Caput 89 Chapter 89 Quod in Deo non sunt passiones affectuum That the passions of the appetite are not in God Ex praemissis autem sciri potest quod passiones affectuum in Deo non sunt. From the foregoing we may conclude that the passions of the appetite are not in God. Secundum enim intellectivam affectionem non est aliqua passio, sed solum secundum sensitivam, ut probatur in VII physicorum. Nulla autem talis affectio in Deo esse potest: cum desit sibi sensitiva cognitio, ut per supra dicta est manifestum. Relinquitur igitur quod in Deo non sit affectiva passio. For there is no passion in the intellective appetite, but only in the sensitive, as is proved in 7 Physics 3. Now no such appetite can be in God, since he has no knowledge through senses, as clearly results from what has been said (ch. 44). Therefore, it follows that no passion of the appetite is in God. Praeterea. Omnis affectiva passio secundum aliquam transmutationem corporalem fit: puta secundum constrictionem vel dilatationem cordis, aut secundum aliquid huiusmodi. Quorum nullum in Deo possibile est accidere: eo quod non sit corpus nec virtus in corpore, ut supra ostensum est. Non est igitur in ipso affectiva passio. Further. Every passion of the appetite is accompanied by a bodily change (for instance, in respect of the contraction and dilatation of the heart, or something of the kind). But none of these can possibly happen in God, since he is not a body nor a power in a body, as we have shown above (ch. 20). Therefore, there is no passion of the appetite in him. Item. In omni affectiva passione patiens aliqualiter trahitur extra suam communem, aequalem vel connaturalem dispositionem: cuius signum est quod huiusmodi passiones, si intendantur, animalibus inferunt mortem. Sed non est possibile Deum extra suam naturalem conditionem aliqualiter trahi: cum sit omnino immutabilis, ut supra ostensum est. Patet igitur quod in Deo huiusmodi passiones esse non possunt. Again. In every passion of the appetite the patient is somewhat drawn outside its ordinary, even, or connatural disposition: a sign of which is that these passions, if they become intense, cause an animal’s death. But it is impossible for God to be in any way drawn outside his natural disposition, since he is utterly unchangeable, as was shown above (ch. 13). It is, therefore, evident that these passions cannot be in God. Amplius. Omnis affectio quae est secundum passionem, determinate in unum fertur, secundum modum et mensuram passionis: passio enim impetum habet ad aliquid unum, sicut et natura; et propter hoc ratione oportet eam reprimi et regulari. Divina autem voluntas non determinatur secundum se ad unum in his quae creata sunt, nisi ex ordine suae sapientiae, ut supra ostensum est. Non est igitur in ipso passio secundum affectionem aliquam. Moreover. Every emotion that is accompanied by a passion has one definite object, according to the mode and measure of the passion. For a passion has an impulse to some one thing, even as nature has, and on this account it needs to be curbed and ruled by reason. Now the divine will is not in itself determined to one in things created, except by the ordering of his wisdom, as was proved above (ch. 82). Therefore, there is no emotional passion in him. Adhuc. Omnis passio est alicuius potentia existentis. Deus autem est omnino liber a potentia: cum sit purus actus. Est igitur agens tantum, et nullo modo aliqua passio in ipso locum habet. Again. Every passion is in a subject that is in potency. But God is altogether free of potency, since he is pure act (ch. 16). Therefore, he is agent only, and in no way can passion take place in him. Sic igitur omnis passio ratione generis a Deo removetur. Accordingly, all passion, by reason of its genus, is absent from God. Quaedam autem passiones removentur a Deo non solum ratione sui generis, sed etiam ratione speciei. Omnis enim passio ex obiecto speciem recipit. Cuius igitur obiectum omnino est Deo incompetens, talis passio a Deo removetur etiam secundum rationem propriae speciei. Some passions, however, are absent from God not only by reason of their genus, but also on account of their species. For every passion takes its species from its object. Therefore, a passion whose object is wholly unbefitting God is absent from God on account of its proper species. Talis autem est tristitia vel dolor: nam eius obiectum est malum iam inhaerens, sicut gaudii obiectum est bonum praesens et habitum. Tristitia igitur et dolor ex ipsa sui ratione in Deo esse non possunt. Such a passion is sorrow or pain: for its object is an actually inherent evil, just as the object of joy is a good present and possessed. Sorrow, therefore, and pain by their very nature cannot be in God. Adhuc. Ratio obiecti alicuius passionis non solum sumitur ex bono et malo, sed etiam ex hoc quod aliqualiter quis se habet ad alterum horum: sic enim spes et gaudium differunt. Si igitur modus ipse se habendi ad obiectum qui in ratione passionis includitur, Deo non competit, nec ipsa passio Deo convenire potest, etiam ex ratione propriae speciei. Spes autem, quamvis habeat obiectum bonum, non tamen bonum iam obtentum, sed obtinendum. Quod quidem Deo non potest competere, ratione suae perfectionis, quae tanta est quod ei additio fieri non potest. Spes igitur in Deo esse non potest, etiam ratione suae speciei. Et similiter nec desiderium alicuius non habiti. Again. The formality of a passion’s object is taken not only from good or evil, but also from the fact that a person is referred in some mode to the one or the other: for thus it is that hope and joy differ. Therefore, if the mode in which a person is referred to the object—that mode being essential to the passion—is not becoming to God, neither can the passion itself be becoming to God, and this by reason of its proper species. Now although hope has a good for its object, this is a good not already acquired, but to be yet obtained. And this cannot be competent to God on account of his perfection, which is so great that nothing can be added to it (ch. 28). Hope, therefore, cannot be in God, even by reason of its species, nor again desire of anything not possessed. Amplius. Sicut divina perfectio impedit potentiam additionis alicuius boni obtinendi a Deo, ita etiam, et multo amplius, excludit potentiam ad malum. Timor autem respicit malum quod potest imminere, sicut spes bonum obtinendum. Duplici igitur ratione suae speciei timor a Deo excluditur: et quia non est nisi existentis in potentia; et quia habet obiectum malum quod potest inesse. Moreover. Just as the divine perfection excludes from God the potency of acquiring any additional good, so too and much more it excludes the potency to evil (ch. 28, 39). Now fear regards evil that may be imminent, even as hope regards a good to be acquired. Therefore, fear by reason of its species is absent from God on two counts, both because it is befitting only one that is in potency, and because its object is an evil that can become present. Item. Poenitentia mutationem affectus importat. Igitur et ratio poenitentiae Deo repugnat, non solum quia species tristitiae est, sed etiam quia mutationem voluntatis importat. Again. Repentance denotes a change in the appetite. Therefore, the idea of repentance is inapplicable to God (cf. ch. 13), both because it is a kind of sorrow, and because it implies a change of will. Praeterea. Absque errore cognitivae virtutis esse non potest ut illud quod est bonum apprehendatur ut malum. Nec est nisi in particularibus bonis ut alterius malum possit bonum existere alteri, in quibus corruptio unius est generatio alterius: universali autem bono ex nullo particulari bono aliquid deperit, sed per unumquodque repraesentatur. Deus autem est universale bonum, cuius similitudinem participando omnia dicuntur bona. Nullius igitur malum sibi potest esse bonum. Nec potest esse ut id quod est simpliciter bonum et non est sibi malum, apprehendat ut malum: quia sua scientia est absque errore, ut supra ostensum est. Invidiam igitur in Deo impossibile est esse, etiam secundum suae speciei rationem: non solum quia invidia species tristitiae est, sed etiam quia tristatur de bono alterius, et sic accipit bonum alterius tanquam malum sibi. Further. Without error in the cognitive power, it is impossible for that which is good to be apprehended as evil. Nor does it happen that the evil of one can be the good of another save in particular goods, in which the corruption of one is the generation of another. But the universal good is impaired in no way by any particular good, but is reflected by each one. Now God is the universal good, and by partaking of his likeness all things are said to be good (ch. 29). Hence no one’s evil can be to him a good. Nor is it possible for him to apprehend as evil that which is good simply, and is not evil to him: because his knowledge is without error, as we have proved above (ch. 61). Hence envy cannot possibly be in God, even according to the nature of its species, not only because envy is a kind of sorrow, but because it grieves for the good of another, and thus looks upon another’s good as its own evil. Adhuc. Eiusdem rationis est tristari de bono et appetere malum: nam primum est ex hoc quod bonum aestimatur malum; secundum vero est ex hoc quod malum aestimatur bonum. Ira autem est appetitus mali alterius ad vindictam. Ira igitur a Deo longe est secundum rationem suae speciei: non solum quia effectus tristitiae est; sed etiam quia est appetitus vindictae propter tristitiam ex iniuria illata conceptam. Again. To grieve for a good is the same as desiring an evil, for the former results from a good being deemed an evil, while the latter results from an evil being deemed a good. Now anger is the desire of another’s evil in revenge. Therefore, anger is far removed from God according to its specific nature, not only because it is an effect of sorrow, but also because it is a desire for revenge on account of sorrow arising from a harm inflicted. Rursus, quaecumque aliae passiones harum species sunt vel ab eis causantur, pari ratione a Deo excluduntur. Also, whatever passions are species or effects of the above are equally removed from God. Caput 90 Chapter 90 Quod in Deo sit delectatio et gaudium non tamen repugnat divinae perfectioni That in God are delight and joy, nor are they incompatible with the divine perfection Sunt autem quaedam passiones quae, licet Deo non conveniant secundum quod passiones, nihil tamen ex ratione suae speciei important repugnans divinae perfectioni. There are, however, certain passions which, though unbecoming to God as passions, nevertheless contain nothing in their specific nature incompatible with the divine perfection. Harum autem est gaudium et delectatio. Est enim gaudium praesentis boni. Neque igitur ratione obiecti, quod est bonum, neque ratione modi se habendi ad obiectum, quod est actu habitum, gaudium secundum suae speciei rationem divinae perfectioni repugnat. Among these are joy and delight. For joy has for its object a present good. Therefore, neither by reason of its object, which is a good, nor by reason of the way in which it is referred to that object, which is actually possessed, is joy incompatible with the divine perfection according to its specific nature. Ex hoc autem manifestum est quod gaudium vel delectatio proprie in Deo sit. Sicut enim bonum et malum apprehensum sunt obiectum appetitus sensibilis, ita et appetitus intellectivi. Utriusque enim est prosequi bonum et fugere malum, vel secundum veritatem vel secundum aestimationem: nisi quod obiectum intellectivi appetitus est communius quam sensitivi, quia intellectivus appetitus respicit bonum vel malum simpliciter, appetitus autem sensitivus bonum vel malum secundum sensum; sicut etiam et intellectus obiectum est communius quam sensus. Sed operationes appetitus speciem ex obiectis sortiuntur. Inveniuntur igitur in appetitu intellectivo, qui est voluntas, similes operationes secundum rationem speciei operationibus appetitus sensitivi, in hoc differentes quod in appetitu sensitivo sunt passiones, propter coniunctionem eius ad organum corporale, in intellectivo autem sunt operationes simplices: sicut enim per passionem timoris, quae est in appetitu sensitivo, refugit quis malum futurum, ita sine passione intellectivus appetitus idem operatur. Cum igitur gaudium et delectatio Deo non repugnent secundum suam speciem, sed solum inquantum passiones sunt; in voluntate autem sunt secundum suam speciem, non autem ut passiones: relinquitur quod etiam divinae voluntati non desint. Hence it is evident that joy or delight, properly speaking, is in God. Because just as good and evil apprehended are the object of the sensible appetite, so are they the object of the intellective appetite. For it belongs to both to pursue good and to avoid evil, whether so in truth, or in the estimation. The difference is that the object of the intellective appetite is more universal than that of the sensitive appetite, since the intellective appetite regards good or evil simply, whereas the sensitive appetite regards good or evil according to the senses, even as the object of the intellect is more universal than that of the senses. Now the operations of the appetite take their species from their objects. Accordingly, we find in the intellective appetite (which is the will) operations specifically similar to those of the sensitive appetite, though differing in this: in the sensitive appetite they are passions on account of its connection with a bodily organ, but in the intellective appetite they are pure operations. For just as by the passion of fear which, in the sensitive appetite, one shuns a future evil, so the intellective appetite has a like operation without passion. Since, then, joy and delight are not inapplicable to God according to their species, but only as passions, while they are in the will according to their species, but not as passions, it follows that they are not absent from the divine will. Item. Gaudium et delectatio est quaedam quietatio voluntatis in suo volito. Deus autem in seipso, qui est suum principale volitum, maxime quietatur, utpote in se omnem sufficientiam habens. Ipse igitur per suam voluntatem in se maxime gaudet et delectatur. Again. Joy and delight are a kind of repose of the will in the object of its willing. Now God is supremely at rest in himself, who is the principal object of his will, as finding all sufficiency in himself (ch. 74). Therefore, by his will he rejoices and delights supremely in himself. Praeterea. Delectatio est quaedam operationis perfectio, ut patet per Philosophum, X Ethic.: perficit enim operationem sicut pulchritudo iuventutem. Sed Deus perfectissimam operationem habet in intelligendo, ut ex praedictis patet. Si igitur nostrum intelligere, propter suam perfectionem, est delectabile, divinum intelligere erit sibi delectabilissimum. Further. Delight is a perfection of operation, as the Philosopher teaches, in 10 Ethics, for it perfects operation as beauty perfects youth. Now God has a most perfect operation in understanding, as shown above (ch. 45). Therefore, if our act of understanding is delightful on account of its perfection, God’s act of understanding will be most delightful to him. Amplius. Unumquodque naturaliter in suo simili gaudet, quasi in convenienti: nisi per accidens, inquantum est impeditivum propriae utilitatis, sicut figuli ad invicem corrixantur, pro eo quod unus impedit lucrum alterius. Omne autem bonum est divinae bonitatis similitudo, ut ex supra dictis patet: nec ex aliquo bono sibi aliquid deperit. Relinquitur igitur quod Deus de omni bono gaudet. Moreover. Everything naturally rejoices in its like as being congenial to it, except accidentally, insofar as this thing impedes its own utility. Thus potters quarrel among themselves, because one hinders the profit of another. Now every good is a likeness of the divine goodness, as stated above (ch. 40), nor is any good prejudicial to it. Therefore, God rejoices in every good. Est igitur in eo proprie gaudium et delectatio. Differunt autem gaudium et delectatio ratione. Nam delectatio provenit ex bono realiter coniuncto: gaudium autem hoc non requirit, sed sola quietatio voluntatis in volito sufficit ad gaudii rationem. Unde delectatio est solum de coniuncto bono, si proprie sumatur: gaudium autem de exteriori. Ex quo patet quod Deus proprie in seipso delectatur, gaudet autem et in se et in aliis. Therefore, joy and delight are in him properly speaking. Yet joy and delight differ in aspect. For delight is caused by a good conjoined in reality, while joy does not require this conjunction, because the mere repose of the will in the thing willed suffices for the notion of joy. Hence delight is only in a conjoined good, if it be taken in its proper sense, whereas joy is in a separate good. Therefore, it is evident that, properly speaking, God delights in himself, but rejoices in himself in other things. Caput 91 Chapter 91 Quod in Deo sit amor That in God there is love Similiter autem oportet et amorem in Deo esse secundum actum voluntatis eius. In like manner it follows that love is in God as an act of his will. Hoc enim est proprie de ratione amoris, quod amans bonum amati velit. Deus autem vult bonum suum et aliorum, ut ex dictis patet. Secundum hoc igitur Deus et se et alia amat. For it belongs properly to the nature of love that the lover wills the good of the beloved. Now God wills his own and others’ good, as stated above (ch. 74, 75). Accordingly, then, God loves both himself and other things. Adhuc. Ad veritatem amoris requiritur quod bonum alicuius vult prout est eius: cuius enim bonum aliquis vult solum prout in alterius bonum cedit, per accidens amatur; sicut qui vult vinum conservari ut illud bibat, aut hominem ut sibi sit utilis aut delectabilis, per accidens amat vinum aut hominem, per se autem seipsum. Sed Deus vult bonum uniuscuiusque secundum quod est eius: vult enim unumquodque esse secundum quod in se bonum est; licet etiam unum ordinet in utilitatem alterius. Deus igitur vere amat et se et alia. Again. True love requires one to will another’s good as one’s own. For a thing whose good one wills merely as conducive to another’s good is loved accidentally: thus he who wills wine to be preserved that he may drink it, or who loves a man that he may be useful or pleasing to him, loves the wine or the man accidentally, but himself properly speaking. Now God loves each thing’s good as its own, since he wills each thing to be inasmuch as it is good in itself, although he directs one to the profit of another. God, therefore, truly loves both himself and other things. Amplius. Cum unumquodque naturaliter velit aut appetat suo modo proprium bonum, si hoc habet amoris ratio quod amans velit aut appetat bonum amati, consequens est quod amans ad amatum se habeat sicut ad id quod est cum eo aliquo modo unum. Ex quo videtur propria ratio amoris consistere in hoc quod affectus unius tendat in alterum sicut in unum cum ipso aliquo modo: propter quod dicitur a Dionysio quod amor est unitiva virtus. Quanto ergo id unde amans est unum cum amato est maius, tanto est amor intensior: magis enim amamus quos nobis unit generationis origo, aut conversationis usus, aut aliquid huiusmodi, quam eos quos solum nobis unit humanae naturae societas. Et rursus, quanto id ex quo est unio est magis intimum amanti, tanto amor fit firmior: unde interdum amor qui est ex aliqua passione, fit intensior amore qui est ex naturali origine vel ex aliquo habitu, sed facilius transit. Id autem unde omnia Deo uniuntur, scilicet eius bonitas, quam omnia imitantur, est maximum et intimum Deo: cum ipse sit sua bonitas. Est igitur in Deo amor non solum verus, sed etiam perfectissimus et firmissimus. Moreover. Since everything naturally wills or desires its own good in its own way, if the nature of love is that the lover will or desire the good of the beloved, it follows that the lover is referred to the beloved as to a thing that is in a way one with him. Therefore, it appears that the proper notion of love consists in the affection of one tending to another as one with himself in some way, for which reason Dionysius describes love as a unitive force. Hence the greater the thing that makes the lover one with the beloved, the more intense is the love: for we love those more who are united to us by the origin of birth, or by frequent companionship, than those who are merely united to us by the bond of human nature. Again, the more the cause of union is deeply seated in the lover, the stronger the love; therefore, sometimes a love that is caused by a passion becomes more intense than a love arising from natural origin or from some habit, although it is more liable to be transitory. Now the cause of all things being united to God, namely his goodness (which all things reflect), is exceedingily great and deeply seated in God, since he is his own goodness (ch. 38). Therefore, in God not only is there true love, but also most perfect and most abiding love. Item. Amor ex parte obiecti non importat aliquid repugnans Deo: cum sit boni. Nec ex modo se habendi ad obiectum: nam amor est alicuius rei non minus cum habetur, sed magis, quia bonum aliquod fit nobis affinius cum habetur; unde et motus ad finem in rebus naturalibus ex propinquitate finis intenditur (quandoque autem contrarium per accidens accidit, utpote quando in amato experimur aliquid quod repugnat amori: tunc enim minus amatur quando habetur). Non igitur amor repugnat divinae perfectioni secundum rationem suae speciei. Est igitur in Deo. Again. On the part of its object, love does not denote anything inconsistent with God, since that object is a good. Nor again, as regards the way in which it is referred to its object, since a thing when possessed is loved not less, but more, because a good is more closely united to us when possessed. Therefore, in natural things movement towards an end is more intense if the end be near (although the contrary happens accidentally sometimes, for instance, when we discover something repugnant to love in the beloved, for then possession diminishes love). Accordingly, love is not inconsistent with the divine perfection as regards its specific nature. Therefore, it is in God. Praeterea. Amoris est ad unionem movere, ut Dionysius dicit. Cum enim, propter similitudinem vel convenientiam amantis et amati, affectus amantis sit quodammodo unitus amato, tendit appetitus in perfectionem unionis, ut scilicet unio quae iam inchoata est in affectu, compleatur in actu: unde et amicorum proprium est mutua praesentia et convictu et collocutionibus gaudere. Deus autem movet omnia alia ad unionem: inquantum enim dat eis esse et alias perfectiones, unit ea sibi per modum quo possibile est. Deus igitur et se et alia amat. Further. It belongs to love to move toward union, as Dionysius says. For, since, on account of likeness or suitability between lover and beloved, the affection of the lover is somehow united to the beloved, the appetite tends to the completion of the union, namely, that the union which was begun in the affections be completed in actions. Therefore, it belongs to friends to rejoice in mutual companionship, living together, and common pursuits. Now God moves all other things to union—for inasmuch as he gives them being and other perfections, he unites them to himself as far as possible. Therefore, God loves both himself and other things. Adhuc. Omnis affectionis principium est amor. Gaudium enim et desiderium non est nisi amati boni; timor et tristitia non est nisi de malo quod contrariatur bono amato; ex his autem omnes aliae affectiones oriuntur. Sed in Deo est gaudium et delectatio, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo in Deo est amor. Again. Love is the source of all the emotions. For joy and desire are only of a good that is loved; fear and sorrow are only of evil that is contrary to the beloved good; and from these all the other emotions arise. Now joy and delight are in God, as we have shown above (ch. 90). Therefore, in God there is love. Posset autem alicui videri quod Deus non magis hoc quam illud amet. Si enim intensio et remissio naturae mutabilis proprie est, Deo competere non potest, a quo omnis mutabilitas procul est. Someone, however, might think that God does not love one thing more than another. For if intenseness and remissness are proper to a changeable nature, they cannot apply to God, from whom all change is far removed (ch. 13).