Caput 75 Chapter 75 Quod Deus, volendo se, vult etiam alia That God in willing himself wills also other things Hinc autem ostendi potest quod, volendo se, vult etiam alia. Hence it may be proved that in willing himself he wills other things also. Cuius enim est velle finem principaliter, eius est velle ea quae sunt ad finem ratione finis. Est autem ipse Deus ultimus rerum finis, ut ex praedictis aliquatenus patet. Ex hoc igitur quod vult se esse, etiam alia vult, quae in ipsum sicut in finem ordinantur. For he who wills the end principally wills the means to the end, for the sake of that end. Now God himself is the last end of things, as appears sufficiently from what we have said (ch. 74). Therefore, from the fact that he wills himself to be, he wills also other things that are directed to himself as their end. Item. Unusquisque eius quod est propter ipsum ab ipso volitum et amatum, perfectionem desiderat: quae enim propter se amamus, volumus esse optima, et semper meliorari et multiplicari, quantum possibile est. Ipse autem Deus essentiam suam propter seipsam vult et amat. Non autem secundum se augmentabilis et multiplicabilis est, ut ex supra dictis est manifestum: sed solum multiplicabilis est secundum suam similitudinem, quae a multis participatur. Vult igitur Deus rerum multitudinem ex hoc quod suam essentiam et perfectionem vult et amat. Again. Every thing desires the perfection of that which it wills and loves for its own sake, because whatever we love for its own sake, we wish to be best, and ever to be bettered and multiplied as much as possible. Now God wills and loves his essence for its own sake: and it cannot be increased or multiplied in itself, as appears from what has been said (ch. 42). Also, it can only be multiplied in respect of its likeness which is shared by many (ch. 29). Therefore, God wishes things to be multiplied, because he wills and loves his essence and perfection. Amplius. Quicumque amat aliquid secundum se et propter ipsum, amat per consequens omnia in quibus illud invenitur: ut qui amat dulcedinem propter ipsam, oportet quod omnia dulcia amet. Sed Deus suum esse secundum se et propter ipsum vult et amat, ut supra ostensum est. Omne autem aliud esse est quaedam sui esse secundum similitudinem participatio, ut ex praedictis aliquatenus patet. Relinquitur igitur quod Deus, ex hoc ipso quod vult et amat se, vult et amat alia. Moreover. Whoever loves a thing in itself and for its own sake loves in consequence all the things in which it is found: thus he who loves sweetness for its own sake must love all sweet things. Now God wills and loves his own being, in itself and for its own sake, as we have proved above (ch. 74). And all other being is a participation by likeness of his being, as was made sufficiently clear by what we have said above (ch. 29). Therefore, from the very fact that God wills and loves himself, it follows that he wills and loves other things. Adhuc. Deus, volendo se, vult omnia quae in ipso sunt. Omnia autem quodammodo praeexistunt in ipso per proprias rationes, ut supra ostensum est. Deus igitur, volendo se, etiam alia vult. Again. God, in willing himself, wills all things that are in him. Now all things preexist in him somewhat by their proper types, as we have proved (ch. 54). Therefore, in willing himself, God wills other things. Item. Quanto aliquid est perfectioris virtutis, tanto sua causalitas ad plura se extendit et in magis remotum, ut supra dictum est. Causalitas autem finis in hoc consistit quod propter ipsum alia desiderantur. Quanto igitur finis est perfectior et magis volitus, tanto voluntas volentis finem ad plura extenditur ratione finis illius. Divina autem essentia est perfectissima in ratione bonitatis et finis. Igitur diffundet suam causalitatem maxime ad multa, ut propter ipsam multa sint volita; et praecipue a Deo, qui eam secundum totam suam virtutem perfecte vult. Again. As stated above (ch. 70), the greater a thing’s power, to so many more things, and to the greater distance does its causality extend. Now, the causality of an end consists in other things being desired for its sake. Therefore, the more perfect and the more willed an end is, to so many more things does the will of him who wills that end extend by reason of that end. But the divine essence is most perfect considered under the aspect of goodness and end. Therefore, it will extend its causality most of all to many things, so that many be willed for its sake, especially by God, who wills it perfectly with all his might. Praeterea. Voluntas consequitur intellectum. Sed Deus intellectu suo intelligit se principaliter et in se intelligit alia. Igitur similiter principaliter vult se, et, volendo se, vult omnia alia. Further. Will is consequent upon intellect. Now God, by his intellect, understands himself principally, and other things in himself (ch. 49). Therefore, in like manner he wills himself principally, and in willing himself, he wills all else. Hoc autem auctoritate sacrae Scripturae confirmatur. Dicitur enim Sap. 11:25: diligis enim omnia quae sunt, et nihil eorum odisti quae fecisti. This is confirmed by the authority of Sacred Scripture. For it is written: you love all things that exist, and have loathing for none of the things which you have made (Wis 11:25). Caput 76 Chapter 76 Quod Deus uno actu voluntatis se et alia velit That God, by the one act of his will, wills himself and other things Hoc autem habito, sequitur quod Deus uno actu voluntatis se et alia velit. This being proved, it follows that God, by one act of his will, wills himself and other things. Omnis enim virtus una operatione, vel uno actu, fertur in obiectum et in rationem formalem obiecti: sicut eadem visione videmus lumen et colorem, qui fit visibilis actu per lumen. Cum autem aliquid volumus propter finem tantum, illud quod propter finem desideratur accipit rationem voliti ex fine: et sic finis comparatur ad ipsum sicut ratio formalis ad obiectum, ut lumen ad colorem. Cum igitur Deus omnia alia velit propter se sicut propter finem, ut ostensum est, uno actu voluntatis vult se et alia. For every power tends by one operation or act to its object and the formal aspect of that object, even as by one vision we see light and color (made visible by light). Now, when we will something solely for the sake of an end, that which is desired for the sake of the end takes its aspect of thing willed from the end; thus the end is compared to it as the formal aspect to an object, as light to color. Since, then, God wills all things for his own sake as for the sake of an end, as we have proved (ch. 75), he wills himself and other things by one act of his will. Amplius. Quod perfecte cognoscitur et desideratur, secundum totam suam virtutem cognoscitur et desideratur. Finis autem virtus est non solum secundum quod in se desideratur, sed etiam secundum quod alia fiunt appetibilia propter ipsum. Qui igitur perfecte desiderat finem, utroque modo ipsum desiderat. Sed non est ponere aliquem actum Dei volentis quo velit se et non velit se perfecte: cum in eo nihil sit imperfectum. Quolibet igitur actu quo Deus vult se, vult se absolute et alia propter se. Alia vero a se non vult nisi inquantum vult se, ut probatum est. Relinquitur igitur quod se et alia non alio et alio actu voluntatis vult, sed uno et eodem. Moreover. That which is perfectly known and desired is known and desired with respect to its whole virtue. Now the virtue of an end consists not only in its being desired for its own sake, but also in other things being made desirable for its sake. Therefore, he that desires an end perfectly desires it in both these ways. But it cannot be admitted that God has an act by which he wills himself without willing himself perfectly, since in him there is nothing imperfect (ch. 28). Hence by every act in which God wills himself, he wills himself absolutely, and other things for his own sake. And he does not will things other than himself except because he wills himself, as was proved above (ch. 75). It follows, therefore, that not by distinct acts but by one and the same act he wills himself and other things. Adhuc. Sicut ex supra dictis patet, in actu cognitivae virtutis discursus attenditur secundum quod semotim cognoscimus principia, et ex eis in conclusiones venimus: si enim in ipsis principiis intueremur conclusiones ipsa principia cognoscendo, non esset discursus, sicut nec quando aliquid videmus in speculo. Sicut autem principia se habent ad conclusiones in speculativis, ita fines ad ea quae sunt ad finem in operativis et appetitivis: nam sicut conclusiones cognoscimus per principia, ita ex fine procedit appetitus et operatio eorum quae sunt ad finem. Si igitur aliquis semotim velit finem et ea quae sunt ad finem, erit quidam discursus in eius voluntate. Hunc autem in Deo esse est impossibile: cum sit extra omnem motum. Relinquitur igitur quod simul, et eodem actu voluntatis, Deus vult se et alia. Again. As appears from what has been said (ch. 57), discursion in the act of the cognitive faculty occurs when we know the premises apart from the conclusions, and draw the conclusions from them. For if we were to see the conclusions in the premises themselves, simply through knowing the premises, there would be no discursion, as neither is there when we see something reflected in a mirror. Now just as the premises are related to the conclusions in speculative matters, so are the ends to the means in practical and appetitive matters, because even as we know conclusions through their premises, so does the end lead us to the appetite and practice of the means. Accordingly, if a person will the end and the means separately, there will be discursion in his will. But there can be no such thing in God, since he is outside all movement (ch. 13). Therefore, it follows that God wills himself and other things simultaneously by the one same act of his will. Item. Cum Deus semper velit se, si alio actu vult se et alio alia, sequetur quod est impossibile: nam unius simplicis potentiae non sunt simul duae operationes. Again. Since God always wills himself, if he will himself by one, and other things by another act, it follows that there are two acts of will in him at the same time. But this is impossible, since of one simple power there are not at the one time two operations. Praeterea. In omni actu voluntatis volitum comparatur ad volentem ut movens ad motum. Si igitur sit aliqua actio voluntatis divinae qua vult alia a se, diversa a voluntate qua vult se, in illo erit aliquid aliud movens divinam voluntatem. Quod est impossibile. Further. In every act of the will the thing willed is compared to the will as mover to moved. Therefore, if there be an act of the divine will by which he wills things other than himself, and which is distinct from the act whereby he wills himself, there will be in him something else that moves the divine will, and this is impossible. Amplius. Velle Dei est suum esse, ut probatum est. Sed in Deo non est nisi unum esse. Ergo non est ibi nisi unum velle. Moreover. God’s willing is his being, as we have proved (ch. 73). But in God there is only one being. Therefore, in him there is but one act of the will. Item. Velle competit Deo secundum quod est intelligens. Sicut igitur uno actu intelligit se et alia, inquantum essentia sua est exemplar omnium; ita uno actu vult se et alia, inquantum sua bonitas est ratio omnis bonitatis. Again. It is becoming to God to will inasmuch as he is intelligent (ch. 72). Therefore, just as by one act he understands himself and other things, inasmuch as his essence is the exemplar of all things (ch. 49), so by one act he wills himself and other things, inasmuch as his goodness is the type of all goodness (ch. 40). Caput 77 Chapter 77 Quod volitorum multitudo divinae simplicitati non repugnat That the multitude of things willed is not inconsistent with the divine simplicity Ex hoc autem sequitur quod volitorum multitudo non repugnat unitati et simplicitati divinae substantiae. Hence it follows that the multitude of things willed is not inconsistent with the oneness and simplicity of the divine substance. Nam actus secundum obiecta distinguuntur. Si igitur volita plura quae Deus vult inducerent in ipso aliquam multitudinem, sequeretur quod non esset in eo una tantum operatio voluntatis. Quod est contra praeostensa. For acts are distinguished according to their objects. If, then, the plurality of things willed by God indicated any kind of multitude in him, it would follow that there is not only one operation of the will in him, and this is contrary to what has been proved (ch. 76). Item. Ostensum est quod Deus alia vult inquantum vult bonitatem suam. Hoc igitur modo comparantur aliqua ad voluntatem quo comprehenduntur a bonitate eius. Sed omnia in bonitate eius unum sunt: sunt enim alia in ipso secundum modum eius, scilicet materialia immaterialiter et multa unite, ut ex supra dictis patet. Relinquitur igitur quod multitudo volitorum non multiplicat divinam substantiam. Again. It has been shown (ch. 75) that God wills other things inasmuch as he wills his goodness. Therefore, things stand in relation to his will for as much as they are comprised in his goodness. Now all things are one in his goodness, because other things are in him according to his mode (material things immaterially and multitude unitedly), as we have shown above (ch. 58). Hence it follows that the plurality of things willed does not argue plurality in the divine substance. Praeterea. Divinus intellectus et voluntas sunt aequalis simplicitatis: quia utrumque est divina substantia, ut probatum est. Multitudo autem intellectorum non inducit multitudinem in essentia divina, neque compositionem in intellectu eius. Ergo neque multitudo volitorum inducit aut diversitatem in essentia divina, aut compositionem in eius voluntate. Further. The divine intellect and will are of equal simplicity, since each is the divine substance, as we have proved (ch. 45, 73). Now the multitude of things understood does not involve multiplicity in the divine essence, nor composition in his intellect (ch. 51-58). Neither, therefore, does the multitude of things willed prove either diversity in the divine essence or composition in his will. Amplius. Hoc inter cognitionem et appetitum interest, quod cognitio fit secundum quod cognitum est aliquo modo in cognoscente; appetitus autem non, sed e converso secundum quod appetitus refertur ad rem appetibilem, quam appetens quaerit vel in qua quiescit. Et propter hoc bonum et malum, quae respiciunt appetitum, sunt in rebus; verum autem et falsum, quae respiciunt cognitionem, sunt in mente; ut Philosophus dicit, in VI Metaphysicae. Quod autem aliquid ad multa se habeat, non repugnat simplicitati eius: cum et unitas sit multorum numerorum principium. Multitudo ergo volitorum a Deo non repugnat eius simplicitati. Moreover. The difference between knowledge and appetite is that knowledge results from the thing known being somehow in the knower, whereas appetite does not; on the contrary, it results from the appetite being referred to the appetible thing, which the appetent seeks and wherein it rests. For this reason good and evil, which regard the appetite, are in things, whereas true and false, which regard knowledge, are in the mind, as the Philosopher states in 6 Metaphysics. Now it is not inconsistent with the simplicity of a thing that it be referred to many, since even unity is the principle of the multitude of numbers. Therefore, the multitude of things willed by God is not inconsistent with his simplicity. Caput 78 Chapter 78 Quod divina voluntas ad singula bonorum se extendit That the divine will extends to particular goods Ex quo etiam apparet quod non oportet nos dicere, ad conservandam simplicitatem divinam, quod velit alia bona in quadam universalitate, inquantum vult se esse principium bonorum quae possunt ab ipso fluere, non autem velit ea in particulari. It is also evident from the foregoing that in order to safeguard the divine simplicity we do not have to say that God wills other goods in a kind of universal way, insofar as he wills himself to be the source of the goods which can flow from him, and that he does not will them in particular. Nam velle est secundum comparationem volentis ad rem volitam. Non autem prohibet divina simplicitas quin possit comparari ad multa etiam particularia: dicitur enim Deus optimum vel primum etiam respectu singularium. Ergo sua simplicitas non prohibet quin etiam in speciali vel particulari alia a se velit. For the act of willing is according to a comparison of the willer to the thing willed. Now the divine simplicity does not forbid God’s being compared to many things, even to particulars: for he is said to be best or first even in comparison with singulars. Therefore, his simplicity is not inconsistent with his willing even special or particular things other than himself. Item. Voluntas Dei ad alia comparatur inquantum bonitatem participant ex ordine ad bonitatem divinam, quae est ratio volendi Deo. Sed non solum universitas bonorum, sed et singulum eorum a bonitate divina bonitatem sortitur, sicut et esse. Voluntas igitur Dei ad singula bonorum se extendit. Again. God’s will is compared to other things inasmuch as they partake of his goodness through being ordered to the divine goodness, which is to God the reason of his willing (ch. 75). Now not only the universe of good things, but also each one of them derives its goodness, as also its being, from the goodness of God. Therefore, God’s will extends to each single good. Amplius. Secundum Philosophum, in XI Metaph., duplex bonum ordinis invenitur in universo: unum quidem secundum quod totum universum ordinatur ad id quod est extra universum, sicut exercitus ordinatur ad ducem; aliud secundum quod partes universi ordinantur ad invicem, sicut et partes exercitus. Secundus autem ordo est propter primum. Deus autem, ex hoc quod vult se ut finis est, vult alia quae ordinantur in ipsum ut in finem, sicut probatum est. Vult igitur bonum ordinis totius universi in ipsum, et bonum ordinis universi secundum partes suas ad invicem. Bonum autem ordinis consurgit ex singulis bonis. Vult igitur etiam singula bona. Moreover. According to the Philosopher, in 11 Metaphysics, 10, 1, there is a twofold good of order in the universe: one consisting in the whole universe being directed to that which is outside the universe, just as the army is directed to the general, while the other consists in the parts of the universe being directed to each other, as the parts of an army. The second order is for the sake of the first. Now God, through willing himself as end, wills other things that are directed to him as their end, as we have proved (ch. 75). Therefore, he wills the good of the order of the whole universe in relation to himself, and the order of the universe as regards the mutual relation of its parts. Now the good of order arises from each single good. Therefore, he wills also singular goods. Praeterea. Si Deus non vult singula bona ex quibus constat universum, sequitur quod in universo sit casu ordinis bonum: non est enim possibile quod aliqua pars universi omnia particularia bona componat in ordinem universi, sed sola universalis causa totius universi, quae Deus est, qui per suam voluntatem agit, ut infra ostendetur. Quod autem ordo universi sit casualis, est impossibile: quia sequeretur quod multo magis alia posteriora essent casu. Relinquitur igitur quod Deus etiam singula bonorum vult. Further. If God does not will the singular goods of which the universe consists, it follows that the good of order is in the universe by chance: for it is not possible that some one part of the universe arranges all the particular goods so as to produce the order of the universe. Only the universal cause of the whole universe can do this, which cause is God who acts by his will, as we shall prove further on (bk. II, ch. 23). But it is impossible for the order of the universe to result from chance, since it would follow a fortiori that other things which come afterwards are the result of chance. Therefore, it follows that God wills even each particular good. Adhuc. Bonum intellectum, inquantum huiusmodi, est volitum. Sed Deus intelligit etiam particularia bona, ut supra probatum est. Vult igitur etiam particularia bona. Again. The good understood as such is the object of the will (ch. 72). But God understands also particular goods, as we have proved (ch. 65). Therefore, he also wills particular goods. Hoc autem auctoritate Scripturae confirmatur, quae, Genesis 1, ad singula opera complacentiam divinae voluntatis ostendit, dicens: vidit Deus lucem quod esset bona, et similiter de aliis operibus, et postea de omnibus simul: vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. This is confirmed by the authority of Scripture, which sets forth the pleasure of the divine will in each work, in the words: God saw that the light was good (Gen 1:4), and in like manner as to each work, and afterwards in reference to all the works: God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good (Gen 1:31).