Caput 7 Chapter 7 Quod veritati fidei Christianae non contrariatur veritas rationis That the truth of reason is not in opposition to the truth of the Christian faith Quamvis autem praedicta veritas fidei Christianae humanae rationis capacitatem excedat, haec tamen quae ratio naturaliter indita habet, huic veritati contraria esse non possunt. Now, though the aforesaid truth of the Christian faith surpasses the ability of human reason, nevertheless those things which are naturally instilled in human reason cannot be opposed to this truth. Ea enim quae naturaliter rationi sunt insita, verissima esse constat: in tantum ut nec esse falsa sit possibile cogitare. Nec id quod fide tenetur, cum tam evidenter divinitus confirmatum sit, fas est credere esse falsum. Quia igitur solum falsum vero contrarium est, ut ex eorum definitionibus inspectis manifeste apparet, impossibile est illis principiis quae ratio naturaliter cognoscit, praedictam veritatem fidei contrariam esse. For it is clear that those things which are implanted in reason by nature are most true, so much so that it is impossible to think them to be false. Nor is it lawful to deem false that which is held by faith, since it is so evidently confirmed by God. Seeing, then, that the false alone is opposed to the true (as is obvious if we examine their definitions), it is impossible for the aforesaid truth of faith to be contrary to those principles which reason knows naturally. Item. Illud idem quod inducitur in animam discipuli a docente, doctoris scientia continet: nisi doceat ficte, quod de Deo nefas est dicere. Principiorum autem naturaliter notorum cognitio nobis divinitus est indita: cum ipse Deus sit nostrae auctor naturae. Haec ergo principia etiam divina sapientia continet. Quicquid igitur principiis huiusmodi contrarium est, divinae sapientiae contrariatur. Non igitur a Deo esse potest. Ea igitur quae ex revelatione divina per fidem tenentur, non possunt naturali cognitioni esse contraria. Again. The same thing which the disciple’s mind receives from its teacher is contained in the knowledge of the teacher—unless he teach fictitiously, which is wicked to say of God. Now, the knowledge of naturally known principles is instilled into us by God, since God himself is the author of our nature. Therefore, the divine wisdom also contains these principles. Consequently, whatever is contrary to these principles is contrary to the divine wisdom. Therefore, it cannot be from God. Therefore, those things which are received by faith from divine revelation cannot be contrary to our natural knowledge. Adhuc. Contrariis rationibus intellectus noster ligatur, ut ad veri cognitionem procedere nequeat. Si igitur contrariae cognitiones nobis a Deo immitterentur, ex hoc a veritatis cognitione noster intellectus impediretur. Quod a Deo esse non potest. Moreover. Contrary arguments bind our intellect so that it cannot advance to the knowledge of truth. Therefore, if conflicting knowledges were instilled into us by God, our intellect would thereby be hindered from knowing the truth. And this cannot be ascribed to God. Amplius. Ea quae sunt naturalia mutari non possunt, natura manente. Contrariae autem opiniones simul eidem inesse non possunt. Non igitur contra cognitionem naturalem aliqua opinio vel fides homini a Deo immittitur. Furthermore. Things that are natural are unchangeable so long as nature remains. Now, contrary opinions cannot be together in the same subject. Therefore, God does not instil into man any opinion or belief contrary to natural knowledge. Et ideo apostolus dicit, Rom. 10:8: prope est verbum in corde tuo et in ore tuo: hoc est verbum fidei, quod praedicamus. Sed quia superat rationem, a nonnullis reputatur quasi contrarium. Quod esse non potest. Hence the Apostle says: the word is near you, on your lips and in your heart: this is the word of faith which we preach (Rom 10:8). Yet, because it surpasses reason, some look upon it as though it were contrary to reason; which is impossible. Huic etiam auctoritas Augustini concordat, qui in II super Gen. ad Litt. dicit sic: illud quod veritas patefaciet, libris sanctis sive testamenti veteris sive novi nullo modo potest esse adversum. This is confirmed also by the authority of Augustine, who says: that which truth shall make known can in no way be in opposition to the holy books, whether of the Old or of the New Testament (2 On the Literal Meaning of Genesis 18). Ex quo evidenter colligitur, quaecumque argumenta contra fidei documenta ponantur, haec ex principiis primis naturae inditis per se notis non recte procedere. Unde nec demonstrationis vim habent, sed vel sunt rationes probabiles vel sophisticae. Et sic ad ea solvenda locus relinquitur. From this we may evidently conclude that whatever arguments are alleged against the teachings of faith, they do not rightly proceed from the first self-evident principles instilled by nature. Hence they lack the force of demonstration, and are either probable or sophistical arguments, and consequently it is possible to solve them. Caput 8 Chapter 8 Qualiter se habeat humana ratio ad veritatem fidei In what relation human reason stands to the truth of faith Considerandum etiam videtur quod res quidem sensibiles, ex quibus humana ratio cognitionis principium sumit, aliquale vestigium in se divinae imitationis retinent, ita tamen imperfectum quod ad declarandam ipsius Dei substantiam omnino insufficiens invenitur. Habent enim effectus suarum causarum suo modo similitudinem, cum agens agat sibi simile: non tamen effectus ad perfectam agentis similitudinem semper pertingit. Humana igitur ratio ad cognoscendum fidei veritatem, quae solum videntibus divinam substantiam potest esse notissima, ita se habet quod ad eam potest aliquas verisimilitudines colligere, quae tamen non sufficiunt ad hoc quod praedicta veritas quasi demonstrative vel per se intellecta comprehendatur. It would also seem well to observe that sensible things, from which human reason derives the source of its knowledge, retain a certain trace of likeness to God, but so imperfect that it proves altogether inadequate to manifest the substance itself of God. For effects resemble their causes according to their own mode, since like action proceeds from like agent; and yet the effect does not always reach to a perfect likeness to the agent. Accordingly, human reason is adapted to the knowledge of the truth of faith (which can be known in the highest degree only by those who see the divine substance) insofar as it is able to put together certain probable arguments in support of it, which nevertheless are insufficient to enable us to understand the aforesaid truth as though it were demonstrated or understood in itself. Utile tamen est ut in huiusmodi rationibus, quantumcumque debilibus, se mens humana exerceat, dummodo desit comprehendendi vel demonstrandi praesumptio: quia de rebus altissimis etiam parva et debili consideratione aliquid posse inspicere iucundissimum est, ut ex dictis apparet. And yet, however weak these arguments may be, it is useful for the human mind to be practiced in them, so long as it does not pride itself on having comprehended or demonstrated, since although our view of the sublimest things is limited and weak, it is most pleasant to be able to catch but a glimpse of them, as appears from what has been said (ch. 5). Cui quidem sententiae auctoritas Hilarii concordat, qui sic dicit in libro de Trin., loquens de huiusmodi veritate: haec credendo incipe, procurre, persiste: etsi non perventurum sciam, gratulabor tamen profecturum. Qui enim pie infinita prosequitur, etsi non contingat aliquando, semper tamen proficiet prodeundo. Sed ne te inferas in illud secretum, et arcano interminabilis nativitatis non te immergas, summam intelligentiae comprehendere praesumens: sed intellige incomprehensibilia esse. The authority of Hilary concords with this, for he says in his book On the Trinity 2, 10-11, while speaking of this same truth: begin by believing these things, advance and persevere, and though I know you will not arrive, I shall rejoice at your advance. For he who devoutly follows in pursuit of the infinite, though he never come up with it, will always advance by setting forth. Yet do not pry into that secret, and do not meddle in the mystery of the birth of the infinite, nor presume to grasp that which is the summit of understanding, but understand that there are things you cannot grasp. Caput 9 Chapter 9 De ordine et modo procedendi in hoc opere Of the order and mode of procedure in this work Ex praemissis igitur evidenter apparet sapientis intentionem circa duplicem veritatem divinorum debere versari, et circa errores contrarios destruendos: ad quarum unam investigatio rationis pertingere potest, alia vero omnem rationis excedit industriam. Dico autem duplicem veritatem divinorum, non ex parte ipsius Dei, qui est una et simplex veritas; sed ex parte cognitionis nostrae, quae ad divina cognoscenda diversimode se habet. Accordingly, from what we have been saying it is evident that the intention of the wise man must be directed to the twofold truth of divine things and to the refutation of contrary errors, and that the reason’s investigation can reach one of these, but the other surpasses every effort of reason. And I speak of a twofold truth of divine things not on the part of God himself, who is truth one and simple, but on the part of our knowledge, which has a variable relation to the knowledge of divine things. Ad primae igitur veritatis manifestationem per rationes demonstrativas, quibus adversarius convinci possit, procedendum est. Sed quia tales rationes ad secundam veritatem haberi non possunt, non debet esse ad hoc intentio ut adversarius rationibus convincatur: sed ut eius rationes, quas contra veritatem habet, solvantur; cum veritati fidei ratio naturalis contraria esse non possit, ut ostensum est. Therefore, in order to deduce the first kind of truth, we must proceed by demonstrative arguments by which we can convince our adversaries. But, since there are no such arguments in support of the second kind of truth, our intention must be not to convince our opponent by our arguments, but to solve the arguments which he brings against the truth, because, as shown above (ch. 7), natural reason cannot be opposed to the truth of faith. Singularis vero modus convincendi adversarium contra huiusmodi veritatem est ex auctoritate Scripturae divinitus confirmata miraculis: quae enim supra rationem humanam sunt, non credimus nisi Deo revelante. In a special way, the opponent of this kind of truth may be convinced by the authority of Scripture confirmed by God with miracles, since we do not believe what is above human reason unless God has revealed it. Sunt tamen ad huiusmodi veritatem manifestandam rationes aliquae verisimiles inducendae, ad fidelium quidem exercitium et solatium, non autem ad adversarios convincendos: quia ipsa rationum insufficientia eos magis in suo errore confirmaret, dum aestimarent nos propter tam debiles rationes veritati fidei consentire. In support, however, of this kind of truth, certain probable arguments must be adduced for the practice and help of the faithful, but not for the conviction of our opponents, because the very insufficiency of these arguments would rather confirm them in their error if they thought that we assented to the truth of faith on account of such weak reasonings. Modo ergo proposito procedere intendentes, primum nitemur ad manifestationem illius veritatis quam fides profitetur et ratio investigat, inducentes rationes demonstrativas et probabiles, quarum quasdam ex libris philosophorum et sanctorum collegimus per quas veritas confirmetur et adversarius convincatur. With the intention, then, of proceeding in the manner laid down, we shall first endeavor to declare that truth which is the object of faith’s confession and of reason’s researches, by adducing arguments both demonstrative and probable, some of which we have gathered from the writings of the philosophers and of holy men, so as to thereby confirm the truth and convince our opponents. Deinde, ut a manifestioribus ad minus manifesta fiat processus, ad illius veritatis manifestationem procedemus quae rationem excedit, solventes rationes adversariorum et rationibus probabilibus et auctoritatibus, quantum Deus dederit, veritatem fidei declarantes. After this, so as to proceed from the more to the less manifest, we shall, with God’s help, proceed to declare that truth which surpasses reason by refuting the arguments of our opponents, and by setting forth the truth of faith by means of probable arguments and authority (bk. IV). Intendentibus igitur nobis per viam rationis prosequi ea quae de Deo ratio humana investigare potest, primo, occurrit consideratio de his quae Deo secundum seipsum conveniunt; secundo, vero, de processu creaturarum ab ipso; tertio, autem, de ordine creaturarum in ipsum sicut in finem. Seeing, then, that we intend by the way of reason to pursue those things about God which human reason is able to investigate, the first object that offers itself to our consideration consists in those things which pertain to God in himself; the second (bk. II) will be the procession of creatures from him; and the third (bk. III) the relation of creatures to him as their end. Inter ea vero quae de Deo secundum seipsum consideranda sunt, praemittendum est, quasi totius operis necessarium fundamentum, consideratio qua demonstratur Deum esse. Quo non habito, omnis consideratio de rebus divinis tollitur. Of those things which we need to consider about God in himself, we must give the first place, as to the necessary foundation of this whole work, to the question of demonstrating that there is a God. If this is not established, the entire consideration of divine things is taken away. Esse Dei God’s existence Caput 10 Chapter 10 De opinione dicentium quod Deum esse demonstrari non potest cum sit per se notum Of the opinion of those who say it cannot be demonstrated that there is a God, since this is self-evident Haec autem consideratio qua quis nititur ad demonstrandum Deum esse, superflua fortasse quibusdam videbitur, qui asserunt quod Deum esse per se notum est, ita quod eius contrarium cogitari non possit, et sic Deum esse demonstrari non potest. Quod quidem videtur ex his. It may seem useless to some to endeavor to show that there is a God: they say that it is self-evident that God is, so that it is impossible to think the contrary, and thus it cannot be demonstrated that there is a God. The reasons for this view are as follow. Illa enim per se esse nota dicuntur quae statim notis terminis cognoscuntur: sicut, cognito quid est totum et quid est pars, statim cognoscitur quod omne totum est maius sua parte. Huiusmodi autem est hoc quod dicimus Deum esse. Nam nomine Dei intelligimus aliquid quo maius cogitari non potest. Hoc autem in intellectu formatur ab eo qui audit et intelligit nomen Dei: ut sic saltem in intellectu iam Deum esse oporteat. Nec potest in intellectu solum esse: nam quod in intellectu et re est, maius est eo quod in solo intellectu est; Deo autem nihil esse maius ipsa nominis ratio demonstrat. Unde restat quod Deum esse per se notum est, quasi ex ipsa significatione nominis manifestum. Those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known; thus, as soon as it is known what is a whole, and what is a part, it is known that the whole is greater than its part. Now such is the statement ‘God is’. For by this word ‘God’ we understand a thing than which a greater cannot be thought of. This is what a man conceives in his mind when he hears and understands this word ‘God’: so that God must already be at least in his mind. Nor can he be in the mind alone, for that which is both in the mind and in reality is greater than that which is in the mind only. And the very signification of the word shows that nothing is greater than God. Therefore, it follows that God’s existence is self-evident, since it is made clear from the very signification of the word. Item. Cogitari quidem potest quod aliquid sit quod non possit cogitari non esse. Quod maius est evidenter eo quod potest cogitari non esse. Sic ergo Deo aliquid maius cogitari posset, si ipse posset cogitari non esse. Quod est contra rationem nominis. Relinquitur quod Deum esse per se notum est. Again. It is possible to think that there is a thing which cannot be thought not to exist, and such a thing is evidently greater than that which can be thought not to exist. Therefore, if God can be thought not to exist, it follows that something can be thought greater than God, and this is contrary to the signification of the term. Therefore, it remains that God’s existence is self-evident. Adhuc. Propositiones illas oportet esse notissimas in quibus idem de seipso praedicatur, ut, homo est homo; vel quarum praedicata in definitionibus subiectorum includuntur, ut, homo est animal. In Deo autem hoc prae aliis invenitur, ut infra ostendetur, quod suum esse est sua essentia, ac si idem sit quod respondetur ad quaestionem quid est, et ad quaestionem an est. Sic ergo cum dicitur, Deus est, praedicatum vel est idem subiecto, vel saltem in definitione subiecti includitur. Et ita Deum esse per se notum erit. Further. Those propositions are most evident in which the selfsame thing is predicated of itself, such as: ‘man is man’; or in which the predicate is included in the definition of the subject, for instance: ‘man is an animal.’ Now, as we shall show further on (ch. 22), in God alone do we find that his being is his essence: so that the answer is the same to the question, ‘What is he?’ as to the question, ‘Is he?’ Accordingly, when we say, ‘God is,’ the predicate is either identified with the subject, or at least is included in the definition of the subject. And thus it will be self-evident that God is. Amplius. Quae naturaliter sunt nota, per se cognoscuntur: non enim ad ea cognoscenda inquisitionis studio pervenitur. At Deum esse naturaliter notum est: cum in Deum naturaliter desiderium hominis tendat sicut in ultimum finem, ut infra patebit. Est igitur per se notum Deum esse. Moreover. Things that are known naturally are self-evident, for it is not by a process of research that they become evident. Now it is naturally known that God is, since man’s desire tends naturally to God as his last end, as we shall show further on (bk. III, ch. 25). Therefore, it is self-evident that God is. Item. Illud per se notum oportet esse quo omnia alia cognoscuntur. Deus autem huiusmodi est. Sicut enim lux solis principium est omnis visibilis perceptionis, ita divina lux omnis intelligibilis cognitionis principium est: cum sit in quo primum maxime lumen intelligibile invenitur. Oportet igitur quod Deum esse per se notum sit. Again. That by which all things are known must be self-evident. Now God is such. For just as the light of the sun is the principle of all visual perception, so the divine light is the principle of all intellectual knowledge, because it is in it that the first and greatest intellectual light is found. Therefore, it must be self-evident that God is. Ex his igitur et similibus aliqui opinantur Deum esse sic per se notum existere ut contrarium mente cogitari non possit. On account of these and similar arguments some are of the opinion that God’s existence is so self-evident that the mind cannot think the contrary. Caput 11 Chapter 11