Caput 8 Chapter 8 Qualiter se habeat humana ratio ad veritatem fidei In what relation human reason stands to the truth of faith Considerandum etiam videtur quod res quidem sensibiles, ex quibus humana ratio cognitionis principium sumit, aliquale vestigium in se divinae imitationis retinent, ita tamen imperfectum quod ad declarandam ipsius Dei substantiam omnino insufficiens invenitur. Habent enim effectus suarum causarum suo modo similitudinem, cum agens agat sibi simile: non tamen effectus ad perfectam agentis similitudinem semper pertingit. Humana igitur ratio ad cognoscendum fidei veritatem, quae solum videntibus divinam substantiam potest esse notissima, ita se habet quod ad eam potest aliquas verisimilitudines colligere, quae tamen non sufficiunt ad hoc quod praedicta veritas quasi demonstrative vel per se intellecta comprehendatur. It would also seem well to observe that sensible things, from which human reason derives the source of its knowledge, retain a certain trace of likeness to God, but so imperfect that it proves altogether inadequate to manifest the substance itself of God. For effects resemble their causes according to their own mode, since like action proceeds from like agent; and yet the effect does not always reach to a perfect likeness to the agent. Accordingly, human reason is adapted to the knowledge of the truth of faith (which can be known in the highest degree only by those who see the divine substance) insofar as it is able to put together certain probable arguments in support of it, which nevertheless are insufficient to enable us to understand the aforesaid truth as though it were demonstrated or understood in itself. Utile tamen est ut in huiusmodi rationibus, quantumcumque debilibus, se mens humana exerceat, dummodo desit comprehendendi vel demonstrandi praesumptio: quia de rebus altissimis etiam parva et debili consideratione aliquid posse inspicere iucundissimum est, ut ex dictis apparet. And yet, however weak these arguments may be, it is useful for the human mind to be practiced in them, so long as it does not pride itself on having comprehended or demonstrated, since although our view of the sublimest things is limited and weak, it is most pleasant to be able to catch but a glimpse of them, as appears from what has been said (ch. 5). Cui quidem sententiae auctoritas Hilarii concordat, qui sic dicit in libro de Trin., loquens de huiusmodi veritate: haec credendo incipe, procurre, persiste: etsi non perventurum sciam, gratulabor tamen profecturum. Qui enim pie infinita prosequitur, etsi non contingat aliquando, semper tamen proficiet prodeundo. Sed ne te inferas in illud secretum, et arcano interminabilis nativitatis non te immergas, summam intelligentiae comprehendere praesumens: sed intellige incomprehensibilia esse. The authority of Hilary concords with this, for he says in his book On the Trinity 2, 10-11, while speaking of this same truth: begin by believing these things, advance and persevere, and though I know you will not arrive, I shall rejoice at your advance. For he who devoutly follows in pursuit of the infinite, though he never come up with it, will always advance by setting forth. Yet do not pry into that secret, and do not meddle in the mystery of the birth of the infinite, nor presume to grasp that which is the summit of understanding, but understand that there are things you cannot grasp. Caput 9 Chapter 9 De ordine et modo procedendi in hoc opere Of the order and mode of procedure in this work Ex praemissis igitur evidenter apparet sapientis intentionem circa duplicem veritatem divinorum debere versari, et circa errores contrarios destruendos: ad quarum unam investigatio rationis pertingere potest, alia vero omnem rationis excedit industriam. Dico autem duplicem veritatem divinorum, non ex parte ipsius Dei, qui est una et simplex veritas; sed ex parte cognitionis nostrae, quae ad divina cognoscenda diversimode se habet. Accordingly, from what we have been saying it is evident that the intention of the wise man must be directed to the twofold truth of divine things and to the refutation of contrary errors, and that the reason’s investigation can reach one of these, but the other surpasses every effort of reason. And I speak of a twofold truth of divine things not on the part of God himself, who is truth one and simple, but on the part of our knowledge, which has a variable relation to the knowledge of divine things. Ad primae igitur veritatis manifestationem per rationes demonstrativas, quibus adversarius convinci possit, procedendum est. Sed quia tales rationes ad secundam veritatem haberi non possunt, non debet esse ad hoc intentio ut adversarius rationibus convincatur: sed ut eius rationes, quas contra veritatem habet, solvantur; cum veritati fidei ratio naturalis contraria esse non possit, ut ostensum est. Therefore, in order to deduce the first kind of truth, we must proceed by demonstrative arguments by which we can convince our adversaries. But, since there are no such arguments in support of the second kind of truth, our intention must be not to convince our opponent by our arguments, but to solve the arguments which he brings against the truth, because, as shown above (ch. 7), natural reason cannot be opposed to the truth of faith. Singularis vero modus convincendi adversarium contra huiusmodi veritatem est ex auctoritate Scripturae divinitus confirmata miraculis: quae enim supra rationem humanam sunt, non credimus nisi Deo revelante. In a special way, the opponent of this kind of truth may be convinced by the authority of Scripture confirmed by God with miracles, since we do not believe what is above human reason unless God has revealed it. Sunt tamen ad huiusmodi veritatem manifestandam rationes aliquae verisimiles inducendae, ad fidelium quidem exercitium et solatium, non autem ad adversarios convincendos: quia ipsa rationum insufficientia eos magis in suo errore confirmaret, dum aestimarent nos propter tam debiles rationes veritati fidei consentire. In support, however, of this kind of truth, certain probable arguments must be adduced for the practice and help of the faithful, but not for the conviction of our opponents, because the very insufficiency of these arguments would rather confirm them in their error if they thought that we assented to the truth of faith on account of such weak reasonings. Modo ergo proposito procedere intendentes, primum nitemur ad manifestationem illius veritatis quam fides profitetur et ratio investigat, inducentes rationes demonstrativas et probabiles, quarum quasdam ex libris philosophorum et sanctorum collegimus per quas veritas confirmetur et adversarius convincatur. With the intention, then, of proceeding in the manner laid down, we shall first endeavor to declare that truth which is the object of faith’s confession and of reason’s researches, by adducing arguments both demonstrative and probable, some of which we have gathered from the writings of the philosophers and of holy men, so as to thereby confirm the truth and convince our opponents. Deinde, ut a manifestioribus ad minus manifesta fiat processus, ad illius veritatis manifestationem procedemus quae rationem excedit, solventes rationes adversariorum et rationibus probabilibus et auctoritatibus, quantum Deus dederit, veritatem fidei declarantes. After this, so as to proceed from the more to the less manifest, we shall, with God’s help, proceed to declare that truth which surpasses reason by refuting the arguments of our opponents, and by setting forth the truth of faith by means of probable arguments and authority (bk. IV). Intendentibus igitur nobis per viam rationis prosequi ea quae de Deo ratio humana investigare potest, primo, occurrit consideratio de his quae Deo secundum seipsum conveniunt; secundo, vero, de processu creaturarum ab ipso; tertio, autem, de ordine creaturarum in ipsum sicut in finem. Seeing, then, that we intend by the way of reason to pursue those things about God which human reason is able to investigate, the first object that offers itself to our consideration consists in those things which pertain to God in himself; the second (bk. II) will be the procession of creatures from him; and the third (bk. III) the relation of creatures to him as their end. Inter ea vero quae de Deo secundum seipsum consideranda sunt, praemittendum est, quasi totius operis necessarium fundamentum, consideratio qua demonstratur Deum esse. Quo non habito, omnis consideratio de rebus divinis tollitur. Of those things which we need to consider about God in himself, we must give the first place, as to the necessary foundation of this whole work, to the question of demonstrating that there is a God. If this is not established, the entire consideration of divine things is taken away. Esse Dei God’s existence Caput 10 Chapter 10 De opinione dicentium quod Deum esse demonstrari non potest cum sit per se notum Of the opinion of those who say it cannot be demonstrated that there is a God, since this is self-evident Haec autem consideratio qua quis nititur ad demonstrandum Deum esse, superflua fortasse quibusdam videbitur, qui asserunt quod Deum esse per se notum est, ita quod eius contrarium cogitari non possit, et sic Deum esse demonstrari non potest. Quod quidem videtur ex his. It may seem useless to some to endeavor to show that there is a God: they say that it is self-evident that God is, so that it is impossible to think the contrary, and thus it cannot be demonstrated that there is a God. The reasons for this view are as follow. Illa enim per se esse nota dicuntur quae statim notis terminis cognoscuntur: sicut, cognito quid est totum et quid est pars, statim cognoscitur quod omne totum est maius sua parte. Huiusmodi autem est hoc quod dicimus Deum esse. Nam nomine Dei intelligimus aliquid quo maius cogitari non potest. Hoc autem in intellectu formatur ab eo qui audit et intelligit nomen Dei: ut sic saltem in intellectu iam Deum esse oporteat. Nec potest in intellectu solum esse: nam quod in intellectu et re est, maius est eo quod in solo intellectu est; Deo autem nihil esse maius ipsa nominis ratio demonstrat. Unde restat quod Deum esse per se notum est, quasi ex ipsa significatione nominis manifestum. Those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known; thus, as soon as it is known what is a whole, and what is a part, it is known that the whole is greater than its part. Now such is the statement ‘God is’. For by this word ‘God’ we understand a thing than which a greater cannot be thought of. This is what a man conceives in his mind when he hears and understands this word ‘God’: so that God must already be at least in his mind. Nor can he be in the mind alone, for that which is both in the mind and in reality is greater than that which is in the mind only. And the very signification of the word shows that nothing is greater than God. Therefore, it follows that God’s existence is self-evident, since it is made clear from the very signification of the word. Item. Cogitari quidem potest quod aliquid sit quod non possit cogitari non esse. Quod maius est evidenter eo quod potest cogitari non esse. Sic ergo Deo aliquid maius cogitari posset, si ipse posset cogitari non esse. Quod est contra rationem nominis. Relinquitur quod Deum esse per se notum est. Again. It is possible to think that there is a thing which cannot be thought not to exist, and such a thing is evidently greater than that which can be thought not to exist. Therefore, if God can be thought not to exist, it follows that something can be thought greater than God, and this is contrary to the signification of the term. Therefore, it remains that God’s existence is self-evident. Adhuc. Propositiones illas oportet esse notissimas in quibus idem de seipso praedicatur, ut, homo est homo; vel quarum praedicata in definitionibus subiectorum includuntur, ut, homo est animal. In Deo autem hoc prae aliis invenitur, ut infra ostendetur, quod suum esse est sua essentia, ac si idem sit quod respondetur ad quaestionem quid est, et ad quaestionem an est. Sic ergo cum dicitur, Deus est, praedicatum vel est idem subiecto, vel saltem in definitione subiecti includitur. Et ita Deum esse per se notum erit. Further. Those propositions are most evident in which the selfsame thing is predicated of itself, such as: ‘man is man’; or in which the predicate is included in the definition of the subject, for instance: ‘man is an animal.’ Now, as we shall show further on (ch. 22), in God alone do we find that his being is his essence: so that the answer is the same to the question, ‘What is he?’ as to the question, ‘Is he?’ Accordingly, when we say, ‘God is,’ the predicate is either identified with the subject, or at least is included in the definition of the subject. And thus it will be self-evident that God is. Amplius. Quae naturaliter sunt nota, per se cognoscuntur: non enim ad ea cognoscenda inquisitionis studio pervenitur. At Deum esse naturaliter notum est: cum in Deum naturaliter desiderium hominis tendat sicut in ultimum finem, ut infra patebit. Est igitur per se notum Deum esse. Moreover. Things that are known naturally are self-evident, for it is not by a process of research that they become evident. Now it is naturally known that God is, since man’s desire tends naturally to God as his last end, as we shall show further on (bk. III, ch. 25). Therefore, it is self-evident that God is. Item. Illud per se notum oportet esse quo omnia alia cognoscuntur. Deus autem huiusmodi est. Sicut enim lux solis principium est omnis visibilis perceptionis, ita divina lux omnis intelligibilis cognitionis principium est: cum sit in quo primum maxime lumen intelligibile invenitur. Oportet igitur quod Deum esse per se notum sit. Again. That by which all things are known must be self-evident. Now God is such. For just as the light of the sun is the principle of all visual perception, so the divine light is the principle of all intellectual knowledge, because it is in it that the first and greatest intellectual light is found. Therefore, it must be self-evident that God is. Ex his igitur et similibus aliqui opinantur Deum esse sic per se notum existere ut contrarium mente cogitari non possit. On account of these and similar arguments some are of the opinion that God’s existence is so self-evident that the mind cannot think the contrary. Caput 11 Chapter 11 Reprobatio praemissae opinionis et solutio rationum praemissarum Refutation of the foregoing opinion and solution of the aforesaid arguments Praedicta autem opinio provenit. Partim quidem ex consuetudine qua ex principio assueti sunt nomen Dei audire et invocare. Consuetudo autem, et praecipue quae est a puero, vim naturae obtinet: ex quo contingit ut ea quibus a pueritia animus imbuitur, ita firmiter teneat ac si essent naturaliter et per se nota. The foregoing opinion arose from their being accustomed from the beginning to hear and call upon the name of God. Now custom, especially if it dates from our childhood, acquires the force of nature, from which it happens that the mind holds those things with which it was imbued from childhood as firmly as though they were self-evident. Partim vero contingit ex eo quod non distinguitur quod est notum per se simpliciter, et quod est quoad nos per se notum. Nam simpliciter quidem Deum esse per se notum est: cum hoc ipsum quod Deus est, sit suum esse. Sed quia hoc ipsum quod Deus est mente concipere non possumus, remanet ignotum quoad nos. Sicut omne totum sua parte maius esse, per se notum est simpliciter: ei autem qui rationem totius mente non conciperet, oporteret esse ignotum. Et sic fit ut ad ea quae sunt notissima rerum, noster intellectus se habeat ut oculus noctuae ad solem, ut II Metaphys. dicitur. It is also a result of failing to distinguish between what is self-evident simply, and that which is self-evident to us. For it is simply self-evident that God is, because God’s essence is his existence. But since we are unable to conceive mentally what God is, it remains unknown in regard to us. Thus it is self-evident simply that every whole is greater than its part, but to one who fails to conceive mentally the meaning of a whole, it must be unknown. And so it happens that those things which are most evident of all are to the intellect what the sun is to the eye of an owl, as stated in 2 Metaphysics 1, 2. Nec oportet ut statim, cognita huius nominis Deus significatione, Deum esse sit notum, ut prima ratio intendebat. Primo quidem, quia non omnibus notum est, etiam concedentibus Deum esse, quod Deus sit id quo maius cogitari non possit: cum multi antiquorum mundum istum dixerint Deum esse. Nec etiam ex interpretationibus huius nominis Deus, quas Damascenus ponit, aliquid huiusmodi intelligi datur. Deinde quia, dato quod ab omnibus per hoc nomen Deus intelligatur aliquid quo maius cogitari non possit, non necesse erit aliquid esse quo maius cogitari non potest in rerum natura. Eodem enim modo necesse est poni rem, et nominis rationem. Nor does it follow, as the first argument alleged, that as soon as the meaning of the word ‘God’ is understood, it is known that God is. First, because it is not known to all, even to those who grant that there is a God, that God is that thing than which no greater can be thought of, since many of the ancients asserted that this world is God. Nor can any such conclusion be gathered from the significations which Damascene assigns to this word ‘God’ (On the Orthodox Faith 1, 9). Second, even granted that everyone understands this word ‘God’ to signify something than which a greater cannot be thought of, it does not follow that something than which a greater cannot be thought of exists in reality. For we must allege a thing in the same way as we allege the signification of its name. Ex hoc autem quod mente concipitur quod profertur hoc nomine Deus, non sequitur Deum esse nisi in intellectu. Unde nec oportebit id quo maius cogitari non potest esse nisi in intellectu. Et ex hoc non sequitur quod sit aliquid in rerum natura quo maius cogitari non possit. Et sic nihil inconveniens accidit ponentibus Deum non esse: non enim inconveniens est quolibet dato vel in re vel in intellectu aliquid maius cogitari posse, nisi ei qui concedit esse aliquid quo maius cogitari non possit in rerum natura. Now from the fact that we conceive mentally that which the word ‘God’ is intended to convey, it does not follow that God is otherwise than in the mind. Therefore, neither will it follow that the thing than which a greater cannot be thought of is otherwise than in the mind. And thence it does not follow that there exists in reality something than which a greater cannot be thought of. Hence this is no argument against those who assert that there is no God, since there is nothing to prevent a person from thinking of something greater than whatever is granted to exist either in reality or in the mind, unless he grants that there is in reality something than which a greater cannot be thought of. Nec etiam oportet, ut secunda ratio proponebat, Deo posse aliquid maius cogitari si potest cogitari non esse. Nam quod possit cogitari non esse, non ex imperfectione sui esse est vel incertitudine, cum suum esse sit secundum se manifestissimum: sed ex debilitate nostri intellectus, qui eum intueri non potest per seipsum, sed ex effectibus eius, et sic ad cognoscendum ipsum esse ratiocinando perducitur. Nor does it follow, as the second argument pretended, that if it is possible to think that God is not, it is possible to think of something greater than God. For the possibility of thinking that he does not exist is not on account of the imperfection of his being, or the uncertainty of it—since in itself his being is supremely manifest—but is the result of the weakness of our mind, which is able to see him only in his effects and not in himself, so that it is led by reasoning to know that he is. Ex quo etiam tertia ratio solvitur. Nam sicut nobis per se notum est quod totum sua parte sit maius, sic videntibus ipsam divinam essentiam per se notissimum est Deum esse, ex hoc quod sua essentia est suum esse. Sed quia eius essentiam videre non possumus, ad eius esse cognoscendum non per seipsum, sed per eius effectus pervenimus. From this the third argument is also solved. For just as it is self-evident to us that a whole is greater than its part, so is it most evident to those who see the very essence of God that God exists, since his essence is his existence. But because we are unable to see his essence, we come to know his existence not in himself, but in his effects. Ad quartam etiam patet solutio. Sic enim homo naturaliter Deum cognoscit sicut naturaliter ipsum desiderat. Desiderat autem ipsum homo naturaliter inquantum desiderat naturaliter beatitudinem, quae est quaedam similitudo divinae bonitatis. Sic igitur non oportet quod Deus ipse in se consideratus sit naturaliter notus homini, sed similitudo ipsius. Unde oportet quod per eius similitudines in effectibus repertas in cognitionem ipsius homo ratiocinando perveniat. The solution to the fourth argument is also clear. For man knows God naturally in the same way as he desires him naturally. Now man desires him naturally insofar as he naturally desires happiness, which is a likeness of the divine goodness. Hence it does not follow that God considered in himself is naturally known to man, but that his likeness is. Therefore, man must come by reasoning to know God in the likenesses to him which he discovers in God’s effects. Ad quintam etiam de facili patet solutio. Nam Deus est quidem quo omnia cognoscuntur, non ita quod alia non cognoscantur nisi eo cognito, sicut in principiis per se notis accidit: sed quia per eius influentiam omnis causatur in nobis cognitio. It is also easy to reply to the fifth argument. For God is that in which all things are known, not so that other things are unknown unless he is known, as happens in self-evident principles, but because all knowledge is caused in us by his outpouring. Caput 12 Chapter 12