Amplius. Impossibile est duo corpora se invicem continere: cum continens excedat contentum. Duo autem intellectus se invicem continent et comprehendunt, dum unus alium intelligit. Non est igitur intellectus corpus. Moreover. It is impossible for two bodies to contain one another, since the container exceeds the contained. Yet two intellects contain and comprehend one another, when one understands the other. Therefore, the intellect is not a body. Item. Nullius corporis actio reflectitur super agentem: ostensum est enim in Physicis quod nullum corpus a seipso movetur nisi secundum partem, ita scilicet quod una pars eius sit movens et alia mota. Intellectus autem supra seipsum agendo reflectitur: intelligit enim seipsum non solum secundum partem, sed secundum totum. Non est igitur corpus. Again. No body’s action reflects on the agent: for it is proved in the Physics that no body is moved by itself except in respect of a part (namely, so that one of its parts be mover and the other moved). Now the intellect by its action reflects on itself, for it understands itself not only as to a part, but as to the whole. Therefore, it is not a body. Adhuc. Actio corporis ad actionem non terminatur, nec motus ad motum: ut in Physicis est probatum. Actio autem substantiae intelligentis ad actionem terminatur: intellectus enim, sicut intelligit rem, ita intelligit se intelligere, et sic in infinitum. Substantia igitur intelligens non est corpus. Again. A body’s action is not the object of that body’s action, nor is its movement the object of its movement, as proved in the Physics. But the action of the intellect is the object of its action: for just as the intellect understands a thing, so does it understand that it understands, and so on indefinitely. Therefore, an intellectual substance is not a body. Hinc est quod sacra Scriptura substantias intellectuales spiritus nominat: per quem modum consuevit Deum incorporeum nominare, secundum illud Ioan. 4:24, Deus spiritus est. Dicitur autem Sap. 7:23 est autem in illa, scilicet divina sapientia, spiritus intelligentiae, qui capiat omnes spiritus intelligibiles. Hence it is that Sacred Scripture calls intellectual substances ‘spirits,’ in which way it is accustomed to name God, who is incorporeal: God is a spirit (John 4:24). And it is said: for in her, namely divine wisdom, is the spirit of understanding, containing all intelligible spirits (Wis 7:23). Per hoc autem excluditur error antiquorum naturalium, qui nullam substantiam nisi corpoream esse ponebant: unde et animam dicebant esse corpus, vel ignem vel aerem vel aquam, vel aliud huiusmodi. By this is excluded the error of the early natural philosophers, who held that there was none but corporeal substance: therefore, they said that even the soul is a body, either fire, air, or water, or something of the kind. Quam quidem opinionem in fidem Christianam quidam inducere sunt conati, dicentes animam esse corpus effigiatum, sicut corpus exterius figuratur. Which opinion some have endeavored to introduce into the Christian faith, by saying that the soul is the effigy of a body, like a body outwardly imitated. Caput 50 Chapter 50 Quod substantiae intellectuales sunt immateriales That intellectual substances are immaterial Ex hoc autem apparet quod substantiae intellectuales sunt immateriales. It follows from this that intellectual substances are immaterial. Unumquodque enim ex materia et forma compositum est corpus. Diversas enim formas materia non nisi secundum diversas partes recipere potest. Quae quidem diversitas partium esse in materia non potest nisi secundum quod per dimensiones in materia existentes una communis materia in plures dividitur: subtracta enim quantitate, substantia indivisibilis est. Ostensum est autem quod nulla substantia intelligens est corpus. Relinquitur igitur quod non sit ex materia et forma composita. For everything composed of matter and form is a body, since matter cannot receive various forms except in respect of its various parts. And this diversity of parts cannot be in matter, except insofar as common matter is divided into several by the dimensions existing in matter: for without quantity substance is indivisible. Now it has been proved (ch. 49) that no intelligent substance is a body. It follows, therefore, that it is not composed of matter and form. Amplius. Sicut homo non est sine hoc homine, ita materia non est sine hac materia. Quicquid igitur in rebus est subsistens ex materia et forma compositum, est compositum ex forma et materia individuali. Intellectus autem non potest esse compositus ex materia et forma individuali. Species enim rerum intellectarum fiunt intelligibiles actu per hoc quod a materia individuali abstrahuntur. Secundum autem quod sunt intelligibiles actu, fiunt unum cum intellectu. Unde et intellectum oportet esse absque materia individuali. Non est igitur substantia intelligens ex materia et forma composita. Moreover. Just as man does not exist apart from this man, so matter exists not apart from this matter. Accordingly, whatever subsistent thing is composed of matter and form is composed of individual form and matter. Now the intellect cannot be composed of individual matter and form. For the species of things understood become actually intelligible through being abstracted from individual matter. And according as they are actually intelligible, they become one with the intellect (bk. I, ch. 44). Therefore, the intellect also must be without individual matter. Therefore, the intelligent substance is not composed of matter and form. Adhuc. Actio cuiuslibet ex materia et forma compositi non est tantum formae, nec tantum materiae, sed compositi: eius enim est agere cuius est esse; esse autem est compositi per formam; unde et compositum per formam agit. Si igitur substantia intelligens sit composita ex materia et forma, intelligere erit ipsius compositi. Actus autem terminatur ad aliquid simile agenti: unde et compositum generans non generat formam, sed compositum. Si igitur intelligere sit actio compositi, non intelligetur nec forma nec materia, sed tantum compositum. Hoc autem patet esse falsum. Non est igitur substantia intelligens composita ex materia et forma. Further. The action of anything composed of matter and form belongs not to the form alone, nor to the matter alone, but to the composite: because to act belongs to that which has being, and being belongs to the composite through its form. Therefore, the composite also acts through its form. Accordingly, if the intelligent substance be composed of matter and form, to understand will be the act of the composite. But action terminates in a thing like the agent; therefore, the composite in generating produces not a form but a composite. If, therefore, to understand be an action of the composite, it would understand neither form nor matter, but only the composite. Therefore, the intelligent substance is not composed of matter and form. Item. Formae rerum sensibilium perfectius esse habent in intellectu quam in rebus sensibilibus: sunt enim simpliciores et ad plura se extendentes; per unam enim formam hominis intelligibilem, omnes homines intellectus cognoscit. Forma autem perfecte in materia existens facit esse actu tale, scilicet vel ignem, vel coloratum: si autem non faciat aliquid esse tale, est imperfecte in illo, sicut forma coloris in aere ut in deferente, et sicut virtus primi agentis in instrumento. Si igitur intellectus sit ex materia et forma compositus, formae rerum intellectarum facient intellectum esse actu talis naturae quale est quod intelligitur. Et sic sequitur error Empedoclis, qui dicebat quod ignem igne cognoscit anima, et terra terram, et sic de aliis. Quod patet esse inconveniens. Non est igitur intelligens substantia composita ex materia et forma. Again. The forms of sensible things have a more perfect being in the intellect than in sensible things, since they are more simple and extend to more objects: for by the one intelligible form of man, the intellect knows all men. Now a form existing perfectly in matter makes a thing to be actually such (for instance, to be fire or to be colored): if it does not make a thing to be actually such, it is in that thing imperfectly (for instance, the form of heat in the air that carries it, and the power of the first agent in its instrument). Consequently if the intellect were composed of matter and form, the forms of the things understood would make the intellect to be actually of the same nature as that which is understood. And this leads to the error of Empedocles, who said that the soul knows fire by fire, and earth by earth, and so on. But this is clearly unreasonable. Therefore, the intelligent substance is not composed of matter and form. Praeterea. Omne quod est in aliquo est in eo per modum recipientis. Si igitur intellectus sit compositus ex materia et forma, formae rerum erunt in intellectu materialiter, sicut sunt extra animam. Sicut igitur extra animam non sunt intelligibiles actu, ita nec existentes in intellectu. Further. Whatever is in something is in it according to the mode of the recipient. Therefore, if the intellect be composed of matter and form, the forms of things would be in the intellect materially, just as they are outside the mind. Consequently, just as outside the mind they are not actually intelligible, neither would they be when they are in the intellect. Item. Formae contrariorum, secundum esse quod habent in materia, sunt contrariae: unde et se invicem expellunt. Secundum autem quod sunt in intellectu, non sunt contrariae: sed unum contrariorum est ratio intelligibilis alterius, quia unum per aliud cognoscitur. Non igitur habent esse materiale in intellectu. Ergo intellectus non est compositus ex materia et forma. Again. Forms of contraries, according to the being which they have in matter, are contrary: hence they exclude one another. But according as they are in the intellect they are not contrary: in fact one contrary is the intelligible ratio of the other, since one is understood through the other. Consequently, they do not have a material being in the intellect. Therefore, the intellect is not composed of matter and form. Adhuc. Materia non recipit aliquam formam de novo nisi per motum vel mutationem. Intellectus autem non movetur per hoc quod recipit formas, sed magis perficitur et quiescens intelligit, impeditur autem in intelligendo per motum. Non igitur recipiuntur formae in intellectu sicut in materia vel in re materiali. Unde patet quod substantiae intelligentes immateriales sunt, sicut et incorporeae. Further. Matter does not receive a fresh form except by movement or change. But the intellect is not moved through receiving forms; rather is it perfected and is at rest while understanding, but its understanding is hindered by movement. Consequently, forms are not received by the intellect as by matter or a material thing. Therefore, it is clear that intelligent substances are immaterial as well as incorporeal. Hinc est quod Dionysius dicit, III cap. de Div. Nom.: propter divinae bonitatis radios substiterunt intellectuales omnes substantiae, quae sicut incorporales et immateriales intelliguntur. Hence Dionysius says: on account of the rays of the divine goodness, all intellectual substances are subsistent, and are known to be both incorporeal and immaterial. Caput 51 Chapter 51 Quod substantia intellectualis non sit forma materialis That the intellectual substance is not a material form Per eadem autem ostenditur quod naturae intellectuales sunt formae subsistentes, non autem existentes in materia quasi esse earum a materia dependeat. From the same premises it may be shown that intellectual natures are subsistent forms, and do not exist in matter as though their being depended on matter. Formae enim secundum esse a materia dependentes non ipsae proprie habent esse, sed composita per ipsas. Si igitur naturae intellectuales essent huiusmodi formae, sequeretur quod haberent esse materiale, sicut et si essent ex materia et forma compositae. For forms dependent on matter, as regards their being properly speaking, do not have being themselves, but the composites through them. Hence, if intellectual substances were forms of this kind, it would follow that they have material being, just as they would if they were composed of matter and form. Adhuc. Formae quae per se non subsistunt, non possunt per se agere, agunt autem composita per eas. Si igitur naturae intellectuales huiusmodi formae essent, sequeretur quod ipsae non intelligerent, sed composita ex eis et materia. Et sic intelligens esset compositum ex materia et forma. Quod est impossibile, ut ostensum est. Again. Forms that do not subsist of themselves cannot act of themselves, but the composites act through them. If, therefore, intellectual natures were forms of this kind, it would follow that they do not themselves understand, but the things composed of them and matter. Consequently, an intelligent being would be composed of matter and form. And this has been proved (ch. 50) to be impossible. Amplius. Si intellectus esset forma in materia et non per se subsistens, sequeretur quod id quod recipitur in intellectu reciperetur in materia: huiusmodi enim formae quae habent esse materiae obligatum, non recipiunt aliquid quod in materia non recipiatur. Cum igitur receptio formarum in intellectu non sit receptio formarum in materia, impossibile est quod intellectus sit forma materialis. Moreover. If the intellect were a form in matter and not self-subsistent, it would follow that what is received into the intellect is received into matter, for such forms as have their being tied to matter do not receive anything without its being received into matter. Since, then, the reception of forms into the intellect is not a reception of forms into matter, it is impossible that the intellect be a material form. Praeterea. Dicere quod intellectus sit forma non subsistens sed materiae immersa, idem est secundum rem et si dicatur quod intellectus sit compositus ex materia et forma, differt autem solum secundum nomen: nam primo modo, dicetur intellectus ipsa forma compositi; secundo vero modo, dicetur intellectus ipsum compositum. Si igitur falsum est intellectum esse compositum ex materia et forma, falsum erit quod sit forma non subsistens sed materialis. Further. To say that the intellect is a non-subsistent form and buried in matter is the same in reality as to say that the intellect is composed of matter and form, and the difference is merely nominal: for in the former case, the intellect will be indicated as the form of the composite, while in the latter, the intellect denotes the composite itself. Therefore, if it is false that the intellect be composed of matter and form (ch. 50), it will be false that it is a non-subsistent and material form. Caput 52 Chapter 52 Quod in substantiis intellectualibus creatis differt esse et quod est That in created intellectual substances there is a difference between being and what is Non est autem opinandum quod, quamvis substantiae intellectuales non sint corporeae, nec ex materia et forma compositae, nec in materia existentes sicut formae materiales, quod propter hoc divinae simplicitati adaequentur. Invenitur enim in eis aliqua compositio ex eo quod non est idem in eis esse et quod est. Now, although intellectual substances are not corporeal, nor composed of matter and form, nor existing in matter as material forms, we must not think that they equal the divine simplicity. For a certain composition is to be found in them from that ‘being’ in them is not the same as ‘what is.’ Si enim esse est subsistens, nihil praeter ipsum esse ei adiungitur. Quia etiam in his quorum esse non est subsistens, quod inest existenti praeter esse eius, est quidem existenti unitum, non autem est unum cum esse eius, nisi per accidens, inquantum est unum subiectum habens esse et id quod est praeter esse: sicut patet quod Socrati, praeter suum esse substantiale, inest album, quod quidem diversum est ab eius esse substantiali; non enim idem est esse Socratem et esse album, nisi per accidens. Si igitur non sit esse in aliquo subiecto, non remanebit aliquis modus quo possit ei uniri illud quod est praeter esse. Esse autem, inquantum est esse, non potest esse diversum: potest autem diversificari per aliquid quod est praeter esse; sicut esse lapidis est aliud ab esse hominis. Illud ergo quod est esse subsistens, non potest esse nisi unum tantum. Ostensum est autem quod Deus est suum esse subsistens. Nihil igitur aliud praeter ipsum potest esse suum esse. Oportet igitur in omni substantia quae est praeter ipsum, esse aliud ipsam substantiam et esse eius. For if being is subsistent, nothing besides being is added to it. For even in those things whose being is not subsistent, that which is in an existing thing beside its being is indeed united to the existing thing, but it is not one with its being, except accidentally, insofar as there is one subject having being and that which is beside being: thus it is clear that in Socrates, beside his substantial being, there is white, which is distinct from his substantial being, since to be Socrates and to be white are not the same, save accidentally. Consequently, if being is not in a subject, there will remain no way in which that which is beside being can be united to it. Now being, as being, cannot be diverse, but it can be differentiated by something beside being: thus the being of a stone is other than the being of a man. Hence that which is subsistent being can be one only. Now it was shown above (bk. I, ch. 22) that God is his own subsistent being: hence nothing beside him can be its own being. Therefore, in every substance beside him, the substance itself must be distinct from its being. Amplius. Natura communis, si separata intelligatur, non potest esse nisi una: quamvis habentes naturam illam plures possint inveniri. Si enim natura animalis per se separata subsisteret, non haberet ea quae sunt hominis vel quae sunt bovis: iam enim non esset animal tantum, sed homo vel bos. Remotis autem differentiis constitutivis specierum, remanet natura generis indivisa: quia eaedem differentiae quae sunt constitutivae specierum sunt divisivae generis. Sic igitur, si hoc ipsum quod est esse sit commune sicut genus, esse separatum per se subsistens non potest esse nisi unum. Si vero non dividatur differentiis, sicut genus, sed per hoc quod est huius vel illius esse, ut veritas habet; magis est manifestum quod non potest esse per se existens nisi unum. Relinquitur igitur quod, cum Deus sit esse subsistens, nihil aliud praeter ipsum est suum esse. Moreover. A common nature, if considered in the abstract, can only be one—although those that have that nature may be found to be many. For if the nature of animal subsisted as separate by itself, it would not have the things belonging to a man or to an ox. Now if we remove the differences which constitute a species, there remains the nature of the genus without division, since the same differences which divide the genus constitute the species. Accordingly, if being itself is common like a genus, a separate self-subsistent being can only be one. If, however, it be not divided by differences as a genus is, but by the fact that it is the being of this or that (as it is in truth), it is yet more evident that what exists of itself can only be one. It follows, therefore, since God is subsistent being, that nothing beside him is its own being. Adhuc. Impossibile est quod sit duplex esse omnino infinitum: esse enim quod omnino est infinitum, omnem perfectionem essendi comprehendit; et sic, si duobus talis adesset infinitas, non inveniretur quo unum ab altero differret. Esse autem subsistens oportet esse infinitum: quia non terminatur aliquo recipiente. Impossibile est igitur esse aliquod esse subsistens praeter primum. Again. There cannot possibly be a twofold being absolutely infinite, for being that is absolutely infinite contains every perfection of being, so that if two things had such an infinity, there would be nothing in which they differed. Now subsistent being must be infinite, because it is not limited by any recipient. Therefore, there cannot be any subsistent being outside the first. Item. Si sit aliquod esse per se subsistens, nihil competit ei nisi quod est entis inquantum est ens: quod enim dicitur de aliquo non inquantum huiusmodi, non convenit ei nisi per accidens, ratione subiecti; unde, si separatum a subiecto ponatur, nullo modo ei competit. Esse autem ab alio causatum non competit enti inquantum est ens: alias omne ens esset ab alio causatum; et sic oporteret procedere in infinitum in causis, quod est impossibile, ut supra ostensum est. Illud igitur esse quod est subsistens, oportet quod sit non causatum. Nullum igitur ens causatum est suum esse. Again. If there is a self-subsistent being, nothing is applicable to it except that which belongs to a being as being. This is so because what is not said of a thing as such is only applicable to it accidentally, by reason of the subject: so that if we suppose it to be separated from its subject, it is in no way applicable to it. Now to be caused by another is not applicable to a being, as being: otherwise every being would be caused by another, and consequently we should have to proceed to infinity in causes, which is impossible, as shown above (bk. I, ch. 13). Therefore, that being which is subsistent must not be caused. Therefore, no caused being is its own being. Amplius. Substantia uniuscuiusque est ei per se et non per aliud: unde esse lucidum actu non est de substantia aeris, quia est ei per aliud. Sed cuilibet rei creatae suum esse est ei per aliud: alias non esset causatum. Nullius igitur substantiae creatae suum esse est sua substantia. Moreover. The substance of a thing appertains to it of itself and not by another: therefore, to be actually lightsome is not of the air’s substance, since it comes to it from something else. Now every created thing has being from another, else it would not be caused. Therefore, in no created being is its being the same as its substance. Item. Cum omne agens agat inquantum est actu, primo agenti, quod est perfectissimum, competit esse in actu perfectissimo modo. Tanto autem aliquid est perfectius in actu quanto talis actus est in via generationis posterior: actus enim est tempore potentia posterior in uno et eodem quod de potentia ad actum procedit. Perfectius quoque est in actu quod est ipse actus quam quod est habens actum: hoc enim propter illud actu est. His igitur sic positis, constat ex supra ostensis quod Deus solus est primum agens. Sibi ergo soli competit esse in actu perfectissimo modo, ut scilicet sit ipse actus perfectissimus. Hic autem est esse, ad quod generatio et omnis motus terminatur: omnis enim forma et actus est in potentia antequam esse acquirat. Soli igitur Deo competit quod sit ipsum esse: sicut soli competit quod sit primum agens. Again. Since every agent acts insofar as it is actual, it belongs to the first agent, which is most perfect, to be actual in the most perfect way. Now a thing is the more perfectly actual, the more its act is posterior in the order of generation, for act is posterior in time to the potency in the one and same subject which passes from potency to act. Also, act itself is more perfectly actual than that which has act, for the latter is actual on account of the former. Accordingly, these premises being supposed, it is clear from what has been already proved (bk. I, ch. 13) that God alone is the first agent. Therefore, it belongs to him alone to be actual in the most perfect way—that is, to be the most perfect act. Now this is being, in which generation and all movement terminates, since every form and act is in potency before it acquires being. Therefore, it belongs to God alone to be his own being, just as it belongs to him alone to be the first agent. Amplius. Ipsum esse competit primo agenti secundum propriam naturam: esse enim Dei est eius substantia ut supra ostensum est. Quod autem competit alicui secundum propriam naturam suam, non convenit aliis nisi per modum participationis: sicut calor aliis corporibus ab igne. Ipsum igitur esse competit omnibus aliis a primo agente per participationem quandam. Quod autem competit alicui per participationem, non est substantia eius. Impossibile est igitur quod substantia alterius entis praeter agens primum sit ipsum esse. Moreover. Being itself belongs to the first agent in respect of his proper nature: for God’s being is his substance, as we have proved above. Now that which belongs to a thing in respect of its proper nature does not belong to others except by way of participation (like heat to bodies other than fire). Therefore, being itself belongs to all others except the first agent by a kind of participation. But that which belongs to a thing by participation is not its substance. Therefore, it is impossible that the substance of a thing other than the first agent should be being itself. Hinc est quod Exodi 3:14 proprium nomen Dei ponitur esse qui est: quia eius solius proprium est quod sua substantia non sit aliud quam suum esse. Hence the name proper to God is stated in Exodus 3:14 to be ‘he who is,’ because it is proper to him alone that his substance is not distinct from his being. Caput 53 Chapter 53