Summa Contra Gentiles 2 Summa Contra Gentiles 2 Introductio Introduction Caput 1 Chapter 1 Continuatio sequentium ad praecedentia Connection of the foregoing with the sequel Meditatus sum in omnibus operibus tuis, et in factis manuum tuarum meditabar. I meditated on all your operations: I meditated upon the works of your hands. Psalm. 142:5 Psalm 143(142):5 Rei cuiuslibet perfecta cognitio haberi non potest nisi eius operatio cognoscatur. Ex modo enim operationis et specie mensura et qualitas virtutis pensatur, virtus vero naturam rei monstrat: secundum hoc enim unumquodque natum est operari quod actu talem naturam sortitur. It is impossible to know a thing perfectly unless we know its operation, since from the mode and species of its operation we gauge the measure and quality of its power, and the power of a thing shows forth its nature (because a thing has naturally an aptitude for work according as it actually has such and such a nature). Est autem duplex rei operatio, ut Philosophus tradit, in IX Metaphysicae: una quidem quae in ipso operante manet et est ipsius operantis perfectio, ut sentire, intelligere et velle; alia vero quae in exteriorem rem transit, quae est perfectio facti quod per ipsam constituitur, ut calefacere, secare et aedificare. Now the operation of a thing is twofold, as the Philosopher teaches in 9 Metaphysics: one that abides in the very worker and is a perfection of the worker himself, such as to sense, to understand, and to will; and another that passes into an outward thing, and is a perfection of the thing made that results from it, such as to heat, to cut, and to build. Utraque autem dictarum operationum competit Deo: prima quidem in eo quod intelligit, vult, gaudet et amat; alia vero in eo quod res in esse producit, et eas conservat et regit. Quia vero prima operatio perfectio operantis est, secunda vero perfectio facti; agens autem naturaliter prius est facto et causa ipsius: oportet quod prima dictarum operationum sit ratio secundae et eam praecedat naturaliter, sicut causa effectum. Quod quidem in rebus humanis manifeste apparet: consideratio enim et voluntas artificis principium est et ratio aedificationis. Now both of the aforesaid operations are competent to God: the former, in that he understands, wills, rejoices, and loves; the latter, in that he brings forth things into being, preserves them, and rules them. Since, however, the former operation is a perfection of the operator, while the latter is a perfection of the thing made, and since the agent is naturally prior to the thing made and is its cause, it follows that the first of the aforesaid operations is the reason of the second, and naturally precedes it, as a cause precedes its effect. This is, in fact, clearly seen in human affairs: for the thought and will of the craftsman is the origin and reason of the work of building. Prima igitur dictarum operationum, tanquam simplex operantis perfectio, operationis vindicat sibi nomen, vel etiam actionis: secunda vero, eo quod sit perfectio facti, factionis nomen assumit; unde manufacta dicuntur quae per actionem huiusmodi ab artifice in esse procedunt. Accordingly, the first of the aforesaid operations, as a simple perfection of the operator, claims for itself the name of operation, or again of action: while the second, as being a perfection of the thing made, takes the name of work. Hence things which a craftsman brings into being by an action of this kind are said to be his handiwork. De prima quidem Dei operatione in praecedenti libro iam diximus, ubi est actum de cognitione et voluntate divina. Unde, ad completam divinae veritatis considerationem, restat nunc de secunda operatione tractare, per quam scilicet res producuntur et gubernantur a Deo. Of the former operation of God we have already spoken in the foregoing book, where we treated of the divine knowledge and will (ch. 44–102). Therefore, in order to complete our treatise of the divine truth, it remains for us to treat of the latter operation, namely, that whereby things are made and governed by God. Quem quidem ordinem ex praemissis verbis sumere possumus. Praemittit namque primae operationis meditationem, cum dicit, meditatus sum in omnibus operibus tuis: ut operatio ad divinum intelligere et velle referatur. Subiungit vero de factionis meditatione, cum dicit, et in factis manuum tuarum meditabar: ut per facta manuum ipsius intelligamus caelum et terram, et omnia quae procedunt in esse a Deo sicut ab artifice manufacta procedunt. We may gather this order from the words quoted above (Ps 143[142]2:5). For first he speaks of meditation on the first kind of operation, when he says: I meditated on all your operations, so that we refer operation to the divine intelligence and will. Then he refers to meditation on God’s works when he says, and I meditated on the works of your hands, so that by the works of his hands we understand heaven and earth, and all that is brought into being by God, as the handiwork produced by a craftsman. Caput 2 Chapter 2 Quod consideratio creaturarum utilis est ad fidei instructionem That the consideration of creatures is useful for building up our faith Huiusmodi quidem divinorum factorum meditatio ad fidem humanam instruendam de Deo necessaria est. This meditation on the divine works is indeed necessary in order to build up man’s faith in God. Primo quidem, quia ex factorum meditatione divinam sapientiam utcumque possumus admirari et considerare. Ea enim quae arte fiunt, ipsius artis sunt repraesentativa, utpote ad similitudinem artis facta. Deus autem sua sapientia res in esse produxit: propter quod in Psalmo dicitur: omnia in sapientia fecisti. Unde ex factorum consideratione divinam sapientiam colligere possumus, sicut in rebus factis per quandam communicationem suae similitudinis sparsam. Dicitur enim Eccli. 1:10: effudit illam, scilicet sapientiam, super omnia opera sua. Unde, cum Psalmus diceret, mirabilis facta est scientia tua ex me: confortata est, et non potero ad eam: et adiungeret divinae illuminationis auxilium cum dicit. Nox illuminatio mea etc.; ex consideratione divinorum operum se adiutum ad divinam sapientiam cognoscendam confitetur, dicens: mirabilia opera tua, et anima mea cognoscet nimis. First, because through meditating on his works we are able somewhat to admire and consider the divine wisdom. For things made by art are indications of the art itself, since they are made in likeness to the art. Now God brought things into being by his wisdom: for which reason it is said in the Psalm: in wisdom have you made them all (Ps 104[103]:24). Hence we are able to gather the wisdom of God from the consideration of his works, since by a kind of communication of his likeness it is spread abroad in the things he has made. For it is said: he poured her out, namely wisdom, upon all his works (Sir 1:10); therefore, the Psalmist, after saying: your knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is high, I cannot attain it (Ps 139[138]:6), and after referring to the aid of the divine enlightening, when he says: let only darkness cover me, and the light about me be night (Ps 139[138]:11), confesses himself to have been helped to know the divine wisdom by the consideration of the divine works, saying: wonderful are thy works! My soul knows right well (Ps 139[138]:14). Secundo, haec consideratio in admirationem altissimae Dei virtutis ducit: et per consequens in cordibus hominum reverentiam Dei parit. Oportet enim quod virtus facientis eminentior rebus factis intelligatur. Et ideo dicitur Sap. 13:4: si virtutem et opera eorum, scilicet caeli et stellarum et elementorum mundi, mirati sunt, scilicet philosophi, intelligant quoniam qui fecit haec, fortior est illis. Et Rom. 1:20 dicitur: invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur: sempiterna quoque virtus eius et divinitas. Ex hac autem admiratione Dei timor procedit et reverentia. Unde dicitur Ierem. 10:6 magnum est nomen tuum in fortitudine. Quis non timebit te, o rex gentium? Second, this consideration leads us to admire the sublime power of God, and consequently begets in men’s hearts a reverence for God. For we must conclude that the power of the maker transcends the things made. Therefore it is said: if they, the philosophers, were amazed at their power and working, namely of the heavens, stars, and elements of the world, let them perceive from them how much more powerful is he who formed them (Wis 13:4). Also, it is written: ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made (Rom 1:20). And this admiration makes us fear and reverence God. Hence it is said: your name is great in might. Who would not fear you, O King of the nations? (Jer 10:6–7). Tertio, haec consideratio animas hominum in amorem divinae bonitatis accendit. Quicquid enim bonitatis et perfectionis in diversis creaturis particulariter distributum est, totum in ipso universaliter est adunatum, sicut in fonte totius bonitatis, ut in primo libro ostensum est. Si igitur creaturarum bonitas, pulchritudo et suavitas sic animos hominum allicit, ipsius Dei fontana bonitas, rivulis bonitatum in singulis creaturis repertis diligenter comparata, animas hominum inflammatas totaliter ad se trahet. Unde in Psalmo dicitur: delectasti me, domine, in factura tua, et in operibus manuum tuarum exsultabo. Et alibi de filiis hominum dicitur: inebriabuntur ab ubertate domus tuae, quasi totius creaturae, et sicut torrente voluptatis tuae potabis eos: quoniam apud te est fons vitae. Et Sap. 13:1, dicitur contra quosdam: ex his quae videntur bona, scilicet creaturis, quae sunt bona per quandam participationem, non potuerunt intelligere eum qui est, scilicet vere bonus, immo ipsa bonitas, ut in primo ostensum est. Third, this consideration inflames the souls of men to the love of the divine goodness. For whatever goodness and perfection is generally apportioned among various creatures is all united together in him universally, as in the source of all goodness, as we proved in the first book. Therefore, if the goodness, beauty, and sweetness of creatures are so alluring to the minds of men, the fountainhead of the goodness of God himself, in comparison with the rivulets of goodness which we find in creatures, will draw the kindled souls of men wholly to itself. Hence it is said in the Psalm, you, O Lord, hast made me glad in your works; at the operations of your hands I sing for joy (Ps 92:4[91:5]); and elsewhere it is said of the children of men: they feast on the abundance of your house, that is of all creatures, and you give them drink from the river of your delights. For with you is the fountain of life (Ps 35:9–10). Again, it is said against certain men: they were unable from the good things that are seen, namely creatures that are good by participation, to know him who exists (Wis 13:1), namely, the true good; no, more: goodness itself, as we have shown in the first book (ch. 38). Quarto, haec consideratio homines in quadam similitudine divinae perfectionis constituit. Ostensum est enim in primo libro quod Deus, cognoscendo seipsum, in se omnia alia intuetur. Cum igitur Christiana fides hominem de Deo principaliter instruit, et per lumen divinae revelationis eum creaturarum cognitorem facit, fit in homine quaedam divinae sapientiae similitudo. Hinc est quod dicitur 2 Cor. 3:18: nos vero omnes, revelata facie gloriam domini speculantes, in eandem imaginem transformamur. Fourth, this consideration bestows on man a certain likeness to the divine perfection. For it was shown in the first book (ch. 49-54) that God, by knowing himself, beholds all other things in himself. Since, then, the Christian faith teaches man chiefly about God, and makes him to know creatures by the light of divine revelation, there results in man a certain likeness to the divine wisdom. Hence it is said: we all, with unveiled face, beholding the glory of the Lord, are being changed into his likeness (2 Cor 3:18). Sic igitur patet quod consideratio creaturarum pertinet ad instructionem fidei Christianae. Et ideo dicitur Eccli. 42:15: memor ero operum domini, et quae vidi annuntiabo: in sermonibus domini opera eius. Accordingly it is evident that the consideration of creatures helps to build up the Christian faith. Therefore it is said: I will now call to mind the works of the Lord, and will declare what I have seen. By the words of the Lord his works are done (Sir 42:15). Caput 3 Chapter 3 Quod cognoscere naturam creaturarum valet ad destruendum errores qui sunt circa Deum That the knowledge of the nature of creatures avails for refuting errors against God Est etiam necessaria creaturarum consideratio non solum ad veritatis instructionem, sed etiam ad errores excludendos. Errores namque qui circa creaturam sunt, interdum a fidei veritate abducunt, secundum quod verae Dei cognitioni repugnant. Hoc autem multipliciter contingit. The consideration of creatures is likewise necessary not only for the building up of faith, but also for the destruction of errors. For errors about creatures sometimes lead one astray from the truth of faith, insofar as they disagree with true knowledge of God. This happens in several ways. Primo quidem, ex hoc quod creaturarum naturam ignorantes in hoc pervertuntur quandoque quod id quod non potest nisi ab alio esse, primam causam et Deum constituunt, nihil ultra creaturas quae videntur aestimantes: sicut fuerunt illi qui corpus quodcumque Deum aestimaverunt; de quibus dicitur Sap. 13:2: qui aut ignem, aut spiritum, aut citatum aerem, aut gyrum stellarum, aut nimiam aquam, aut solem et lunam, deos putaverunt. First, because through ignorance of the nature of creatures men are sometimes so far misled as to deem that which can but derive its being from something else to be the first cause and God, for they think that nothing exists besides visible creatures. Such were those who thought that any kind of body was God, of whom it is said: they supposed that either fire or wind or swift air, or the circle of the stars, or turbulent water, or the sun and moon were the gods that rule the world (Wis 13:2). Secundo, ex hoc quod id quod Dei solius est creaturis aliquibus adscribunt. Quod etiam ex errore circa creaturas contingit. Quod enim natura rei alicuius non patitur, ei non attribuitur nisi quia eius natura ignoratur: sicut si homini attribueretur habere tres pedes. Quod autem solius Dei est natura creaturae non patitur: sicut quod solius hominis est non patitur alterius rei natura. Ex hoc ergo quod natura creaturae ignoratur, praedictus error contingit. Et contra hunc errorem dicitur Sap. 14:21: incommunicabile nomen lignis et lapidibus imposuerunt. In hunc errorem labuntur qui rerum creationem, vel futurorum cognitionem, vel miraculorum operationem, aliis causis quam Deo adscribunt. Second, because they ascribe to certain creatures that which belongs to God alone. This also results from error about creatures: for one does not ascribe to a thing that which is incompatible with its nature unless one is ignorant of its nature (for instance, if we were to ascribe three feet to a man). Now that which belongs to God alone is incompatible with the nature of a creature, even as that which belongs to man alone is incompatible with another thing’s nature. Hence the foregoing error arises from ignorance of the creature’s nature. Against this error it is said: men . . . bestowed on objects of stone or wood the name that ought not to be shared (Wis 14:21). Into this error fell those who ascribe the creation of things, or the knowledge of the future, or the working of miracles to causes other than God. Tertio vero, ex hoc quod divinae virtuti in creaturas operanti aliquid detrahitur per hoc quod creaturae natura ignoratur. Sicut patet in his qui duo rerum principia constituunt; et qui res non ex divina voluntate, sed ex necessitate naturae a Deo procedere asserunt; et illi etiam qui res, vel omnes vel quasdam, divinae providentiae subtrahunt; aut eam posse praeter solitum cursum operari negant. Haec enim omnia divinae derogant potestati. Contra quos dicitur Iob 22:17: quasi nihil possit facere omnipotens, aestimabant eum; et Sap. 12:17: virtutem ostendis tu, qui non crederis esse in virtute consummatus. Third, because, through ignorance of the creature’s nature, something is withdrawn from the divine power in its working on creatures. This is evidenced in those who ascribe to things a twofold principle, and in those who aver that things proceed from God not by the divine will, but by natural necessity, and in those who withdraw either all or some things from divine providence, or who deny that it can work outside the ordinary course of things. For all these are derogatory to the divine power. Against these it is said: who looked upon the Almighty as if he could do nothing (Job 22:17), and: you show your strength when men doubt the completeness of your power (Wis 12:17). Quarto. Homo, qui per fidem in Deum ducitur sicut in ultimum finem, ex hoc quod ignorat naturas rerum, et per consequens gradum sui ordinis in universo, aliquibus creaturis se putat esse subiectum quibus superior est: ut patet in illis qui voluntates hominum astris supponunt, contra quos dicitur Ierem. 10:2, a signis caeli nolite metuere, quae gentes timent; et in illis qui angelos creatores animarum existimant; et animas hominum esse mortales; et si qua similia hominum derogant dignitati. Fourth, man, who is led by faith to God as his last end, through ignoring the natures of things—and consequently the order of his place in the universe—thinks himself to be beneath certain creatures above whom he is placed, as evidenced in those who subject man’s will to the stars. Against these it is said: be not be dismayed at the signs of the heavens because the nations are dismayed at them (Jer 10:2). Also in those who deem the angels to be the creators of souls, and human souls to be mortal; and in those who hold any like opinions derogatory to the dignity of man. Sic ergo patet falsam esse quorundam sententiam qui dicebant nihil interesse ad fidei veritatem quid de creaturis quisque sentiret, dummodo circa Deum recte sentiatur, ut Augustinus narrat in libro de origine animae: nam error circa creaturas redundat in falsam de Deo sententiam, et hominum mentes a Deo abducit, in quem fides dirigere nititur, dum ipsas quibusdam aliis causis supponit. Accordingly, it is clear that the opinion is false of those who asserted that it does not matter to the truth of faith what opinions one holds about creatures, so long as one has right opinion about God, as Augustine relates in his book On the Soul and Its Origin 4, 4, since error concerning creatures by subjecting the human mind to causes other than God amounts to a false opinion about God, and misleads the minds of men from God, to whom faith strives to lead them. Et ideo illis qui circa creaturas errant poenas sicut infidelibus Scriptura comminatur, dicens in Psalmo: quoniam non intellexerunt opera domini et in opera manuum eius, destrues illos et non aedificabis eos; et Sap. 2:21 haec cogitaverunt et erraverunt, et subiungit, 22 non iudicaverunt honorem animarum sanctarum. Therefore, Scripture threatens punishment to those who err about creatures like unbelievers, in the words of the Psalm: because they do not regard the works of the Lord, or the operations of his hands, he will break them down and build them up no more (Ps 28[27]:5); and: thus they reasoned, but they were led astray (Wis 2:21), and further on: they did not . . . discern the prize for blameless souls (Wis 2:22). Caput 4 Chapter 4 Quod aliter considerat de creaturis philosophus et theologus That the philosopher and the theologian treat of creatures in different ways Manifestum est autem ex praedictis quod considerationem circa creaturas habet doctrina fidei Christianae inquantum in eis resultat quaedam Dei similitudo, et inquantum error in ipsis inducit in divinorum errorem. Et sic alia ratione subiiciuntur praedictae doctrinae, et philosophiae humanae. Nam philosophia humana eas considerat secundum quod huiusmodi sunt: unde et secundum diversa rerum genera diversae partes philosophiae inveniuntur. Fides autem Christiana eas considerat, non inquantum huiusmodi, utpote ignem inquantum ignis est, sed inquantum divinam altitudinem repraesentat, et in ipsum Deum quoquo modo ordinatur. Ut enim Eccli. 42 dicitur: gloria domini plenum est opus eius. Nonne dominus fecit enarrare sanctos omnia mirabilia sua? Now it is evident from what has been said that the teaching of the Christian faith treats of creatures insofar as they reflect a certain likeness of God, and insofar as error concerning them leads to error about God. And so they are viewed from a different point by the aforesaid teaching and by human philosophy. For human philosophy considers them as such; therefore, we find that the different parts of philosophy correspond to the different genera of things. But the Christian faith does not consider them as such—for instance, it considers fire not as such, but as representing the sublimity of God, and as being directed to him in any way whatever. For as it is stated: full of the glory of the Lord is his work. Hath not the Lord made the saints to declare all his wonderful works? (Sir 42:16–17). Et propter hoc etiam alia circa creaturas et philosophus et fidelis considerat. Philosophus namque considerat illa quae eis secundum naturam propriam conveniunt: sicut igni ferri sursum. Fidelis autem ea solum considerat circa creaturas quae eis conveniunt secundum quod sunt ad Deum relata: utpote, quod sunt a Deo creata, quod sunt Deo subiecta, et huiusmodi. Hence also the philosopher and the believer consider different matters about creatures. For the philosopher considers such things as belong to them by their own nature (for instance, that fire tends upwards). But the believer only considers about creatures such things as belong to them in respect of their relation to God (for instance, that they are created by God, are subject to God, and so forth). Unde non est ad imperfectionem doctrinae fidei imputandum si multas rerum proprietates praetermittat: ut caeli figuram, et motus qualitatem. Sic enim nec naturalis circa lineam illas passiones considerat quas geometra: sed solum ea quae accidunt sibi inquantum est terminus corporis naturalis. Thus it does not argue imperfection in the teaching of faith if it overlooks many properties of things, such as the shape of the heavens, and the quality of its movement. For neither does the physicist consider the same characters of a line as the geometrician, but only such as are accidental to it, as the term of a natural body. Si qua vero circa creaturas communiter a philosopho et fideli considerantur, per alia et alia principia traduntur. Nam philosophus argumentum assumit ex propriis rerum causis: fidelis autem ex causa prima; ut puta, quia sic divinitus est traditum; vel quia hoc in gloriam Dei cedit; vel quia Dei potestas est infinita. Any matters, however, that the philosopher and the believer consider in common about creatures are delivered through different principles in each. For the philosopher takes his argument from the proper causes of things, whereas the believer has recourse to the first cause (for instance, because it has been thus delivered by God, or because it conduces to God’s glory, or because God’s power is infinite). Unde et ipsa maxima sapientia dici debet, utpote super altissimam causam considerans: secundum illud Deut. 4:6: haec est sapientia vestra et intellectus coram populis. Hence (the teaching of faith) should be called the greatest wisdom, since it considers the highest cause, according to the saying of Deuteronomy 4:6: this is your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the peoples.