Caput 98 Chapter 98 Quod Deus est sua vita That God is his own life Ex hoc autem ulterius patet quod Deus sit sua vita. From this it further appears that God is his own life. Vita enim viventis est ipsum vivere in quadam abstractione significatum: sicut cursus non est secundum rem aliud quam currere. Vivere autem viventium est ipsum esse eorum, ut patet per Philosophum, in II De anima: cum enim ex hoc animal dicatur vivens quod animam habet, secundum quam habet esse, utpote secundum propriam formam, oportet quod vivere nihil sit aliud quam tale esse ex tali forma proveniens. Deus autem est suum esse, ut supra probatum est. Est igitur suum vivere et sua vita. For life in a living being is the same as to live expressed in the abstract; just as running is in reality the same as to run. Now in living things, to live is to be, as the Philosopher declares in On the Soul. For, since an animal is said to be living because it has a soul whereby it has existence (that is, by its proper form), it follows that to live is nothing but a particular kind of existence resulting from a particular kind of form. Now God is his own existence, as proved above. Therefore, he is his own living and his own life. Item. Ipsum intelligere est quoddam vivere, ut patet per Philosophum, in II De anima: nam vivere est actus viventis. Deus autem est suum intelligere, sicut supra ostensum est. Est igitur suum vivere et sua vita. Again. Intelligence is a kind of life, as the Philosopher declares, in On the Soul, since to live is the act of a living being. Now God is his own act of intelligence, as we have proved. Therefore, he is his own living and his own life. Amplius. Si Deus non esset sua vita, cum sit vivens, ut ostensum est, sequeretur quod esset vivens per participationem vitae. Omne autem quod est per participationem, reducitur ad id quod est per seipsum. Deus igitur reduceretur in aliquod prius, per quod viveret. Quod est impossibile, ut ex dictis patet. Moreover. If God were not his own life, since he is a living being, as shown above, it would follow that he is living by a participation of life. Now whatever is by participation is reduced to that which is by its essence. Therefore, God would be reduced to something preceding him whereby he would live. But this is impossible, as is evident from what has been said. Adhuc. Si sit vivens Deus, ut ostensum est, oportet in ipso esse vitam. Si igitur non sit ipse sua vita, erit aliquid in ipso quod non est ipse. Et sic erit compositus. Quod supra improbatum est. Est igitur Deus sua vita. Again. If God is a living being, as we have proved, it follows that life is in him. Therefore, if he be not his own life, there will be something in him that is not himself: consequently, he will be composite. But this was disproved above. Therefore, God is his own life. Et hoc est quod dicitur Ioan. 14:6: ego sum vita. This is what is said: I am life (John 14:6). Caput 99 Chapter 99 Quod vita Dei est sempiterna That God’s life is eternal Ex hoc autem apparet quod vita eius sit sempiterna. It follows from this that God’s life is eternal. Nihil enim desinit vivere nisi per separationem vitae. Nihil autem a seipso separari potest: omnis enim separatio fit per divisionem alicuius ab alio. Impossibile est igitur quod Deus deficiat vivere: cum ipse sit sua vita, ut ostensum est. For nothing ceases to live except by being severed from life. But nothing can be severed from itself: for all severance results from the separation of one thing from another. Therefore, it is impossible that God cease to live, since himself is his own life, as we have proved. Item. Omne illud quod quandoque est et quandoque non est, est per aliquam causam: nihil enim seipsum de non esse in esse adducit, quia quod nondum est, non agit. Divina autem vita non habet aliquam causam: sicut nec divinum esse. Non igitur quandoque est vivens et quandoque non vivens, sed semper vivit. Est igitur vita eius sempiterna. Again. Whatever sometimes is and sometimes is not results from a cause: for nothing brings itself from non-being to being, since what does not yet exist does not act. Now the divine life has no cause, as neither has the divine existence. Therefore, he is not sometimes living and sometimes not living, but is ever living. Therefore, his life is eternal. Adhuc. In qualibet operatione operans manet, licet interdum operatio transeat secundum successionem: unde et in motu mobile manet idem subiecto in toto motu, licet non secundum rationem. Ubi igitur actio est ipsum agens, oportet quod nihil ibi per successionem transeat, sed totum simul maneat. Intelligere autem et vivere Dei ipse est Deus, ut ostensum est. Igitur eius vita non habet successionem, sed est tota simul. Est igitur sempiterna. Again. In every operation the operator remains, although sometimes the operation is transitory by way of succession: thus in movement, the thing moved remains the same identically though not logically. Hence where action is the agent itself, it follows that nothing passes by in succession, but that the whole is simultaneously the same throughout. Now in God to understand and to live are God himself, as was proved. Therefore, his life is without succession and is simultaneously whole. Therefore, it is eternal. Amplius. Deus omnino immobilis est, ut supra ostensum est. Quod autem incipit aut desinit vivere, vel in vivendo successionem patitur, mutabile est: nam vita alicuius incipit per generationem, desinit autem per corruptionem, successio autem propter motum aliquem est. Deus igitur neque incoepit vivere, neque desinet vivere, neque in vivendo successionem patitur. Est igitur eius vita sempiterna. Moreover. God is utterly unchangeable, as we have proved above. But that which begins or ceases to live, or is subject to succession in living, is changeable: for the life of a being begins by generation and ceases by corruption, and succession results from change of some kind. Therefore, God neither began to be, nor will cease to be, nor is subject to succession in living. Therefore, his life is eternal. Hinc est quod dicitur Deut. 32:40, ex ore domini: vivo ego in aeternum; I Ioan. ult.: hic est verus Deus et vita aeterna. Therefore, it is said in the person of the Lord: I live forever (Deut 32:40); and: this is the true God and eternal life (1 John 5:20). Caput 100 Chapter 100 Quod Deus est beatus That God is happy Restat autem ex praemissis ostendere Deum esse beatum. It remains for us to show from the foregoing that God is happy. Cuiuslibet enim intellectualis naturae proprium bonum est beatitudo. Cum igitur Deus sit intelligens, suum proprium bonum erit beatitudo. Non autem comparatur ad proprium bonum sicut quod in bonum nondum habitum tendit, hoc enim est naturae mobilis et in potentia existentis: sed sicut quod iam obtinet proprium bonum. Igitur beatitudinem non solum desiderat, sicut nos, sed ea fruitur. Est igitur beatus. For happiness is the proper good of every intellectual nature. Since, then, God is intelligent, his proper good is happiness. Now he is compared to his proper good not as that which tends to a good not yet possessed—for this belongs to a nature that is changeable and in potency—but as that which already possesses its proper good. Therefore, he not only desires happiness, as we do, but enjoys it. Therefore, he is happy. Amplius. Illud est maxime desideratum vel volitum ab intellectuali natura quod est perfectissimum in ipsa: et hoc est eius beatitudo. Perfectissimum autem in unoquoque est operatio perfectissima eius: nam potentia et habitus per operationem perficiuntur; unde et philosophus dicit felicitatem esse operationem perfectam. Moreover. An intellectual nature desires and wills above all that which is most perfect in it, and this is its happiness. But the most perfect thing in every being is its most perfect operation: for power and habit are perfected by operation; therefore, the Philosopher says that happiness is a perfect operation. Perfectio autem operationis dependet ex quatuor. Primo, ex suo genere: ut scilicet sit manens in ipso operante. Dico autem operationem in ipso manentem per quam non fit aliud praeter ipsam operationem: sicut videre et audire. Huiusmodi enim sunt perfectiones eorum quorum sunt operationes, et possunt esse ultimum: quia non ordinantur ad aliquod factum quod sit finis. Operatio vero vel actio ex qua sequitur aliquid actum praeter ipsam, est perfectio operati, non operantis, et comparatur ad ipsum sicut ad finem. Et ideo talis operatio intellectualis naturae non est beatitudo sive felicitas. Secundo, ex principio operationis: ut sit altissimae potentiae. Unde secundum operationem sensus non est in nobis felicitas, sed secundum operationem intellectus et per habitum perfecti. Tertio, ex operationis obiecto. Et propter hoc in nobis ultima felicitas est in intelligendo altissimum intelligibile. Quarto, ex forma operationis: ut scilicet perfecte, faciliter, firmiter et delectabiliter operetur. Talis autem est Dei operatio: cum sit intelligens; et suus intellectus altissima virtutum sit, nec indiget habitu perficiente, quia in seipso perfectus est, ut supra ostensum est; ipse autem seipsum intelligit, qui est summum intelligibilium; perfecte, absque omni difficultate, et delectabiliter. Est igitur beatus. Now the perfection of operation depends on four things. First, on its genus, namely, so that it abides in the operator. I mean one by which nothing else is done besides the operation, such as to see or to hear. For the like are perfections of those things whose operations they are, and can be something ultimate, because they are not directed to something made as their end. On the other hand, an operation or action from which there follows something done besides the action itself, is a perfection of the thing done, not of the doer, and is compared to the doer as its end. Hence such an operation of the intellectual nature is not beatitude or happiness. Second, on the principle of operation: it should be an operation of the highest power. Hence happiness in us is not by an operation of the senses, but by an operation of the intellect perfected by a habit. Third, on the object of the operation. For this reason ultimate happiness in us consists in understanding the highest object of our intellect. Fourth, on the form of operation, namely, that the operation should be performed perfectly, easily, constantly, and pleasurably. Now such is the operation of God. For he is intelligent, and his intellect is the sovereign power; nor does it need to be perfected by a habit, since it is perfect in itself, as we proved above. He also understands himself, who is the highest of intelligible objects, perfectly, without any difficulty, and pleasurably. Therefore, he is happy. Adhuc. Per beatitudinem desiderium omne quietatur: quia, ea habita, non restat aliud desiderandum; cum sit ultimus finis. Oportet igitur eum esse beatum qui perfectus est quantum ad omnia quae desiderare potest: unde Boetius dicit quod beatitudo est status omnium bonorum congregatione perfectus. Sed talis est divina perfectio quod omnem perfectionem in quadam simplicitate comprehendit, ut supra ostensum est. Ipse igitur est vere beatus. Again. Every desire is set at rest by happiness, because once it is possessed nothing remains to be desired, for it is the last end. Accordingly, he must be happy, since he is perfect in all things that can be desired; thus Boethius says that happiness is a state made perfect by the assemblage of all good things (On the Consolation of Philosophy 3, pros. 2). Now such is the divine perfection that it contains every perfection with simplicity, as shown above. Therefore, he is truly happy. Item. Quandiu alicui deest aliquid quo indigeat, nondum beatus est: quia eius desiderium nondum est quietatum. Quicumque igitur sibi sufficiens est, nullo indigens, ille beatus est. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus non indiget aliis: cum a nullo exteriori sua perfectio dependeat; nec alia vult propter se sicut propter finem quasi eis indigeat, sed solum quia hoc est conveniens suae bonitati. Est igitur ipse beatus. Again. As long as a person lacks that which he needs, he is not yet happy: for his desire is not yet set at rest. Therefore, anyone who is self-sufficient, needing nothing, is happy. Now it was proved above that God does not need other things, since his perfection depends on nothing outside him: nor does he will other things for his own sake as their end, as though he needed them, but merely because this is befitting his goodness. Therefore, he is happy. Praeterea. Ostensum est supra quod Deus non potest velle aliquod impossibile. Impossibile est autem ei aliquid advenire quod nondum habeat: cum ipse nullo modo sit in potentia, ut ostensum est. Igitur nihil potest velle se habere quod non habeat. Quicquid igitur vult, habet. Nec aliquid male vult, ut supra ostensum est. Est igitur beatus: secundum quod a quibusdam beatus esse perhibetur qui habet quicquid vult et nihil male vult. Further. It has been proved that God cannot will what is impossible. Now it is impossible for anything to accrue to him that he has not already, since he is in no way in potency, as we have shown. Therefore, he cannot will to have what he has not. Whatever, then, he wills he has. Nor does he will anything evil, as we have proved. Therefore, he is happy, according as some assert that a happy man is one who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss. Eius etiam beatitudinem Sacra Scriptura protestatur, I Tim. ult.: quem ostendet suis temporibus beatus et potens. Sacred Scripture also bears witness to his happiness: this will be made manifest at the proper time by the blessed and only sovereign (1 Tim 6:15). Caput 101 Chapter 101 Quod Deus sit sua beatitudo That God is his own happiness Ex his autem apparet quod Deus sit sua beatitudo. It follows from this that God is his own happiness. Beatitudo enim eius est intellectualis operatio ipsius, ut ostensum est. Supra autem ostendimus quod ipsum Dei intelligere sit sua substantia. Ipse igitur est sua beatitudo. For his happiness is his intellectual operation, as we have shown, and it was proved above that God’s act of intelligence is his substance. Therefore, he is his own happiness. Item. Beatitudo, cum sit ultimus finis, est id quod quilibet natus habere, vel habens, principaliter vult. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus principaliter vult suam essentiam. Sua igitur essentia est eius beatitudo. Again. Happiness, since it is the last end, is that which everyone wills principally, whether he has a natural inclination for it, or possesses it already. Now it has been proved that God principally wills his essence. Therefore, his essence is his happiness. Adhuc. Unusquisque in beatitudinem suam ordinat quicquid vult: ipsa enim est quae propter aliud non desideratur, et ad quam terminatur motus desiderii unum propter aliud desiderantis, ne sit infinitus. Cum igitur Deus omnia alia velit propter suam bonitatem, quae est sua essentia, oportet quod ipse, sicut est sua essentia et sua bonitas, ita sit sua beatitudo. Further. Whatever a person wills, he directs to his happiness: for happiness is what is not desired on account of something else, and is the term of the movement of desire in one who desires one thing for the sake of another, lest movement be infinite. Since, then, God wills all other things for the sake of his goodness, which is his essence it follows that he is his own happiness, even as he is his own essence and his own goodness. Praeterea. Duo summa bona esse est impossibile: si enim aliquid uni deesset quod alterum haberet, neutrum summum et perfectum esset. Deus autem ostensus est supra summum bonum esse. Beatitudo etiam summum bonum ostendetur esse ex hoc quod est ultimus finis. Ergo beatitudo et Deus sunt idem. Est igitur Deus sua beatitudo. Moreover. There cannot be two highest goods, for if either lacked what the other has, neither would be highest and perfect. Now it has been shown above that God is the highest good. And it will be proved that happiness is the supreme good since it is the last end. Therefore, happiness and God are one and the same. Therefore, God is his own happiness. Caput 102 Chapter 102 Quod beatitudo divina perfecta et singularis est excedens omnem aliam beatitudinem That God’s happiness is perfect and singular, surpassing all other happiness Ulterius autem ex praemissis considerari potest beatitudinis divinae excellentia. Furthermore, from what has been said we are able to consider the excellence of the divine happiness.