Caput 53 Chapter 53 Solutio praemissae dubitationis Solution of the foregoing doubt Praemissa autem dubitatio faciliter solvi potest, si diligenter inspiciatur qualiter res intellectae in intellectu existant. The foregoing doubt may be easily solved if we examine carefully how things understood are in the understanding. Et ut ab intellectu nostro ad divini intellectus cognitionem, prout est possibile, procedamus, considerandum est quod res exterior intellecta a nobis in intellectu nostro non existit secundum propriam naturam, sed oportet quod species eius sit in intellectu nostro, per quam fit intellectus in actu. Existens autem in actu per huiusmodi speciem sicut per propriam formam, intelligit rem ipsam. Non autem ita quod ipsum intelligere sit actio transiens in intellectum, sicut calefactio transit in calefactum, sed manet in intelligente: sed habet relationem ad rem quae intelligitur, ex eo quod species praedicta, quae est principium intellectualis operationis ut forma, est similitudo illius. And in order that, as far as possible, we may proceed from our intellect to the knowledge of the divine intellect, it must be observed that the external objects which we understand do not exist in our intellect according to their own nature, but it is necessary that our intellect contain their species by which it becomes intellect in act. And being in act by this species, as by its proper form, it understands the object itself. And yet the act of understanding is not an act passing into the intellect, as heating passes into the object heated, but it remains in the one who understands, although it bears a relation to the object understood, for the very reason that the aforesaid species, which is the formal principle of intellectual operation, is the image of that object. Ulterius autem considerandum est quod intellectus, per speciem rei formatus, intelligendo format in seipso quandam intentionem rei intellectae, quae est ratio ipsius, quam significat definitio. Et hoc quidem necessarium est: eo quod intellectus intelligit indifferenter rem absentem et praesentem, in quo cum intellectu imaginatio convenit; sed intellectus hoc amplius habet, quod etiam intelligit rem ut separatam a conditionibus materialibus, sine quibus in rerum natura non existit; et hoc non posset esse nisi intellectus sibi intentionem praedictam formaret. Moreover, it must be observed that the intellect, informed by the species of the object, by understanding forms in itself some intention of the understood object, which is this notion of the object, signified by its definition. This indeed is necessary, since the intellect understands indifferently a thing absent or present, and in this point agrees with the imagination. Yet the intellect has this besides: it understands a thing as separate from material conditions, without which it does not exist in reality; and this is impossible unless the intellect forms for itself the aforesaid intention. Haec autem intentio intellecta, cum sit quasi terminus intelligibilis operationis, est aliud a specie intelligibili quae facit intellectum in actu, quam oportet considerari ut intelligibilis operationis principium: licet utrumque sit rei intellectae similitudo. Per hoc enim quod species intelligibilis quae est forma intellectus et intelligendi principium, est similitudo rei exterioris, sequitur quod intellectus intentionem formet illi rei similem: quia quale est unumquodque, talia operatur. Et ex hoc quod intentio intellecta est similis alicui rei, sequitur quod intellectus, formando huiusmodi intentionem, rem illam intelligat. Now this understood intention, since it is the term, so to speak, of the intellectual operation, is distinct from the intelligible species which makes the intellect in act, and which we must look upon as the principle of the intellectual operation (although each is an image of the object understood). It is because the intelligible species (which is the form of the intellect and the principle of understanding) is the image of the external object that the intellect in consequence forms an intention like that object: for such as a thing is, such is the effect of its operation. And since the understood intention is like a particular thing, it follows that the intellect, by forming this intention, understands that thing. Intellectus autem divinus nulla alia specie intelligit quam essentia sua, ut supra ostensum est. Sed tamen essentia sua est similitudo omnium rerum. Per hoc ergo sequitur quod conceptio intellectus divini, prout seipsum intelligit, quae est verbum ipsius, non solum sit similitudo ipsius Dei intellecti, sed etiam omnium quorum est divina essentia similitudo. Sic ergo per unam speciem intelligibilem, quae est divina essentia, et per unam intentionem intellectam, quae est verbum divinum, multa possunt a Deo intelligi. On the other hand, the divine intellect understands by no species other than his essence, as we have proved. And yet his essence is the likeness of all things. Therefore, it follows from this that the concept of the divine intellect, according as he understands himself, which concept is his word, is the likeness not only of God himself understood, but also of all things of which the divine essence is the likeness. Accordingly, God can understand many things by one intelligible species, which is the divine essence, and by one understood intention, which is the divine word. Caput 54 Chapter 54 Qualiter divina essentia una et simplex sit propria similitudo omnium intelligibilium How the divine essence, though one and simple, is a proper likeness of all things intelligible Sed rursus difficile vel impossibile alicui videri potest quod unum et idem simplex, ut divina essentia, sit propria ratio sive similitudo diversorum. And yet it may seem to someone difficult or impossible that the one and same simple thing, such as God’s essence, be the proper type or likeness of diverse things. Nam, cum diversarum rerum sit distinctio ratione propriarum formarum, quod alicui secundum propriam formam simile fuerit, alteri necesse est ut dissimile inveniatur. Secundum vero quod diversa aliquid commune habent, nihil prohibet ea similitudinem unam habere, sicut homo et asinus inquantum sunt animalia. Ex quo sequetur quod Deus de rebus propriam cognitionem non habeat, sed communem: nam secundum modum quo similitudo cogniti est in cognoscente, sequitur cognitionis operatio, sicut et calefactio secundum modum caloris; similitudo enim cogniti in cognoscente est sicut forma qua agitur. Oportet igitur, si Deus de pluribus propriam cognitionem habet, quod ipse sit propria ratio singulorum. Quod qualiter sit investigandum est. For, since the distinction of diverse things arises from their proper forms, that which by reason of its proper form is like one of them must be unlike another. Whereas, so far as diverse things have something in common, nothing hinders them from having one likeness, for instance, a man and an ass, inasmuch as they are animals. Hence it would follow that God has not proper but common knowledge of things, because the operation of knowledge follows according to the mode by which the thing known is in the knower, even as heating follows the mode of heat, for the likeness of the thing known in the knower is as the form by which a thing acts. Therefore, if God has proper knowledge of many things it follows that he is himself the proper type of each. How this may be, we must investigate. Ut enim Philosophus dicit, in VIII Metaph., formae et definitiones rerum, quae eas significant, sunt similes numeris. Nam in numeris, una unitate addita vel subtracta, species numeri variatur: ut patet in binario et ternario. Similiter autem est et in definitionibus: nam una differentia addita vel subtracta variat speciem; substantia enim sensibilis absque rationali, et rationali addito, specie differt. As the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 8, forms of things, and their definitions which signify them, are like numbers. For in numbers, if one unit be added or subtracted the species of the number is changed, as appears in the numbers 3 and 4. Now it is the same with definitions, for the addition or subtraction of one difference changes the species: thus a sensible substance minus “rational” and plus “rational” differs specifically. In his autem quae in se multa continent, non sic se habet intellectus ut natura. Nam ea quae ad esse alicuius rei requiruntur illius rei natura divisa esse non patitur: non enim remanebit animalis natura si a corpore anima subtrahatur. Intellectus vero ea quae sunt in esse coniuncta, interdum disiunctim accipere potest, quando unum eorum in alterius rationem non cadit. Et per hoc in ternario potest considerare binarium tantum; et in animali rationali id quod est sensibile tantum. Unde intellectus id quod plura complectitur potest accipere ut propriam rationem plurimorum, apprehendendo aliqua illorum absque aliis. Potest enim accipere denarium ut propriam rationem novenarii, una unitate subtracta; et similiter ut propriam rationem singulorum numerorum infra inclusorum. Similiter etiam in homine accipere potest proprium exemplar animalis irrationalis inquantum huiusmodi, et singularum specierum eius, nisi aliquas differentias adderent positivas. Now in things which include many, it is not the same with the intellect as with nature. For the nature of a thing does not allow of the separation of those things that are required essentially for that thing: thus the nature of an animal will not remain if the soul be taken away from the body. But the intellect is sometimes able to take separately those things which are essentially united, when one is not included in the notion of the other. Thus in the number 3, it can consider the number 2 alone, and in a rational animal it can consider that which is only sensible. Hence the intellect is able to consider that which includes several things as the proper notion of several, by apprehending one of them without the others. For it can consider 10 as the proper notion of 9, by subtracting one unit, and in like manner as the proper notion of each lesser number included in it. Again, in man, it can consider the proper type of an irrational animal as such, and of each of its species, unless they imply the addition of a positive difference. Propter hoc quidam philosophus, Clemens nomine, dixit quod nobiliora in entibus, sunt minus nobilium exemplaria. For this reason a certain philosopher, Clement by name, said that the things of higher rank are the types of those of lesser rank. Divina autem essentia in se nobilitates omnium entium comprehendit, non quidem per modum compositionis, sed per modum perfectionis, ut supra ostensum est. Forma autem omnis, tam propria quam communis, secundum id quod aliquid ponit, est perfectio quaedam: non autem imperfectionem includit nisi secundum quod deficit a vero esse. Intellectus igitur divinus id quod est proprium unicuique in essentia sua comprehendere potest, intelligendo in quo eius essentiam imitetur, et in quo ab eius perfectione deficit unumquodque: utpote, intelligendo essentiam suam ut imitabilem per modum vitae et non cognitionis, accipit propriam formam plantae; si vero ut imitabilem per modum cognitionis et non intellectus, propriam formam animalis; et sic de aliis. Sic igitur patet quod essentia divina, inquantum est absolute perfecta, potest accipi ut propria ratio singulorum. Unde per eam Deus propriam cognitionem de omnibus habere potest. Now the divine essence contains the excellences of all beings, not indeed by way of composition, but by way of perfection, as we have shown above. And every form, whether proper or common, so far as it is something positive, is a perfection, nor does it include imperfection except insofar as it falls short of true being. Therefore, God’s intellect can include within his essence that which is proper to each thing by understanding in what each thing imitates his essence, and in what it falls short of his essence: for instance, by understanding his essence as imitable in respect of life and not of knowledge, it understands the proper form of a plant, or again as imitable in respect of knowledge but not of intellect, it understands the proper form of an animal, and so on. Hence it is clear that the divine essence, inasmuch as it is absolutely perfect, may be taken as the proper type of such thing. Hence God can have proper knowledge of all things through it. Quia vero propria ratio unius distinguitur a propria ratione alterius; distinctio autem est pluralitatis principium: oportet in intellectu divino distinctionem quandam et pluralitatem rationum intellectarum considerare, secundum quod id quod est in intellectu divino est propria ratio diversorum. Unde, cum hoc sit secundum quod Deus intelligit proprium respectum assimilationis quam habet unaquaeque creatura ad ipsum, relinquitur quod rationes rerum in intellectu divino non sint plures vel distinctae nisi secundum quod Deus cognoscit res pluribus et diversis modis esse assimilabiles sibi. Since, however, the proper notion of one thing is distinct from the proper notion of another, and since distinction is the principle of plurality, we must consider a certain distinction and plurality of understood notions in the divine intellect, insofar as that which is in the divine intellect is the proper notion of diverse things. Therefore, since this is according as God understands the proper relation of similarity which each creature bears to him, it follows that the types of things in the divine intellect are not many nor different, except insofar as God knows that things can be like him in many and diverse ways. Et secundum hoc Augustinus dicit quod Deus alia ratione facit hominem et alia equum; et rationes rerum pluraliter in mente divina esse dicit. In this sense, Augustine says that God makes man after one type and a horse after another, and that the types of things are manifold in the divine mind. In quo etiam aliqualiter salvatur Platonis opinio ponentis ideas, secundum quas formarentur omnia quae in rebus materialibus existunt. Also, by this the opinion of Plato holds good, in that he held the existence of ideas according to which all that exists in material things would be formed. Caput 55 Chapter 55 Quod Deus omnia simul intelligit That God understands all things at the same instant Ex his autem ulterius apparet quod Deus omnia simul intelligit. From the foregoing it is also made evident that God understands all things at the same instant. Intellectus enim noster simul multa actu intelligere non potest, quia, cum intellectus in actu sit intellectum in actu, si plura simul actu intelligeret, sequeretur quod intellectus simul esset plura secundum unum genus, quod est impossibile. Dico autem secundum unum genus: quia nihil prohibet idem subiectum informari diversis formis diversorum generum, sicut idem corpus est figuratum et coloratum. For our intellect is unable actually to understand several things simultaneously because, since the intellect in act is the thing understood in act, if it were to understand actually several things at the same time, it would follow that the intellect is simultaneously several things according to one genus, which is impossible. And I say “according to one genus” because nothing hinders the same subject receiving different forms of different genera, even as the one body receives shape and color. Species autem intelligibiles, quibus intellectus formatur ad hoc quod sit ipsa intellecta in actu, omnes sunt unius generis: habent enim unam rationem essendi secundum esse intelligibile, licet res quarum sunt species in una essendi non conveniant ratione; unde nec contrariae sunt per contrarietatem rerum quae sunt extra animam. Et inde est quod, quando aliqua multa accipiuntur quocumque modo unita, simul intelliguntur: simul enim intelligit totum continuum, non partem post partem; et similiter simul intelligit propositionem, non prius subiectum et postea praedicatum; quia secundum unam totius speciem omnes partes cognoscit. Now, the intelligible species by which the intellect is informed (with the result that the things themselves are actually understood) are all of one genus. For they have one essential nature, although the things of which they are the species do not agree in one essential nature; hence neither are they contrary to one another as are the things outside the mind. Thus it is that, when we consider a certain number of things in any way united together, we understand them at the same time: for we understand a continuous whole simultaneously, and not part by part. In like manner, we understand a proposition, and not the subject first and the predicate afterwards, because we know all the parts by one species of the whole. Ex his igitur accipere possumus quod quaecumque plura una specie cognoscuntur, simul possunt intelligi. Omnia autem quae Deus cognoscit, una specie cognoscit, quae est sua essentia. Omnia igitur simul intelligere potest. From this we may gather that whatever number of things are known by one species, they can be understood simultaneously. Now all that God knows, he knows by one species which is his essence. Therefore, he can understand all things simultaneously. Item. Vis cognoscitiva non cognoscit aliquid actu nisi adsit intentio: unde et phantasmata in organo conservata interdum non actu imaginamur, quia intentio non fertur ad ea; appetitus enim alias potentias in actum movet in agentibus per voluntatem. Multa igitur ad quae simul intentio non fertur, non simul intuemur. Quae autem oportet sub una intentione cadere, oportet simul esse intellecta: qui enim comparationem duorum considerat, intentionem ad utrumque dirigit et simul intuetur utrumque. Again. The cognitive power does not know a thing unless the intention be there: thus at times we do not actually imagine the phantasms preserved in the organ, because the intention is not directed to them, for in voluntary agents, the appetite moves the other powers to act. Hence we do not consider simultaneously a number of things if the intention be not directed to them simultaneously, and those things that must come under one intention must be understood simultaneously, since he who considers the comparison between two things directs his intention simultaneously to both, and considers both at the same time. Omnia autem quae sunt in divina scientia sub una intentione necesse est cadere. Intendit enim Deus suam essentiam perfecte videre. Quod est videre ipsam secundum totam virtutem suam, sub qua omnia concluduntur. Deus igitur, videndo essentiam suam, simul omnia intuetur. Now all those things that are in the divine knowledge must come under one intention. For God intends to see his essence perfectly, and this is to see it according to its whole power under which all things are comprised. Therefore, God, in seeing his essence, sees all things simultaneously. Amplius. Intellectus successive multa considerantis impossibile est esse unam tantum operationem: cum enim operationes secundum obiecta differant, oportebit diversam esse operationem intellectus qua considerabitur primum, et qua considerabitur secundum. Intellectus autem divini est una operatio, quae est sua essentia, ut probatum est supra. Non igitur successive, sed simul omnia sua cognita considerat. Moreover. The intellect of one who considers many things in succession cannot possibly have only one operation: for, since operations differ according to their objects, the operation by which the intellect considers the first thing must be distinct from that by which it considers the second. But the divine intellect has only one operation, which is its essence, as proved above. Therefore, it considers all that it knows not successively, but simultaneously. Adhuc. Successio sine tempore intelligi non potest, nec tempus sine motu: cum tempus sit numerus motus secundum prius et posterius. In Deo autem impossibile est esse motum aliquem, ut ex supra dictis haberi potest. Nulla igitur est in consideratione divina successio. Et sic omnia quae cognoscit simul considerat. Further. Succession is inconceivable apart from time, and time apart from movement, since time is the measure of movement according to before or after. Now no movement is possible in God, as may be gathered from what has been said above. Therefore, in God’s thought there is no succession: consequently, whatever he knows, he considers simultaneously. Item. Intelligere Dei est ipsum suum esse, ut ex supra dictis patet. In esse autem divino non est prius et posterius, sed est totum simul, ut supra ostensum est. Igitur nec consideratio Dei habet prius et posterius, sed omnia simul intelligit. Again. God’s act of understanding is his very being, as shown above. Now there is no before and after in the divine being, but it is all simultaneously, as proved above. Therefore, neither is there before and after in God’s thought, but he understands all things simultaneously. Praeterea. Omnis intellectus intelligens unum post aliud est quandoque potentia intelligens et quandoque actu: dum enim intelligit primum in actu, intelligit secundum in potentia. Intellectus autem divinus nunquam est in potentia sed semper actu intelligens. Non igitur intelligit res successive, sed omnia simul intelligit. Moreover. Every intellect that understands one thing after another is at one time understanding potentially, and at another time actually: for while it understands the first thing actually, it understands the second potentially. But the divine intellect is never in potency, but is always actually understanding. Therefore, it understands things, not successively, but altogether simultaneously. Huic autem veritati testimonium Sacra Scriptura affert: dicitur enim Iac. 1:17, quod apud Deum non est transmutatio nec vicissitudinis obumbratio. Sacred Scripture bears witness to this truth: for it is said that with God there is no variation or shadow due to change (Jas 1:17). Caput 56 Chapter 56 Quod cognitio Dei non est habitualis That God’s knowledge is not a habit Ex hoc autem apparet quod in Deo non est habitualis cognitio. From the foregoing it follows that God’s knowledge is not a habit. In quibuscumque enim est habitualis cognitio, non omnia simul cognoscuntur, sed dum quaedam cognoscuntur actu, alia cognoscuntur habitu. Deus autem omnia simul actu intelligit, ut probatum est. Non est igitur in eo habitualis cognitio. For wherever knowledge is habitual, all things are not known simultaneously, but some actually and others habitually. Now God knows all things actually in the same instant, as we have proved. Therefore, in him knowledge is not a habit. Praeterea. Habens habitum et non considerans est quodammodo in potentia, aliter tamen quam ante intelligere. Ostensum est autem quod intellectus divinus nullo modo est in potentia. Nullo igitur modo est in ipso habitualis cognitio. Further. He who has a habit, while not using it, is somewhat in potency, but not in the same way as before learning. Now it has been shown that the divine intellect is in potency in no way. Therefore, in no way is there habitual knowledge in him.