Item. Voluntas nunquam ad malum fertur nisi aliquo errore in ratione existente, ad minus in particulari eligibili. Cum enim voluntatis obiectum sit bonum apprehensum, non potest voluntas ferri in malum nisi aliquo modo proponatur sibi ut bonum: et hoc sine errore esse non potest. In divina autem cognitione non potest esse error, ut supra ostensum est. Non igitur voluntas eius potest ad malum tendere.
Again. The will never tends towards evil unless there be an error in the reason, at least as regards the particular object of choice. For, since the object of the will is an apprehended good, the will cannot tend towards an evil unless, in some way, it is proposed to it as a good, and this cannot be without an error. Now there can be no error in the divine knowledge, as we have shown (ch. 61). Therefore, God’s will cannot tend to evil.
Amplius. Deus est summum bonum, ut supra probatum est. Summum autem bonum non patitur aliquod consortium mali: sicut nec summe calidum permixtionem frigidi. Divina igitur voluntas non potest flecti ad malum.
Moreover. God is the highest good, as was proved above (ch. 41). Now the highest good does not suffer the company of evil, as neither does the supremely hot suffer an admixture of cold. Therefore, the divine will cannot be inclined to evil.
Praeterea. Cum bonum habeat rationem finis, malum non potest incidere in voluntate nisi per aversionem a fine. Voluntas autem divina a fine averti non potest: cum nihil possit velle nisi volendo seipsum, ut ostensum est. Non potest igitur velle malum.
Further. Since good has the aspect of end, evil cannot be an object of the will except the latter turn away from its end. But the divine will cannot turn away from its end, because he cannot will anything except by willing himself, as we have proved (ch. 74-76). Therefore, he cannot will evil.
Et sic patet quod liberum arbitrium in ipso naturaliter stabilitum est in bono.
It is, therefore, evident that in him free will is naturally established in good.
Hoc autem est quod dicitur Deut. 32:4: Deus fidelis et absque iniquitate; et Hab. 1:13: mundi sunt oculi tui, domine, et respicere ad iniquitatem non potes.
This is expressed in the words of Deuteronomy 32:4: God of faithfulness and without iniquity, and Habakkuk 1:13: you who are of purer eyes than to behold evil and cannot look on wrong.
Per hoc autem confutatur error Iudaeorum, qui in Talmut dicunt Deum quandoque peccare et a peccato purgari; et Luciferianorum, qui dicunt Deum in Luciferi deiectione peccasse.
Through this, the error of the Jews is confuted, who assert in the Talmud that God sins sometimes and is cleansed from sin; and also of the Luciferians, who say that God sinned in casting out Lucifer.
Quod Deus nihil odit, nec odium alicuius rei ei convenire potest
That God hates nothing, nor can the hatred of anything be ascribed to him
Ex hoc autem apparet quod odium alicuius rei Deo convenire non potest.
Hence it appears that hatred of a thing cannot be ascribed to God.
Sicut enim amor se habet ad bonum, ita odium se habet ad malum: nam his quos amamus, bonum volumus; his vero quos odimus, malum. Si igitur voluntas Dei ad malum inclinari non potest, ut ostensum est, impossibile est quod ipse rem aliquam odio habeat.
Because as love is related to good, so is hatred to evil: for we will good to those whom we love, but evil to those whom we hate. Therefore, if God’s will cannot be inclined to evil, as was proved above (ch. 95), it is impossible for him to hate anything.
Item. Voluntas Dei in alia a se fertur, ut supra ostensum est, inquantum, volendo et amando suum esse et suam bonitatem vult eam diffundi, secundum quod possibile est, per similitudinis communicationem. Hoc igitur est quod Deus in rebus aliis a se vult, ut in eis sit suae bonitatis similitudo. Hoc autem est bonum uniuscuiusque rei, ut similitudinem divinam participet: nam quaelibet bonitas alia non est nisi quaedam similitudo primae bonitatis. Igitur Deus unicuique rei vult bonum. Nihil igitur odit.
Again. As we have shown above (ch. 75), God’s will tends to things other than himself, inasmuch as by willing and loving his being and goodness, he wills it to be poured forth by communicating its likeness as far as possible. Accordingly, what God wills in things other than himself is that the likeness of his goodness be in them. Now the goodness of each thing consists in its partaking of the divine likeness, since every other goodness is nothing but a likeness of the first goodness (ch. 40). Therefore, God wills good to everything, and consequently he hates nothing.
Adhuc. A primo ente omnia alia originem essendi sumunt. Si igitur aliquid eorum quae sunt odio habet, vult illud non esse: quia hoc est unicuique bonum. Vult igitur actionem suam non esse qua illud in esse producitur vel mediate vel immediate: ostensum est enim supra quod, si Deus aliquid vult, oportet quod illa velit quae ad illud requiruntur. Hoc autem est impossibile. Quod quidem patet, si res per voluntatem ipsius in esse procedant: quia tunc oportet actionem qua res producuntur esse voluntariam. Similiter si naturaliter sit rerum causa: quia, sicut placet sibi sua natura, sic placet sibi omne illud quod sua natura requirit. Nullam igitur rem Deus odit.
Again. From the first being all others take the origin of their being (ch. 13). Therefore, if he hates any one of the things that are, he wills it not to be, because to be is a thing’s good. Hence he wills his action not to be by which that thing is brought into being mediately or immediately; for it has been proved above (ch. 83) that if God wills a thing, it follows that he wills whatever is required for that thing. But this is impossible. And this is evident if things are brought into being by his will, since in that case the action by which things are produced must be voluntary. Likewise, if he is the cause of things naturally, because just as his nature pleases him, so also everything that his nature requires pleases him. Therefore, God does not hate anything.
Praeterea. Illud quod invenitur in omnibus causis activis naturaliter, praecipue in primo agente necesse est inveniri. Omnia autem agentia suo modo suos effectus amant, secundum quod huiusmodi: sicut parentes filios, poetae poemata, artifices sua opera. Multo igitur magis Deus nullam rem odit: cum ipse sit omnium causa.
Further. That which is found naturally in all active causes must most of all be found in the first active cause. Now every active cause loves its effect, as such, in its own way: for instance, parents love their children, a poet his poems, a craftsman his handiwork. Much more, therefore, God does not hate anything, since he is the cause of all.
Hoc autem est quod dicitur Sap. 11:25: diligis omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti.
This agrees with the saying of Wisdom 11:25: you love all things that exist, and have loathing for none of the things which you have made.
Dicitur autem similitudinarie Deus aliqua odire. Et hoc dupliciter. Primo modo, ex hoc quod Deus, amando res, volens eorum bonum esse, vult contrarium malum non esse. Unde malorum odium habere dicitur, nam quae non esse volumus, dicimur odio habere: secundum illud Zach. 8:17: unusquisque malum contra amicum suum ne cogitetis in cordibus vestris, et iuramentum mendax non diligatis: omnia enim haec sunt quae odi, dicit dominus. Haec autem non sunt effectus ut res subsistentes, quarum proprie est odium vel amor.
And yet God is said metaphorically to hate certain things, and this in two ways. First, from the fact that God in loving things, and willing their good to be, wills the contrary evil not to be. Therefore, he is said to hate evils, since we are said to hate that which we will not to be: do not devise evil in your hearts against one another, and love no false oath, for all these things I hate, says the Lord (Zach 8:17). But such things are not his effects as subsistent things, to which hatred or love are directed properly speaking.
Alius autem modus est ex hoc quod Deus vult aliquod maius bonum quod esse non potest sine privatione minoris boni. Et sic dicitur odire: cum magis hoc sit amare. Sic enim, inquantum vult bonum iustitiae vel ordinis universi, quod esse non potest sine punitione vel corruptione aliquorum, dicitur illa odire quorum punitionem vult vel corruptionem: secundum illud Mal. 1:3: Esau odio habui; et illud Psalmi: odisti omnes qui operantur iniquitatem; perdes omnes qui loquuntur mendacium: virum sanguinum et dolosum abominatur dominus.
The other way is due to God willing some greater good that cannot be without the privation of a lesser good. And thus he is said to hate, since to do more than this were to love. For in this way insofar as he wills the good of justice or of the order of the universe (which good is impossible without the punishment or destruction of some) he is said to hate those whose punishment or destruction he wills: I have hated Esau (Mal 1:3); and: you hate all evildoers; you destroy those who speak lies; the Lord abhors bloodthirsty and deceitful men (Ps 5:6).
Quod Deus est vivens
That God is a living being
Ex his autem quae iam ostensa sunt, de necessitate habetur quod Deus est vivens.
From what has been already proved, it follows of necessity that God is a living being.
Ostensum est enim Deum esse intelligentem et volentem. Intelligere autem et velle non nisi viventis est. Est igitur Deus vivens.
For it has been shown (ch. 44, 72) that in God there are intelligence and will. Now intelligence and will are only in that which lives. Therefore, God is a living being.
Adhuc. Vivere secundum hoc aliquibus attributum est quod visa sunt per se, non ab alio moveri. Et propter hoc illa quae videntur per se moveri, quorum motores vulgus non percipit, per similitudinem dicimus vivere: sicut aquam vivam fontis fluentis, non autem cisternae vel stagni stantis; et argentum vivum, quod motum quendam habere videtur. Proprie enim illa sola per se moventur quae movent seipsa, composita ex motore et moto, sicut animata. Unde haec sola proprie vivere dicimus: alia vero omnia ab aliquo exteriori moventur, vel generante, vel removente prohibens, vel impellente. Et quia operationes sensibiles cum motu sunt, ulterius omne illud quod agit se ad proprias operationes, quamvis non sint cum motu, dicitur vivere: unde intelligere, appetere et sentire actiones vitae sunt. Sed Deus maxime non ab alio, sed a seipso operatur: cum sit prima causa agens. Maxime igitur ei competit vivere.
Again. Life is ascribed to certain things inasmuch as they seem to be set in motion of themselves and not by another. For which reason, things which seem to be moved of themselves, whose movers are not perceived by the unlearned, are described metaphorically as living: for instance, we speak of the living water of a flowing source, but not of a tank or stagnant pond; and of quicksilver, which seems to have a kind of movement. For properly speaking, those things alone are themselves in motion which move themselves (being composed of mover and moved), such as animate beings. Therefore, such things alone are said to live, while all others are moved by some other thing: either as generating them, or as removing an obstacle, or as impelling them. And since sensible operations are accompanied by movement, finally whatever moves itself to its proper operations, although these be without movement, is said to live: thus intelligence, appetite, and sensation are vital actions. Now God especially works not as moved by another but by himself, since he is the first active cause (ch. 13). Therefore, to live befits him the most.
Item. Divinum esse omnem perfectionem essendi comprehendit, ut supra ostensum est. Vivere autem est quoddam esse perfectum: unde viventia in ordine entium non viventibus praeferuntur. Divinum igitur esse est vivere. Ipse igitur est vivens.
Again. The divine being contains every perfection of being, as was shown above (ch. 28). Now life is a kind of perfect existence; therefore, living beings are placed above non-living things in the order of beings. Therefore, God’s being is life. Therefore, he is a living being.
Hoc etiam auctoritate divinae Scripturae confirmatur. Dicitur enim Deut. 32:40, ex ore domini: dicam, vivo ego in aeternum; et in Psalmo: cor meum et caro mea exultaverunt in Deum vivum.
This is confirmed by the authority of divine Scripture. For it is said in the person of the Lord: I will say: 'I live forever' (Deut 32:40); and in the Psalm: my heart and flesh sing for joy to the living God (Ps 84:2[83:3]).
Quod Deus est sua vita
That God is his own life
Ex hoc autem ulterius patet quod Deus sit sua vita.
From this it further appears that God is his own life.
Vita enim viventis est ipsum vivere in quadam abstractione significatum: sicut cursus non est secundum rem aliud quam currere. Vivere autem viventium est ipsum esse eorum, ut patet per Philosophum, in II De anima: cum enim ex hoc animal dicatur vivens quod animam habet, secundum quam habet esse, utpote secundum propriam formam, oportet quod vivere nihil sit aliud quam tale esse ex tali forma proveniens. Deus autem est suum esse, ut supra probatum est. Est igitur suum vivere et sua vita.
For life in a living being is the same as to live expressed in the abstract; just as running is in reality the same as to run. Now in living things, to live is to be, as the Philosopher declares in 2 De Anima, 4, 4. For, since an animal is said to be living because it has a soul whereby it has existence (that is, by its proper form), it follows that to live is nothing but a particular kind of existence resulting from a particular kind of form. Now God is his own existence, as proved above (ch. 22). Therefore, he is his own living and his own life.
Item. Ipsum intelligere est quoddam vivere, ut patet per Philosophum, in II De anima: nam vivere est actus viventis. Deus autem est suum intelligere, sicut supra ostensum est. Est igitur suum vivere et sua vita.
Again. Intelligence is a kind of life, as the Philosopher declares, in 2 De Anima, 2, 2. since to live is the act of a living being. Now God is his own act of intelligence, as we have proved (ch. 45). Therefore, he is his own living and his own life.
Amplius. Si Deus non esset sua vita, cum sit vivens, ut ostensum est, sequeretur quod esset vivens per participationem vitae. Omne autem quod est per participationem, reducitur ad id quod est per seipsum. Deus igitur reduceretur in aliquod prius, per quod viveret. Quod est impossibile, ut ex dictis patet.
Moreover. If God were not his own life, since he is a living being, as shown above (ch. 97), it would follow that he is living by a participation of life. Now whatever is by participation is reduced to that which is by its essence. Therefore, God would be reduced to something preceding him whereby he would live. But this is impossible, as is evident from what has been said (ch. 13).
Adhuc. Si sit vivens Deus, ut ostensum est, oportet in ipso esse vitam. Si igitur non sit ipse sua vita, erit aliquid in ipso quod non est ipse. Et sic erit compositus. Quod supra improbatum est. Est igitur Deus sua vita.
Again. If God is a living being, as we have proved (ch. 97), it follows that life is in him. Therefore, if he be not his own life, there will be something in him that is not himself: consequently, he will be composite. But this was disproved above (ch. 18). Therefore, God is his own life.
Et hoc est quod dicitur Ioan. 14:6: ego sum vita.
This is what is said: I am life (John 14:6).
Quod vita Dei est sempiterna
That God’s life is eternal
Ex hoc autem apparet quod vita eius sit sempiterna.
It follows from this that God’s life is eternal.
Nihil enim desinit vivere nisi per separationem vitae. Nihil autem a seipso separari potest: omnis enim separatio fit per divisionem alicuius ab alio. Impossibile est igitur quod Deus deficiat vivere: cum ipse sit sua vita, ut ostensum est.
For nothing ceases to live except by being severed from life. But nothing can be severed from itself: for all severance results from the separation of one thing from another. Therefore, it is impossible that God cease to live, since himself is his own life, as we have proved (ch. 98).
Item. Omne illud quod quandoque est et quandoque non est, est per aliquam causam: nihil enim seipsum de non esse in esse adducit, quia quod nondum est, non agit. Divina autem vita non habet aliquam causam: sicut nec divinum esse. Non igitur quandoque est vivens et quandoque non vivens, sed semper vivit. Est igitur vita eius sempiterna.
Again. Whatever sometimes is and sometimes is not results from a cause: for nothing brings itself from non-being to being, since what does not yet exist does not act. Now the divine life has no cause, as neither has the divine existence. Therefore, he is not sometimes living and sometimes not living, but is ever living. Therefore, his life is eternal.