Caput 43 Chapter 43 Quod Deus est infinitus That God is infinite Cum autem infinitum quantitatem sequatur, ut philosophi tradunt, non potest infinitas Deo attribui ratione multitudinis: cum ostensum sit solum unum Deum esse, nullamque in eo compositionem vel partium vel accidentium inveniri. Secundum etiam quantitatem continuam infinitus dici non potest: cum ostensum sit eum incorporeum esse. Relinquitur igitur investigare an secundum spiritualem magnitudinem esse infinitum ei conveniat. Now while the infinite is a sequel of quantity, as philosophers teach, infinity cannot be ascribed to God in respect of multitude, seeing that it has been proved that there is but one God (ch. 42), and that there is no composition either of parts or of accidents in him (ch. 18, 23). Nor may we say that he is infinite in respect of continuous quantity, since we have shown that he is incorporeal (ch. 20). It remains, therefore, to inquire whether infinity is becoming to him in respect of spiritual magnitude. Quae quidem spiritualis magnitudo quantum ad duo attenditur: scilicet quantum ad potentiam; et quantum ad propriae naturae bonitatem sive completionem. Dicitur enim aliquid magis vel minus album secundum modum quo in eo sua albedo completur. Pensatur etiam magnitudo virtutis ex magnitudine actionis vel factorum. Harum autem magnitudinem una aliam consequitur: nam ex hoc ipso quo aliquid actu est, activum est; secundum igitur modum quo in actu suo completur, est modus magnitudinis suae virtutis. Et sic relinquitur res spirituales magnas dici secundum modum suae completionis: nam et Augustinus dicit quod in his quae non mole magna sunt, idem est esse maius quod melius. This spiritual magnitude is referable to two things, namely, to power and to the goodness or perfection of a thing’s very nature. For a thing is said to be more or less white according to the degree of perfection in its whiteness. And the magnitude of power is gauged from the magnitude of deeds or of things made. Now in these things the magnitude of one follows the magnitude of the other, because from the very fact that a thing is in act it is active, and consequently the degree of magnitude in its power is according to the degree in which it is perfected in its act. And thus spiritual things are said to be great according to their degree of perfection: for Augustine says that in things which are great not by bulk, to be great is to be good. Ostendendum est igitur secundum huius magnitudinis modum Deum infinitum esse. Non autem sic ut infinitum privative accipiatur, sicut in quantitate dimensiva vel numerali: nam huiusmodi quantitas nata est finem habere; unde secundum subtractionem eius quod sunt nata habere, infinita dicuntur; et propter hoc in eis infinitum imperfectionem designat. Sed in Deo infinitum negative tantum intelligitur: quia nullus est perfectionis suae terminus sive finis, sed est summe perfectum. Et sic Deo infinitum attribui debet. Accordingly, we have to show that God is infinite according to this kind of magnitude. Not, however, so that infinite be understood privatively, as in dimensive or numeral quantity: for a quantity of this kind is naturally finite, so that we speak of infinity by subtraction of that which it has by nature, and for this reason infinity in those quantities denotes imperfection. But in God the infinite is understood only negatively, because there is no bound or end to his perfection, and he is the supremely perfect being. And it is thus that the infinite should be ascribed to God. Omne namque quod secundum suam naturam finitum est, ad generis alicuius rationem determinatur. Deus autem non est in aliquo genere, sed eius perfectio omnium generum perfectiones continet, ut supra ostensum est. Est igitur infinitus. For whatever is finite by its nature is confined to some generic notion. Now God is in no genus, and his perfection contains the perfections of all genera, as we have shown above (ch. 25, 28). Therefore, he is infinite. Amplius. Omnis actus alteri inhaerens terminationem recipit ex eo in quo est: quia quod est in altero, est in eo per modum recipientis. Actus igitur in nullo existens nullo terminatur: puta, si albedo esset per se existens, perfectio albedinis in ea non terminaretur, quominus haberet quicquid de perfectione albedinis haberi potest. Deus autem est actus nullo modo in alio existens: quia nec est forma in materia, ut probatum est; nec esse suum inhaeret alicui formae vel naturae, cum ipse sit suum esse, ut supra ostensum est. Relinquitur igitur ipsum esse infinitum. Moreover. Every act inherent to something else receives its limitation from that in which it is, since that which is in another is in it according to the mode of the recipient. Therefore, an act that exists in no subject has no limitations: for instance, if whiteness were essentially existent, the perfection of whiteness in it would not be limited from having whatever it is possible to have of the perfection of whiteness. Now God is an act in no way existing in another: for neither is he form in matter, as we have proved (ch. 26, 27), nor is his being inherent to any form or nature, since he is his own being, as we have shown above (ch. 22). Therefore, it follows that he is infinite. Adhuc. In rebus invenitur aliquid quod est potentia tantum, ut materia prima; aliquid quod est actus tantum, ut Deus, sicut supra ostensum est; aliquid quod est actu et potentia, sicut res ceterae. Sed potentia, cum dicatur ad actum, non potest actum excedere, sicut nec in unoquoque, ita nec simpliciter. Cum igitur materia prima sit infinita in sua potentialitate, relinquitur quod Deus, qui est actus purus, sit infinitus in sua actualitate. Again. In things we find something that is pure potency, as prime matter; something that is pure act, namely, God, as we have shown above (ch. 16); and something that is act and potency, namely, other things. Now as potency, since it bears relation to an act, cannot exceed that act in any particular thing, so neither can it simply. Therefore, since primary matter is infinite in its potency, it follows that God, who is pure act, is infinite in his act. Item. Tanto actus aliquis perfectior est, quanto minus habet potentiae permixtum. Unde omnis actus cui permiscetur potentia, habet terminum suae perfectionis: cui autem non permiscetur aliqua potentia, est absque termino perfectionis. Deus autem est actus purus absque omni potentia, ut supra ostensum est. Est igitur infinitus. Again. An act is the more perfect according as it is less mingled with potency. Therefore, every act that has an admixture of potency has a limit to its perfection, while the act which has no admixture of potency has no limit to its perfection. Now God is pure act without any potency, as we have proved above (ch. 16). Therefore, he is infinite. Amplius. Ipsum esse absolute consideratum infinitum est: nam ab infinitis et infinitis modis participari possibile est. Si igitur alicuius esse sit finitum, oportet quod limitetur esse illud per aliquid aliud quod sit aliqualiter causa illius esse. Sed esse divini non potest esse aliqua causa: quia ipse est necesse per seipsum. Igitur esse suum est infinitum, et ipse infinitus. Again. Being itself, considered absolutely, is infinite; for it can be participated by an infinite number of things in an infinite number of ways. Hence if we take a thing with finite being, this being must be limited by some other thing which is in some way the cause of that being. Now there can be no cause of God’s being, since he is necessary of himself (ch. 13). Therefore, he has infinite being, and himself is infinite. Adhuc. Omne quod habet aliquam perfectionem, tanto est perfectius quanto illam perfectionem plenius participat. Sed non potest esse aliquis modus, nec etiam cogitari, quo plenius habeatur aliqua perfectio quam ab eo quod per suam essentiam est perfectum et cuius essentia est sua bonitas. Hoc autem Deus est. Nullo igitur modo potest cogitari aliquid melius vel perfectius Deo. Est igitur infinitus in bonitate. Moreover. Whatever has a particular perfection is the more perfect according as it more fully participates that perfection. Now there cannot be, nor even be imagined, a way in which a perfection is possessed more fully than by that which is perfect by its essence, and whose being is its goodness: and such is God. Therefore, in no way can anything be imagined better or more perfect than God. Therefore, he is infinite in goodness. Amplius. Intellectus noster ad infinitum in intelligendo extenditur: cuius signum est quod, qualibet quantitate finita data, intellectus noster maiorem excogitare potest. Frustra autem esset haec ordinatio intellectus ad infinitum nisi esset aliqua res intelligibilis infinita. Oportet igitur esse aliquam rem intelligibilem infinitam, quam oportet esse maximam rerum. Et hanc dicimus Deum. Deus igitur est infinitus. Further. Our intellect reaches the infinite in understanding, a sign of which is that, given any finite quantity, our intellect can imagine a greater. Now, it would be to no purpose for the intellect to be thus directed to the infinite unless there were infinite intelligible being. Therefore, there must be some infinite intelligible thing, which must be the greatest of all beings: and this we call God. Therefore, God is infinite. Item. Effectus non potest extendi ultra suam causam. Intellectus autem noster non potest esse nisi a Deo, qui est prima omnium causa. Non igitur potest aliquid cogitare intellectus noster maius Deo. Si igitur omni finito potest aliquid maius cogitare, relinquitur Deum finitum non esse. Again. An effect cannot extend beyond its cause. Now our intellect cannot be but from God, who is the first cause of all things. Therefore, our intellect cannot think of anything greater than God. If, then, it is possible to think of something greater than every finite thing, it follows that God is not finite. Amplius. Virtus infinita non potest esse in essentia finita: quia unumquodque agit per suam formam, quae vel est essentia eius vel pars essentiae; virtus autem principium actionis nominat. Sed Deus non habet virtutem activam finitam: movet enim in tempore infinito, quod non potest esse nisi a virtute infinita, ut supra ostensum est. Relinquitur igitur Dei essentiam esse infinitam. Moreover. Infinite power cannot be in a finite essence, because everything acts by its form, which is either its essence or part thereof, and power denotes a principle of action. But God has not a finite active power, for he moves in infinite time, and this cannot be save from an infinite power, as we have shown above (ch. 20). Therefore, it follows that God’s essence is infinite. Haec autem ratio est secundum ponentes aeternitatem mundi. Qua non posita, adhuc magis confirmatur opinio de infinitate divinae virtutis. Nam unumquodque agens tanto est virtuosius in agendo quanto potentiam magis remotam ab actu in actum reducit: sicut maiori virtute opus est ad calefaciendum aquam quam aerem. Sed id quod omnino non est, infinite distat ab actu, nec est aliquo modo in potentia. Igitur, si mundus factus est postquam omnino prius non erat, oportet factoris virtutem esse infinitam. This argument, however, avails for those who hold to the eternity of the world. If this is not supposed, our opinion about the infinity of the divine power is confirmed yet more. For every agent is the more powerful to act according as it reduces to act a potency the further removed from act: thus a greater power is needed to heat water than air. Now that which is not at all is infinitely distant from act, nor is it in any way in potency. Therefore, if the world was made after previously not being at all, the maker’s power must be infinite. Haec autem ratio, etiam secundum eos qui ponunt aeternitatem mundi, valet ad probandum infinitatem divinae virtutis. Confitentur enim Deum esse causam mundanae substantiae, quamvis eam sempiternam arbitrentur, dicentes hoc modo Deum aeternum sempiterni mundi causam existere sicut pes ab aeterno fuisset causa vestigii si ab aeterno fuisset impressus in pulvere. Hac autem positione facta, secundum rationem praedictam nihilominus sequitur Dei virtutem esse infinitam. Nam sive ex tempore, secundum nos, sive ab aeterno, secundum eos, produxerit, nihil esse potest in re quod ipse non produxerit: cum sit universale essendi principium. Et sic, nulla praesupposita materia vel potentia, produxit. Oportet autem proportionem virtutis activae accipere secundum proportionem potentiae passivae: nam, quanto potentia passiva maior praeexistit vel praeintelligitur, tanto maiori virtute activa in actum completur. Relinquitur igitur, cum virtus finita producat aliquem effectum praesupposita potentia materiae, quod Dei virtus, quae nullam potentiam praesupponit, non sit finita, sed infinita: et ita essentia infinita. This argument, even for those who hold to the eternity of the world, is strong enough to prove the infinity of the divine power. For they confess that God is the cause of the substance of the world, although they aver that it is eternal, since they say that the eternal God is the cause of an eternal world in the same way as a foot would have been from eternity the cause of a footprint, if it had trod on the dust from eternity. Now this opinion being presupposed, it nevertheless follows from the above argument that the power of God is infinite. For whether he fashioned things from time, as we hold, or from eternity, as they maintain, there cannot be in things anything that he has not produced, since he is the universal source of being, and so he produced them without any preexisting matter or potency. Now active power must be in proportion to passive potency, because the greater the passive potency that is preexistent or presupposed, the greater the active power which completes its act. Hence it follows, since a finite power produces an effect if we presuppose the potency of matter, that God’s power, which presupposes no potency, is not finite but infinite: and that consequently his essence is infinite. Amplius. Unaquaeque res tanto est diuturnior quanto eius esse causa est efficacior. Illud igitur cuius diuturnitas est infinita, oportet quod habeat esse per causam efficaciae infinitae. Sed diuturnitas Dei est infinita: ostensum est enim supra ipsum esse aeternum. Cum igitur non habeat, aliam causam sui esse praeter seipsum, oportet ipsum esse infinitum. Moreover. A thing lasts so much the longer as its cause is more efficacious. Consequently, a thing which is of infinite duration must have being through a cause of infinite efficacy. Now God is of infinite duration, for it has been shown above (ch. 15) that he is eternal. Since, then, he has no cause of his being besides himself, it follows that he is infinite. Huic autem veritati sacrae Scripturae auctoritas testimonium perhibet. Ait namque Psalmista: magnus dominus et laudabilis nimis, et magnitudinis eius non est finis. The authority of Sacred Scripture bears witness to this truth; for the Psalmist says: great is the Lord and greatly to be praised: and of his greatness there is no end (Ps 145[144]:3). Huic etiam veritati attestantur antiquissimorum philosophorum dicta, qui omnes infinitum posuerunt primum rerum principium, quasi ab ipsa veritate coacti. Propriam enim vocem ignorabant, aestimantes, infinitatem primi principii ad modum quantitatis discretae, secundum Democritum, qui posuit atomos infinitos rerum principia, et secundum Anaxagoram, qui posuit infinitas partes consimiles principia rerum; vel ad modum quantitatis continuae, secundum illos qui posuerunt aliquod elementum, vel confusum aliquod infinitum corpus, esse primum omnium principium. Sed cum ostensum sit per sequentium philosophorum studium quod non est aliquod corpus infinitum; et huic coniungatur quod oportet esse primum principium aliquo modo infinitum: concluditur quod neque est corpus neque virtus in corpore infinitum quod est primum principium. The same truth is attested by the statements of the oldest philosophers, since all of them, compelled as it were by truth itself, asserted that the first principle of things is infinite. For they knew not what they said, believing the infinity of the first principle to be after the manner of a discrete quantity, as Democritus maintained, asserting an infinite number of atoms to be the principles of things, and as Anaxagoras held, stating that the principles of things are an infinite number of similar parts; or after the manner of continuous quantity, as those who held that some element, or some undefined infinite body, is the first principle of all. But since it was proved by the researches of subsequent philosophers that there is no infinite body, and if to this we add that the first principle must be infinite in some way, it follows that the infinite which is the first principle is neither a body nor a power residing in a body (cf. ch. 20). Scientia Dei God’s knowledge Caput 44 Chapter 44 Quod Deus est intelligens That God is an intelligent being Ex praemissis autem ostendi potest quod Deus sit intelligens. It may be shown from the above that God is an intelligent being. Ostensum enim est supra quod in moventibus et motis non est possibile in infinitum procedere, sed oportet mobilia omnia reducere, ut probabile est, in unum primum movens seipsum. Movens autem seipsum se movet per appetitum et apprehensionem: sola enim huiusmodi inveniuntur seipsa movere, utpote in quibus est moveri et non moveri. Pars igitur movens in primo movente seipsum oportet et quod sit appetens et apprehendens. In motu autem qui est per appetitum et apprehensionem, appetens et apprehendens est movens motum: appetibile autem et apprehensum est movens non motum. For it was proved (ch. 13) that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in movers and things moved, and that all things moved must be reduced, as is probable, to one self-moving principle. Now a self-mover moves itself by appetite and apprehension: for only such things are found to move themselves, since it is in them to be moved and not to be moved. Therefore, the moving part in the first self-mover must be appetitive and apprehensive. Now, in that movement which is by appetite and apprehension the appetent and apprehender is a moved mover, while the appetible and the apprehended is a mover not moved. Cum igitur id quod est omnium primum movens, quod Deum dicimus, sit movens omnino non motum, oportet quod comparetur ad motorem qui est pars moventis seipsum sicut appetibile ad appetentem. Non autem sicut appetibile sensuali appetitu: nam appetitus sensibilis non est boni simpliciter, sed huius particulati boni, cum et apprehensio sensus non sit nisi particularis; id autem quod est bonum et appetibile simpliciter, est prius eo quod est bonum et appetibile ut hic et nunc. Since, then, that which is the first mover of all, which we call God, is a mover altogether unmoved, it follows that it is compared to the motor which is a part of the self-mover as the appetible to the appetent. Not, however, as the appetible to the sensitive appetite, because the sensitive appetite is not of the good simply, but of this particular good, since also sensitive apprehension is only of the particular; and that which is good and appetible simply, is prior to that which is good and appetible here and now. Oportet igitur primum movens esse appetibile ut intellectum. Et ita oportet movens quod appetit ipsum, esse intelligens. Multo igitur magis et ipsum primum appetibile erit intelligens: quia appetens ipsum fit intelligens actu per hoc quod ei tamquam intelligibili unitur. Oportet igitur Deum esse intelligentem facta suppositione quod primum motum moveat seipsum, ut philosophi voluerunt. Therefore, the first mover must be the appetible as an object of the understanding, and consequently the mover that desires itself must be an intelligent being. Much more, therefore, is the very first appetible an intelligent being, because what desires it becomes actually understanding through being united to it as an intelligible object. Therefore, it follows that God is intelligent, if it is supposed that the first mover moves itself, as the early philosophers maintained. Adhuc. Idem necesse est sequi si fiat reductio mobilium non in aliquod primum movens seipsum, sed in movens omnino immobile. Nam primum movens est universale principium motus. Oportet igitur, cum omne movens moveat per aliquam formam quam intendit in movendo, quod forma per quam movet primum movens, sit universalis forma et universale bonum. Forma autem per modum universalem non invenitur nisi in intellectu. Oportet igitur primum movens, quod Deus est, esse intelligens. Again. The same conclusion follows necessarily if movable things be reduced not to some first self-mover, but to a mover that is utterly immovable. For the first mover is the universal principle of movement. Therefore, since every mover moves by some form which it intends in moving, it follows that the form by which the first mover moves must be universal form and universal good. Now a form is not found under conditions of universality save in the intellect. Therefore, the first mover, which is God, must be intelligent. Amplius. In nullo ordine moventium invenitur quod movens per intellectum sit instrumentum eius quod movet absque intellectu, sed magis e converso. Omnia autem moventia quae sunt in mundo, comparantur ad primum movens, quod Deus est, sicut instrumenta ad agens principale. Cum igitur in mundo inveniantur multa moventia per intellectum, impossibile est quod primum movens moveat absque intellectu. Necesse est igitur Deum esse intelligentem. Moreover. In no order of movers do we find that a mover by the intellect is the instrument of that which moves without intellect, but rather the opposite. Now all movers that are in the world are compared to the first mover, which is God, as instruments to the principal agent. Since, then, we find in the world many movers by intellect, it is impossible that the first mover move without intellect. Therefore, God must of necessity be intelligent. Item. Ex hoc aliqua res est intelligens quod est sine materia: cuius signum est quod formae fiunt intellectae in actu per abstractionem a materia. Unde et intellectus est universalium et non singularium: quia materia est individuationis principium. Formae autem intellectae in actu fiunt unum cum intellectu actu intelligente. Unde, si ex hoc sunt formae intellectae in actu quod sunt sine materia, oportet rem aliquam ex hoc esse intelligentem quod est sine materia. Ostensum est autem supra Deum esse omnino immaterialem. Est igitur intelligens. Again. A thing is intelligent from the fact of its being without matter. The sign of this is that forms become understood through abstraction from matter. Hence also understanding is of universals and not of singulars, because matter is the principle of individualization. Now forms actually understood become one with the intellect actually understanding. Therefore, if forms are actually understood from the very fact that they are without matter, it follows that a thing is actually intelligent from the fact that it is without matter. Now it was shown above (ch. 17, 27) that God is absolutely immaterial. Therefore, he is intelligent. Adhuc. Deo nulla perfectio deest quae in aliquo genere entium inveniatur, ut supra ostensum est: nec ex hoc aliqua compositio in eo consequitur, ut etiam ex superioribus patet. Inter perfectiones autem rerum potissima est quod aliquid sit intellectivum: nam per hoc ipsum est quodammodo omnia, habens in se omnium perfectionem. Deus igitur est intelligens. Again. God lacks no perfection that is to be found in any genus of things, as we have proved above (ch. 28), nor does it follow from this that there is any composition in him, as was also shown above (ch. 31) Now the greatest among the perfections of things is that a thing is intellectual, because thereby it is, after a fashion, all things, having in itself the perfection of all. Therefore, God is intelligent. Item. Omne quod tendit determinate in aliquem finem, aut ipsum praestituit sibi finem, aut praestituitur ei finis ab alio: alias non magis in hunc quam in illum finem tenderet. Naturalia autem tendunt in fines determinatos: non enim a casu naturales utilitates consequuntur: sic enim non essent semper aut in pluribus, sed raro; horum enim est casus. Cum ergo ipsa non praestituant sibi finem, quia rationem finis non cognoscunt; oportet quod eis praestituatur finis ab alio, qui sit naturae institutor. Hic autem est qui praebet omnibus esse, et est per seipsum necesse esse, quem Deum dicimus, ut ex supra dictis patet. Non autem posset naturae finem praestituere nisi intelligeret. Deus igitur est intelligens. Moreover. Whatever tends definitely to an end either prescribes that end to itself, or that end is prescribed to it by another, else it would not tend to this end rather than to that. Now natural things tend to definite ends, for they do not pursue their natural purposes by chance, since in that case those purposes would not be realized always or for the most part, but seldom, for such is chance. Since, then, they do not prescribe the end to themselves, for they do not apprehend the notion of end, it follows that the end is prescribed to them by another, who is the author of nature. This is he who gives being to all, and who necessarily exists of himself, whom we call God, as shown above (ch. 13). Now he would be unable to prescribe nature its end unless he were intelligent. Therefore, God is intelligent. Amplius. Omne quod est imperfectum, derivatur ab aliquo perfecto: nam perfecta naturaliter sunt priora imperfectis, sicut actus potentia. Sed formae in rebus particularibus existentes sunt imperfectae: quia partialiter, et non secundum communitatem suae rationis. Oportet igitur quod deriventur ab aliquibus formis perfectis et non particulatis. Tales autem formae esse non possunt nisi intellectae: cum non inveniatur aliqua forma in sua universalitate nisi in intellectu. Et per consequens oportet eas esse intelligentes, si sint subsistentes: sic enim solum possunt esse operantes. Deum igitur, qui est actus primus subsistens, a quo omnia alia derivantur, oportet esse intelligentem. Moreover. Whatever is imperfect originates from something perfect, because the perfect naturally precedes the imperfect, as act precedes potency. Now the forms that exist in particular things are imperfect, since their existence is limited and does not extend to the full universality of their nature. Therefore, they must originate from certain perfect and not limited forms. Now such forms are impossible except as an object of the understanding, since no form is found in a state of universality except in the intellect. Consequently, those forms must be intelligent if they are subsistent, for in no other way can they be operative. Therefore, it follows that God, who is the first subsistent act from which all others derive, is intelligent. Hanc autem veritatem etiam fides Catholica confitetur. Dicitur enim Iob 9:4 de Deo: sapiens corde est et fortis robore. Et 12:16: apud ipsum est fortitudo et sapientia. In Psalmo: mirabilis facta est scientia tua ex me. Et Rom. 11:33: o altitudo divitiarum sapientiae et scientiae Dei. The Catholic faith confesses this truth. For it is said of God: he is wise in heart and mighty in strength (Job 9:4); and: with him are strength and wisdom (Job 12:16); and in the Psalm: your knowledge is become wonderful to me (Ps 139[138]:6); and: O the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God (Rom 11:33). Huius autem fidei veritas in tantum apud homines invaluit ut ab intelligendo nomen Dei imponerent: nam Theos, quod secundum Graecos Deum significat, dicitur a theasthe, quod est considerare vel videre. The truth of this belief took such hold on men that they named God from understanding: for Theos, which is the Greek for ‘God,’ is derived from theasthai, which means ‘to consider’ or ‘to see.’ Caput 45 Chapter 45 Quod intelligere Dei est sua essentia That God’s act of intelligence is his essence