 Chapter 44 Quod Deus est intelligens That God is an intelligent being