Caput 91 Chapter 91 Quod in Deo sit amor That in God there is love Similiter autem oportet et amorem in Deo esse secundum actum voluntatis eius. In like manner it follows that love is in God as an act of his will. Hoc enim est proprie de ratione amoris, quod amans bonum amati velit. Deus autem vult bonum suum et aliorum, ut ex dictis patet. Secundum hoc igitur Deus et se et alia amat. For it belongs properly to the nature of love that the lover wills the good of the beloved. Now God wills his own and others’ good, as stated above (ch. 74, 75). Accordingly, then, God loves both himself and other things. Adhuc. Ad veritatem amoris requiritur quod bonum alicuius vult prout est eius: cuius enim bonum aliquis vult solum prout in alterius bonum cedit, per accidens amatur; sicut qui vult vinum conservari ut illud bibat, aut hominem ut sibi sit utilis aut delectabilis, per accidens amat vinum aut hominem, per se autem seipsum. Sed Deus vult bonum uniuscuiusque secundum quod est eius: vult enim unumquodque esse secundum quod in se bonum est; licet etiam unum ordinet in utilitatem alterius. Deus igitur vere amat et se et alia. Again. True love requires one to will another’s good as one’s own. For a thing whose good one wills merely as conducive to another’s good is loved accidentally: thus he who wills wine to be preserved that he may drink it, or who loves a man that he may be useful or pleasing to him, loves the wine or the man accidentally, but himself properly speaking. Now God loves each thing’s good as its own, since he wills each thing to be inasmuch as it is good in itself, although he directs one to the profit of another. God, therefore, truly loves both himself and other things. Amplius. Cum unumquodque naturaliter velit aut appetat suo modo proprium bonum, si hoc habet amoris ratio quod amans velit aut appetat bonum amati, consequens est quod amans ad amatum se habeat sicut ad id quod est cum eo aliquo modo unum. Ex quo videtur propria ratio amoris consistere in hoc quod affectus unius tendat in alterum sicut in unum cum ipso aliquo modo: propter quod dicitur a Dionysio quod amor est unitiva virtus. Quanto ergo id unde amans est unum cum amato est maius, tanto est amor intensior: magis enim amamus quos nobis unit generationis origo, aut conversationis usus, aut aliquid huiusmodi, quam eos quos solum nobis unit humanae naturae societas. Et rursus, quanto id ex quo est unio est magis intimum amanti, tanto amor fit firmior: unde interdum amor qui est ex aliqua passione, fit intensior amore qui est ex naturali origine vel ex aliquo habitu, sed facilius transit. Id autem unde omnia Deo uniuntur, scilicet eius bonitas, quam omnia imitantur, est maximum et intimum Deo: cum ipse sit sua bonitas. Est igitur in Deo amor non solum verus, sed etiam perfectissimus et firmissimus. Moreover. Since everything naturally wills or desires its own good in its own way, if the nature of love is that the lover will or desire the good of the beloved, it follows that the lover is referred to the beloved as to a thing that is in a way one with him. Therefore, it appears that the proper notion of love consists in the affection of one tending to another as one with himself in some way, for which reason Dionysius describes love as a unitive force. Hence the greater the thing that makes the lover one with the beloved, the more intense is the love: for we love those more who are united to us by the origin of birth, or by frequent companionship, than those who are merely united to us by the bond of human nature. Again, the more the cause of union is deeply seated in the lover, the stronger the love; therefore, sometimes a love that is caused by a passion becomes more intense than a love arising from natural origin or from some habit, although it is more liable to be transitory. Now the cause of all things being united to God, namely his goodness (which all things reflect), is exceedingily great and deeply seated in God, since he is his own goodness (ch. 38). Therefore, in God not only is there true love, but also most perfect and most abiding love. Item. Amor ex parte obiecti non importat aliquid repugnans Deo: cum sit boni. Nec ex modo se habendi ad obiectum: nam amor est alicuius rei non minus cum habetur, sed magis, quia bonum aliquod fit nobis affinius cum habetur; unde et motus ad finem in rebus naturalibus ex propinquitate finis intenditur (quandoque autem contrarium per accidens accidit, utpote quando in amato experimur aliquid quod repugnat amori: tunc enim minus amatur quando habetur). Non igitur amor repugnat divinae perfectioni secundum rationem suae speciei. Est igitur in Deo. Again. On the part of its object, love does not denote anything inconsistent with God, since that object is a good. Nor again, as regards the way in which it is referred to its object, since a thing when possessed is loved not less, but more, because a good is more closely united to us when possessed. Therefore, in natural things movement towards an end is more intense if the end be near (although the contrary happens accidentally sometimes, for instance, when we discover something repugnant to love in the beloved, for then possession diminishes love). Accordingly, love is not inconsistent with the divine perfection as regards its specific nature. Therefore, it is in God. Praeterea. Amoris est ad unionem movere, ut Dionysius dicit. Cum enim, propter similitudinem vel convenientiam amantis et amati, affectus amantis sit quodammodo unitus amato, tendit appetitus in perfectionem unionis, ut scilicet unio quae iam inchoata est in affectu, compleatur in actu: unde et amicorum proprium est mutua praesentia et convictu et collocutionibus gaudere. Deus autem movet omnia alia ad unionem: inquantum enim dat eis esse et alias perfectiones, unit ea sibi per modum quo possibile est. Deus igitur et se et alia amat. Further. It belongs to love to move toward union, as Dionysius says. For, since, on account of likeness or suitability between lover and beloved, the affection of the lover is somehow united to the beloved, the appetite tends to the completion of the union, namely, that the union which was begun in the affections be completed in actions. Therefore, it belongs to friends to rejoice in mutual companionship, living together, and common pursuits. Now God moves all other things to union—for inasmuch as he gives them being and other perfections, he unites them to himself as far as possible. Therefore, God loves both himself and other things. Adhuc. Omnis affectionis principium est amor. Gaudium enim et desiderium non est nisi amati boni; timor et tristitia non est nisi de malo quod contrariatur bono amato; ex his autem omnes aliae affectiones oriuntur. Sed in Deo est gaudium et delectatio, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo in Deo est amor. Again. Love is the source of all the emotions. For joy and desire are only of a good that is loved; fear and sorrow are only of evil that is contrary to the beloved good; and from these all the other emotions arise. Now joy and delight are in God, as we have shown above (ch. 90). Therefore, in God there is love. Posset autem alicui videri quod Deus non magis hoc quam illud amet. Si enim intensio et remissio naturae mutabilis proprie est, Deo competere non potest, a quo omnis mutabilitas procul est. Someone, however, might think that God does not love one thing more than another. For if intenseness and remissness are proper to a changeable nature, they cannot apply to God, from whom all change is far removed (ch. 13). Rursus. Nullum aliorum quae de Deo per modum operationis dicuntur, secundum magis et minus de ipso dicitur: neque enim magis aliquid alio cognoscit, neque magis de hoc quam de illo gaudet. Again. None of the other things that are said of God by way of operation are applied to him more or less, since he does not know one thing more than another, nor rejoices more in this than in that. Sciendum itaque quod, cum aliae operationes animae sint circa unum solum obiectum, solus amor ad duo obiecta ferri videtur. Per hoc enim quod intelligimus vel gaudemus, ad aliquod obiectum aliqualiter nos habere oportet: amor vero aliquid alicui vult, hoc enim amare dicimur cui aliquod bonum volumus, secundum modum praedictum. Unde et ea quae concupiscimus, simpliciter quidem et proprie desiderare dicimur, non autem amare, sed potius nos ipsos, quibus ea concupiscimus: et ex hoc ipsa per accidens et improprie dicuntur amari. Aliae igitur operationes secundum solum actionis vigorem secundum magis et minus dicuntur. Quod in Deo accidere non potest. Nam vigor actionis secundum virtutem qua agitur mensuratur: omnis autem divina actio unius et eiusdem virtutis est. Amor autem secundum magis et minus dupliciter dici potest. Uno quidem modo, ex bono quod alicui volumus: secundum quod illum magis diligere dicimur cui volumus maius bonum. Alio modo ex vigore actionis: secundum quod dicimur illum magis diligere cui, etsi non maius bonum, aequale tamen bonum ferventius et efficacius volumus. Accordingly, it must be observed that while other operations of the soul are about one object only, love alone appears to be directed to a twofold object. For if we understand or rejoice, it follows that we are referred somehow to some object, whereas love wills something to someone, since we are said to love that to which we will some good, in the aforesaid way. Hence when we want a thing, we are said simply and properly to desire it, and not to love it, but rather to love ourselves for whom we want it. Consequently, we are said to love it accidentally and improperly. Accordingly, other operations are greater or lesser in proportion to the energy alone of the action. But this cannot apply to God, because energy of action is measured by the force from which it proceeds, and every divine action is of one and the same force. On the other hand, love may be greater or lesser in two ways. In one way, as regards the good that we will someone, according to which we are said to love that person more for whom we will a greater good. In another way, as regards the energy of the action, according to which we are said to love that person more for whom, although we will not a greater good, nevertheless we will an equal good with greater fervor and efficacy. Primo quidem igitur modo, nihil prohibet dici quod Deus aliquid alio magis diligat, secundum quod ei maius vult bonum. Secundo autem modo dici non potest: eadem ratione quae de aliis dicta est. In the first way, accordingly, nothing forbids us to say that God loves one thing more than another, according as he wills for it a greater good. But in the second way this cannot be said, for the same reason as we have stated in the case of other operations. Patet igitur ex praedictis quod de nostris affectionibus nulla est quae in Deo proprie possit esse nisi gaudium et amor: quamvis haec etiam in eo non secundum passionem, sicut in nobis, sint. It is therefore clear from what has been said (ch. 89, 90, 91), that none of our emotions, properly speaking, can be in God, except joy and love: and yet even these are not in him as they are in us, by way of passion. Quod autem in Deo sit gaudium vel delectatio, auctoritate Scripturae confirmatur. Dicitur enim in Psalmo: delectationes in dextera tua usque in finem. Prov. 9: delectabar per singulos dies ludens coram eo, dicit divina sapientia, quae Deus est, ut ostensum est. Luc. 15:10: gaudium est in caelo super uno peccatore poenitentiam agente. Philosophus etiam dicit, in VII Ethic., quod Deus semper gaudet una et simplici delectatione. That joy or delight is in God is confirmed by the authority of Scripture. For it is said in the Psalm: in your right hand are delights forevermore (Ps 16[15]:11). Divine wisdom, which is God, as we have proved (ch. 45, 60), says: I was delighted every day, playing before him (Prov 8:30); and: there is joy before the angels of God over one sinner who repents (Luke 15:10). Also, the Philosopher says, in 7 Ethics, 14, 8 that God rejoices with one simple delight. Amorem etiam Dei Scriptura commemorat, Deut. 33:3: dilexit populos; Ierem. 31:3: in caritate perpetua dilexi te; Ioan. 16:27: ipse enim pater amat vos. Philosophi etiam quidam posuerunt rerum principium Dei amorem. Cui consonat Dionysii verbum, IV cap. de Div. Nom.; dicentis quod divinus amor non permisit ipsum sine germine esse. Scripture also makes mention of God’s love: he loved his people (Deut 33:3); I have loved you with an everlasting love (Jer 31:3); the Father himself loves you (John 16:27). Certain philosophers also taught that God’s love is the principle of things, which agrees with Dionysius (On the Divine Names, 4), who says that: God’s love did not allow him to be unproductive. Sciendum tamen etiam alias affectiones, quae secundum speciem suam divinae perfectioni repugnant, in sacra Scriptura de Deo dici, non quidem proprie, ut probatum est, sed metaphorice, propter similitudinem vel effectuum, vel alicuius affectionis praecedentis. It must, however, be observed that even other emotions which by their specific nature are inapplicable to God are applied to God in Sacred Scripture, not indeed properly, as we have shown (ch. 89; cf. ch. 30), but metaphorically, on account of a likeness either of effects, or of some preceding emotion. Dico autem effectuum, quia interdum voluntas ex sapientiae ordine in illum effectum tendit in quem aliquis ex passione defectiva inclinatur: iudex enim ex iustitia punit, sicut et iratus ex ira. Dicitur igitur aliquando Deus iratus, inquantum ex ordine suae sapientiae aliquem vult punire: secundum illud Psalmi: cum exarserit in brevi ira eius. Misericors vero dicitur inquantum ex sua benevolentia miserias hominum tollit: sicut et nos propter misericordiae passionem facimus idem. Unde in Psalmo: miserator et misericors dominus, patiens et multum misericors. Poenitens etiam interdum dicitur, inquantum secundum aeternum et immutabilem providentiae suae ordinem facit quae prius destruxerat, vel destruit quae prius fecit: sicut et poenitentia moti facere inveniuntur. Unde Gen. 6:7: poenitet me fecisse hominem. Quod autem hoc proprie intelligi non possit, patet per hoc quod habetur I Reg. 15:29: triumphator in Israel non parcet, nec poenitudine flectetur. I say of effects, because sometimes his will, by the ordering of his wisdom, tends to an effect to which a person is inclined through a defective passion: thus a judge punishes out of justice as an angry man out of anger. Accordingly, sometimes God is said to be angry insofar as by the ordering of his wisdom he wills to punish someone, according to the saying of the Psalm: his wrath is quickly kindled (Ps 2:12). He is said to be merciful insofar as out of his goodwill he removes man’s unhappiness, even as we do the same through the passion of mercy. Hence the Psalm says: the Lord is merciful and gracious, slow to anger and abounding in steadfast love (Ps 103[102]:8). Sometimes also he is said to repent insofar as in accordance with the eternal and unchangeable decree of his providence, he makes what he destroyed before, or destroys what previously he made, even as those who are moved by repentance are wont to do. Hence: I am sorry that I have made man (Gen 6:7). That this cannot be taken in the proper sense is clear from the words of 1 Samuel 15:29: the triumpher in Israel will not spare and will not be moved to repentance. Dico autem propter similitudinem affectionis praecedentis. Nam amor et gaudium, quae in Deo proprie sunt, principia sunt omnium affectionum: amor quidem per modum principii moventis: gaudium vero per modum finis; unde etiam irati punientes gaudent, quasi finem assecuti. Dicitur igitur Deus tristari, inquantum accidunt aliqua contraria his quae ipse amat et approbat: sicut et in nobis est tristitia de his quae nobis nolentibus acciderunt. Et hoc patet Isaiae 59:15 vidit Deus, et malum apparuit in oculis eius, quia non est iudicium. Et vidit quia non est vir, et aporiatus est, quia non est qui occurrat. I also say on account of a likeness to a preceding emotion. For love and joy, which are in God properly, are the principles of all the emotions: love by way of moving principle; joy by way of end. Therefore, even an angry man rejoices while punishing, as having obtained his end. Hence God is said to grieve insofar as certain things occur contrary to those he loves and approves, even as we grieve for what has happened against our will: the Lord saw it, and it displeased him that there was no justice. He saw that there was no man, and wondered that there was no one to intervene (Isa 59:15–16). Ex praedictis autem excluditur error quorundam Iudaeorum attribuentium Deo iram, tristitiam, poenitentiam, et omnes huiusmodi passiones, secundum proprietatem, non distinguentes quid in Scripturis sacris proprie et metaphorice dicatur. By what has been said we can refute the error of certain Jews who ascribed to God anger, sorrow, repentance, and all such passions in their proper sense, failing to discriminate between the proper and the metaphorical expressions of Scripture. Caput 92 Chapter 92 Quomodo in Deo ponantur esse virtutes How virtues are to be ascribed to God Consequens est autem dictis ostendere quomodo virtutes in Deo ponere oportet. Oportet enim, sicut esse eius est universaliter perfectum, omnium entium perfectiones in se quodammodo comprehendens, ita et bonitatem eius omnium bonitates in se quodammodo comprehendere. Virtus autem est bonitas quaedam virtuosi: nam secundum eam dicitur bonus, et opus eius bonum. Oportet ergo bonitatem divinam omnes virtutes suo modo continere. In sequence to what has been said we must show how virtues are to be ascribed to God. For just as his being is universally perfect, in some way containing within itself the perfection of all beings (ch. 28), so must his goodness in some way comprise the various kinds of goodness of all things (ch. 40). Now virtue is a kind of goodness of the virtuous person, since in respect of it he is said to be good, and his work good. It follows, therefore, that the divine goodness contains in its own way all virtues. Unde nulla earum secundum habitum in Deo dicitur, sicut in nobis. Deo enim non convenit bonum esse per aliquid aliud ei superadditum, sed per essentiam suam: cum sit omnino simplex. Nec etiam per aliquid suae essentiae additum agit: cum sua actio sit suum esse, ut ostensum est. Non est igitur virtus eius aliquis habitus, sed sua essentia. Therefore, none of them is ascribed as a habit to God as it is to us. For it is not befitting God to be good through something else added to him, but by his essence, for he is altogether simple (ch. 18, 38). Nor does he act by anything added to his essence, since his action is his being, as we have shown (ch. 45, 73). Therefore, his virtue is not a habit, but his essence. Item. Habitus imperfectus actus est, quasi medius inter potentiam et actum: unde et habentes habitum dormientibus comparantur. In Deo autem est actus perfectissimus. Actus igitur in eo non est sicut habitus, ut scientia: sed sicut considerare, quod est actus ultimus et perfectus. Again. Habit is imperfect act, a mean, as it were, between potency and act. Therefore, one who has a habit is compared to a person asleep. But in God there is most perfect act. Hence act in him is not like a habit, as knowledge, but like ‘to consider,’ which is an ultimate and perfect act. Adhuc. Habitus potentiae alicuius perfectivus est. In Deo autem nihil est secundum potentiam, sed solum secundum actum. In eo igitur habitus esse non potest. Again. Habit perfects a potency, but in God nothing is potential but only actual (ch. 16). Therefore, a habit cannot be in him. Praeterea. Habitus de genere accidentis est. Quod in Deo omnino non est, ut supra ostensum est. Igitur nec virtus aliqua in Deo secundum habitum dicitur, sed solum secundum essentiam. Further. Habit is a kind of accident: and this is utterly foreign to God, as we have proved above (ch. 23). Neither, therefore, is virtue ascribed to God as a habit, but only as his essence. Cum autem virtutes humanae sint quibus humana vita dirigitur; humana autem vita est duplex, contemplativa et activa: quae quidem ad activam vitam virtutes pertinent, prout hanc vitam perficiunt, Deo competere non possunt. Now since it is by human virtues that human life is regulated, and since human life is twofold, contemplative and active, those virtues which belong to the active life, as perfecting it, cannot be becoming to God. Vita enim activa hominis in usu corporalium bonorum consistit: unde et virtutes vitam activam dirigunt quibus his bonis recte utimur. Huiusmodi autem Deo convenire non possunt. Igitur nec huiusmodi virtutes prout hanc vitam dirigunt. For the active life of man consists in the use of bodily goods: therefore, those virtues by which we use these goods aright regulate the active life. But these goods cannot be befitting God. Therefore, neither can these virtues, insofar as they regulate this life. Adhuc. Huiusmodi virtutes mores hominum secundum politicam conversationem perficiunt: unde illis qui politica conversatione non utuntur, convenire non multum videntur. Multo igitur minus Deo convenire possunt, cuius conversatio et vita longe est a modo humanae vitae. Again. The same virtues perfect man’s conduct in his civil life: hence they do not seem very applicable to those who have nothing to do with the civil life. Much less, therefore, can they be applied to God, whose conduct and life are far removed from the manner of human life. Harum etiam virtutum quae circa activam vitam sunt, quaedam circa passiones nos dirigunt. Quas in Deo ponere non possumus. Virtutes enim quae circa passiones sunt, ex ipsis passionibus speciem sortiuntur sicut ex propriis obiectis: unde et temperantia a fortitudine differt inquantum haec circa concupiscentias est, illa vero circa timores et audacias. In Deo autem passiones non sunt, ut ostensum est. Igitur nec huiusmodi virtutes in Deo esse possunt. Moreover. Some of the virtues that are concerned with the active life regulate us in regard to the passions. These we cannot ascribe to God. For those virtues which are concerned with the passions take their species from those very passions as from their proper objects: thus temperance differs from fortitude because the former is about desires, while the latter is about fear and daring. But in God there are no passions, as we have proved (ch. 89). Neither, therefore, can these virtues be in God. Item. Huiusmodi virtutes non in parte intellectiva animae sunt, sed in parte sensitiva, in qua sola passiones esse possunt, ut probatur in VII physicorum. In Deo autem non est sensitiva pars, sed solus intellectus. Relinquitur igitur quod in Deo huiusmodi virtutes esse non possint, etiam secundum proprias rationes. Again. These same virtues are not in the intellective part of the soul, but in the sensitive part, in which alone can the passions be, as is proved in 7 Physics 3. But there is no sensitive faculty in God, but only intellect (ch. 20, 27). It follows, therefore, that these virtues cannot be in God, even according to their proper signification. Passionum autem circa quas virtutes sunt, quaedam sunt secundum inclinationem appetitus in aliquod corporale bonum quod est delectabile secundum sensum, sicut sunt cibi et potus et venerea; circa quorum concupiscentias est sobrietas, castitas, et universaliter temperantia et continentia. Unde, quia corporales delectationes omnino a Deo remotae sunt, virtutes praedictae nec proprie Deo conveniunt, cum circa passiones sint; nec etiam metaphorice de Deo dicuntur in Scripturis, quia nec est accipere similitudinem ipsarum in Deo secundum similitudinem alicuius effectus. Some of the passions about which these virtues are concerned result from an inclination of the appetite to some bodily good that is pleasant to the senses—for instance, meat, drink, and sexual matters. And in respect of the desires for these things there are sobriety, chastity, and speaking in a general way, temperance and continence. Therefore, since bodily pleasures are utterly removed from God, the aforesaid virtues neither apply to God properly, since they are about the passions, nor even are they applied to God metaphorically in the Scriptures, because no likeness to them is to be found in God as regards a likeness in their effects (cf. ch. 91). Quaedam vero passiones sunt secundum inclinationem appetitus in aliquod spirituale bonum, sicut est honor, dominium, victoria, vindicta, et alia huiusmodi: circa quorum spes, audacias et omnino appetitus sunt fortitudo, magnanimitas, mansuetudo, et aliae huiusmodi virtutes. Quae quidem in Deo proprie esse non possunt, eo quod circa passiones sunt: dicuntur tamen in Scriptura metaphorice de Deo, propter similitudinem effectus; ut est illud I Reg. 2:2: non est fortis sicut Deus noster; et Mich. 6: quaerite mansuetum, quaerite bonum. And there are some passions resulting from an inclination of the appetite to a spiritual good, such as honor, dominion, victory, revenge, and so forth: and there are fortitude, magnanimity, meekness, and other like virtues about our hopes, darings, and any acts of the appetite in respect of these things. These cannot be in God properly, because they are about the passions, but they are applied metaphorically to God in Scripture, on account of a likeness of effect. For instance: there is none brave like our God (1 Sam 2:2); and: seek the meek, seek the good (Zeph 2:3). Caput 93 Chapter 93 Quod in Deo sunt virtutes morales quae sunt circa actiones That in God there are moral virtues which are about actions