Caput 6 Chapter 6 Quod assentire his quae sunt fidei non est levitatis quamvis supra rationem sint That it is not a mark of levity to assent to the things that are of faith although they are above reason Huiusmodi autem veritati, cui ratio humana experimentum non praebet, fidem adhibentes non leviter credunt, quasi indoctas fabulas secuti, ut 2 Petr. 1:16, dicitur. Now those who believe this truth, of which reason affords no proof believe not lightly, as though following foolish fables (2 Pet 1:16). Haec enim divinae sapientiae secreta ipsa divina sapientia, quae omnia plenissime novit, dignata est hominibus revelare: quae sui praesentiam et doctrinae et inspirationis veritatem, convenientibus argumentis ostendit, dum ad confirmandum ea quae naturalem cognitionem excedunt, opera visibiliter ostendit quae totius naturae superant facultatem; videlicet in mirabili curatione languorum, mortuorum suscitatione, caelestium corporum mirabili immutatione; et, quod est mirabilius, humanarum mentium inspiratione, ut idiotae et simplices, dono spiritus sancti repleti, summam sapientiam et facundiam in instanti consequerentur. For divine wisdom himself, who knows all things most fully, deigned to reveal to man the secrets of God’s wisdom (Job 11:6), and by suitable arguments proves his presence, and the truth of his doctrine and inspiration, by performing works surpassing the capability of the whole of nature, namely, the wondrous healing of the sick, the raising of the dead to life, a marvellous control over the heavenly bodies, and, what excites yet more wonder, the inspiration of human minds, so that unlettered and simple persons are filled with the Holy Spirit, and in one instant are endowed with the most sublime wisdom and eloquence. Quibus inspectis, praedictae probationis efficacia, non armorum violentia, non voluptatum promissione, et, quod est mirabilissimum, inter persecutorum tyrannidem, innumerabilis turba non solum simplicium, sed sapientissimorum hominum, ad fidem Christianam convolavit, in qua omnem humanum intellectum excedentia praedicantur, voluptates carnis cohibentur et omnia quae in mundo sunt contemni docentur; quibus animos mortalium assentire et maximum miraculorum est, et manifestum divinae inspirationis opus, ut, contemptis visibilibus, sola invisibilia cupiantur. And after considering these arguments, convinced by the strength of the proof, and not by the force of arms, nor by the promise of delights, but—and this is the greatest marvel of all—amidst the tyranny of persecutions, a countless crowd of not only simple but also of the wisest men, embraced the Christian faith, which inculcates things surpassing all human understanding, curbs the pleasures of the flesh, and teaches contempt of all worldly things. That the minds of mortal beings should assent to such things is both the greatest of miracles, and the evident work of divine inspiration, seeing that they despise visible things and desire only those that are invisible. Hoc autem non subito neque a casu, sed ex divina dispositione factum esse, manifestum est ex hoc quod hoc se facturum Deus multis ante prophetarum praedixit oraculis, quorum libri penes nos in veneratione habentur, utpote nostrae fidei testimonium adhibentes. And that this happened not suddenly nor by chance, but by the disposition of God, is shown by the fact that God foretold that he would do so by the manifold oracles of the prophets, whose books we hold in veneration as bearing witness to our faith. Huius quidem confirmationis modus tangitur Hebr. 2:3 quae, scilicet humana salus, cum initium accepisset enarrari per dominum, ab eis qui audierunt in nos confirmata est, contestante Deo signis et portentis et variis spiritus sancti distributionibus. This particular kind of proof is alluded to in Hebrews 2:3–4: which, namely the salvation of mankind, having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed with us by them that heard him, God also bearing witness by signs and wonders, and diverse distributions of the Holy Spirit. Haec autem tam mirabilis mundi conversio ad fidem Christianam indicium certissimum est praeteritorum signorum: ut ea ulterius iterari necesse non sit, cum in suo effectu appareant evidenter. Esset enim omnibus signis mirabilius si ad credendum tam ardua, et ad operandum tam difficilia, et ad sperandum tam alta, mundus absque mirabilibus signis inductus fuisset a simplicibus et ignobilibus hominibus. Quamvis non cesset Deus etiam nostris temporibus, ad confirmationem fidei, per sanctos suos miracula operari. Now, such a wondrous conversion of the world to the Christian faith is a most indubitable proof that such signs did take place, so that there is no need to repeat them when they are so evidently apparent from their effect. For it would be the most wondrous sign of all if, without any wondrous signs, the world were persuaded by simple and lowly men to believe things so arduous, to accomplish things so difficult, and to hope for things so sublime. (Although even in our time God does not cease to work miracles through his saints in confirmation of the faith.) Hi vero qui sectas errorum introduxerunt processerunt via contraria: ut patet in Mahumeto qui carnalium voluptatum promissis, ad quorum desiderium carnalis concupiscentia instigat, populus illexit. Praecepta etiam tradidit promissis conformia, voluptati carnali habenas relaxans, in quibus in promptu est a carnalibus hominibus obediri. Documenta etiam veritatis non attulit nisi quae de facili a quolibet mediocriter sapiente naturali ingenio cognosci possint: quin potius vera quae docuit multis fabulis et falsissimis doctrinis immiscuit. Signa etiam non adhibuit supernaturaliter facta, quibus solis divinae inspirationi conveniens testimonium adhibetur, dum operatio visibilis quae non potest esse nisi divina, ostendit doctorem veritatis invisibiliter inspiratum: sed dixit se in armorum potentia missum, quae signa etiam latronibus et tyrannis non desunt. Ei etiam non aliqui sapientes, in rebus divinis et humanis exercitati, a principio crediderunt: sed homines bestiales in desertis morantes, omnis doctrinae divinae prorsus ignari, per quorum multitudinem alios armorum violentia in suam legem coegit. Nulla etiam divina oracula praecedentium prophetarum ei testimonium perhibent: quin potius quasi omnia veteris et novi testamenti documenta fabulosa narratione depravat, ut patet eius legem inspicienti. Unde astuto consilio libros veteris et novi testamenti suis sequacibus non reliquit legendos, ne per eos falsitatis argueretur. Et sic patet quod eius dictis fidem adhibentes leviter credunt. On the other hand, those who introduced the errors of the sects proceeded in contrary fashion, as is clear from Mohammed, who enticed peoples with the promise of carnal pleasures, to the desire of which the concupiscence of the flesh instigates. He also delivered commandments in keeping with his promises, by giving the reins to carnal pleasure, in which it is easy for carnal men to obey. Also, the lessons of truth which he inculcated were only such as can be easily known to any man of average wisdom by his natural powers—in fact, he mingled the truths which he taught with many fables and most false doctrines. Nor did he add any signs of supernatural agency, which alone are a fitting witness to divine inspiration, since a visible work that can only be from God proves the teacher of truth to be invisibly inspired, but he asserted that he was sent in the power of arms, which sign is not lacking even to robbers and tyrants. Again, those who believed in him from the outset were not wise men practiced in things divine and human, but bestial men who dwelt in the deserts, utterly ignorant of all divine teaching, and it was by a multitude of such men and the force of arms that he compelled others to submit to his law. Lastly, no divine oracles of prophets in a previous age bore witness to him; rather, he corrupted almost all the teaching of the Old and New Testaments by a narrative replete with fables, as one may see by a perusal of his law. Hence, by a cunning device, he did not commit the reading of the Old and New Testament books to his followers, lest he should thereby be convicted of falsehood. Thus it is evident that those who believe his words believe lightly. Caput 7 Chapter 7 Quod veritati fidei Christianae non contrariatur veritas rationis That the truth of reason is not in opposition to the truth of the Christian faith Quamvis autem praedicta veritas fidei Christianae humanae rationis capacitatem excedat, haec tamen quae ratio naturaliter indita habet, huic veritati contraria esse non possunt. Now, though the aforesaid truth of the Christian faith surpasses the ability of human reason, nevertheless those things which are naturally instilled in human reason cannot be opposed to this truth. Ea enim quae naturaliter rationi sunt insita, verissima esse constat: in tantum ut nec esse falsa sit possibile cogitare. Nec id quod fide tenetur, cum tam evidenter divinitus confirmatum sit, fas est credere esse falsum. Quia igitur solum falsum vero contrarium est, ut ex eorum definitionibus inspectis manifeste apparet, impossibile est illis principiis quae ratio naturaliter cognoscit, praedictam veritatem fidei contrariam esse. For it is clear that those things which are implanted in reason by nature are most true, so much so that it is impossible to think them to be false. Nor is it lawful to deem false that which is held by faith, since it is so evidently confirmed by God. Seeing, then, that the false alone is opposed to the true (as is obvious if we examine their definitions), it is impossible for the aforesaid truth of faith to be contrary to those principles which reason knows naturally. Item. Illud idem quod inducitur in animam discipuli a docente, doctoris scientia continet: nisi doceat ficte, quod de Deo nefas est dicere. Principiorum autem naturaliter notorum cognitio nobis divinitus est indita: cum ipse Deus sit nostrae auctor naturae. Haec ergo principia etiam divina sapientia continet. Quicquid igitur principiis huiusmodi contrarium est, divinae sapientiae contrariatur. Non igitur a Deo esse potest. Ea igitur quae ex revelatione divina per fidem tenentur, non possunt naturali cognitioni esse contraria. Again. The same thing which the disciple’s mind receives from its teacher is contained in the knowledge of the teacher—unless he teach fictitiously, which is wicked to say of God. Now, the knowledge of naturally known principles is instilled into us by God, since God himself is the author of our nature. Therefore, the divine wisdom also contains these principles. Consequently, whatever is contrary to these principles is contrary to the divine wisdom. Therefore, it cannot be from God. Therefore, those things which are received by faith from divine revelation cannot be contrary to our natural knowledge. Adhuc. Contrariis rationibus intellectus noster ligatur, ut ad veri cognitionem procedere nequeat. Si igitur contrariae cognitiones nobis a Deo immitterentur, ex hoc a veritatis cognitione noster intellectus impediretur. Quod a Deo esse non potest. Moreover. Contrary arguments bind our intellect so that it cannot advance to the knowledge of truth. Therefore, if conflicting knowledges were instilled into us by God, our intellect would thereby be hindered from knowing the truth. And this cannot be ascribed to God. Amplius. Ea quae sunt naturalia mutari non possunt, natura manente. Contrariae autem opiniones simul eidem inesse non possunt. Non igitur contra cognitionem naturalem aliqua opinio vel fides homini a Deo immittitur. Furthermore. Things that are natural are unchangeable so long as nature remains. Now, contrary opinions cannot be together in the same subject. Therefore, God does not instil into man any opinion or belief contrary to natural knowledge. Et ideo apostolus dicit, Rom. 10:8: prope est verbum in corde tuo et in ore tuo: hoc est verbum fidei, quod praedicamus. Sed quia superat rationem, a nonnullis reputatur quasi contrarium. Quod esse non potest. Hence the Apostle says: the word is near you, on your lips and in your heart: this is the word of faith which we preach (Rom 10:8). Yet, because it surpasses reason, some look upon it as though it were contrary to reason; which is impossible. Huic etiam auctoritas Augustini concordat, qui in II super Gen. ad Litt. dicit sic: illud quod veritas patefaciet, libris sanctis sive testamenti veteris sive novi nullo modo potest esse adversum. This is confirmed also by the authority of Augustine, who says: that which truth shall make known can in no way be in opposition to the holy books, whether of the Old or of the New Testament (2 On the Literal Meaning of Genesis 18). Ex quo evidenter colligitur, quaecumque argumenta contra fidei documenta ponantur, haec ex principiis primis naturae inditis per se notis non recte procedere. Unde nec demonstrationis vim habent, sed vel sunt rationes probabiles vel sophisticae. Et sic ad ea solvenda locus relinquitur. From this we may evidently conclude that whatever arguments are alleged against the teachings of faith, they do not rightly proceed from the first self-evident principles instilled by nature. Hence they lack the force of demonstration, and are either probable or sophistical arguments, and consequently it is possible to solve them. Caput 8 Chapter 8 Qualiter se habeat humana ratio ad veritatem fidei In what relation human reason stands to the truth of faith Considerandum etiam videtur quod res quidem sensibiles, ex quibus humana ratio cognitionis principium sumit, aliquale vestigium in se divinae imitationis retinent, ita tamen imperfectum quod ad declarandam ipsius Dei substantiam omnino insufficiens invenitur. Habent enim effectus suarum causarum suo modo similitudinem, cum agens agat sibi simile: non tamen effectus ad perfectam agentis similitudinem semper pertingit. Humana igitur ratio ad cognoscendum fidei veritatem, quae solum videntibus divinam substantiam potest esse notissima, ita se habet quod ad eam potest aliquas verisimilitudines colligere, quae tamen non sufficiunt ad hoc quod praedicta veritas quasi demonstrative vel per se intellecta comprehendatur. It would also seem well to observe that sensible things, from which human reason derives the source of its knowledge, retain a certain trace of likeness to God, but so imperfect that it proves altogether inadequate to manifest the substance itself of God. For effects resemble their causes according to their own mode, since like action proceeds from like agent; and yet the effect does not always reach to a perfect likeness to the agent. Accordingly, human reason is adapted to the knowledge of the truth of faith (which can be known in the highest degree only by those who see the divine substance) insofar as it is able to put together certain probable arguments in support of it, which nevertheless are insufficient to enable us to understand the aforesaid truth as though it were demonstrated or understood in itself. Utile tamen est ut in huiusmodi rationibus, quantumcumque debilibus, se mens humana exerceat, dummodo desit comprehendendi vel demonstrandi praesumptio: quia de rebus altissimis etiam parva et debili consideratione aliquid posse inspicere iucundissimum est, ut ex dictis apparet. And yet, however weak these arguments may be, it is useful for the human mind to be practiced in them, so long as it does not pride itself on having comprehended or demonstrated, since although our view of the sublimest things is limited and weak, it is most pleasant to be able to catch but a glimpse of them, as appears from what has been said (ch. 5). Cui quidem sententiae auctoritas Hilarii concordat, qui sic dicit in libro de Trin., loquens de huiusmodi veritate: haec credendo incipe, procurre, persiste: etsi non perventurum sciam, gratulabor tamen profecturum. Qui enim pie infinita prosequitur, etsi non contingat aliquando, semper tamen proficiet prodeundo. Sed ne te inferas in illud secretum, et arcano interminabilis nativitatis non te immergas, summam intelligentiae comprehendere praesumens: sed intellige incomprehensibilia esse. The authority of Hilary concords with this, for he says in his book On the Trinity 2, 10-11, while speaking of this same truth: begin by believing these things, advance and persevere, and though I know you will not arrive, I shall rejoice at your advance. For he who devoutly follows in pursuit of the infinite, though he never come up with it, will always advance by setting forth. Yet do not pry into that secret, and do not meddle in the mystery of the birth of the infinite, nor presume to grasp that which is the summit of understanding, but understand that there are things you cannot grasp. Caput 9 Chapter 9 De ordine et modo procedendi in hoc opere Of the order and mode of procedure in this work Ex praemissis igitur evidenter apparet sapientis intentionem circa duplicem veritatem divinorum debere versari, et circa errores contrarios destruendos: ad quarum unam investigatio rationis pertingere potest, alia vero omnem rationis excedit industriam. Dico autem duplicem veritatem divinorum, non ex parte ipsius Dei, qui est una et simplex veritas; sed ex parte cognitionis nostrae, quae ad divina cognoscenda diversimode se habet. Accordingly, from what we have been saying it is evident that the intention of the wise man must be directed to the twofold truth of divine things and to the refutation of contrary errors, and that the reason’s investigation can reach one of these, but the other surpasses every effort of reason. And I speak of a twofold truth of divine things not on the part of God himself, who is truth one and simple, but on the part of our knowledge, which has a variable relation to the knowledge of divine things. Ad primae igitur veritatis manifestationem per rationes demonstrativas, quibus adversarius convinci possit, procedendum est. Sed quia tales rationes ad secundam veritatem haberi non possunt, non debet esse ad hoc intentio ut adversarius rationibus convincatur: sed ut eius rationes, quas contra veritatem habet, solvantur; cum veritati fidei ratio naturalis contraria esse non possit, ut ostensum est. Therefore, in order to deduce the first kind of truth, we must proceed by demonstrative arguments by which we can convince our adversaries. But, since there are no such arguments in support of the second kind of truth, our intention must be not to convince our opponent by our arguments, but to solve the arguments which he brings against the truth, because, as shown above (ch. 7), natural reason cannot be opposed to the truth of faith. Singularis vero modus convincendi adversarium contra huiusmodi veritatem est ex auctoritate Scripturae divinitus confirmata miraculis: quae enim supra rationem humanam sunt, non credimus nisi Deo revelante. In a special way, the opponent of this kind of truth may be convinced by the authority of Scripture confirmed by God with miracles, since we do not believe what is above human reason unless God has revealed it. Sunt tamen ad huiusmodi veritatem manifestandam rationes aliquae verisimiles inducendae, ad fidelium quidem exercitium et solatium, non autem ad adversarios convincendos: quia ipsa rationum insufficientia eos magis in suo errore confirmaret, dum aestimarent nos propter tam debiles rationes veritati fidei consentire. In support, however, of this kind of truth, certain probable arguments must be adduced for the practice and help of the faithful, but not for the conviction of our opponents, because the very insufficiency of these arguments would rather confirm them in their error if they thought that we assented to the truth of faith on account of such weak reasonings. Modo ergo proposito procedere intendentes, primum nitemur ad manifestationem illius veritatis quam fides profitetur et ratio investigat, inducentes rationes demonstrativas et probabiles, quarum quasdam ex libris philosophorum et sanctorum collegimus per quas veritas confirmetur et adversarius convincatur. With the intention, then, of proceeding in the manner laid down, we shall first endeavor to declare that truth which is the object of faith’s confession and of reason’s researches, by adducing arguments both demonstrative and probable, some of which we have gathered from the writings of the philosophers and of holy men, so as to thereby confirm the truth and convince our opponents. Deinde, ut a manifestioribus ad minus manifesta fiat processus, ad illius veritatis manifestationem procedemus quae rationem excedit, solventes rationes adversariorum et rationibus probabilibus et auctoritatibus, quantum Deus dederit, veritatem fidei declarantes. After this, so as to proceed from the more to the less manifest, we shall, with God’s help, proceed to declare that truth which surpasses reason by refuting the arguments of our opponents, and by setting forth the truth of faith by means of probable arguments and authority (bk. IV). Intendentibus igitur nobis per viam rationis prosequi ea quae de Deo ratio humana investigare potest, primo, occurrit consideratio de his quae Deo secundum seipsum conveniunt; secundo, vero, de processu creaturarum ab ipso; tertio, autem, de ordine creaturarum in ipsum sicut in finem. Seeing, then, that we intend by the way of reason to pursue those things about God which human reason is able to investigate, the first object that offers itself to our consideration consists in those things which pertain to God in himself; the second (bk. II) will be the procession of creatures from him; and the third (bk. III) the relation of creatures to him as their end. Inter ea vero quae de Deo secundum seipsum consideranda sunt, praemittendum est, quasi totius operis necessarium fundamentum, consideratio qua demonstratur Deum esse. Quo non habito, omnis consideratio de rebus divinis tollitur. Of those things which we need to consider about God in himself, we must give the first place, as to the necessary foundation of this whole work, to the question of demonstrating that there is a God. If this is not established, the entire consideration of divine things is taken away. Esse Dei God’s existence Caput 10 Chapter 10