Caput 72 Chapter 72 Quod Deus est volens That in God there is will Expeditis his quae ad divini intellectus cognitionem pertinent, nunc restat considerare de Dei voluntate. After discussing the matters concerning the knowledge of the divine intellect, it remains for us to consider the divine will. Ex hoc enim quod Deus est intelligens, sequitur quod sit volens. Cum enim bonum intellectum sit obiectum proprium voluntatis, oportet quod bonum intellectum, inquantum huiusmodi, sit volitum. Intellectum autem dicitur ad intelligentem. Necesse est igitur quod intelligens bonum, inquantum huiusmodi, sit volens. Deus autem intelligit bonum: cum enim sit perfecte intelligens, ut ex supra dictis patet, intelligit ens simul cum ratione boni. Est igitur volens. For, from the fact that there is intelligence in God, it follows that there is will in him. Because, since the good understood is the proper object of the will, it follows that the good understood, as such, is willed. Now ‘understood’ indicates a reference to one who understands. It follows, therefore, of necessity that one who understands good, as such, has a will. Now God understands good: For, since he is perfectly intelligent, as shown above (ch. 44, 45), he understands being simultaneously with the notion of good. Therefore, in him there is will. Adhuc. Cuicumque inest aliqua forma, habet per illam formam habitudinem ad ea quae sunt in rerum natura: sicut lignum album per suam albedinem est aliquibus simile et quibusdam dissimile. In intelligente autem et sentiente est forma rei intellectae et sensatae: cum omnis cognitio sit per aliquam similitudinem. Oportet igitur esse habitudinem intelligentis et sentientis ad ea quae sunt intellecta et sensata secundum quod sunt in rerum natura. Non autem hoc est per hoc quod intelligunt et sentiunt: nam per hoc magis attenditur habitudo rerum ad intelligentem et sentientem; quia intelligere et sentire est secundum quod res sunt in intellectu et sensu, secundum modum utriusque. Habet autem habitudinem sentiens et intelligens ad rem quae est extra animam per voluntatem et appetitum. Unde omnia sentientia et intelligentia appetunt et volunt: voluntas tamen proprie in intellectu est. Cum igitur Deus sit intelligens, oportet quod sit volens. Again. Whatever has a form is thereby related to things actually existing: thus white timber, by its whiteness, is like some things and unlike others. Now, in intelligent and sentient subjects there is the form of the thing understood and sensed, because all knowledge is through some likeness. Therefore, there must be a relation in the intelligent or sentient subject to the things understood or sensed, according as the latter actually exist. Now this is not due to the fact that they understand or sense: for in this respect there is rather a relation in things to the intelligent or sentient subject, since intelligence and sensation depend on things being in the intellect and sense according to the respective modes of each. But the sentient and the intelligent subject have by the will and appetite a relation to things outside the mind. Therefore, every sentient and intelligent subject has an appetite and will, although, properly speaking, will is in an intellect. Since, then, God is intelligent, it follows that he has a will. Amplius. Illud quod consequitur omne ens, convenit enti inquantum est ens. Quod autem est huiusmodi, oportet quod in eo maxime inveniatur quod est primum ens. Cuilibet autem enti competit appetere suam perfectionem et conservationem sui esse: unicuique tamen secundum suum modum, intellectualibus quidem per voluntatem, animalibus per sensibilem appetitum, carentibus vero sensu per appetitum naturalem. Aliter tamen quae habent, et quae non habent: nam ea quae non habent, appetitiva virtute sui generis desiderio tendunt ad acquirendum quod ei deest; quae autem habent, quietantur in ipso. Hoc igitur primo enti, quod Deus est, deesse non potest. Cum igitur ipse sit intelligens, inest sibi voluntas, qua placet sibi suum esse et sua bonitas. Moreover. That which is consequent upon every being belongs to being as such, and a thing of this kind must be found especially in the first being. Now, every being desires its own perfection and the preservation of its being. And to each one this is according to its mode: to intelligent beings by will, to animals by sensitive appetite, to those that are devoid of sense by natural appetite. But it is otherwise to those who have it than to those who do not have it: for those who do not have it tend, by the appetitive power of their genus, with desire to acquire what is lacking to them, whereas those who have it are at rest in it. Therefore, this cannot be lacking to the first being, which is God. Since, then, he is intelligent, there is will in him, by which his being and his goodness are pleasing to him. Item. Intelligere, quanto perfectius est, tanto delectabilius est intelligenti. Sed Deus intelligit, et suum intelligere est perfectissimum, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo intelligere est ei delectabilissimum. Delectatio autem intelligibilis est per voluntatem: sicut delectatio sensibilis est per concupiscentiae appetitum. Est igitur in Deo voluntas. Again. The more perfect the act of understanding is, the more delightful is it to the one who understands. Now God understands, and his act of understanding is most perfect, as was proved above (ch. 44, 45). Therefore, to understand is to him most delightful. But intellectual delight is by the will, even as sensitive delight is by the appetite of concupiscence. Therefore, there is will in God. Praeterea. Forma per intellectum considerata non movet nec aliquid causat nisi mediante voluntate, cuius obiectum est finis et bonum, a quo movetur aliquis ad agendum. Unde intellectus speculativus non movet; neque imaginatio pura absque aestimatione. Sed forma intellectus divini est causa motus et esse in aliis: agit enim res per intellectum, ut infra ostendetur. Oportet igitur quod ipse sit volens. Further. A form considered by the intellect neither moves nor causes anything except through the medium of the will, whose object is an end and a good by which one is moved to act. Hence the speculative intellect does not move; nor does the sole imagination without the estimative power. Now the form of the divine intellect is the cause of being and movement in other things, for God moves things by his intellect, as we shall prove further on (bk. II, ch. 24). Therefore, it follows that he has a will. Item. In virtutibus motivis, in habentibus intellectum, prima invenitur voluntas: nam voluntas omnem potentiam applicat ad suum actum; intelligimus enim quia volumus, et imaginamur quia volumus, et sic de aliis. Et hoc habet quia obiectum eius est finis: quamvis intellectus, non secundum modum causae efficientis et moventis, sed secundum modum causae finalis, moveat voluntatem, proponendo sibi suum obiectum, quod est finis. Primo igitur moventi convenit maxime habere voluntatem. Again. The first of motive powers in intelligent beings is the will, because the will applies every power to its act, for we understand because we will, we imagine because we will, and so forth. And the will has this because its object is the end, although the intellect moves the will—not by way of efficient and moving cause, but by way of final cause—by putting its object before it (which is the end). Therefore, it is especially fitting that the first mover should have a will. Praeterea. Liberum est quod sui causa est: et sic liberum habet rationem eius quod est per se. Voluntas autem primo habet libertatem in agendo: inquantum enim voluntarie agit quis, dicitur libere agere quamcumque actionem. Primo igitur agenti maxime competit per voluntatem agere, cui maxime convenit per se agere. Further. The free is that which is its own cause, and so the free has the aspect of that which is of itself. Now liberty of action is seated primarily in the will, for insofar as one acts voluntarily, one is said to perform any action whatever freely. Therefore, it is especially fitting that the first agent should act by will, since to him it is most competent to act of himself. Amplius. Finis et agens ad finem semper unius ordinis inveniuntur in rebus: unde et finis proximus, qui est proportionatus agenti, incidit in idem specie cum agente, tam in naturalibus quam in artificialibus; nam forma artis per quam artifex agit, est species formae quae est in materia, quae est finis artificis; et forma ignis generantis qua agit, est eiusdem speciei cum forma ignis geniti, quae est finis generationis. Deo autem nihil coordinatur quasi eiusdem ordinis nisi ipse: alias essent plura prima, cuius contrarium supra ostensum est. Ipse est igitur primum agens propter finem qui est ipsemet. Ipse igitur non solum est finis appetibilis, sed appetens, ut ita dicam, se finem, et appetitu intellectuali, cum sit intelligens: qui est voluntas. Est igitur in Deo voluntas. Moreover. The end and the agent intending the end are always of the same order in things: therefore, the proximate end (which is proportionate to the agent) is of the same species as the agent, in works both of nature and of art. For the form of the art whereby the craftsman works is the species of the form that is in matter, and is the end of the craftsman; and the form of the generating fire, whereby the fire acts, is of the same species as the form of the fire generated, which form is the end of the generation. Now, nothing is coordinate with God as though it were of the same order, except God himself, otherwise there would be several first beings, and we have shown the contrary to be the case (ch. 42). He is, therefore, the first agent intending an end which is himself. Therefore, not only is he a desirable end, but he also desires himself, so to speak, as an end; and, since he is intelligent, he desires himself by intellectual appetite; and this is will. Therefore, in God there is will. Hanc autem Dei voluntatem Scripturae sacrae testimonia confitentur. Dicitur enim in Psalmo: omnia quaecumque voluit, dominus fecit. Et Rom. 9:19: voluntati eius quis resistit? Sacred Scripture bears witness to this will of God. For it is said in the Psalm: whatever the Lord willed, he has done (Ps 134:6); and: who can resist his will? (Rom 9:19). Caput 73 Chapter 73 Quod voluntas Dei est eius essentia That God’s will is his essence Ex hoc autem apparet quod sua voluntas non est aliud quam sua essentia. It is evident from the foregoing that his will is not distinct from his essence. Deo enim convenit esse volentem inquantum est intelligens, ut ostensum est. Est autem intelligens per essentiam suam, ut supra probatum est. Ergo et volens. Est igitur voluntas Dei ipsa eius essentia. For it belongs to God to have a will insofar as he has an intellect, as proved above (ch. 72). Now he is intelligent by his essence, as we have already shown (ch. 45, 46), and consequently will also is in him by his essence. Therefore, God’s will is his very essence. Adhuc. Sicut intelligere est perfectio intelligentis, ita et velle volentis: utrumque enim est actio in agente manens, non autem transiens in aliquid passum, sicut calefactio. Sed intelligere Dei est eius esse, ut supra probatum est: eo quod, cum esse divinum secundum se sit perfectissimum, nullam supervenientem perfectionem admittit, ut supra ostensum est. Est igitur et divinum velle esse ipsius. Ergo et voluntas Dei est eius essentia. Again. Even as to understand is the perfection of one who is intelligent, so to will is the perfection of one who wills, for each is an action abiding in the agent, and not passing into something passive, as heating. Now God’s act of intelligence is his being, as we proved above (ch. 45), because, since God’s being is by itself supremely perfect, it admits of no additional perfection, as we have shown above (ch. 23, 28). Therefore, the divine willing is also his being. Consequently, God’s will is his essence. Amplius. Cum omne agens agat inquantum actu est, oportet quod Deus, qui est actus purus, per suam essentiam agat. Velle autem est quaedam Dei operatio. Oportet igitur quod Deus per essentiam suam sit volens. Sua igitur voluntas est sua essentia. Moreover. Since every agent acts insofar as it is actual, it follows that God, who is pure act, acts by his essence. Now willing is an operation of God. Therefore, it follows that God wills by his essence. Therefore, his will is his essence. Item. Si voluntas esset aliquid additum divinae substantiae, cum divina substantia sit quid completum in esse, sequeretur quod voluntas adveniret ei quasi accidens subiecto; sequeretur quod divina substantia compararetur ad ipsam quasi potentia ad actum; et quod esset compositio in Deo. Quae omnia supra improbata sunt. Non est igitur possibile quod divina voluntas sit aliquid additum divinae essentiae. Again. If will were something added to the divine substance, since the divine substance is complete in being it would follow that will would come to him like an accident to its subject; that the divine substance would be compared thereto as potency to act; and that there is composition in God. All of which have been disproved above (ch. 16, 18, 23). It is, therefore, impossible for the divine will to be something in addition to the divine essence. Caput 74 Chapter 74 Quod principale volitum Dei est divina essentia That the principal object of God’s will is the divine essence Ex hoc autem ulterius apparet quod principale divinae voluntatis volitum est eius essentia. It is also evident from the foregoing that the principal object of God’s will is his essence. Bonum enim intellectum est obiectum voluntatis, ut dictum est. Id autem quod a Deo principaliter intelligitur est divina essentia, ut supra probatum est. Divina igitur essentia est id de quo principaliter est divina voluntas. For the good understood is the object of the will, as proved above (ch. 72). Now the principal object of God’s intellect is the divine essence, as we have already proved (ch. 48). Therefore, the divine essence is the principal object of the divine will. Item. Appetibile comparatur ad appetitum sicut movens ad motum, ut supra dictum est. Et similiter se habet volitum ad voluntatem: cum voluntas sit de genere appetitivarum potentiarum. Si igitur voluntatis divinae sit aliud principale volitum quam ipsa Dei essentia, sequetur quod aliquid aliud sit superius divina voluntate, quod ipsam movet. Cuius contrarium ex praedictis patet. Again. The appetible object is compared to the appetite as mover to the thing moved, as we have stated above (ch. 44). It is the same with the thing willed in relation to the will, since the will belongs to the genus of appetitive powers. Therefore, if something besides God’s essence were the principal object of God’s will, it would follow that something else is superior to and moves the divine will: and the contrary of this was proved above (ch. 73). Praeterea. Principale volitum est unicuique volenti causa volendi: cum enim dicimus, volo ambulare ut saner, causam nos reddere arbitramur; et si quaeratur, quare vis sanari, procedetur in assignatione causarum quousque perveniatur ad finem ultimum, qui est principale volitum, quod est causa volendi per seipsum. Si igitur Deus aliquid aliud principaliter velit quam seipsum, sequetur quod aliquid aliud sit ei causa volendi. Sed suum velle est suum esse, ut ostensum est. Ergo aliquid aliud erit ei causa essendi. Quod est contra rationem primi entis. Further. The principal thing willed is to every willer the cause of his willing: for when we say: ‘I wish to walk that I may be healed,’ we consider that we are stating the reason, and if it be asked, ‘Why do you wish to be healed?’ we shall continue to give reasons until we come to the last end, which is the principal thing willed, and is of itself the cause of willing. Accordingly, if God wills principally something other than himself, it follows that something other than himself is the cause of his willing. But his willing is his being, as we have shown (ch. 73). Therefore, something else will be the cause of his being, and this is contrary to the notion of the first being. Adhuc. Unicuique volenti principale volitum est suus ultimus finis: nam finis est per se volitus, et per quem alia fiunt volita. Ultimus autem finis est ipse Deus: quia ipse est summum bonum, ut ostensum est. Ipse igitur est principale volitum suae voluntatis. Again. To every willer the thing willed principally is his last end: for the end is willed by reason of itself, and other things come to be willed by reason of it. Now God is the last end, because he is the highest good, as was proved (ch. 41). Therefore, he is the principal object of his will. Amplius. Unaquaeque virtus ad suum obiectum principale secundum aequalitatem proportionatur: nam virtus rei secundum obiecta mensuratur, ut patet per Philosophum, in I Caeli et mundi. Voluntas igitur ex aequo proportionatur suo principali obiecto: et similiter intellectus, et etiam sensus. Divinae autem voluntati nihil ex aequo proportionatur nisi eius essentia. Ergo principale obiectum divinae voluntatis est essentia divina. Moreover. Every power is proportionate to its principal object according to equality: for the power of a thing is measured according to its object, as the Philosopher says in 1 Coeli et Mundi 11, 6. Therefore, the will is proportionate according to equality to its principal object, as well as the intellect and the senses. Now nothing is proportionate according to equality to God’s will, except his essence. Therefore, the principal object of the divine will is the divine essence. Cum autem essentia divina sit Dei intelligere et omnia alia quae in ipso esse dicuntur, manifestum est ulterius quod eodem modo principaliter vult se intelligere, se velle, se esse unum, et quicquid aliud est huiusmodi. And since the divine essence is God’s act of understanding and everything else that is said to be in God, it is also clear that in the same way God wills principally, to will, to understand, to be one and so forth. Caput 75 Chapter 75 Quod Deus, volendo se, vult etiam alia That God in willing himself wills also other things Hinc autem ostendi potest quod, volendo se, vult etiam alia. Hence it may be proved that in willing himself he wills other things also. Cuius enim est velle finem principaliter, eius est velle ea quae sunt ad finem ratione finis. Est autem ipse Deus ultimus rerum finis, ut ex praedictis aliquatenus patet. Ex hoc igitur quod vult se esse, etiam alia vult, quae in ipsum sicut in finem ordinantur. For he who wills the end principally wills the means to the end, for the sake of that end. Now God himself is the last end of things, as appears sufficiently from what we have said (ch. 74). Therefore, from the fact that he wills himself to be, he wills also other things that are directed to himself as their end. Item. Unusquisque eius quod est propter ipsum ab ipso volitum et amatum, perfectionem desiderat: quae enim propter se amamus, volumus esse optima, et semper meliorari et multiplicari, quantum possibile est. Ipse autem Deus essentiam suam propter seipsam vult et amat. Non autem secundum se augmentabilis et multiplicabilis est, ut ex supra dictis est manifestum: sed solum multiplicabilis est secundum suam similitudinem, quae a multis participatur. Vult igitur Deus rerum multitudinem ex hoc quod suam essentiam et perfectionem vult et amat. Again. Every thing desires the perfection of that which it wills and loves for its own sake, because whatever we love for its own sake, we wish to be best, and ever to be bettered and multiplied as much as possible. Now God wills and loves his essence for its own sake: and it cannot be increased or multiplied in itself, as appears from what has been said (ch. 42). Also, it can only be multiplied in respect of its likeness which is shared by many (ch. 29). Therefore, God wishes things to be multiplied, because he wills and loves his essence and perfection. Amplius. Quicumque amat aliquid secundum se et propter ipsum, amat per consequens omnia in quibus illud invenitur: ut qui amat dulcedinem propter ipsam, oportet quod omnia dulcia amet. Sed Deus suum esse secundum se et propter ipsum vult et amat, ut supra ostensum est. Omne autem aliud esse est quaedam sui esse secundum similitudinem participatio, ut ex praedictis aliquatenus patet. Relinquitur igitur quod Deus, ex hoc ipso quod vult et amat se, vult et amat alia. Moreover. Whoever loves a thing in itself and for its own sake loves in consequence all the things in which it is found: thus he who loves sweetness for its own sake must love all sweet things. Now God wills and loves his own being, in itself and for its own sake, as we have proved above (ch. 74). And all other being is a participation by likeness of his being, as was made sufficiently clear by what we have said above (ch. 29). Therefore, from the very fact that God wills and loves himself, it follows that he wills and loves other things. Adhuc. Deus, volendo se, vult omnia quae in ipso sunt. Omnia autem quodammodo praeexistunt in ipso per proprias rationes, ut supra ostensum est. Deus igitur, volendo se, etiam alia vult. Again. God, in willing himself, wills all things that are in him. Now all things preexist in him somewhat by their proper types, as we have proved (ch. 54). Therefore, in willing himself, God wills other things. Item. Quanto aliquid est perfectioris virtutis, tanto sua causalitas ad plura se extendit et in magis remotum, ut supra dictum est. Causalitas autem finis in hoc consistit quod propter ipsum alia desiderantur. Quanto igitur finis est perfectior et magis volitus, tanto voluntas volentis finem ad plura extenditur ratione finis illius. Divina autem essentia est perfectissima in ratione bonitatis et finis. Igitur diffundet suam causalitatem maxime ad multa, ut propter ipsam multa sint volita; et praecipue a Deo, qui eam secundum totam suam virtutem perfecte vult. Again. As stated above (ch. 70), the greater a thing’s power, to so many more things, and to the greater distance does its causality extend. Now, the causality of an end consists in other things being desired for its sake. Therefore, the more perfect and the more willed an end is, to so many more things does the will of him who wills that end extend by reason of that end. But the divine essence is most perfect considered under the aspect of goodness and end. Therefore, it will extend its causality most of all to many things, so that many be willed for its sake, especially by God, who wills it perfectly with all his might.