Caput 88 Chapter 88 Quod in Deo est liberum arbitrium That in God there is free will Ex praedictis autem ostendi potest quod in Deo liberum arbitrium invenitur. It is possible to conclude from the foregoing that free will is to be found in God. Nam liberum arbitrium dicitur respectu eorum quae non necessitate quis vult, sed propria sponte: unde in nobis est liberum arbitrium respectu eius quod volumus currere vel ambulare. Deus autem alia a se non ex necessitate vult, ut supra ostensum est. Deo igitur liberum arbitrium habere competit. For free will is applied to those things that one wills not of necessity but of one’s own accord: thus in us there is free will in regard to our wishing to run or walk. Now God wills not of necessity things other than himself, as we have shown above. Therefore, it is fitting that God should have free will. Adhuc. Voluntas divina in his ad quae secundum suam naturam non determinatur, inclinatur quodammodo per suum intellectum, ut supra ostensum est. Sed ex hoc homo dicitur prae ceteris animalibus liberum arbitrium habere quod ad volendum iudicio rationis inclinatur, non impetu naturae sicut bruta. Ergo in Deo est liberum arbitrium. Again. The divine will, in those things to which it is not determined by its nature, is inclined in a way by the intellect, as we have shown above. Now man to the exclusion of other animals is said to have free will, because he is inclined to will by the judgment of his reason, and not by natural impulse as brute animals are. Therefore, there is free will in God. Item. Secundum Philosophum, in III Ethic., voluntas est finis, electio autem eorum quae ad finem sunt. Cum igitur Deus seipsum tanquam finem velit, alia vero sicut quae ad finem sunt, sequitur quod respectu sui habeat voluntatem tantum, respectu autem aliorum electionem. Electio autem semper per liberum arbitrium fit. Deo igitur liberum arbitrium competit. Again. According to the Philosopher, in Ethics 3, will is of the end, but choice is of the means to the end. Therefore, since God wills himself as end, and other things as means to the end, it follows that in regard to himself he has will only, but choice in respect of other things. Now choice is always an act of free will. Therefore, free will is befitting God. Praeterea. Homo per hoc quod habet liberum arbitrium, dicitur suorum actuum dominus. Hoc autem maxime competit primo agenti, cuius actus ab alio non dependet. Ipse igitur Deus liberum arbitrium habet. Further. Through having free will, man is said to be master of his own actions. Now this is most befitting the first agent, whose action depends on no other. Therefore, God has free will. Hoc etiam ex ipsa nominis ratione haberi potest. Nam liberum est quod sui causa est, secundum Philosophum, in principio Metaphysicae. Hoc autem nulli magis competit quam primae causae, quae Deus est. This may also be gathered from the very signification of the word. For the free is that which is its own cause, according to the Philosopher at the beginning of the Metaphysics. And to none is this more befitting than to the first cause, which is God. Vita Dei God’s life Caput 89 Chapter 89 Quod in Deo non sunt passiones affectuum That the passions of the appetite are not in God Ex praemissis autem sciri potest quod passiones affectuum in Deo non sunt. From the foregoing we may conclude that the passions of the appetite are not in God. Secundum enim intellectivam affectionem non est aliqua passio, sed solum secundum sensitivam, ut probatur in VII Physicorum. Nulla autem talis affectio in Deo esse potest: cum desit sibi sensitiva cognitio, ut per supra dicta est manifestum. Relinquitur igitur quod in Deo non sit affectiva passio. For there is no passion in the intellective appetite, but only in the sensitive, as is proved in Physics 7.3. Now no such appetite can be in God, since he has no knowledge through senses, as clearly results from what has been said. Therefore, it follows that no passion of the appetite is in God. Praeterea. Omnis affectiva passio secundum aliquam transmutationem corporalem fit: puta secundum constrictionem vel dilatationem cordis, aut secundum aliquid huiusmodi. Quorum nullum in Deo possibile est accidere: eo quod non sit corpus nec virtus in corpore, ut supra ostensum est. Non est igitur in ipso affectiva passio. Further. Every passion of the appetite is accompanied by a bodily change (for instance, in respect of the contraction and dilatation of the heart, or something of the kind). But none of these can possibly happen in God, since he is not a body nor a power in a body, as we have shown above. Therefore, there is no passion of the appetite in him. Item. In omni affectiva passione patiens aliqualiter trahitur extra suam communem, aequalem vel connaturalem dispositionem: cuius signum est quod huiusmodi passiones, si intendantur, animalibus inferunt mortem. Sed non est possibile Deum extra suam naturalem conditionem aliqualiter trahi: cum sit omnino immutabilis, ut supra ostensum est. Patet igitur quod in Deo huiusmodi passiones esse non possunt. Again. In every passion of the appetite the patient is somewhat drawn outside its ordinary, even, or connatural disposition: a sign of which is that these passions, if they become intense, cause an animal’s death. But it is impossible for God to be in any way drawn outside his natural disposition, since he is utterly unchangeable, as was shown above. It is, therefore, evident that these passions cannot be in God. Amplius. Omnis affectio quae est secundum passionem, determinate in unum fertur, secundum modum et mensuram passionis: passio enim impetum habet ad aliquid unum, sicut et natura; et propter hoc ratione oportet eam reprimi et regulari. Divina autem voluntas non determinatur secundum se ad unum in his quae creata sunt, nisi ex ordine suae sapientiae, ut supra ostensum est. Non est igitur in ipso passio secundum affectionem aliquam. Moreover. Every emotion that is accompanied by a passion has one definite object, according to the mode and measure of the passion. For a passion has an impulse to some one thing, even as nature has, and on this account it needs to be curbed and ruled by reason. Now the divine will is not in itself determined to one in things created, except by the ordering of his wisdom, as was proved above. Therefore, there is no emotional passion in him. Adhuc. Omnis passio est alicuius potentia existentis. Deus autem est omnino liber a potentia: cum sit purus actus. Est igitur agens tantum, et nullo modo aliqua passio in ipso locum habet. Again. Every passion is in a subject that is in potency. But God is altogether free of potency, since he is pure act. Therefore, he is agent only, and in no way can passion take place in him. Sic igitur omnis passio ratione generis a Deo removetur. Accordingly, all passion, by reason of its genus, is absent from God. Quaedam autem passiones removentur a Deo non solum ratione sui generis, sed etiam ratione speciei. Omnis enim passio ex obiecto speciem recipit. Cuius igitur obiectum omnino est Deo incompetens, talis passio a Deo removetur etiam secundum rationem propriae speciei. Some passions, however, are absent from God not only by reason of their genus, but also on account of their species. For every passion takes its species from its object. Therefore, a passion whose object is wholly unbefitting God is absent from God on account of its proper species. Talis autem est tristitia vel dolor: nam eius obiectum est malum iam inhaerens, sicut gaudii obiectum est bonum praesens et habitum. Tristitia igitur et dolor ex ipsa sui ratione in Deo esse non possunt. Such a passion is sorrow or pain: for its object is an actually inherent evil, just as the object of joy is a good present and possessed. Sorrow, therefore, and pain by their very nature cannot be in God. Adhuc. Ratio obiecti alicuius passionis non solum sumitur ex bono et malo, sed etiam ex hoc quod aliqualiter quis se habet ad alterum horum: sic enim spes et gaudium differunt. Si igitur modus ipse se habendi ad obiectum qui in ratione passionis includitur, Deo non competit, nec ipsa passio Deo convenire potest, etiam ex ratione propriae speciei. Spes autem, quamvis habeat obiectum bonum, non tamen bonum iam obtentum, sed obtinendum. Quod quidem Deo non potest competere, ratione suae perfectionis, quae tanta est quod ei additio fieri non potest. Spes igitur in Deo esse non potest, etiam ratione suae speciei. Et similiter nec desiderium alicuius non habiti. Again. The formality of a passion’s object is taken not only from good or evil, but also from the fact that a person is referred in some mode to the one or the other: for thus it is that hope and joy differ. Therefore, if the mode in which a person is referred to the object—that mode being essential to the passion—is not becoming to God, neither can the passion itself be becoming to God, and this by reason of its proper species. Now although hope has a good for its object, this is a good not already acquired, but to be yet obtained. And this cannot be competent to God on account of his perfection, which is so great that nothing can be added to it. Hope, therefore, cannot be in God, even by reason of its species, nor again desire of anything not possessed. Amplius. Sicut divina perfectio impedit potentiam additionis alicuius boni obtinendi a Deo, ita etiam, et multo amplius, excludit potentiam ad malum. Timor autem respicit malum quod potest imminere, sicut spes bonum obtinendum. Duplici igitur ratione suae speciei timor a Deo excluditur: et quia non est nisi existentis in potentia; et quia habet obiectum malum quod potest inesse. Moreover. Just as the divine perfection excludes from God the potency of acquiring any additional good, so too and much more it excludes the potency to evil. Now fear regards evil that may be imminent, even as hope regards a good to be acquired. Therefore, fear by reason of its species is absent from God on two counts, both because it is befitting only one that is in potency, and because its object is an evil that can become present. Item. Poenitentia mutationem affectus importat. Igitur et ratio poenitentiae Deo repugnat, non solum quia species tristitiae est, sed etiam quia mutationem voluntatis importat. Again. Repentance denotes a change in the appetite. Therefore, the idea of repentance is inapplicable to God, both because it is a kind of sorrow, and because it implies a change of will. Praeterea. Absque errore cognitivae virtutis esse non potest ut illud quod est bonum apprehendatur ut malum. Nec est nisi in particularibus bonis ut alterius malum possit bonum existere alteri, in quibus corruptio unius est generatio alterius: universali autem bono ex nullo particulari bono aliquid deperit, sed per unumquodque repraesentatur. Deus autem est universale bonum, cuius similitudinem participando omnia dicuntur bona. Nullius igitur malum sibi potest esse bonum. Nec potest esse ut id quod est simpliciter bonum et non est sibi malum, apprehendat ut malum: quia sua scientia est absque errore, ut supra ostensum est. Invidiam igitur in Deo impossibile est esse, etiam secundum suae speciei rationem: non solum quia invidia species tristitiae est, sed etiam quia tristatur de bono alterius, et sic accipit bonum alterius tanquam malum sibi. Further. Without error in the cognitive power, it is impossible for that which is good to be apprehended as evil. Nor does it happen that the evil of one can be the good of another save in particular goods, in which the corruption of one is the generation of another. But the universal good is impaired in no way by any particular good, but is reflected by each one. Now God is the universal good, and by partaking of his likeness all things are said to be good. Hence no one’s evil can be to him a good. Nor is it possible for him to apprehend as evil that which is good simply, and is not evil to him: because his knowledge is without error, as we have proved above. Hence envy cannot possibly be in God, even according to the nature of its species, not only because envy is a kind of sorrow, but because it grieves for the good of another, and thus looks upon another’s good as its own evil. Adhuc. Eiusdem rationis est tristari de bono et appetere malum: nam primum est ex hoc quod bonum aestimatur malum; secundum vero est ex hoc quod malum aestimatur bonum. Ira autem est appetitus mali alterius ad vindictam. Ira igitur a Deo longe est secundum rationem suae speciei: non solum quia effectus tristitiae est; sed etiam quia est appetitus vindictae propter tristitiam ex iniuria illata conceptam. Again. To grieve for a good is the same as desiring an evil, for the former results from a good being deemed an evil, while the latter results from an evil being deemed a good. Now anger is the desire of another’s evil in revenge. Therefore, anger is far removed from God according to its specific nature, not only because it is an effect of sorrow, but also because it is a desire for revenge on account of sorrow arising from a harm inflicted. Rursus, quaecumque aliae passiones harum species sunt vel ab eis causantur, pari ratione a Deo excluduntur. Also, whatever passions are species or effects of the above are equally removed from God. Caput 90 Chapter 90 Quod in Deo sit delectatio et gaudium non tamen repugnat divinae perfectioni That in God are delight and joy, nor are they incompatible with the divine perfection Sunt autem quaedam passiones quae, licet Deo non conveniant secundum quod passiones, nihil tamen ex ratione suae speciei important repugnans divinae perfectioni. There are, however, certain passions which, though unbecoming to God as passions, nevertheless contain nothing in their specific nature incompatible with the divine perfection. Harum autem est gaudium et delectatio. Est enim gaudium praesentis boni. Neque igitur ratione obiecti, quod est bonum, neque ratione modi se habendi ad obiectum, quod est actu habitum, gaudium secundum suae speciei rationem divinae perfectioni repugnat. Among these are joy and delight. For joy has for its object a present good. Therefore, neither by reason of its object, which is a good, nor by reason of the way in which it is referred to that object, which is actually possessed, is joy incompatible with the divine perfection according to its specific nature. Ex hoc autem manifestum est quod gaudium vel delectatio proprie in Deo sit. Sicut enim bonum et malum apprehensum sunt obiectum appetitus sensibilis, ita et appetitus intellectivi. Utriusque enim est prosequi bonum et fugere malum, vel secundum veritatem vel secundum aestimationem: nisi quod obiectum intellectivi appetitus est communius quam sensitivi, quia intellectivus appetitus respicit bonum vel malum simpliciter, appetitus autem sensitivus bonum vel malum secundum sensum; sicut etiam et intellectus obiectum est communius quam sensus. Sed operationes appetitus speciem ex obiectis sortiuntur. Inveniuntur igitur in appetitu intellectivo, qui est voluntas, similes operationes secundum rationem speciei operationibus appetitus sensitivi, in hoc differentes quod in appetitu sensitivo sunt passiones, propter coniunctionem eius ad organum corporale, in intellectivo autem sunt operationes simplices: sicut enim per passionem timoris, quae est in appetitu sensitivo, refugit quis malum futurum, ita sine passione intellectivus appetitus idem operatur. Cum igitur gaudium et delectatio Deo non repugnent secundum suam speciem, sed solum inquantum passiones sunt; in voluntate autem sunt secundum suam speciem, non autem ut passiones: relinquitur quod etiam divinae voluntati non desint. Hence it is evident that joy or delight, properly speaking, is in God. Because just as good and evil apprehended are the object of the sensible appetite, so are they the object of the intellective appetite. For it belongs to both to pursue good and to avoid evil, whether so in truth, or in the estimation. The difference is that the object of the intellective appetite is more universal than that of the sensitive appetite, since the intellective appetite regards good or evil simply, whereas the sensitive appetite regards good or evil according to the senses, even as the object of the intellect is more universal than that of the senses. Now the operations of the appetite take their species from their objects. Accordingly, we find in the intellective appetite (which is the will) operations specifically similar to those of the sensitive appetite, though differing in this: in the sensitive appetite they are passions on account of its connection with a bodily organ, but in the intellective appetite they are pure operations. For just as by the passion of fear which, in the sensitive appetite, one shuns a future evil, so the intellective appetite has a like operation without passion. Since, then, joy and delight are not inapplicable to God according to their species, but only as passions, while they are in the will according to their species, but not as passions, it follows that they are not absent from the divine will. Item. Gaudium et delectatio est quaedam quietatio voluntatis in suo volito. Deus autem in seipso, qui est suum principale volitum, maxime quietatur, utpote in se omnem sufficientiam habens. Ipse igitur per suam voluntatem in se maxime gaudet et delectatur. Again. Joy and delight are a kind of repose of the will in the object of its willing. Now God is supremely at rest in himself, who is the principal object of his will, as finding all sufficiency in himself. Therefore, by his will he rejoices and delights supremely in himself. Praeterea. Delectatio est quaedam operationis perfectio, ut patet per Philosophum, X Ethic.: perficit enim operationem sicut pulchritudo iuventutem. Sed Deus perfectissimam operationem habet in intelligendo, ut ex praedictis patet. Si igitur nostrum intelligere, propter suam perfectionem, est delectabile, divinum intelligere erit sibi delectabilissimum. Further. Delight is a perfection of operation, as the Philosopher teaches, in Ethics 10, for it perfects operation as beauty perfects youth. Now God has a most perfect operation in understanding, as shown above. Therefore, if our act of understanding is delightful on account of its perfection, God’s act of understanding will be most delightful to him. Amplius. Unumquodque naturaliter in suo simili gaudet, quasi in convenienti: nisi per accidens, inquantum est impeditivum propriae utilitatis, sicut figuli ad invicem corrixantur, pro eo quod unus impedit lucrum alterius. Omne autem bonum est divinae bonitatis similitudo, ut ex supra dictis patet: nec ex aliquo bono sibi aliquid deperit. Relinquitur igitur quod Deus de omni bono gaudet. Moreover. Everything naturally rejoices in its like as being congenial to it, except accidentally, insofar as this thing impedes its own utility. Thus potters quarrel among themselves, because one hinders the profit of another. Now every good is a likeness of the divine goodness, as stated above, nor is any good prejudicial to it. Therefore, God rejoices in every good. Est igitur in eo proprie gaudium et delectatio. Differunt autem gaudium et delectatio ratione. Nam delectatio provenit ex bono realiter coniuncto: gaudium autem hoc non requirit, sed sola quietatio voluntatis in volito sufficit ad gaudii rationem. Unde delectatio est solum de coniuncto bono, si proprie sumatur: gaudium autem de exteriori. Ex quo patet quod Deus proprie in seipso delectatur, gaudet autem et in se et in aliis. Therefore, joy and delight are in him properly speaking. Yet joy and delight differ in aspect. For delight is caused by a good conjoined in reality, while joy does not require this conjunction, because the mere repose of the will in the thing willed suffices for the notion of joy. Hence delight is only in a conjoined good, if it be taken in its proper sense, whereas joy is in a separate good. Therefore, it is evident that, properly speaking, God delights in himself, but rejoices in himself in other things. Caput 91 Chapter 91