Quod a Deo non excluditur veritas enuntiabilium
That God is not ignorant of the truth of enunciations
Ex hoc autem apparet quod, licet divini intellectus cognitio non se habeat ad modum intellectus componentis et dividentis, non tamen excluditur ab eo veritas, quae, secundum Philosophum, solum circa compositionem et divisionem intellectus est.
It follows from the foregoing that, although the knowledge of the divine intellect is not like that of a composing and dividing intellect, it is not ignorant of the truth which, according to the Philosopher, is solely about composition and division of the intellect.
Cum enim veritas intellectus sit adaequatio intellectus et rei, secundum quod intellectus dicit esse quod est vel non esse quod non est, ad illud in intellectu veritas pertinet quod intellectus dicit, non ad operationem qua illud dicit. Non enim ad veritatem intellectus exigitur ut ipsum intelligere rei aequetur, cum res interdum sit materialis, intelligere vero immateriale: sed illud quod intellectus intelligendo dicit et cognoscit, oportet esse rei aequatum, ut scilicet ita sit in re sicut intellectus dicit. Deus autem sua simplici intelligentia, in qua non est compositio et divisio, cognoscit non solum rerum quidditates, sed etiam enuntiationes, ut ostensum est. Et sic illud quod intellectus divinus intelligendo dicit est compositio et divisio. Non ergo excluditur veritas ab intellectu divino ratione suae simplicitatis.
For, since the truth of the intellect is the equation of thought and thing, insofar as the intellect asserts that to be which is, and that not to be which is not, truth in the intellect belongs to that which the intellect asserts, not to the operation by which it asserts. Because the truth of the intellect does not require that the act itself of understanding be equated to the thing, since sometimes the thing is material while the act of understanding is immaterial. But that which the intellect in understanding asserts and knows needs to be equated to the thing, namely, to be in reality as the intellect asserts it to be. Now God, by his simple act of intelligence, in which is neither composition nor division, knows not only the essence of things, but also that which is enunciated about them, as proved above (ch. 58). Therefore, that which the divine intellect asserts in understanding is composition or division. Therefore, truth is not excluded from the divine intellect by reason of the latter’s simplicity.
Amplius. Cum aliquod incomplexum vel dicitur vel intelligitur, ipsum quidem incomplexum, quantum est de se, non est rei aequatum nec rei inaequale: cum aequalitas et inaequalitas secundum comparationem dicantur; incomplexum autem, quantum est de se, non continet aliquam comparationem vel applicationem ad rem. Unde de se nec verum nec falsum dici potest: sed tantum complexum, in quo designatur comparatio incomplexi ad rem per notam compositionis aut divisionis. Intellectus tamen incomplexus, intelligendo quod quid est, apprehendit quidditatem rei in quadam comparatione ad rem: quia apprehendit eam ut huius rei quidditatem. Unde, licet ipsum incomplexum, vel etiam definitio, non sit secundum se verum vel falsum, tamen intellectus apprehendens quod quid est dicitur quidem per se semper esse verus, ut patet in III de anima; etsi per accidens possit esse falsus, inquantum vel definitio includit aliquam complexionem, vel partium definitionis ad invicem, vel totius definitionis ad definitum. Unde definitio dicetur, secundum quod intelligitur ut huius vel illius rei definitio, secundum quod ab intellectu accipitur, vel simpliciter falsa, si partes definitionis non cohaereant invicem, ut si dicatur animal insensibile; vel falsa secundum hanc rem, prout definitio circuli accipitur ut trianguli. Dato igitur, per impossibile, quod intellectus divinus solum incomplexa cognosceret, adhuc esset verus, cognoscendo suam quidditatem ut suam.
Moreover. When something non-complex is said or understood, the non-complex in itself is neither equal nor unequal to the reality, since equality and inequality imply a comparison, and the non-complex in itself contains no comparison or application to a reality. Thus in itself it cannot be said to be either true or false, but only the complex which contains a comparison between the non-complex and the reality, expressed by composition or division. But the non-complex intellect, by understanding what a thing is, apprehends the quiddity of a thing in a kind of comparison with the thing, since it apprehends it as the quiddity of this particular thing. Hence, although the non-complex itself, or even a definition, is not in itself true or false, nevertheless the intellect that apprehends what a thing is is said to be always true in itself, as stated in 3 De Anima, although it may be accidentally false, insofar as the definition includes complexion either of the parts of the definition with one another, or of the whole definition with the thing defined. Therefore, a definition, according as it is taken to be the definition of this or that thing as understood by the intellect, will be said to be false either simply, if the parts of the definition do not hold together (as if we were to say ‘an insensible animal’), or false in its application to this particular thing (as if one were to apply the definition of a circle to a triangle). Hence, though it be granted by an impossibility that the divine intellect knows only non-complex things, it would still be true in knowing its quiddity as its own.
Adhuc. Divina simplicitas perfectionem non excludit: quia in suo esse simplici habet quicquid perfectionis in aliis rebus per quandam aggregationem perfectionum seu formarum invenitur, ut supra ostensum est. Intellectus autem noster, apprehendendo incomplexa, nondum pertingit ad ultimam suam perfectionem, quia adhuc est in potentia respectu compositionis vel divisionis: sicut et in naturalibus simplicia sunt in potentia respectu commixtorum, et partes respectu totius. Deus igitur secundum suam simplicem intelligentiam illam perfectionem cognitionis habet quam intellectus noster habet per utramque cognitionem, et complexorum et incomplexorum. Sed veritas consequitur intellectum nostrum in sui perfecta cognitione, quando iam usque ad compositionem pervenit. Ergo et in ipsa simplici Dei intelligentia est veritas.
Again. The divine simplicity does not exclude perfection: because in its simple essence it has all the perfections to be found in other things by the aggregation of perfections or forms; as was proved above (ch. 28, 31). Now, our intellect, by apprehending the incomplex, does not as yet reach to its ultimate perfection, since it is still in potency as regards composition and division: even as in natural things simple things are in potency in respect of mixed things, and parts in respect of the whole. Accordingly, God, in respect of his simple act of intelligence, has that perfection of knowledge which our intellect has by both kinds of knowledge, whether of the complex or of the non-complex. Now truth is acquired by our intellect in its perfect knowledge thereof, when it arrives at composition. Therefore, there is truth in God’s mere act of simple intelligence.
Item. Cum Deus omnis boni bonum sit, utpote omnes bonitates in se habens, ut supra ostensum est, bonitas intellectus ei deesse non potest. Sed verum est bonum intellectus: ut patet per Philosophum, in VI Ethicorum. Ergo veritas in Deo est.
Again. Since God is the good of every good, through having in himself all manner of goodness, as we have shown above (ch. 40), the goodness of the intellect cannot be lacking to him. Now truth is the good of the intellect, as the Philosopher declares in 6 Ethics. Therefore, truth is in God.
Et hoc est quod dicitur in Psalmo: est autem Deus verax.
And this is what is stated in the Psalm: but God is true (Ps 50:6).
Quod Deus est veritas
That God is truth
Ex praemissis autem apparet quod ipse Deus est veritas.
It follows from what has been said that God himself is truth.
Veritas enim quaedam perfectio est intelligentiae, sive intellectualis operationis, ut dictum est. Intelligere autem Dei est sua substantia. Ipsum etiam intelligere, cum sit divinum esse, ut ostensum est, non supervenienti aliqua perfectione perfectum est, sed est per seipsum perfectum: sicut et de divino esse supra ostensum est. Relinquitur igitur quod divina substantia sit ipsa veritas.
For truth is a perfection of the intelligence or intellectual operation, as stated above (ch. 59). Now God’s act of intelligence is his substance (ch. 45), and since this very act of intelligence is God’s being, as we have shown (ch. 45), it is not made perfect by some additional perfection, but is perfect in itself, just as we have said about the divine being (ch. 28). It remains, therefore, that the divine substance is truth itself.
Item. Veritas est quaedam bonitas intellectus, secundum Philosophum. Deus autem est sua bonitas, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo est etiam sua veritas.
Again. Truth is a good of the intellect, according to the Philosopher (6 Ethics, 2, 3). Now God is his own goodness, as we have shown (ch. 38). Therefore, he is also his own truth.
Praeterea. De Deo nihil participative dici potest: cum sit suum esse, quod nihil participat. Sed veritas est in Deo, ut supra ostensum est. Si igitur non dicatur participative, oportet quod dicatur essentialiter. Deus ergo est sua veritas.
Further. Nothing can be said participatively of God, since he is his own being, which participates in nothing. Now truth is in God, as was shown above (ch. 59). If, then, it be not said of him participatively, it follows that it is said essentially. Therefore, God is his own truth.
Amplius. Licet verum proprie non sit in rebus sed in mente, secundum Philosophum, res tamen interdum vera dicitur, secundum quod proprie actum propriae naturae consequitur. Unde Avicenna dicit, in sua metaphysica, quod veritas rei est proprietas esse uniuscuiusque rei quod stabilitum est ei, inquantum talis res nata est de se facere veram aestimationem, et inquantum propriam sui rationem quae est in mente divina, imitatur. Sed Deus est sua essentia. Ergo, sive de veritate intellectus loquamur sive de veritate rei, Deus est sua veritas.
Moreover. Although properly speaking the true is not in things but in the mind, according to the Philosopher (5 Metaphysics, 4, 1), nevertheless sometimes a thing is said to be true, insofar as it attains to the act of its own nature. Hence, Avicenna says in his Metaphysics that the truth of a thing is a property of the nature immutably attached to it (Tract. 8, 6), insofar as that thing is naturally inclined to cause a true estimate of itself, and reflects the type of itself that is in the divine mind. Now God is his own essence. Therefore, whether we speak of the truth of the mind, or of the truth of the thing, God is his own truth.
Hoc autem confirmatur auctoritate domini de se dicentis, Ioan. 14:6: ego sum via, veritas et vita.
This is confirmed by the authority of our Lord, who says of himself: I am the way, the truth, and the life (John 14:6).
Quod Deus est purissima veritas
That God is the most pure truth
Hoc autem ostenso, manifestum est quod in Deo est pura veritas, cui nulla falsitas vel deceptio admisceri potest.
The foregoing being established it is evident that in God there is pure truth, in which there can be no alloy of falsehood or deception.
Veritas enim falsitatem non compatitur: sicut nec albedo nigredinem. Deus autem non solum est verus, sed est ipsa veritas. Ergo in eo falsitas esse non potest.
For falsehood is incompatible with truth, even as black with white. Now God is not merely true, but is truth itself (ch. 60). Therefore, there can be no falsehood in him.
Amplius. Intellectus non decipitur in cognoscendo quod quid est: sicut nec sensus in proprio sensibili. Omnis autem cognitio divini intellectus se habet ad modum intellectus cognoscentis quod quid est, ut ostensum est. Impossibile est igitur in divina cognitione errorem sive deceptionem aut falsitatem esse.
Moreover. The intellect is not deceived in knowing what a thing is, as neither is the sense about its proper sensible (cf. ch. 59). Now all knowledge of the divine intellect is as the knowledge of one who knows what a thing is, as was proved above (ch. 58). Therefore, it is impossible that there be error, deception, or falsehood in the divine knowledge.
Praeterea. Intellectus in primis principiis non errat, sed in conclusionibus interdum, ad quas ex principiis primis ratiocinando procedit. Intellectus autem divinus non est ratiocinativus aut discursivus, ut supra ostensum est. Non igitur potest esse in ipso falsitas aut deceptio.
Further. The intellect does not err about first principles, but it does sometimes about conclusions, to which it proceeds by arguing from first principles. Now, the divine intellect is not argumentative or discursive, as we proved above (ch. 57). Therefore, there can be no falsehood or deception in it.
Item. Quanto aliqua vis cognoscitiva est altior, tanto eius proprium obiectum est universalius, plura sub se continens: unde illud quod visus cognoscit per accidens, sensus communis aut imaginatio apprehendit ut sub proprio obiecto contentum. Sed vis divini intellectus est in fine sublimitatis in cognoscendo. Ergo omnia cognoscibilia comparantur ad ipsum sicut cognoscibilia proprie et per se et non secundum accidens. In talibus autem virtus cognoscitiva non errat. In nullo igitur cognoscibili possibile est divinum intellectum errare.
Again. The higher a cognitive power is, the more universal and the more comprehensive is its proper object: therefore, that which the sight knows accidentally, the common sense or the imagination apprehends as included in its proper object. Now the power of the divine intellect is absolutely supreme in knowledge. Therefore, all things knowable are compared to it as knowable properly and essentially, and not accidentally. But the cognitive power errs not about such things. Therefore, it is impossible for the divine intellect to err about any knowable object.
Amplius. Virtus intellectualis est quaedam perfectio intellectus in cognoscendo. Secundum autem virtutem intellectualem non contingit intellectum falsum dicere, sed semper verum: verum enim dicere est bonus actus intellectus, virtutis autem est actum bonum reddere. Sed divinus intellectus perfectior est per suam naturam quam intellectus humanus per habitum virtutis: est enim in fine perfectionis. Relinquitur igitur quod in intellectu divino non potest esse falsitas.
Moreover. An intellectual virtue is a perfection of the intellect in knowing things. Now the intellect cannot, according to an intellectual virtue, speak false, but always speaks true, because to speak true is the good act of the intellect, and it belongs to virtue to perform a good act. Now the divine intellect is more perfect by its nature than the human intellect is by a habit of virtue, for it is in the summit of perfection (ch. 28). It remains, therefore, that falsehood cannot be in the divine intellect.
Adhuc. Scientia intellectus humani a rebus quodammodo causatur: unde provenit quod scibilia sunt mensura scientiae humanae; ex hoc enim verum est quod intellectu diiudicatur, quia res ita se habet, et non e converso. Intellectus autem divinus per suam scientiam est causa rerum. Unde oportet quod scientia eius sit mensura rerum: sicut ars est mensura artificiatorum, quorum unumquodque in tantum perfectum est inquantum arti concordat. Talis igitur est comparatio intellectus divini ad res qualis rerum ad intellectum humanum. Falsitas autem causata ex inaequalitate intellectus humani et rei non est in rebus, sed in intellectu. Si igitur non esset omnimoda adaequatio intellectus divini ad res, falsitas esset in rebus, non in intellectu divino. Nec tamen in rebus est falsitas: quia quantum unumquodque habet de esse, tantum habet de veritate. Nulla igitur inaequalitas est inter intellectum divinum et res; nec aliqua falsitas in intellectu divino esse potest.
Further. The knowledge of the human intellect is somewhat caused by things; the result being that man’s knowledge is measured by its objects, since the judgment of the intellect is true through being in accordance with things, and not vice versa. Now the divine intellect is the cause of things by its knowledge (ch. 50). Therefore, his knowledge must be the measure of things, even as art is the measure of the products of art, each of which is so far perfect as it accords with art. Hence the divine intellect is compared to things as things to the human intellect. Now falsehood resulting from inequality between man’s mind and things is not in things but in the mind. Therefore, if there were not perfect equality between the divine mind and things, falsehood would be in things, but not in the divine mind. And yet there is no falsehood in things, because as much as a thing has of being, so much has it of truth. Therefore, there is no inequality between the divine intellect and things: nor is any falsehood possible in the divine mind.
Item. Sicut verum est bonum intellectus, ita falsum est malum ipsius: naturaliter enim appetimus verum cognoscere et refugimus falso decipi. Malum autem in Deo esse non potest, ut probatum est. Non potest igitur in eo esse falsitas.
Again. As the true is the good of the intellect, so is falsehood its evil, for we naturally desire to know the true and shun to be deceived by the false. Now evil cannot be in God, as was proved above (ch. 39). Therefore, falsehood cannot be in him.
Hinc est quod dicitur Rom. 3:4: est autem Deus verax; et Num. 23:19: non est Deus ut homo, ut mentiatur; et I Ioan. 1:5: Deus lux est et tenebrae in eo non sunt ullae.
Hence it is said: but God is true (Rom 3:4); and: God is not man, that he should lie (Num 23:19); and: God is light and in him is no darkness (1 John 1:5).
Quod divina veritas est prima et summa veritas
That the divine truth is the first and supreme truth
Ex his autem quae ostensa sunt manifeste habetur quod divina veritas sit prima et summa veritas.
From what has been proved it clearly follows that the divine truth is the first and supreme truth.
Sicut enim est dispositio rerum in esse, ita et in veritate, ut patet per Philosophum, in II Metaph.: et hoc ideo quia verum et ens se invicem consequuntur; est enim verum cum dicitur esse quod est vel non esse quod non est. Sed divinum esse est primum et perfectissimum. Ergo et sua veritas est prima et summa.
For the disposition of things in truth is as their disposition in being, according to the Philosopher in 2 Metaphysics, and this because truth and being are mutually consequent upon one another, since the true is when that is said to be which is, and that not to be which is not. Now God’s being is first and most perfect. Therefore, his truth is also first and supreme.
Item. Quod per essentiam alicui convenit, perfectissime ei convenit. Sed veritas Deo attribuitur essentialiter, ut ostensum est. Sua igitur veritas est summa et prima veritas.
Again. That which belongs to a thing essentially belongs to it most perfectly. Now truth is ascribed to God essentially, as we have proved (ch. 60). Therefore, his truth is the supreme and first truth.
Praeterea. Veritas in nostro intellectu ex hoc est quod adaequatur rei intellectae. Aequalitatis autem causa est unitas, ut patet in V metaphysicae. Cum igitur in intellectu divino sit omnino idem intellectus et quod intelligitur, sua veritas erit prima et summa veritas.
Further. Truth is in our intellect through the latter being equated to the thing understood. Now the cause of equality is unity, as stated in 5 Metaphysics. Since, then, in the divine intellect, intellect and thing understood are absolutely the same, his truth must be the first and supreme truth.
Amplius. Illud quod est mensura in unoquoque genere, est perfectissimum illius generis: unde omnes colores mensurantur albo. Sed divina veritas est mensura omnis veritatis. Veritas enim nostri intellectus mensuratur a re quae est extra animam, ex hoc enim intellectus noster verus dicitur quod consonat rei: veritas autem rei mensuratur ad intellectum divinum, qui est causa rerum, ut infra probabitur; sicut veritas artificiatorum ab arte artificis; tunc enim vera est arca quando consonat arti. Cum etiam Deus sit primus intellectus et primum intelligibile, oportet quod veritas intellectus cuiuslibet eius veritate mensuretur: si unumquodque mensuratur primo sui generis, ut Philosophus tradit, in X Metaphysicae. Divina igitur veritas est prima, summa et perfectissima veritas.
Moreover. That which is the measure in any genus must be the most perfect in that genus; thus all colors are measured by white. Now the divine truth is the measure of all truth. For the truth of our intellect is measured by the thing that is outside the mind, since our intellect is said to be true from the very fact that it accords with the thing. And the truth of a thing is measured according to the divine intellect which is the cause of things, as we shall prove further on (bk. II, ch. 24). Thus the truth of art-products is measured by the art of the craftsman, for a casket is true when it accords with art. Also, since God is the first intellect and the first intelligible, it follows that the truth of every intellect must be measured by his truth, if each thing is measured by the first in its genus, as the Philosopher teaches in 10 Metaphysics. Hence the divine truth is the first, supreme and most perfect truth.
Rationes volentium subtrahere Deo cognitionem singularium
The arguments of those who would deny to God the knowledge of singulars