Caput 25 Chapter 25 Qualiter omnipotens dicatur quaedam non posse How the Almighty is said to be unable to do certain things Ex praemissis autem accipi potest quod, quamvis Deus sit omnipotens, aliqua tamen dicitur non posse. Ostensum enim est supra in Deo esse potentiam activam: potentiam vero passivam in eo non esse iam supra in primo fuerat probatum. Secundum autem utramque potentiam dicimur posse. Illa igitur Deus non potest quae posse potentiae passivae est. Quae autem huiusmodi sint, investigandum est. From the foregoing we may gather that though God is almighty, he is nevertheless said to be unable to do certain things. For it was shown above (ch. 7) that in God there is active potency (while it had already been proved in the first book (ch. 16) that there is no passive potency in him), whereas we are said ‘to be able’ in respect of either potency. Thus God is unable to do those things the possibility of which belongs to passive potency. What such things are must be the subject of our inquiry. Primo quidem igitur potentia activa ad agere est, potentia autem passiva ad esse. Unde in illis solis est potentia ad esse quae materiam habent contrarietati subiectam. Cum igitur in Deo passiva potentia non sit, quicquid ad suum esse pertinet, Deus non potest. Non potest igitur Deus esse corpus, aut aliquid huiusmodi. In the first place, then, active potency is directed to action, while passive potency is directed to being. Consequently, potency to being is only in those things which have matter subject to contrariety. Since, therefore, passive potency is not in God, he is unable as regards anything that pertains to his being. Therefore, God cannot be a body, and so forth. Adhuc. Huius potentiae passivae motus actus est. Deus igitur, cui potentia passiva non competit, mutari non potest. Again. The act of this passive potency is movement. Therefore, God, to whom passive potency is unbecoming, cannot be changed. Potest autem ulterius concludi quod non potest mutari secundum singulas mutationis species: ut quod non potest augeri vel minui, aut alterari, aut generari aut corrumpi. It may be further concluded that he cannot be changed in respect of each kind of movement (for instance, that he cannot be increased, nor diminished, nor altered, nor generated, nor corrupted). Amplius. Cum deficere quoddam corrumpi sit, sequitur quod in nullo deficere potest. Moreover. Since to fail is a kind of corruption, it follows that he is unable to fail in anything. Praeterea. Defectus omnis secundum privationem aliquam est. Privationis autem subiectum potentia materiae est. Nullo igitur modo potest deficere. Further. Every failing is in respect of some privation. But the subject of privation is the potency of matter. Therefore, he can fail in no way. Adhuc. Cum fatigatio sit per defectum virtutis, oblivio autem per defectum scientiae, patet quod neque fatigari neque oblivisci potest. Again. Since weariness results from defect of power, and forgetfulness from defect of knowledge, it is clear that he can neither be weary nor forget. Amplius. Neque vinci aut violentiam pati. Haec enim non sunt nisi eius quod natum est moveri. Moreover. Nor can he be overcome or suffer violence. For these things only happen to those things that are of a movable nature. Similiter autem neque poenitere potest, neque irasci aut tristari: cum haec omnia in passionem et defectum sonent. Likewise, he can neither repent, nor be angry, or sorrowful, since all these denote passion and defect. Rursus. Quia potentiae activae obiectum et effectus est ens factum, nulla autem potentia operationem habet ubi deficit ratio sui obiecti, sicut visus non videt deficiente visibili in actu: oportet quod Deus dicatur non posse quicquid est contra rationem entis inquantum est ens, vel facti entis inquantum est factum. Quae autem sint huiusmodi, inquirendum est. Again. Since the object and effect of an active potency is something made, and since no potency is operative, if the ratio of object be lacking—thus the sight sees not if the actually visible be lacking—it follows that God is unable to do whatever is contrary to the ratio of being as being, or of being made insofar as it is made. We must inquire what these things are. Primo quidem igitur contra rationem entis est quod entis rationem tollit. Tollitur autem ratio entis per suum oppositum: sicut ratio hominis per opposita eius vel particularum ipsius. Oppositum autem entis est non ens. Hoc igitur Deus non potest, ut faciat simul unum et idem esse et non esse: quod est contradictoria esse simul. In the first place, that which destroys the ratio of being is contrary to the ratio of being. Now the ratio of being is destroyed by the opposite of being, as the ratio of man is destroyed by the opposite of man or of his parts. Now the opposite of being is non-being. Consequently, God is unable to do this, so as to make the one and same thing to be and not to be at the same time, which is for contradictories to be simultaneous. Adhuc. Contradictio contrariis et privative oppositis includitur: sequitur enim, si est album et nigrum, quod sit album et non album; et si est videns et caecum, quod sit videns et non videns. Unde eiusdem rationis etiam est quod Deus non possit facere opposita simul inesse eidem secundum idem. Again. Contradiction is included in contraries and privative opposites: for to be white and black is to be white and not white, and to be seeing and blind is to be seeing and not seeing. Hence it amounts to the same that God is unable to make opposites to be simultaneously in the same subject and in the same respect. Amplius. Ad remotionem cuiuslibet principii essentialis sequitur remotio ipsius rei. Si igitur Deus non potest facere rem simul esse et non esse, nec etiam potest facere quod rei desit aliquod suorum principiorum essentialium ipsa remanente: sicut quod homo non habeat animam. Moreover. The removal of an essential principle of a thing implies the removal of the thing itself. If, then, God cannot make a thing at the same time to be and not to be, neither can he make a thing to lack any of its essential principles while the thing itself remains (for instance, that a man have no soul). Praeterea. Cum principia quarundam scientiarum, ut logicae, geometriae et arithmeticae, sumantur ex solis principiis formalibus rerum, ex quibus essentia rei dependet, sequitur quod contraria horum principiorum Deus facere non possit: sicut quod genus non sit praedicabile de specie; vel quod lineae ductae a centro ad circumferentiam non sint aequales; aut quod triangulus rectilineus non habeat tres angulos aequales duobus rectis. Further. The principles of certain sciences—for instance, of logic, geometry, and arithmetic—are taken only from the formal principles of things, on which the essence of those things depends. Therefore, it follows that God cannot make the contraries of these principles—for instance, that genus be not predicable of species, or that lines drawn from center to circumference be not equal, or that the three angles of a rectilinear triangle be not equal to two right angles. Hinc etiam patet quod Deus non potest facere quod praeteritum non fuerit. Nam hoc etiam contradictionem includit: eiusdem namque necessitatis est aliquid esse dum est, et aliquid fuisse dum fuit. Hence it is also evident that God cannot make the past not to have been. For this also includes a contradiction, since it is equally necessary for a thing to be while it is, and to have been while it was. Sunt etiam quaedam quae repugnant rationi entis facti inquantum huiusmodi. Quae etiam Deus facere non potest: nam omne quod facit Deus, oportet esse factum. There are also some things which are incompatible with the ratio of being made as made. God cannot do these also, since whatever God makes must be something made. Ex hoc autem patet quod Deus non potest facere Deum. Nam de ratione entis facti est quod esse suum ex alia causa dependeat. Quod est contra rationem eius quod dicitur Deus, ut ex superioribus patet. Hence it is evident that God cannot make God. For it belongs to the ratio of being made that its being depends on another cause. And this is contrary to the ratio of that which we call God, as is evident from the foregoing (bk. I, ch. 13). Eadem etiam ratione, non potest Deus facere aliquid aequale sibi. Nam illud cuius esse ab alio non dependet, potius est in essendo et in ceteris dignitatibus eo quod ab alio dependet, quod ad rationem entis facti pertinet. For the same reason God cannot make a thing equal to himself. Because a thing whose being does not depend on another is greater in being and other excellencies than that which depends on another, which belongs to the ratio of a thing made. Similiter etiam Deus facere non potest quod aliquid conservetur in esse sine ipso. Nam conservatio esse uniuscuiusque dependet a causa sua. Unde oportet quod, remota causa, removeatur effectus. Si igitur res aliqua posset esse quae a Deo non conservaretur in esse, non esset effectus eius. Likewise, God cannot make a thing to be preserved in being without himself. For the preservation of a thing in being depends on its cause. Therefore, if the cause be removed, the effect must be removed. Consequently, if there could be a thing that is not preserved in being by God, it would not be his effect. Rursus. Quia ipse est per voluntatem agens, illa non potest facere quae non potest velle. Quae autem velle non possit, considerari potest si accipiamus qualiter in divina voluntate necessitas esse possit: nam quod necesse est esse, impossibile est non esse; et quod impossibile est esse, necesse est non esse. Again. Since he is an agent by will (ch. 23), he cannot do those things which he cannot will. Now we may realize what he cannot will if we consider how it is possible for necessity to be in the divine will, since what is of necessity is impossible not to be, and what is impossible to be, necessarily is not. Patet autem ex hoc quod non potest Deus facere se non esse, vel non esse bonum aut beatum: quia de necessitate vult se esse, bonum esse et beatum, ut in primo ostensum est. It is, therefore, evident that God cannot make himself not to be, or not to be good or happy, because he necessarily wills himself to be, and to be good and happy, as we proved in the first book (bk. I, ch. 80). Item ostensum est supra quod Deus non potest velle aliquod malum. Unde patet quod Deus peccare non potest. Again, it was shown above (bk. I, ch. 95) that God cannot will anything evil. Therefore, it is evident that God cannot sin. Similiter ostensum est supra quod Dei voluntas non potest esse mutabilis. Sic igitur non potest facere id quod est a se volitum, non impleri. Likewise, it was proved above (bk. I, ch. 82) that God’s will cannot be changeable. Consequently, it cannot make that which is willed by him not to be fulfilled. Sciendum tamen quod hoc alio modo dicitur non posse a praemissis. Nam praemissa simpliciter Deus nec velle nec facere potest. Huiusmodi autem potest quidem Deus vel facere vel velle, si eius voluntas vel potentia absolute consideretur, non autem si considerentur praesupposita voluntate de opposito: nam voluntas divina respectu creaturarum necessitatem non habet nisi ex suppositione, ut in primo ostensum est. Et ideo omnes istae locutiones, Deus non potest facere contraria his quae disposuit facere, et quaecumque similiter dicuntur, intelliguntur composite: sic enim implicant suppositionem divinae voluntatis de opposito. Si autem intelliguntur divise, sunt falsae: quia respiciunt potentiam et voluntatem Dei absolute. It must, however, be observed that he is said to be unable to do this in a different sense from that in which he is said to be unable to do the things mentioned before. For God is simply unable either to will or to make the foregoing, but God can do or will these, if we consider his power or will absolutely, but not if we presuppose him to will the opposite. For the divine will, in respect of creatures, has no necessity except on a supposition, as we proved in the first book (ch. 81). Hence all such statements as ‘God cannot do the contrary of what he has decreed to do,’ and any like sayings are to be understood in the composite sense, for thus they imply a supposition of the divine will with regard to the opposite. But if they be understood in the divided sense, they are false, because they refer to God’s power and will absolutely. Sicut autem Deus agit per voluntatem, ita et per intellectum et scientiam ut ostensum est. Pari igitur ratione non potest facere quae se facturum non praescivit, aut dimittere quae se facturum praescivit, qua non potest facere quae facere non vult, aut dimittere quae vult. Et eodem modo conceditur et negatur utrumque: ut scilicet praedicta non posse dicatur, non quidem absolute, sed sub conditione vel ex suppositione. And as God acts by will, so also does he act by intellect and knowledge, as we have proved (ch. 24). Hence he cannot do what he has foreseen that he will not do, or omit to do what he has foreseen that he will do, for the same reason that he cannot do what he wills not to do, or omit to do what he wills. Also, each assertion is conceded and denied in the same sense, namely, that he be said to be unable to do these things, indeed not absolutely, but on a certain condition or supposition. Caput 26 Chapter 26 Quod divinus intellectus non coartatur ad determinatos effectus That the divine intellect is not confined to certain determined effects Quoniam autem ostensum est quod divina potentia ad determinatos effectus non limitatur, ac per hoc quod ex necessitate naturae non agit, sed per intellectum et voluntatem; ne cui forte videatur quod eius intellectus vel scientia ad determinatos effectus solummodo possit extendi, et sic agat ex necessitate scientiae, quamvis non ex necessitate naturae: restat ostendere quod eius scientia vel intellectus nullis effectuum limitibus coartatur. Insofar as it has been proved (chs 22, 23) that the divine power is not limited to certain determined effects, and this because he acts not by a necessity of his nature, but by his intellect and will. Lest someone perhaps think that his intellect or knowledge can only reach to certain effects, and that consequently he acts by a necessity of his knowledge, although not by a necessity of his nature, it remains to be shown that his knowledge or intellect is not confined to any limits in its effects. Ostensum est enim supra quod Deus omnia alia quae ab eo procedere possunt comprehendit suam essentiam intelligendo, in qua omnia huiusmodi esse necessarium est per aliqualem similitudinem, sicut effectus virtute sunt in causa. Si igitur potentia divina ad effectus determinatos non coartatur, ut supra ostensum est, necessarium est et de eius intellectu similem sententiam proferre. For it was proved above (bk. I, ch. 49) that God comprehends all other things that can proceed from him by understanding his essence, in which all such things must necessarily exist by a kind of likeness, even as effects are virtually in their causes. If, then, the divine power is not confined to certain definite effects, as we have shown above (ch. 22), it is necessary to pronounce a like opinion on his intellect. Adhuc. Divinae essentiae infinitatem supra ostendimus. Infinitum autem, quantalibet adiectione finitorum facta, adaequari non potest quin infinitum excedat quantalibet finita, si etiam numero infinita existant. Nihil autem aliud praeter Deum constat esse secundum essentiam infinitum: cum omnia alia secundum essentiae rationem sub determinatis generibus et speciebus concludantur. Quotcumque igitur et quanticumque divini effectus comprehendantur, semper in divina essentia est ut eos excedat. Et ita plurium ratio esse possit. Divinus igitur intellectus, qui perfecte divinam essentiam cognoscit, ut supra ostensum est, omnem finitatem effectuum transcendit. Non igitur ex necessitate ad hos vel illos effectus coartatur. Further. We have already proved (bk. I, ch. 43) the infinity of the divine intellect. Now, no matter how many finite things we add together, even though there were an infinite number of finite things, we cannot equal the infinite, for it infinitely exceeds the finite, however great. Now it is clear that nothing outside God is infinite in its essence, since all else are by the very nature of their essence included under certain definite genera and species. Consequently, however many and however great divine effects be taken, it is always in the divine essence to exceed them, and so it can be the ratio of more. Therefore, the divine intellect, which knows the divine essence perfectly, as we have shown above (bk. I, ch. 47), surpasses all finitude of effects. Therefore, it is not necessarily confined to these or those effects. Item. Supra ostensum est quod divinus intellectus infinitorum est cognitor. Deus autem per sui intellectus scientiam res producit in esse. Causalitas igitur divini intellectus ad finitos effectus non coartatur. Again. It was shown above (bk. I, ch. 69) that the divine intellect knows an infinite number of things. Now God brings things into being by the knowledge of his intellect. Therefore, the causality of the divine intellect is not confined to a finite number of effects. Amplius. Si divini intellectus causalitas ad effectus aliquos, quasi de necessitate agens, artaretur, hoc esset respectu illorum qui ab eo producuntur in esse. Hoc autem esse non potest: cum supra ostensum sit quod Deus intelligit etiam quae nunquam sunt nec erunt nec fuerunt. Non igitur Deus agit ex necessitate sui intellectus vel scientiae. Moreover. If the causality of the divine intellect were confined to certain effects, as though it produced them of necessity, this would be in reference to the things which it brings into being. But this is impossible, for it was shown above (bk. I, ch. 66) that God understands even those things that never are, nor shall be, nor have been. Therefore, God does not work by necessity of his intellect or knowledge. Praeterea. Divina scientia comparatur ad res ab ipso productas sicut scientia artificis ad res artificiatas. Quaelibet autem ars se extendit ad omnia quae possunt contineri sub genere subiecto illius artis: sicut ars aedificatoria ad omnes domos. Genus autem subiectum divinae arti est ens: cum ipse per suum intellectum sit universale principium entis, ut ostensum est. Igitur intellectus divinus ad omnia quibus entis ratio non repugnat, suam causalitatem extendit: huiusmodi enim omnia, quantum est de se, nata sunt sub ente contineri. Non igitur divinus intellectus ad aliquos determinatos effectus coartatur. Further. God’s knowledge is compared to things produced by him as the knowledge of the craftsman to his handiwork. Now every art extends to all the things that can be comprised under the genus subject to that art: thus the art of building extends to all houses. Now the genus subject to the divine art is being, since God by his intellect is the universal principle of being, as we have proved (ch. 15). Therefore, the divine intellect extends its causality to whatever is not incompatible with the notion of being, for all such things, considered in themselves, are of a nature to be contained under being. Therefore, the divine intellect is not confined to certain determined effects. Hinc est quod in Psalmo dicitur: magnus dominus, et magna virtus eius, et sapientiae eius non est numerus. Hence it is said in the Psalm: great is our Lord, and abundant in power; his wisdom is beyond measure (Ps 147[146]:5).