Amplius. A conceptione universali non sequitur motus et actio nisi mediante particulari apprehensione: eo quod motus et actio circa particularia est. Intellectus autem est naturaliter universalium apprehensivus. Ad hoc igitur quod ex apprehensione intellectus sequatur motus aut quaecumque actio, oportet quod universalis intellectus conceptio applicetur ad particularia. Sed universale continet in potentia multa particularia. Potest igitur applicatio conceptionis intellectualis fieri ad plura et diversa. Iudicium igitur intellectus de agibilibus non est determinatum ad unum tantum. Habent igitur omnia intellectualia liberum arbitrium. Moreover. Movement and action do not follow from a universal concept save through the medium of a particular apprehension, for movement and action are about particular things. Now the intellect is naturally apprehensive of universals. Therefore, so that movement and action of any kind follow from the apprehension of the intellect, it is necessary for the universal concept of the intellect to be applied to particulars. But the universal contains many particulars potentially. Hence application of the intellectual concept may be made to many and diverse things. Consequently, the judgment of the intellect about matters of action is not determined to one thing only. Therefore, all intellectual beings have free will. Praeterea. Iudicii libertate carent aliqua vel propter hoc quod nullum habent iudicium, sicut quae cognitione carent, ut lapides et plantae: vel quia habent iudicium a natura determinatum ad unum, sicut irrationalia animalia; naturali enim existimatione iudicat ovis lupum sibi nocivum, et ex hoc iudicio fugit ipsum; similiter autem in aliis. Quaecumque igitur habent iudicium de agendis non determinatum a natura ad unum, necesse est liberi arbitrii esse. Huiusmodi autem sunt omnia intellectualia. Intellectus enim apprehendit non solum hoc vel illud bonum, sed ipsum bonum commune. Unde, cum intellectus per formam apprehensam moveat voluntatem; in omnibus autem movens et motum oporteat esse proportionata; voluntas substantiae intellectualis non erit determinata a natura nisi ad bonum commune. Quicquid igitur offeretur sibi sub ratione boni, poterit voluntas inclinari in illud, nulla determinatione naturali in contrarium prohibente. Omnia igitur intellectualia liberam voluntatem habent ex iudicio intellectus venientem. Quod est liberum arbitrium habere, quod definitur esse liberum de ratione iudicium. Further. Certain things lack liberty of judgment either because they have no judgment at all (like plants and stones), or because they have a judgment determined by nature to one thing, like irrational animals: for the sheep by its natural estimate judges the wolf to be harmful to it, and as a result of this judgment flies from the wolf; and the same applies to others. Whatever beings, therefore, have a judgment that is not determined to one thing by nature must have free will. Now such are all intellectual beings. For the intellect apprehends not only this or that good, but good itself in general. Therefore, since the intellect moves the will by the form apprehended, and since in all things mover and moved must be mutually proportionate, the will of an intellectual substance will not be determined by nature otherwise than to the good in general. Hence, it is possible for the will to be inclined to whatever be offered to it under the aspect of good, since there is no natural determination to the contrary to prevent it. Therefore, in all intellectual beings, the will’s act resulting from the judgments of the intellect is free, and this is to have free will, which is defined as the free judgment of reason. Caput 49 Chapter 49 Quod substantia intellectualis non sit corpus That the intellectual substance is not a body Ex praemissis autem ostenditur quod nulla substantia intellectualis est corpus. From the foregoing it is shown that no intellectual substance is a body. Nullum enim corpus invenitur aliquid continere nisi per commensurationem quantitatis: unde et, si se toto totum aliquid continet, et partem parte continet, maiorem quidem maiore, minorem autem minore. Intellectus autem non comprehendit rem aliquam intellectam per aliquam quantitatis commensurationem: cum se toto intelligat et comprehendat totum et partem, maiora in quantitate et minora. Nulla igitur substantia intelligens est corpus. For no body is found to contain anything except by quantitative commensuration: therefore, if a thing contain a whole thing in the whole of itself, each part will contain a part, the greater part a greater part, and the lesser part a lesser part. But an intellect does not contain a thing understood by quantitative commensuration, because by its whole self it understands and comprehends both whole and part, things both great and small in quantity. Therefore, no intelligent substance is a body. Amplius. Nullum corpus potest alterius corporis formam substantialem recipere nisi per corruptionem suam formam amittat. Intellectus autem non corrumpitur, sed magis perficitur per hoc quod recipit formas omnium corporum: perficitur enim in intelligendo; intelligit autem secundum quod habet in se formas intellectorum. Nulla igitur substantia intellectualis est corpus. Moreover. No body can receive the substantial form of another body unless it lose its own form by corruption. But an intellect is not corrupted by receiving the forms of all bodies, but rather is perfected, since it is perfected by understanding, and understands by having in itself the forms of things understood. Therefore, no intellectual substance is a body. Adhuc. Principium diversitatis individuorum eiusdem speciei est divisio materiae secundum quantitatem: forma enim huius ignis a forma illius ignis non differt nisi per hoc quod est in diversis partibus in quas materia dividitur; nec aliter quam divisione quantitatis, sine qua substantia est indivisibilis. Quod autem recipitur in corpore, recipitur in eo secundum quantitatis divisionem. Ergo forma non recipitur in corpore nisi ut individuata. Si igitur intellectus esset corpus, formae rerum intelligibiles non reciperentur in eo nisi ut individuatae. Intelligit autem intellectus res per formas earum quas penes se habet. Non ergo intellectus intelligit universalia, sed solum particularia. Quod patet esse falsum. Nullus igitur intellectus est corpus. Further. The principle of distinction between individuals of the same species is the division of matter in respect of quantity, for the form of this fire differs not from the form of that fire, except by the fact of its being in different parts into which matter is divided; nor is this otherwise than by division of quantity, without which substance is indivisible. Now that which is received into a body is received into it according to quantitative division. Therefore, a form is not received into a body, except as individualized. If, therefore, an intellect were a body, the intelligible forms of things would not be received into it except as individualized. But the intellect understands things by their forms which it has at its disposal. Consequently, the intellect would not understand universals, but only particulars. Now this is clearly false. Therefore, no intellect is a body. Item. Nihil agit nisi secundum suam speciem: eo quod forma est principium agendi in unoquoque. Si igitur intellectus sit corpus, actio eius ordinem corporum non excedet. Non igitur intelligeret nisi corpora. Hoc autem patet esse falsum: intelligimus enim multa quae non sunt corpora. Intellectus igitur non est corpus. Again. Nothing acts except in accordance with its species, because the form is the principle of action in everything. If, therefore, an intellect be a body, its action will not transcend the order of bodies. Therefore, it would understand nothing but bodies. Now this is clearly false, since we understand many things that are not bodies. Therefore, the intellect is not a body. Adhuc. Si substantia intelligens est corpus, aut est finitum, aut infinitum. Corpus autem esse infinitum actu est impossibile, ut in Physicis probatur. Est igitur finitum corpus, si corpus esse ponatur. Hoc autem est impossibile. In nullo enim corpore finito potest esse potentia infinita, ut supra probatum est. Potentia autem intellectus est quodammodo infinita in intelligendo: in infinitum enim intelligit species numerorum augendo, et similiter species figurarum et proportionum; cognoscit etiam universale, quod est virtute infinitum secundum suum ambitum, continet enim individua quae sunt potentia infinita. Intellectus igitur non est corpus. Again. If an intelligent substance is a body, it is either finite or infinite. Now, it is impossible for a body to be infinite actually, as is proved in the Physics. Therefore, it is a finite body, if we suppose it to be a body at all. But this is impossible, since in no body can there be infinite power, as we have proved above (bk. I, ch. 20). Now the power of the intellect in understanding is in a manner infinite, for by adding, it understands species of numbers to infinitude, and likewise species of figures and proportions. Moreover, it knows the universal, which is virtually infinite in its compass, since it contains individuals which are potentially infinite. Therefore, the intellect is not a body. Amplius. Impossibile est duo corpora se invicem continere: cum continens excedat contentum. Duo autem intellectus se invicem continent et comprehendunt, dum unus alium intelligit. Non est igitur intellectus corpus. Moreover. It is impossible for two bodies to contain one another, since the container exceeds the contained. Yet two intellects contain and comprehend one another, when one understands the other. Therefore, the intellect is not a body. Item. Nullius corporis actio reflectitur super agentem: ostensum est enim in Physicis quod nullum corpus a seipso movetur nisi secundum partem, ita scilicet quod una pars eius sit movens et alia mota. Intellectus autem supra seipsum agendo reflectitur: intelligit enim seipsum non solum secundum partem, sed secundum totum. Non est igitur corpus. Again. No body’s action reflects on the agent: for it is proved in the Physics that no body is moved by itself except in respect of a part (namely, so that one of its parts be mover and the other moved). Now the intellect by its action reflects on itself, for it understands itself not only as to a part, but as to the whole. Therefore, it is not a body. Adhuc. Actio corporis ad actionem non terminatur, nec motus ad motum: ut in Physicis est probatum. Actio autem substantiae intelligentis ad actionem terminatur: intellectus enim, sicut intelligit rem, ita intelligit se intelligere, et sic in infinitum. Substantia igitur intelligens non est corpus. Again. A body’s action is not the object of that body’s action, nor is its movement the object of its movement, as proved in the Physics. But the action of the intellect is the object of its action: for just as the intellect understands a thing, so does it understand that it understands, and so on indefinitely. Therefore, an intellectual substance is not a body. Hinc est quod sacra Scriptura substantias intellectuales spiritus nominat: per quem modum consuevit Deum incorporeum nominare, secundum illud Ioan. 4:24, Deus spiritus est. Dicitur autem Sap. 7:23 est autem in illa, scilicet divina sapientia, spiritus intelligentiae, qui capiat omnes spiritus intelligibiles. Hence it is that Sacred Scripture calls intellectual substances ‘spirits,’ in which way it is accustomed to name God, who is incorporeal: God is a spirit (John 4:24). And it is said: for in her, namely divine wisdom, is the spirit of understanding, containing all intelligible spirits (Wis 7:23). Per hoc autem excluditur error antiquorum naturalium, qui nullam substantiam nisi corpoream esse ponebant: unde et animam dicebant esse corpus, vel ignem vel aerem vel aquam, vel aliud huiusmodi. By this is excluded the error of the early natural philosophers, who held that there was none but corporeal substance: therefore, they said that even the soul is a body, either fire, air, or water, or something of the kind. Quam quidem opinionem in fidem Christianam quidam inducere sunt conati, dicentes animam esse corpus effigiatum, sicut corpus exterius figuratur. Which opinion some have endeavored to introduce into the Christian faith, by saying that the soul is the effigy of a body, like a body outwardly imitated. Caput 50 Chapter 50 Quod substantiae intellectuales sunt immateriales That intellectual substances are immaterial Ex hoc autem apparet quod substantiae intellectuales sunt immateriales. It follows from this that intellectual substances are immaterial. Unumquodque enim ex materia et forma compositum est corpus. Diversas enim formas materia non nisi secundum diversas partes recipere potest. Quae quidem diversitas partium esse in materia non potest nisi secundum quod per dimensiones in materia existentes una communis materia in plures dividitur: subtracta enim quantitate, substantia indivisibilis est. Ostensum est autem quod nulla substantia intelligens est corpus. Relinquitur igitur quod non sit ex materia et forma composita. For everything composed of matter and form is a body, since matter cannot receive various forms except in respect of its various parts. And this diversity of parts cannot be in matter, except insofar as common matter is divided into several by the dimensions existing in matter: for without quantity substance is indivisible. Now it has been proved (ch. 49) that no intelligent substance is a body. It follows, therefore, that it is not composed of matter and form. Amplius. Sicut homo non est sine hoc homine, ita materia non est sine hac materia. Quicquid igitur in rebus est subsistens ex materia et forma compositum, est compositum ex forma et materia individuali. Intellectus autem non potest esse compositus ex materia et forma individuali. Species enim rerum intellectarum fiunt intelligibiles actu per hoc quod a materia individuali abstrahuntur. Secundum autem quod sunt intelligibiles actu, fiunt unum cum intellectu. Unde et intellectum oportet esse absque materia individuali. Non est igitur substantia intelligens ex materia et forma composita. Moreover. Just as man does not exist apart from this man, so matter exists not apart from this matter. Accordingly, whatever subsistent thing is composed of matter and form is composed of individual form and matter. Now the intellect cannot be composed of individual matter and form. For the species of things understood become actually intelligible through being abstracted from individual matter. And according as they are actually intelligible, they become one with the intellect (bk. I, ch. 44). Therefore, the intellect also must be without individual matter. Therefore, the intelligent substance is not composed of matter and form. Adhuc. Actio cuiuslibet ex materia et forma compositi non est tantum formae, nec tantum materiae, sed compositi: eius enim est agere cuius est esse; esse autem est compositi per formam; unde et compositum per formam agit. Si igitur substantia intelligens sit composita ex materia et forma, intelligere erit ipsius compositi. Actus autem terminatur ad aliquid simile agenti: unde et compositum generans non generat formam, sed compositum. Si igitur intelligere sit actio compositi, non intelligetur nec forma nec materia, sed tantum compositum. Hoc autem patet esse falsum. Non est igitur substantia intelligens composita ex materia et forma. Further. The action of anything composed of matter and form belongs not to the form alone, nor to the matter alone, but to the composite: because to act belongs to that which has being, and being belongs to the composite through its form. Therefore, the composite also acts through its form. Accordingly, if the intelligent substance be composed of matter and form, to understand will be the act of the composite. But action terminates in a thing like the agent; therefore, the composite in generating produces not a form but a composite. If, therefore, to understand be an action of the composite, it would understand neither form nor matter, but only the composite. Therefore, the intelligent substance is not composed of matter and form. Item. Formae rerum sensibilium perfectius esse habent in intellectu quam in rebus sensibilibus: sunt enim simpliciores et ad plura se extendentes; per unam enim formam hominis intelligibilem, omnes homines intellectus cognoscit. Forma autem perfecte in materia existens facit esse actu tale, scilicet vel ignem, vel coloratum: si autem non faciat aliquid esse tale, est imperfecte in illo, sicut forma coloris in aere ut in deferente, et sicut virtus primi agentis in instrumento. Si igitur intellectus sit ex materia et forma compositus, formae rerum intellectarum facient intellectum esse actu talis naturae quale est quod intelligitur. Et sic sequitur error Empedoclis, qui dicebat quod ignem igne cognoscit anima, et terra terram, et sic de aliis. Quod patet esse inconveniens. Non est igitur intelligens substantia composita ex materia et forma. Again. The forms of sensible things have a more perfect being in the intellect than in sensible things, since they are more simple and extend to more objects: for by the one intelligible form of man, the intellect knows all men. Now a form existing perfectly in matter makes a thing to be actually such (for instance, to be fire or to be colored): if it does not make a thing to be actually such, it is in that thing imperfectly (for instance, the form of heat in the air that carries it, and the power of the first agent in its instrument). Consequently if the intellect were composed of matter and form, the forms of the things understood would make the intellect to be actually of the same nature as that which is understood. And this leads to the error of Empedocles, who said that the soul knows fire by fire, and earth by earth, and so on. But this is clearly unreasonable. Therefore, the intelligent substance is not composed of matter and form. Praeterea. Omne quod est in aliquo est in eo per modum recipientis. Si igitur intellectus sit compositus ex materia et forma, formae rerum erunt in intellectu materialiter, sicut sunt extra animam. Sicut igitur extra animam non sunt intelligibiles actu, ita nec existentes in intellectu. Further. Whatever is in something is in it according to the mode of the recipient. Therefore, if the intellect be composed of matter and form, the forms of things would be in the intellect materially, just as they are outside the mind. Consequently, just as outside the mind they are not actually intelligible, neither would they be when they are in the intellect. Item. Formae contrariorum, secundum esse quod habent in materia, sunt contrariae: unde et se invicem expellunt. Secundum autem quod sunt in intellectu, non sunt contrariae: sed unum contrariorum est ratio intelligibilis alterius, quia unum per aliud cognoscitur. Non igitur habent esse materiale in intellectu. Ergo intellectus non est compositus ex materia et forma. Again. Forms of contraries, according to the being which they have in matter, are contrary: hence they exclude one another. But according as they are in the intellect they are not contrary: in fact one contrary is the intelligible ratio of the other, since one is understood through the other. Consequently, they do not have a material being in the intellect. Therefore, the intellect is not composed of matter and form. Adhuc. Materia non recipit aliquam formam de novo nisi per motum vel mutationem. Intellectus autem non movetur per hoc quod recipit formas, sed magis perficitur et quiescens intelligit, impeditur autem in intelligendo per motum. Non igitur recipiuntur formae in intellectu sicut in materia vel in re materiali. Unde patet quod substantiae intelligentes immateriales sunt, sicut et incorporeae. Further. Matter does not receive a fresh form except by movement or change. But the intellect is not moved through receiving forms; rather is it perfected and is at rest while understanding, but its understanding is hindered by movement. Consequently, forms are not received by the intellect as by matter or a material thing. Therefore, it is clear that intelligent substances are immaterial as well as incorporeal. Hinc est quod Dionysius dicit, III cap. de Div. Nom.: propter divinae bonitatis radios substiterunt intellectuales omnes substantiae, quae sicut incorporales et immateriales intelliguntur. Hence Dionysius says: on account of the rays of the divine goodness, all intellectual substances are subsistent, and are known to be both incorporeal and immaterial. Caput 51 Chapter 51 Quod substantia intellectualis non sit forma materialis That the intellectual substance is not a material form Per eadem autem ostenditur quod naturae intellectuales sunt formae subsistentes, non autem existentes in materia quasi esse earum a materia dependeat. From the same premises it may be shown that intellectual natures are subsistent forms, and do not exist in matter as though their being depended on matter. Formae enim secundum esse a materia dependentes non ipsae proprie habent esse, sed composita per ipsas. Si igitur naturae intellectuales essent huiusmodi formae, sequeretur quod haberent esse materiale, sicut et si essent ex materia et forma compositae. For forms dependent on matter, as regards their being properly speaking, do not have being themselves, but the composites through them. Hence, if intellectual substances were forms of this kind, it would follow that they have material being, just as they would if they were composed of matter and form. Adhuc. Formae quae per se non subsistunt, non possunt per se agere, agunt autem composita per eas. Si igitur naturae intellectuales huiusmodi formae essent, sequeretur quod ipsae non intelligerent, sed composita ex eis et materia. Et sic intelligens esset compositum ex materia et forma. Quod est impossibile, ut ostensum est. Again. Forms that do not subsist of themselves cannot act of themselves, but the composites act through them. If, therefore, intellectual natures were forms of this kind, it would follow that they do not themselves understand, but the things composed of them and matter. Consequently, an intelligent being would be composed of matter and form. And this has been proved (ch. 50) to be impossible. Amplius. Si intellectus esset forma in materia et non per se subsistens, sequeretur quod id quod recipitur in intellectu reciperetur in materia: huiusmodi enim formae quae habent esse materiae obligatum, non recipiunt aliquid quod in materia non recipiatur. Cum igitur receptio formarum in intellectu non sit receptio formarum in materia, impossibile est quod intellectus sit forma materialis. Moreover. If the intellect were a form in matter and not self-subsistent, it would follow that what is received into the intellect is received into matter, for such forms as have their being tied to matter do not receive anything without its being received into matter. Since, then, the reception of forms into the intellect is not a reception of forms into matter, it is impossible that the intellect be a material form. Praeterea. Dicere quod intellectus sit forma non subsistens sed materiae immersa, idem est secundum rem et si dicatur quod intellectus sit compositus ex materia et forma, differt autem solum secundum nomen: nam primo modo, dicetur intellectus ipsa forma compositi; secundo vero modo, dicetur intellectus ipsum compositum. Si igitur falsum est intellectum esse compositum ex materia et forma, falsum erit quod sit forma non subsistens sed materialis. Further. To say that the intellect is a non-subsistent form and buried in matter is the same in reality as to say that the intellect is composed of matter and form, and the difference is merely nominal: for in the former case, the intellect will be indicated as the form of the composite, while in the latter, the intellect denotes the composite itself. Therefore, if it is false that the intellect be composed of matter and form (ch. 50), it will be false that it is a non-subsistent and material form. Caput 52 Chapter 52 Quod in substantiis intellectualibus creatis differt esse et quod est That in created intellectual substances there is a difference between being and what is