Est enim aliorum ut ordinatorum ad finem suae bonitatis. Voluntas autem non ex necessitate fertur in ea quae sunt ad finem, si finis sine his esse possit: non enim habet necesse medicus, ex suppositione voluntatis quam habet de sanando, illa medicamenta adhibere infirmo sine quibus nihilominus potest infirmum sanare. Cum igitur divina bonitas sine aliis esse possit, quinimmo nec per alia ei aliquid accrescat; nulla inest ei necessitas ut alia velit ex hoc quod vult suam bonitatem. For he wills other things as ordered to the end, which is his goodness (ch. 75). Now the will is not necessarily directed to the means, if the end is possible without them: for the physician, supposing him to have the will to heal, has no need to prescribe to the patient those remedies without which he can heal the patient. Since, then, God’s goodness can be without other things, (nay more, since nothing accrues to it from other things), he is under no necessity to will other things through willing his own goodness. Adhuc. Cum bonum intellectum sit proprium obiectum voluntatis, cuiuslibet per intellectum concepti potest esse voluntas ubi salvatur ratio boni. Unde, quamvis esse cuiuslibet, inquantum huiusmodi, bonum sit, non esse autem malum; ipsum tamen non esse alicuius potest cadere sub voluntate ratione alicuius boni adiuncti quod salvatur, licet non ex necessitate: est enim bonum aliquid esse, etiam alio non existente. Solum igitur illud bonum voluntas, secundum sui rationem, non potest velle non esse, quo non existente tollitur totaliter ratio boni. Tale autem nullum est praeter Deum. Potest igitur voluntas, secundum sui rationem, velle non esse quamcumque rem praeter Deum. Sed in Deo est voluntas secundum totam suam facultatem: omnia enim in ipso sunt universaliter perfecta. Potest igitur Deus velle non esse quamcumque rem aliam praeter se. Non igitur de necessitate vult esse alia a se. Again. Since the good understood is the proper object of the will, any concept of the intellect, provided it retains an aspect of goodness, can be an object of the will. Therefore, although the being of a thing as such is good, and its non-being an evil, the non-being of a thing can be an object of the will by reason of some connected good which is retained, alhough not of necessity, because it is good for a thing to be, even though another be nonexistent. Hence the will, according to its nature, is unable to will not to be only that good without the existence of which the aspect of good is wholly done away. Now such a good is God alone. Therefore, the will, according to its nature, is able to will the non-being of anything whatever except God. Now will is in God according to its full capacity, since all things in him are in every way perfect (ch. 28). Hence God can will the non-being of anything whatever except himself. Therefore, he does not necessarily will things other than himself. Amplius. Deus, volendo bonitatem suam, vult esse alia a se prout bonitatem eius participant. Cum autem divina bonitas sit infinita, est infinitis modis participabilis, et aliis modis quam ab his creaturis quae nunc sunt participetur. Si igitur, ex hoc quod vult bonitatem suam, vellet de necessitate ea quae ipsam participant, sequeretur quod vellet esse infinitas creaturas, infinitis modis participantes suam bonitatem. Quod patet esse falsum: quia, si vellet, essent; cum sua voluntas sit principium essendi rebus, ut infra ostendetur. Non igitur ex necessitate vult etiam ea quae nunc sunt. Moreover. God, by willing his own goodness, wills other things to be, inasmuch as they partake of his goodness (ch. 75). Now, since God’s goodness is infinite, it can be participated in an infinite number of ways, and in other ways besides those in which it is participated by those creatures which now are. If, then, through willing his own goodness, he willed of necessity the things which participate it, it would follow that he wills an infinite number of creatures partaking of his goodness in an infinite number of ways. But this is clearly false: for if he willed it, they would exist, since his will is the source of being to things, as we shall prove further on (bk. II, ch. 23). Therefore, he does not necessarily also will those things that are not. Item. Sapientis voluntas, ex hoc quod est de causa, est de effectu qui ex causa de necessitate sequitur: stultum enim esset velle solem existere super terram, et non esse diei claritatem. Sed effectum qui non ex necessitate sequitur ex causa, non est necesse aliquem velle ex hoc quod vult causam. A Deo autem procedunt alia non ex necessitate, ut infra ostendetur. Non igitur necesse est quod Deus alia velit ex hoc quod vult se. Again. A wise man, through willing the cause, wills the effect which follows necessarily from the cause: for it would be foolish to will that the sun exist above the earth, and that there be no brightness of day. On the contrary, it is not necessary for one through willing the cause to will an effect which does not follow of necessity from the cause. Now other things proceed from God not necessarily, as we shall show further on (bk. II, ch. 23). Therefore, it is not necessary that God will other things through willing himself. Amplius. Res procedunt a Deo sicut artificiata ab artifice, ut infra ostendetur. Sed artifex, quamvis velit se habere artem, non tamen ex necessitate vult artificiata producere. Ergo nec Deus ex necessitate vult alia a se esse. Moreover. Things proceed from God as products of art from a craftsman, as we shall show further on (bk. II, ch. 24). Now the craftsman, though he will himself to have his art, does not necessarily will to produce his work. Therefore, neither does God necessarily will things other than himself. Est ergo considerandum quare Deus alia a se ex necessitate sciat, non autem ex necessitate velit: cum tamen, ex hoc quod intelligit et vult se, intelligat et velit alia. Huius autem ratio est: quod enim intelligens intelligat aliquid, est ex hoc quod intelligens se habet quodam modo; prout ex hoc aliquid actu intelligitur quod est eius similitudo in intelligente. Sed quod volens aliquid velit, ex hoc est quod volitum aliquo modo se habet: volumus enim aliquid vel quia finis est, vel quia ad finem ordinatur. Esse autem omnia in Deo, ut in eo intelligi possent, ex necessitate requirit divina perfectio: non autem divina bonitas ex necessitate requirit alia esse, quae in ipsam ordinantur ut in finem. Et ob hoc necesse est Deum alia scire, non autem velle. Unde nec omnia vult quae ad bonitatem ipsius ordinem habere possent: omnia autem scit quae ad essentiam eius, per quam intelligit, qualemcumque ordinem habent. We must accordingly consider why it is that God knows of necessity other things than himself, whereas he wills them not of necessity; and yet through understanding and willing himself, he understands and wills other things (ch. 49, 75). The reason a person understands something is that he is conditioned in a certain way, insofar as a thing is actually understood through its likeness being in the person who understands it. But that the willer wills something is due to the thing willed being conditioned in some way, since we will a thing either because it is an end, or because it is directed to an end. Now the divine perfection necessarily requires that all things should be in God in order that they may be understood in him (ch. 50), while the divine goodness does not necessarily demand that the other things which are directed to it as their end should exist. For this reason it is necessary that God should know, but not will, other things. Therefore, neither does he will all things that can possibly be directed to his goodness, although he knows all that can in any way be directed to his essence, by which he understands. Caput 82 Chapter 82 Rationes ducentes ad inconveniens si Deus alia a se non necessario velit Objections against the statement that God wills not of necessity things other than himself Videntur tamen sequi inconvenientia si Deus ea quae vult non ex necessitate velit. Nevertheless, it would seem to lead to impossibilities if God does not necessarily will the things that he wills. Si enim Dei voluntas respectu aliquorum volitorum non determinetur quantum ad illa, videtur se ad utrumlibet habere. Omnis autem virtus quae est ad utrumlibet est quodammodo in potentia: nam ad utrumlibet species est possibilis contingentis. Erit igitur Dei voluntas in potentia. Non igitur erit Dei substantia, in qua nulla est potentia, ut supra ostensum est. For if God’s will is not determined in respect of certain things that he wills, it would seem that he is indifferent. Now every power that is indifferent is somewhat in potency, since the indifferent is a species of possible contingency. Therefore, God’s will would be in potency: consequently, it would not be God’s substance, in which there is no potency, as we have shown above (ch. 16). Adhuc. Si ens in potentia, inquantum huiusmodi, natum est moveri, quia quod potest esse potest non esse; sequitur ulterius divinam voluntatem esse variabilem. Again. If a potential being as such is naturally changeable, since what is possible to be, is possible to not-be, it follows also that the divine will is changeable. Praeterea. Si naturale est Deo aliquid circa causata sua velle, necessarium est. Innaturale autem nihil in ipso esse potest: non enim in ipso potest esse aliquid per accidens neque violentum, ut supra ostensum est. Further. If it is natural for God to will something concerning his effects, it is necessary. Now nothing can be in him that is not natural to him, for nothing accidental or violent can be in him, as we have proved above (ch. 19). Item. Si quod est ad utrumlibet indifferenter se habens non magis in unum quam in aliud tendit nisi ab alio determinetur, oportet quod Deus vel nihil eorum velit ad quae ad utrumlibet se habet, cuius contrarium supra ostensum est; vel quod ab alio determinetur ad unum. Et sic erit aliquid eo prius, quod ipsum determinet ad unum. Again. If that which is indifferent to either of two alternatives does not tend to the one rather than to the other unless it be determined by something else, it follows that either God wills none of the things to which he is indifferent—the contrary of which has been proved above (ch. 75)—or else he is determined to one alternative by something else. And thus something will be before him that determines him to one thing. Horum autem nullum necesse est sequi. Ad utrumlibet enim esse alicui virtuti potest convenire dupliciter: uno modo, ex parte sui; alio modo, ex parte eius ad quod dicitur. Now none of these consequences follow of necessity. For indifference may befit a power in two ways: first, on the part of the power itself; second, in respect of that to which it is said to be indifferent. Ex parte quidem sui, quando nondum consecuta est suam perfectionem, per quam ad unum determinetur. Unde hoc in imperfectionem virtutis redundat, et ostenditur esse potentialitas in ipsa: sicut patet in intellectu dubitantis, qui nondum assecutus est principia ex quibus ad alterum determinetur. On the part of the power itself, when it has not yet reached its perfection whereby it is determined to one thing. Hence this argues imperfection in the power, and potency is proved to be in it, as may be seen in the intellect of one who doubts, for it has not yet acquired the principles by which it may be determined to one alternative. Ex parte autem eius ad quod dicitur, invenitur aliqua virtus ad utrumlibet esse quando perfecta operatio virtutis a neutro dependet, sed tamen utrumque esse potest: sicut ars, quae diversis instrumentis uti potest ad idem opus aequaliter perficiendum. Hoc autem ad imperfectionem virtutis non pertinet, sed magis ad eius eminentiam: inquantum utrumlibet oppositorum excedit, et ob hoc determinatur ad neutrum, se ad utrumlibet habens. Sic autem est in divina voluntate respectu aliorum a se: nam finis eius a nullo aliorum dependet, cum tamen ipsa fini suo perfectissime sit unita. Non igitur oportet potentialitatem aliquam in divina voluntate poni. On the part of the thing to which it is said to be indifferent, a power is found to be indifferent to either alternative, when the perfect operation of the power depends on neither, and yet either is possible, even as an art which can use various instruments that are equally adapted to perfect its work. Now this does not argue imperfection in the power; rather, does it pertain to its perfection, inasmuch as it transcends both alternatives, and for this reason is determined to neither, being indifferent to both. It is thus with God’s will in regard to other things than himself, since its end depends on none of these other things, whereas it is most perfectly united to its end. Therefore, it does not follow that there must be potency in the divine will. Similiter autem nec mutabilitatem. Si enim in divina voluntate nulla est potentialitas, non sic absque necessitate alterum oppositorum praeaccipit circa sua causata quasi consideretur in potentia ad utrumque, ut primo sit volens potentia utrumque et postmodum volens actu, sed semper est volens actu quicquid vult, non solum circa se sed etiam circa causata: sed quia volitum non habet necessarium ordinem ad divinam bonitatem, quae est proprium obiectum divinae voluntatis; per modum quo non necessaria, sed possibilia enuntiabilia dicimus quando non est necessarius ordo praedicati ad subiectum. Unde cum dicitur, Deus vult hoc causatum, manifestum est esse enuntiabile non necessarium, sed possibile, illo modo quo non dicitur aliquid possibile secundum aliquam potentiam, sed quod non necesse est esse nec impossibile est esse, ut Philosophus tradit in V Metaph.: sicut triangulum habere duo latera aequalia est enuntiabile possibile, non tamen secundum aliquam potentiam, cum in mathematicis non sit potentia neque motus. Exclusio igitur necessitatis praedictae immutabilitatem divinae voluntatis non tollit. Quam Scriptura sacra profitetur, I Reg. 15:29: triumphator in Israel poenitudine non flectetur. Likewise, neither does it follow that there is changeableness. For if there is no potency in God’s will, the reason why he does not of necessity give preference to the one alternative in his effects is not because he is considered to be indifferent to either alternative, so as to be at first potentially willing either, and afterwards willing actually (whereas he is always actually willing whatsoever he wills, with regard not only to himself but also his effects). But it is because the thing willed is not necessarily related to the divine goodness, which is the proper object of the divine will, in the same way in which we say that an enunciation is not necessary but possible where the predicate is not necessarily related to the subject. Hence when we say: ‘God wills this effect,’ this statement is clearly not necessary but possible, in the same way as a thing is said to be possible not in reference to a potency, but because it is neither necessary nor impossible for it to be, as the Philosopher teaches in 6 Metaphysics. Thus the statement that a triangle has two equal sides is possible, yet not in reference to a potency, since in mathematics there is neither potency nor movement. Therefore, the exclusion of the aforesaid necessity does not remove the unchangeableness of the divine will, to which Sacred Scripture bears witness: the triumpher in Israel will not be moved to repentance (1 Sam 15:29). Quamvis autem divina voluntas ad sua causata non determinetur, non tamen oportet dicere quod nihil eorum velit, aut quod ad volendum ab aliquo exteriori determinetur. Cum enim bonum apprehensum voluntatem sicut proprium obiectum determinet; intellectus autem divinus non sit extraneus ab eius voluntate, cum utrumque sit sua essentia; si voluntas Dei ad aliquid volendum per sui intellectus cognitionem determinetur, non erit determinatio voluntatis divinae per aliquid extraneum facta. Intellectus enim divinus apprehendit non solum divinum esse, quod est bonitas eius, sed etiam alia bona, ut supra ostensum est. Quae quidem apprehendit ut similitudines quasdam divinae bonitatis et essentiae, non ut eius principia. Et sic voluntas divina in illa tendit ut suae bonitati convenientia, non ut ad suam bonitatem necessaria. Sic autem et in nostra voluntate accidit: quod, cum ad aliquid inclinatur quasi necessarium simpliciter ad finem, quadam necessitate movetur in illud; cum autem tendit in aliquid solum propter convenientiam quandam, non necessario in illud tendit. Unde nec divina voluntas tendit in sua causata necessario. Yet although God’s will is not determined to its effects, it does not follow that he wills none of them, or that he is determined by something outside to will them. For, since the apprehended good determines the will as the latter’s proper object, while God’s intellect is not outside his will, because each is his essence; if God’s will is determined by the will of his intellect to will something, the determination of the divine will is not effected by something outside. For the divine intellect apprehends not only the divine being which is his goodness, but also other goods, as we proved above (ch. 49). And it apprehends these as likenesses of the divine goodness, not as principles of them. Therefore, the divine will tends to them as according with his goodness, not as necessary to it. It is the same with our will, because when it tends to something as simply necessary to an end, it is moved by a kind of necessity towards it, but when it tends to something merely on account of some fittingness, it does not tend thereto of necessity. Therefore, neither does the divine will tend necessarily to its effects. Non etiam oportet propter praemissa innaturale aliquid in Deo ponere. Voluntas namque sua uno et eodem actu vult se et alia: sed habitudo eius ad se est necessaria et naturalis; habitudo autem eius ad alia est secundum convenientiam quandam, non quidem necessaria et naturalis, neque violenta aut innaturalis, sed voluntaria; quod enim voluntarium est, neque naturale neque violentum necesse est esse. Nor does it follow on account of what has been said that we must admit the existence in God of something not natural. For his will, by the one and same act, wills himself and other things. Now his relation to himself is necessary and natural; whereas his relation to other things is by way of a kind of fittingness, not necessary and natural, nor violent and unnatural, but voluntary, since what is voluntary must be neither natural nor violent. Caput 83 Chapter 83 Quod Deus vult aliquid aliud a se necessitate suppositionis That God wills something other than himself by a necessity of supposition Ex his autem haberi potest quod, licet Deus circa causata nihil necessario velit absolute, vult tamen aliquid necessario ex suppositione. We may conclude from the foregoing that, although God wills none of his effects of absolute necessity, he wills something necessarily by supposition. Ostensum enim est divinam voluntatem immutabilem esse. In quolibet autem immutabili, si semel est aliquid, non potest postmodum non esse: hoc enim moveri dicimus quod aliter se habet nunc et prius. Si igitur divina voluntas est immutabilis, posito quod aliquid velit, necesse est ex suppositione eum hoc velle. For it has been proved (ch. 82) that the divine will is unchangeable. Now that which is once in an unchangeable thing cannot afterwards not be therein, since we say that a thing is changed when its condition is different now to what it was before. Therefore, if God’s will is unchangeable, supposing that he will something, it is necessary by supposition that he will it. Item. Omne aeternum est necessarium. Deum autem velle aliquid causatum esse est aeternum: sicut enim esse suum, ita et velle aeternitate mensuratur. Est ergo necessarium. Sed non absolute consideratum: quia voluntas Dei non habet necessariam habitudinem ad hoc volitum. Ergo est necessarium ex suppositione. Again. Everything eternal is necessary. Now that God will some particular effect to exist is eternal: for his willing, like his being, is measured by eternity (ch. 73). Therefore, it is necessary. Not, however, if we consider it absolutely, because God’s will does not have a necessary relation to this particular thing willed. Therefore, it is necessary by supposition (ch. 82). Praeterea. Quicquid Deus potuit, potest: virtus enim eius non minuitur, sicut nec eius essentia. Sed non potest nunc non velle quod ponitur voluisse: quia non potest mutari sua voluntas. Ergo nunquam potuit non velle quicquid voluit. Est ergo necessarium ex suppositione eum voluisse quicquid voluit, sicut et velle: neutrum autem necessarium absolute, sed possibile modo praedicto. Further. Whatever God could do, he can do, for his power is not diminished, as neither is his essence. But he cannot now not will what he is supposed to have willed, since his will is unchangeable. Therefore, he never could not will whatever he has willed. Therefore, it is necessary by supposition that he willed, as also that he wills whatever he willed: neither, however, is necessary absolutely, but possible in the aforesaid manner (ch. 82). Amplius. Quicumque vult aliquid, necessario vult ea quae necessario requiruntur ad illud, nisi sit ex parte eius defectus, vel propter ignorantiam, vel quia a recta electione eius quod est ad finem intentum abducatur per aliquam passionem. Quae de Deo dici non possunt. Si igitur Deus, volendo se, vult aliquid aliud a se, necessarium est eum velle omne illud quod ad volitum ab eo ex necessitate requiritur: sicut necessarium est Deum velle animam rationalem esse, supposito quod velit hominem esse. Moreover. Whosoever wills a thing, necessarily wills those things which are necessarily requisite to that thing, unless there be a defect on his part, either through ignorance, or because he is led astray from the right choice of means to the end in view, by some passion. But these things cannot be said of God. Therefore, if God, in willing himself, wills something other than himself, it is necessary for him to will all that is necessarily required for what is willed by him. Even so is it necessary for God to will that there be a rational soul, supposing that he wills a man to be. Caput 84 Chapter 84 Quod voluntas Dei non est impossibilium secundum se That God’s will is not of things impossible in themselves Ex hoc apparet quod voluntas Dei non potest esse eorum quae sunt secundum se impossibilia. Hence it is clear that God’s will cannot be of things that are impossible in themselves. Huiusmodi enim sunt quae in seipsis repugnantiam habent: ut hominem esse asinum, in quo includitur rationale esse irrationale. Quod autem repugnat alicui, excludit aliquid eorum quae ad ipsum requiruntur: sicut esse asinum excludit hominis rationem. Si igitur necessario vult ea quae requiruntur ad hoc quod supponitur velle, impossibile est eum velle ea quae eis repugnant. Et sic impossibile est eum velle ea quae sunt impossibilia simpliciter. For the like are those which imply a contradiction in themselves (for instance, that a man be an ass, which implies that rational is irrational). Now that which is incompatible with a thing excludes some of those things which are required for that thing (for instance, to be an ass excludes man’s reason). If, then, he wills necessarily the things that are required for those he is supposed to will, it is impossible that he will those that are incompatible with them. Hence it is impossible for him to will things that are simply impossible. Item. Sicut supra ostensum est, Deus, volendo suum esse, quod est sua bonitas, vult omnia alia inquantum habent eius similitudinem. Secundum hoc autem quod aliquid repugnat rationi entis inquantum huiusmodi, non potest in eo salvari similitudo primi esse, scilicet divini, quod est fons essendi. Non potest igitur Deus velle aliquid quod repugnat rationi entis inquantum huiusmodi. Sicut autem rationi hominis inquantum est homo repugnat esse irrationale, ita rationi entis inquantum huiusmodi repugnat quod aliquid sit simul ens et non ens. Non potest igitur Deus velle quod affirmatio et negatio sint simul verae. Hoc autem includitur in omni per se impossibili, quod ad seipsum repugnantiam habet inquantum contradictionem implicat. Voluntas igitur Dei non potest esse per se impossibilium. Again. As was proved above (ch. 75), God, by willing his own being, which is his own goodness, wills all things as bearing a likeness to him. Now insofar as a thing is incompatible with the notion of being as such, it cannot retain a likeness to the first, that is, the divine being, which is the source of being. Therefore, God cannot will that which is incompatible with the notion of being as such. Now just as irrationality is incompatible with the notion of man as such, so is it incompatible with the notion of being as such, that anything be at the same time a being and a non-being. Hence God cannot will affirmation and negation to be true at the same time. Yet this is implied in everything which is in itself impossible, that it is incompatible with itself, inasmuch as it implies a contradiction. Therefore, God’s will cannot be of things impossible in themselves. Amplius. Voluntas non est nisi alicuius boni intellecti. Illud igitur quod non cadit in intellectum, non potest cadere in voluntatem. Sed ea quae sunt secundum se impossibilia non cadunt in intellectum, cum sibi ipsis repugnent: nisi forte per errorem non intelligentis rerum proprietatem, quod de Deo dici non potest. In divinam igitur voluntatem non possunt cadere quae secundum se sunt impossibilia. Moreover. The will is only of some understood good. Therefore, that which is not an object of the intellect cannot be an object of the will. Now things in themselves impossible are not an object of understanding, since they imply a contradiction, except perhaps through an error of one who understands not the property of things, and this cannot be said of God. Therefore, things in themselves impossible cannot be an object of God’s will. Adhuc. Secundum quod unumquodque se habet ad esse, ita se habet ad bonitatem. Sed impossibilia sunt quae non possunt esse. Ergo non possunt esse bona. Ergo nec volita a Deo, qui non vult nisi ea quae sunt vel possunt esse bona. Further. According as a thing is related to being, so is it related to goodness. But impossibles are things that cannot be. Therefore, they cannot be good. Neither, therefore, can they be willed by God, who wills only the things that are or can be good. Caput 85 Chapter 85 Quod divina voluntas non tollit contingentiam a rebus, neque eis necessitatem absolutam imponit That the divine will does not remove contingency from things nor impose absolute necessity on them Ex praedictis autem haberi potest quod divina voluntas contingentiam non tollit, nec necessitatem absolutam rebus imponit. From what has been said we may gather that the divine will does not exclude contingency, nor impose absolute necessity on things.