Caput 33 Chapter 33 Rationes volentium probare aeternitatem mundi sumptae ex parte creaturarum Arguments of those who would prove the eternity of the world from the point of view of creatures Sunt autem et alia, ex parte creaturarum accepta, quae idem ostendere videntur. There are also other arguments, taken from the point of view of creatures, that would seem to prove the same conclusion. Quae enim non habent potentiam ad non esse, impossibile est ea non esse. Quaedam autem sunt in creaturis in quibus non est potentia ad non esse. Non enim potest esse potentia ad non esse nisi in illis quae habent materiam contrarietati subiectam: potentia enim ad esse et non esse est potentia ad privationem et formam, quorum subiectum est materia; privatio vero semper adiungitur formae contrariae, cum impossibile sit materiam esse absque omni forma. Sed quaedam creaturae sunt in quibus non est materia contrarietati subiecta: vel quia omnino non habent materiam, sicut substantiae intellectuales, ut infra ostendetur; vel non habent contrarium, sicut corpora caelestia; quod eorum motus ostendit, qui contrarium non habet. Quasdam igitur creaturas impossibile est non esse. Ergo eas necesse est semper esse. For things which have no potency to non-being cannot possibly not be. Now there are some creatures in which there is no potency to non-being. For there cannot be potency to non-being except in those things which have matter subject to contrariety, since potency to being and to non-being is a potency to privation and form, of which matter is the subject; and privation is always connected with the opposite form, since it is impossible for matter to be without any form at all. But there are certain creatures in which the matter is not subject to contrariety, either because they are entirely devoid of matter, for instance, intellectual substances, as we shall show further on (ch. 50), or because they have no contrary, as heavenly bodies, and this is proved by their movement, which has no contrary. Therefore, it is impossible for certain creatures not to exist, and consequently it is necessary that they exist always. Item. Unaquaeque res tantum durat in esse quanta est sua virtus essendi: nisi per accidens, sicut in his quae violenter corrumpuntur. Sed quaedam creaturae sunt quibus inest virtus essendi non ad aliquod determinatum tempus, sed ad semper essendum: sicut corpora caelestia et intellectuales substantiae; incorruptibilia enim sunt, cum contrarium non habeant. Relinquitur igitur quod eis competit semper esse. Quod autem incipit esse, non semper est. Eis ergo non competit ut esse incipiant. Again. A thing’s endurance in being is in proportion to its power of being, except accidentally, as in those which are corrupted by violence. But there are certain creatures in which there is a power of being not for any definite time, but forever (for instance, the heavenly bodies and intellectual substances, because they are incorruptible through having no contrary). It follows, then, that it is competent to them to be always. But that which begins to exist, is not always. Therefore, it is not becoming to them that they begin to exist. Adhuc. Quandocumque aliquid de novo incipit moveri, oportet quod movens, vel motum, vel utrumque, aliter se habeat nunc quando est motus, quam prius quando non erat motus: est enim habitudo vel relatio quaedam moventis ad motum secundum quod est movens actu; relatio autem nova non incipit sine mutatione utriusque vel alterius saltem extremorum. Quod autem se aliter habet nunc et prius, movetur. Ergo oportet, ante motum qui de novo incipit, alium motum praecedere in mobili vel in movente. Oportet igitur quod quilibet motus vel sit aeternus, vel habeat alium motum ante se. Motus igitur semper fuit. Ergo et mobilia. Et sic creaturae semper fuerunt. Deus enim omnino immobilis est, ut in primo ostensum est. Further. Whenever a thing begins to be moved anew, the mover, the moved, or both must be conditioned otherwise now, while the movement is, than before, when there was no movement. For there is a certain habitude or relation in the mover to the thing moved insofar as it moves actually; and the new relation does not begin without a change either in both or at least in one or other of the extremes. Now that which is conditioned otherwise now and before is moved. Therefore, before the movement that begins anew there must be a previous movement either in the movable or in the mover. It follows, in consequence, that every movement is either eternal or has another movement preceding it. Therefore, movement always has been, and so also has the movable. Therefore, there have always been creatures, since God is utterly immovable, as we proved in the first book (ch. 13). Praeterea. Omne agens, quod generat sibi simile, intendit conservare esse perpetuum in specie, quod non potest perpetuo conservari in individuo. Impossibile est autem naturae appetitum vanum esse. Oportet igitur quod rerum generabilium species sint perpetuae. Further. Every agent that engenders its like intends to preserve perpetual being in the species, for it cannot be preserved perpetually in the individual. But it is impossible for the desire of nature to be frustrated. Therefore, it follows that the species of generable things are everlasting. Adhuc. Si tempus est perpetuum, oportet motum esse perpetuum: cum sit numerus motus. Et per consequens mobilia esse perpetua: cum motus sit actus mobilis. Sed tempus oportet esse perpetuum. Non enim potest intelligi esse tempus quin sit nunc: sicut nec linea potest intelligi sine puncto. Nunc autem semper est finis praeteriti et principium futuri: haec enim est definitio ipsius nunc. Et sic quodlibet nunc datum habet ante se tempus prius et posterius. Et ita nullum potest esse primum neque ultimum. Relinquitur igitur quod mobilia, quae sunt substantiae creatae, sint ab aeterno. Again. If time is everlasting, movement must be everlasting, since it is the reckoning of movement. Consequently, movables must be everlasting, since movement is the act of a movable. Now time must be perpetual. For time is inconceivable without a now, even as a line is inconceivable without a point. But ‘now’ is always the end of the past and the beginning of the future, for this is the definition of the now. Therefore, every given now has time preceding it and following it, and consequently no now can be either first or last. It follows, therefore, that movables, which are created substances, are from eternity. Item. Oportet vel affirmare vel negare. Si igitur ad negationem alicuius sequitur eius positio, oportet illud esse semper. Tempus autem est huiusmodi. Nam, si tempus non semper fuit, est accipere prius non esse ipsius quam esse; et similiter, si non sit semper futurum, oportet quod non esse eius sit posterius ad esse eius. Prius autem et posterius non potest esse secundum durationem nisi tempus sit: nam numerus prioris et posterioris tempus est. Et sic oportebit tempus fuisse antequam inciperet, et futurum esse postquam desinet. Oportet igitur tempus esse aeternum. Tempus autem est accidens: quod sine subiecto esse non potest. Subiectum autem eius non est Deus, qui est supra tempus: cum sit omnino immobilis, ut in primo probatum est. Relinquitur igitur aliquam substantiam creatam aeternam esse. Again. One must either affirm or deny. If, therefore, by denying a thing we suppose its existence, that thing must be always. Now time is a thing of this kind. For if time was not always, we can conceive it as not being previously to being. In like manner, if it will not be always, its non-being must follow its being. Now there can be no before and after in duration unless there be time, since the reckoning of before and after is time. Consequently, time must have been before it began to be, and will be after it has ceased to be: and therefore time is eternal. But time is an accident, and an accident cannot be without a subject. And its subject is not God, who is above time, since he is utterly immovable, as we proved in the first book (bk. I, ch. 13). Therefore, it follows that some created substance is eternal. Amplius. Multae propositiones sic se habent quod qui eas negat, oportet quod eas ponat: sicut qui negat veritatem esse, ponit veritatem esse: ponit enim suam negativam esse veram quam profert. Et simile est de eo qui negat hoc principium, contradictionem non esse simul: negans enim hoc dicit negationem quam ponit esse veram, oppositam autem affirmationem falsam, et sic non de eodem utrumque verificari. Si igitur id ad cuius remotionem sequitur sua positio, oportet esse semper, ut probatum est, sequitur quod praedictae propositiones, et omnes quae ex eis sequuntur, sint sempiternae. Hae autem propositiones non sunt Deus. Ergo oportet aliquid praeter Deum esse aeternum. Moreover. Many propositions are such that to deny them is to affirm them: for instance, anyone who denies that truth exists, supposes the existence of truth, for he supposes that the denial which he utters is true. It is the same with one who denies the principle that contradictories are not simultaneous, since by denying this, he asserts that the negative which he utters is true, and that the opposite affirmative is false, and thus that both are not true about the same thing. Accordingly if, as we have proved, a thing which through being denied has to be admitted, must be always, it follows that the aforesaid propositions, and all that result from them, are everlasting. But such propositions are not God. Therefore, something beside God must be eternal. Hae igitur et huiusmodi rationes sumi possunt ex parte creaturarum quod creaturae fuerint semper. These, then, and similar arguments may be taken from the standpoint of creatures to prove that creatures have been always. Caput 34 Chapter 34 Rationes ad probandum aeternitatem mundi ex parte factionis Arguments to prove the eternity of the world from the point of view of the making Possunt etiam sumi aliae rationes, ex parte ipsius factionis, ad idem ostendendum. Again, other arguments may be taken from the point of view of the making, in order to prove the same conclusion. Quod enim ab omnibus communiter dicitur, impossibile est totaliter esse falsum. Falsa enim opinio infirmitas quaedam intellectus est: sicut et falsum iudicium de sensibili proprio ex infirmitate sensus accidit. Defectus autem per accidens sunt: quia praeter naturae intentionem. Quod autem est per accidens, non potest esse semper et in omnibus: sicut iudicium quod de saporibus ab omni gustu datur, non potest esse falsum. Ita iudicium quod ab omnibus de veritate datur, non potest esse erroneum. Communis autem sententia est omnium philosophorum ex nihilo nihil fieri. For what is asserted by all in common cannot possibly be entirely false, because a false opinion is a weakness of the understanding, even as a false judgment about its proper sensible results from a weakness of the sense. Now defects are accidental, since they are beside the intention of nature. And what is accidental cannot be always and in everything: for instance, the judgment given by all tastes about flavors cannot be false. Consequently, the judgment given by all about a truth cannot be erroneous. Now it is the common opinion of all philosophers that from nothing, naught is made. Oportet igitur hoc esse verum. Si igitur aliquid sit factum, oportet ex aliquo esse factum. Quod si etiam factum sit, oportet etiam et hoc ex alio fieri. Non potest autem hoc in infinitum procedere: quia sic nulla generatio compleretur, cum non sit possibile infinita transire. Oportet igitur devenire ad aliquod primum quod non sit factum. Omne autem ens quod non semper fuit, oportet esse factum. Ergo oportet illud ex quo primo omnia fiunt, esse sempiternum. Hoc autem non est Deus: quia ipse non potest esse materia alicuius rei, ut in primo probatum est. Relinquitur igitur quod aliquid extra Deum sit aeternum, scilicet prima materia. Therefore, this must be true. Hence if a thing is made, it must be made from something, and if this also is made, it must also be made from something. But this cannot go on indefinitely, for then no generation would be completed, since it is not possible to go through an infinite number of things. Therefore, we must come to some first thing that was not made. Now everything that has not always been must have been made. Therefore, the thing from which all things were first made must be eternal. But this is not God, since he cannot be the matter of a thing, as we proved in the first book (bk. I, ch. 17). Therefore, it follows that something beside God is eternal, namely, prime matter. Amplius. Si aliquid non se habet eodem modo nunc et prius, oportet illud esse aliqualiter mutatum: hoc enim est moveri, non eodem modo se nunc et prius habere. Omne autem quod de novo incipit esse, non eodem modo se habet nunc et prius. Oportet igitur hoc per aliquem motum accidere vel mutationem. Omnis autem motus vel mutatio in aliquo subiecto est: est enim actus mobilis. Cum autem motus sit prius eo quod fit per motum, cum ad hoc terminetur motus, oportet ante quodlibet factum praeexistere aliquod subiectum mobile. Et cum hoc non sit possibile in infinitum procedere, oportet devenire ad aliquod primum subiectum non de novo incipiens sed semper existens. Moreover. If a thing is not in the same state now and before, it must be changed in some way, for to be moved is not to be in the same state now as before. Now everything that begins to be anew is not in the same state now as before. Therefore, this must result from some movement or change. But every movement or change is in a subject, for it is the act of a movable. Now, since movement precedes that which is made by movement, for movement terminates in it, it follows that there preexists a movable subject before anything made. And since this cannot go on indefinitely, we must necessarily come to some first subject that begins not anew but always has been. Adhuc. Omne quod de novo esse incipit, antequam esset, possibile erat ipsum esse: si enim non, impossibile erat ipsum esse, et necesse non esse; et sic semper fuisset non ens et nunquam esse incoepisset. Sed quod est possibile esse, est subiectum potentia ens. Oportet igitur ante quodlibet de novo incipiens praeexistere subiectum potentia ens. Et cum hoc in infinitum procedere non possit, oportet ponere aliquod primum subiectum quod non incoepit esse de novo. Again. Whatever begins to be anew, it was possible, before it was, that it would be. For if not, it was impossible for it to be and necessary for it not to be, so it would always have been a non-being, and it never would have begun to be. Now that for which it is possible to be is a subject potentially a being. Therefore, before everything that begins to be anew, there must preexist a subject which is a potential being. And since this cannot go on indefinitely, we must suppose some first subject which did not begin to be anew. Item. Nulla substantia permanens est dum fit: ad hoc enim fit ut sit; non igitur fieret, si iam esset. Sed dum fit, oportet aliquid esse quod sit factionis subiectum: non enim factio, cum sit accidens, sine subiecto esse potest. Omne igitur quod fit, habet aliquod subiectum praeexistens. Et cum hoc in infinitum ire non possit, sequetur primum subiectum non esse factum, sed sempiternum. Ex quo ulterius sequitur aliquid praeter Deum esse aeternum: cum ipse subiectum factionis aut motus esse non possit. Again. No permanent substance is while it is being made, for it is made in order that it may be; therefore, it would not have to be made if it were already. But while it is being made, there must be something that is the subject of the making, since a making, since it is an accident, cannot be without a subject. Therefore, whatever is made has a preexisting subject. And since this cannot go on indefinitely, it follows that the first subject was not made, but is eternal. Hence it also follows that something beside God is eternal, because he cannot be the subject of making or movement. Hae igitur rationes sunt quibus aliqui tanquam demonstrationibus inhaerentes, dicunt necessarium res creatas semper fuisse. In quo fidei Catholicae contradicunt, quae ponit nihil praeter Deum semper fuisse, sed omnia esse coepisse praeter unum Deum aeternum. Accordingly, these are the arguments by which some people say that things created have necessarily been always, clinging to them as though they were demonstrations In this, they contradict the Catholic faith, which affirms that nothing beside God has always been, and that all things have begun to be, save the one eternal God. Caput 35 Chapter 35 Solutio rationum supra positarum et primo earum quae sumebantur ex parte Dei Solution of the foregoing arguments, and first of those taken from the standpoint of God Oportet igitur ostendere praemissas rationes non ex necessitate concludere. Et primo, illas quae ex parte agentis sumuntur. We must, accordingly, show that the foregoing reasons do not necessarily conclude, starting with those that are produced on the part of the agent (ch. 32). Non enim oportet quod per se vel per accidens Deus moveatur si effectus eius de novo esse incipiunt: ut prima ratio procedebat. Novitas enim effectus indicare potest mutationem agentis inquantum demonstrat novitatem actionis: non enim potest esse quod in agente sit nova actio nisi aliquo modo moveatur, saltem de otio in actum. Novitas autem divini effectus non demonstrat novitatem actionis in Deo: cum actio sua sit sua essentia, ut supra ostensum est. Unde neque novitas effectus mutationem Dei agentis demonstrare potest. For it does not follow that God is moved either essentially or accidentally if his effect begin to be anew, as the first argument argued. For newness of effect may indicate change of the agent insofar as it proves newness of action, for it is impossible for a new action to be in the agent unless the latter be in some way moved (at least from inaction to action). But newness of effect does not prove newness of action in God, since his action is his essence, as we have proved above (ch. 9). Neither, therefore, can newness of effect argue change in God the agent. Nec tamen oportet quod, si primo agentis actio sit aeterna, quod eius effectus sit aeternus: ut secunda ratio concludebat. Ostensum est enim supra quod Deus agit voluntate in rerum productione. Non autem ita quod sit aliqua alia ipsius actio media, sicut in nobis actio virtutis motivae est media inter actum voluntatis et effectum, ut in praecedentibus ostensum est: sed oportet quod suum intelligere et velle sit suum facere. Effectus autem ab intellectu et voluntate sequitur secundum determinationem intellectus et imperium voluntatis. Sicut autem per intellectum determinatur rei factae quaecumque alia conditio, ita et praescribitur ei tempus: non enim solum ars determinat ut hoc tale sit, sed ut tunc sit; sicut medicus ut tunc potio detur. Unde, si eius velle per se esset efficax ad effectum producendum, sequeretur de novo effectus ab antiqua voluntate, nulla actione de novo existente. Nihil igitur prohibet dicere actionem Dei ab aeterno fuisse, effectum autem non ab aeterno, sed tunc cum ab aeterno disposuit. And yet it does not follow, if the action of the first agent is eternal, that his effect is eternal, as the second argument inferred. For it has been shown above (ch. 23) that in producing things God acts voluntarily. Not, however, as though there were an intermediate action of his—as in us the action of the motive power intervenes between the act of the will and the effect, as we have proved in a foregoing chapter (ch. 9)—but his act of understanding and willing must be his act of making. Now the effect follows from the intellect and the will according to the determination of the intellect and the command of the will. And just as every other condition of the thing made is determined by the intellect, so is time appointed to it: for art determines not only that this thing is to be such and such, but that it is to be at this particular time, even as a physician determines that a draught is to be taken at such and such a time. Therefore, if his willing were essentially efficacious for producing the effect, the effect would follow anew from his former will without any new action on his part. Therefore, nothing prevents our saying that God’s action was from eternity while his effect was not from eternity, but from the time when he appointed it from eternity. Ex quo etiam patet quod, etsi Deus sit sufficiens causa productionis rerum in esse, non tamen oportet quod eius effectus aeternus ponatur, eo existente aeterno: ut tertia ratio concludebat. Posita enim causa sufficienti, ponitur eius effectus, non autem effectus extraneus a causa: hoc enim esset ex insufficientia causae, ac si calidum non calefaceret. Proprius autem effectus voluntatis est ut sit hoc quod voluntas vult: si autem aliquid aliud esset quam voluntas velit, non poneretur effectus proprius causae, sed alienus ab ea. Voluntas autem, ut dictum est, sicut vult hoc esse tale, ita vult hoc esse tunc. Unde non oportet, ad hoc quod voluntas sit sufficiens causa, quod effectus sit quando voluntas est, sed quando voluntas effectum esse disponit. In his autem quae a causa naturaliter agente procedunt, secus est: quia actio naturae est secundum quod ipsa est; unde ad esse causae sequi oportet effectum. Voluntas autem agit, non secundum modum sui esse, sed secundum modum sui propositi. Et ideo, sicut effectus naturalis agentis sequitur esse agentis, si sit sufficiens, ita effectus agentis per voluntatem sequitur modum propositi. Hence it is also clear that, although God is the sufficient cause of bringing things into being, it is not necessary to suppose that because he is eternal, his effect is eternal, as the third argument contended. For if we suppose a sufficient cause, we suppose its effect, but not an effect outside the cause: for this would be through insufficiency of the cause (for instance, as if a hot thing failed to give heat). Now the proper effect of the will is for that thing to be which the will wills: and if something else were to be than what the will wills, this would be an effect that is not proper to the cause, but foreign to it. But just as the will, as we have said, wills this thing to be such and such, so does it will it to be at such and such a time. Therefore, for the will to be a sufficient cause, it is not necessary for the effect to be when the will is, but when the will has appointed the effect to be. On the other hand, it is different with things which proceed from a cause acting naturally, because the action of nature is according as nature is; therefore, the effect must necessarily follow if the cause exists. Now, the will acts not according to the mode of its being, but according to the mode of its purpose. And consequently, just as the effect of a natural agent follows the being of the agent, so the effect of a voluntary agent follows the mode of his purpose. Ex his etiam patet quod divinae voluntatis non retardatur effectus, quamvis non semper fuerit, voluntate existente: ut quarta ratio supponebat. Nam sub voluntate divina cadit non solum quod eius effectus sit, sed quod tunc sit. Hoc igitur volitum quod est tunc creaturam esse, non retardatur: quia tunc incoepit creatura esse quando Deus ab aeterno disposuit. From the foregoing it is again clear that the effect of the divine will is not delayed, although it was not always, since it was always willed, as the fourth reason argued. This is so because the object of the divine will is not only the existence of the effect, but also the time of its existence. Therefore, the thing willed (namely, that a creature should exist at such and such a time) is not delayed, because the creature began to exist at the time appointed by God from eternity. Non est autem ante totius creaturae inchoationem diversitatem aliquam partium alicuius durationis accipere: ut in quinta ratione supponebatur. Nam nihil mensuram non habet nec durationem. Dei autem duratio, quae est aeternitas, non habet partes, sed est simplex omnino, non habens prius et posterius, cum Deus sit immobilis: ut in primo ostensum est. Non est igitur comparare inchoationem totius creaturae ad aliqua diversa signata in aliqua praeexistente mensura, ad quae initium creaturarum similiter vel dissimiliter se possit habere, ut oporteat rationem esse apud agentem quare in hoc signato illius durationis creaturam in esse produxerit, et non in alio praecedenti vel sequenti. Quae quidem ratio requireretur si aliqua duratio in partes divisibilis esset praeter totam creaturam productam: sicut accidit in particularibus agentibus, a quibus producitur effectus in tempore, non autem ipsum tempus. Deus autem simul in esse produxit et creaturam et tempus. Non est igitur ratio quare nunc et non prius in hoc consideranda: sed solum quare non semper. Nor can we conceive a diversity of parts of any duration before the beginning of the whole creature, as was supposed in the fifth argument. For nothingness has neither measure nor duration. And the duration of God, which is eternity, has no parts, but is utterly simple, having no before and after, since God is immovable, as stated in the first book (bk. I, ch. 15). Therefore, there is no comparison between the beginning of the whole creature and any various signate parts of an already existing measure, to which parts the beginning of creatures can be related in a like or unlike manner, so that there need be a reason in the agent why he should have produced the creature at this particular point of that duration, and not at some particular or subsequent point. Such a reason would be necessary if there were some duration divisible into parts beside the whole creature produced, as happens in particular agents, who produce their effect in time but do not produce time itself. But God brought into being both the creature and time together. Hence in this matter we do not have to consider the reason he produced them now and not before, but only why not always. Sicut per simile in loco apparet. Particularia enim corpora, sicut in tempore determinato, ita et in loco determinato producuntur; et quia habent extra se tempus et locum, a quibus continentur, oportet esse rationem quare magis in hoc loco et in hoc tempore producuntur quam in alio: in toto autem caelo, extra quod non est locus, et cum quo universalis locus omnium producitur, non est ratio consideranda quare hic et non ibi constitutum est; quam rationem quia quidam considerandam putabant, deciderunt in errorem, ut ponerent infinitum in corporibus. Et similiter in productione totius creaturae, extra quam non est tempus, et cum qua simul tempus producitur, non est attendenda ratio quare nunc et non prius, ut per hoc ducamur ad concedendam temporis infinitatem: sed solum quare non semper, vel quare post non esse, vel cum aliquo principio. This may be made clear by a comparison with place. For particular bodies are produced not only at a determined time, but also in a determined place; and since time and place by which they are contained are extraneous to them, there must be a reason why they are produced in this place and time rather than in another: whereas in the whole heaven, outside which there is no place, and together with which the entire place of all things is produced, we do not have to consider the reason why it is produced here and not there. Through thinking that this reason ought to be a matter of consideration, some have fallen into error, so as to place the infinite in bodies. In like manner, in the production of the entire creature, outside which there is no time, and together with which time is produced simultaneously, we do not have to consider the reason why it was produced now and not before (so that we be led to grant the infinity of time), but only why it was not always produced, or why after non-being, or so as to imply a beginning. Ad hoc autem inquirendum, sexta ratio inducebatur ex parte finis, qui solus inducere potest necessitatem in his quae voluntate aguntur. Finis autem divinae voluntatis non potest esse nisi eius bonitas. Non autem agit propter hunc finem producendum in esse, sicut artifex agit propter constitutionem artificiati: cum bonitas eius sit aeterna et immutabilis, ita quod ei nihil accrescere potest. Nec etiam posset dici quod propter eius meliorationem Deus agat. Nec etiam agit propter hunc finem acquirendum sibi, sicut rex pugnat ut acquirat civitatem: ipse enim est sua bonitas. Restat igitur quod agat propter finem inquantum effectum producit ad participationem finis. In producendo igitur res sic propter finem, uniformis habitudo finis ad agentem non est consideranda ut ratio operis sempiterni: sed magis est attendenda habitudo finis ad effectum qui fit propter finem; ut taliter producatur effectus qualiter convenientius ordinetur ad finem. Unde per hoc quod finis uniformiter se habet ad agentem, non potest concludi quod effectus sit sempiternus. For the purpose of inquiring into this question, the sixth argument was adduced on the part of the end, which alone can bring about necessity in those things which are done voluntarily. Now the end of God’s will can only be his goodness. And he does not act in order to bring this end into being, as a craftsman works in order to produce his handiwork, since his goodness is eternal and unchangeable, so that nothing can accrue to it. Nor could it be said that God works for his betterment. Nor again does he act in order to obtain this end for himself, as a king fights in order to obtain possession of a city: for he is his own goodness. It remains, therefore, that he acts for an end by producing an effect, so that it participate his end. Accordingly, in thus producing an effect on account of an end, the uniform relation of the end to the agent is not to be taken as a reason for his work being eternal. Rather, we should consider the relation of the end to the effect which is made on account of the end, so that the effect be produced in such a way as to be most fittingly directed to the end. Consequently, we cannot conclude that the effect is eternal from the fact that the end is uniformly related to the agent. Nec est necessarium effectum divinum semper fuisse, propter hoc quod sic convenientius ordinetur ad finem, ut septima ratio procedere videbatur: sed convenientius ordinatur ad finem per hoc quod est non semper fuisse. Omne enim agens producens effectum in participationem suae formae, intendit in eo inducere suam similitudinem. Sic igitur divinae voluntati conveniens fuit in suae bonitatis participationem creaturam producere, ut sua similitudine divinam bonitatem repraesentaret. Non autem potest esse talis repraesentatio per modum aequalitatis, sicut effectus univocus suam causam repraesentat, ut sic oporteat ab infinita bonitate aeternos effectus produci: sed sicut excedens repraesentatur ab eo quod exceditur. Excessus autem divinae bonitatis supra creaturam per hoc maxime exprimitur quod creaturae non semper fuerunt. Ex hoc enim apparet expresse quod omnia alia praeter ipsum eum habent sui esse auctorem; et quod virtus eius non obligatur ad huiusmodi effectus producendos, sicut natura ad effectus naturales; et per consequens quod est voluntate agens et intelligens. Quorum contraria quidam posuerunt, aeternitatem creaturarum supponentes. Nor is it necessary that the divine effect should have been always, because thus it is more fittingly directed to the end, as the seventh argument seemed to infer; however, it is more fittingly directed to the end by the fact that it was not always. For every agent that produces an effect in participation of his own form intends to produce his likeness in it. Therefore, it was becoming to God’s will to produce the creature in participation of his goodness, so that it might reflect the divine goodness by its likeness. But this reflection cannot be by way of equality, as a univocal effect reflects its cause—so that it be necessary for eternal effects to be produced by the divine goodness—but it is after the manner in which the transcendent is reflected by that which is transcended. Now the transcendence of the divine goodness over the creature is especially manifested by the fact that creatures have not been always. For by that, it is manifest that all else beside him has him as the author of its being, and that his power is not constrained to produce these effects as nature is to natural effects, and consequently that he is a voluntary and intelligent agent. Some have affirmed the opposite through maintaining the eternity of creatures. Sic igitur ex parte agentis nihil est quod aeternitatem creaturarum nos ponere cogat. Accordingly, there is nothing on the part of the agent to oblige us to hold the eternity of creatures. Caput 36 Chapter 36 Solutio rationum quae sumuntur ex parte rerum factarum Solution of the arguments produced on the part of the things made Similiter etiam nec ex parte creaturae est aliquid quod nos ad eius aeternitatem ponendam de necessitate inducat. In like manner, neither is there anything on the part of creatures to induce us to assert their eternity. Necessitas enim essendi quae in creaturis invenitur, ex quo prima ratio ad hoc sumitur, est necessitas ordinis, ut in praecedentibus est ostensum. Necessitas autem ordinis non cogit ipsum cui talis inest necessitas, semper fuisse, ut supra ostensum est. Licet enim substantia caeli, per hoc quod caret potentia ad non esse, habeat necessitatem ad esse, haec tamen necessitas sequitur eius substantiam. Unde, substantia eius iam in esse instituta, talis necessitas impossibilitatem non essendi inducit: non autem facit esse impossibile caelum non esse, in consideratione qua agitur de productione substantiae ipsius. For the necessity of being that we find in creatures, from which the first argument is taken, is a necessity of order, as was shown above (ch. 30): and a necessity of order does not compel the subject of a like necessity to have been always, as we proved above (ch. 31). For although the substance of heaven has a potency to being through being devoid of potency to non-being, yet this necessity follows its substance. Therefore, once its substance is brought into being, this necessity involves the impossibility of not being, but it does not make it impossible for the heaven not to be from the point of view where we consider the production of its very substance.