Caput 56 Chapter 56 Per quem modum substantia intellectualis possit corpori uniri In what way it is possible for an intellectual substance to be united to the body Cum autem supra ostensum sit substantiam intellectualem non esse corpus neque virtutem aliquam a corpore dependentem, restat investigandum utrum aliqua substantia intellectualis corpori possit uniri. Now since it has been shown (ch. 49) that an intellectual substance is neither a body, nor a force dependent on a body, it remains for us to inquire whether an intellectual substance can be united to the body. Est autem primo manifestum quod substantia intellectualis non potest corpori uniri per modum mixtionis. In the first place, it is clear that an intellectual substance cannot be united to the body by way of a mixture. Quae enim miscentur, oportet ad invicem alterata esse. Quod non contingit nisi in his quorum est materia eadem, quae possunt esse activa et passiva ad invicem. Substantiae autem intellectuales non communicant in materia cum corporalibus: sunt enim immateriales, ut supra ostensum est. Non sunt igitur corpori miscibiles. For things that are mixed together must be altered in relation to one another. And this does not happen except in those things whose matter is the same, and which can be active and passive in relation to one another. But intellectual substances have no matter in common with corporeal substances, since they are immaterial, as we have proved above (ch. 50). Therefore, they cannot be mixed with bodies. Adhuc. Quae miscentur, mixtione iam facta, non manent actu, sed virtute tantum: nam si actu manerent, non esset mixtio, sed confusio tantum; unde corpus mixtum ex elementis nullum eorum est. Hoc autem impossibile est accidere substantiis intellectualibus: sunt enim incorruptibiles, ut supra ostensum est. Further. Things that are mixed do not remain actually, but only virtually, after the mixture is made: for were they to remain actually it would not be a mixture but only an accumulation; hence a body formed by a mixture of elements is no one of them. But this cannot possibly happen to intellectual substances, since they are incorruptible, as we have proved above (ch. 55). Non igitur potest substantia intellectualis uniri corpori per modum mixtionis. Therefore, an intellectual substance cannot be united to the body by way of a mixture. Similiter autem patet quod substantia intellectualis non potest uniri corpori per modum contactus proprie sumpti. Tactus enim non nisi corporum est: sunt enim tangentia quorum sunt ultima simul, ut puncta aut lineae aut superficies, quae sunt corporum ultima. Non igitur per modum contactus substantia intellectualis corpori uniri potest. It is likewise evident that an intellectual substance cannot be united to the body by way of contact, properly so called. For contact is only between bodies, since things are in contact when they come together at their extremes, as the points, lines, or superficies which are the extremes of bodies. Therefore, it is not possible for an intellectual substance to be united to the body by way of contact. Ex hoc autem relinquitur quod neque continuatione, neque compositione aut colligatione, ex substantia intellectuali et corpore unum fieri possit. Omnia enim haec sine contactu esse non possunt. Hence it follows that neither by continuity, nor composition, nor connection is it possible for one thing to result from an intellectual substance with the body. For none of these is possible without contact. Est tamen quidam modus contactus quo substantia intellectualis corpori uniri potest. Corpora enim naturalia tangendo se alterant: et sic ad invicem uniuntur non solum secundum ultima quantitatis, sed etiam secundum similitudinem qualitatis aut formae, dum alterans formam suam imprimit in alteratum. Et quamvis, si considerentur solum ultima quantitatis, oporteat in omnibus mutuum esse tactum, tamen, si attendatur ad actionem et passionem, invenientur aliqua esse tangentia tantum et aliqua tacta tantum: corpora enim caelestia tangunt quidem hoc modo elementaria corpora, inquantum ea alterant: non autem tanguntur ab eis, quia ab eis non patiuntur. Si igitur sint aliqua agentia quae quantitatis ultimis non tangant, dicentur nihilominus tangere, inquantum agunt: secundum quem modum dicimus quod contristans nos tangit. Hoc igitur modo tangendi possibile est uniri substantiam intellectualem corpori per contactum. Agunt enim substantiae intellectuales in corpora et movent ea, cum sint immateriales et magis in actu existentes. And yet there is a kind of contact by which it is possible for an intellectual substance to be united to a body. For natural bodies are mutually alterative when in contact with one another, so that they are united to one another not only as to their quantitative extremes, but also in like manner to qualities or forms, when an alterative impresses its like on the thing altered. And although, if we consider only the quantitative extremes, there is need in all cases for contact to be mutual, nevertheless if we consider action and passion, we shall find certain things to be only touching, and others only touched, for the heavenly bodies touch the elemental bodies in this way, insofar as they alter them; yet they are not touched by them, since they do not suffer from them. Accordingly, if there be any agents which are not in contact by their quantitative extremes, they will be said nevertheless to touch, insofar as they act, in which sense we say that a person who makes us sorrowful touches us. Therefore, it is possible for an intellectual substance to be united to a body by contact, by touching it in this way. For intellectual substances act on bodies and move them, since they are immaterial and more actual. Hic autem tactus non est quantitatis, sed virtutis. Unde differt hic tactus a tactu corporeo in tribus. Primo quidem, quia hoc tactu id quod est indivisibile potest tangere divisibile. Quod in tactu corporeo non potest accidere: nam puncto non potest tangi nisi indivisibile aliquid. Substantia autem intellectualis, quamvis sit indivisibilis, potest tangere quantitatem divisibilem, inquantum agit in ipsam. Alio enim modo est indivisibile punctum, et substantia intellectualis. Punctum quidem sicut quantitatis terminus: et ideo habet situm determinatum in continuo, ultra quem porrigi non potest. Substantia autem intellectualis est indivisibilis quasi extra genus quantitatis existens. Unde non determinatur ei indivisibile aliquid quantitatis ad tangendum. Secundo, quia tactus quantitatis est solum secundum ultima: tactus autem virtutis est ad totum quod tangitur. Sic enim tangitur secundum quod patitur et movetur. Hoc autem fit secundum quod est in potentia. Potentia vero est secundum totum, non secundum ultima totius. Unde totum tangitur. Ex quo patet tertia differentia. Quia in tactu quantitatis, qui fit secundum extrema, oportet esse tangens extrinsecum ei quod tangitur; et non potest incedere per ipsum, sed impeditur ab eo. Tactus autem virtutis, qui competit substantiis intellectualibus, cum sit ad intima, facit substantiam tangentem esse intra id quod tangitur, et incedentem per ipsum absque impedimento. This contact, however, is not quantitative, but virtual. Therefore, this contact differs from bodily contact in three ways. First, because by this contact the indivisible can touch the divisible. Now this cannot happen in bodily contact, because nothing but what is indivisible can be touched by a point. But an intellectual substance, although indivisible, can touch a divisible quantity insofar as it acts upon it. For a point is indivisible in one way, and an intellectual substance in another. A point is indivisible as being the term of a quantity; therefore, it has a determined position in a continuous quantity, beyond which it cannot stretch. But an intellectual substance is indivisible as being outside the genus of quantity, so that no quantitative indivisible is assigned with which it can come into contact. Second, because quantitative contact is only in respect of extremes, whereas virtual contact regards the whole thing touched. For it is touched inasmuch as it suffers and is moved. Now this is according as it is in potency: and potency regards the whole and not the extremes of the whole. Therefore, the whole is touched. From this follows the third difference, because in quantitative contact which takes place in regard to the extremes, that which touches must be outside that which is touched, and cannot pierce it, since it is hindered by it. Whereas virtual contact, which applies to intellectual substances, since it reaches inwards, makes the touching substance to be within the thing touched, and to penetrate it without hindrance. Sic igitur substantia intellectualis potest corpori uniri per contactum virtutis. Quae autem uniuntur secundum talem contactum, non sunt unum simpliciter. Sunt enim unum in agendo et patiendo: quod non est esse unum simpliciter. Sic enim dicitur unum quomodo et ens. Esse autem agens non significat esse simpliciter. Unde nec esse unum in agendo est esse unum simpliciter. Accordingly, an intellectual substance can be united to a body by virtual contact. Now things united by contact of this kind are not one simply. For they are one in action and passion, which is not to be one simply. For ‘one’ is predicated in the same way as ‘being.’ But to be an agent does not signify being simply. Consequently, neither is to be one in action to be one simply. Unum autem simpliciter tripliciter dicitur: vel sicut indivisibile; vel sicut continuum; vel sicut quod est ratione unum. Ex substantia autem intellectuali et corpore non potest fieri unum quod sit indivisibile: oportet enim illud esse compositum ex duobus. Neque iterum quod sit continuum: quia partes continui quantae sunt. Relinquitur igitur inquirendum utrum ex substantia intellectuali et corpore possit sic fieri unum sicut quod est ratione unum. Now ‘one simply’ is taken in three ways: either as being indivisible, or as being continuous, or as being logically one. But the one which is indivisible cannot result from an intellectual substance and a body: for the one of this latter kind must be composed of the two. Nor again can the one that is continuous, because the parts of the continuous are parts of quantity. It remains, therefore, for us to inquire whether from an intellectual substance and a body can be formed the one which is one logically. Ex duobus autem permanentibus non fit aliquid ratione unum nisi sicut ex forma substantiali et materia: ex subiecto enim et accidente non fit ratione unum; non enim est eadem ratio hominis et albi. Hoc igitur inquirendum relinquitur, utrum substantia intellectualis corporis alicuius forma substantialis esse possit. Now from two things that stay there does not result something logically one except from substantial form and matter, since from subject and accident there does not result one logically, for the idea of ‘man’ is not the same as the idea of ‘white.’ Hence it remains for us to inquire whether an intellectual substance can be the substantial form of a body. Videtur autem rationabiliter considerantibus hoc esse impossibile. And to those who consider the question reasonably it would seem that this is impossible (ch. 69). Ex duabus enim substantiis actu existentibus non potest fieri aliquid unum: actus enim cuiuslibet est id quo ab altero distinguitur. Substantia autem intellectualis est substantia actu existens, ut ex praemissis apparet. Similiter autem et corpus. Non igitur potest aliquid unum fieri, ut videtur, ex substantia intellectuali et corpore. For from two actually existing substances there cannot be made something one, because the act of a thing is that by which it is distinguished from another. Now an intellectual substance is an actually existing substance, as is clear from what has been said (ch. 51): and so likewise is a body. Therefore, seemingly, something one cannot be made from an intellectual substance and a body. Adhuc. Forma et materia in eodem genere continentur: omne enim genus per actum et potentiam dividitur. Substantia autem intellectualis et corpus sunt diversa genera. Non igitur videtur possibile unum esse formam alterius. Again. Form and matter are contained in the same genus, since every genus is divided into act and potency. But intellectual substance and body are of different genera. Therefore, it does not seem possible that one be the form of the other. Amplius. Omne illud cuius esse est in materia, oportet esse materiale. Sed si substantia intellectualis est forma corporis, oportet quod esse eius sit in materia corporali: non enim esse formae est praeter esse materiae. Sequetur igitur quod substantia intellectualis non sit immaterialis, ut supra ostensum est. Moreover. Everything whose being is in matter must be material. Now if an intellectual substance is the form of a body, its being must be in corporeal matter, since the being of the form is not beside the being of the matter. Hence it will follow that an intellectual substance is not immaterial, as above it was proved to be (ch. 50). Item. Impossibile est illud cuius esse est in corpore, esse a corpore separatum. Intellectus autem ostenditur a philosophis esse separatus a corpore, et quod neque est corpus neque virtus in corpore. Non est igitur intellectualis substantia forma corporis: sic enim esse eius esset in corpore. Again. That which has its being in a body cannot possibly be separated from that body. Now it is proved by philosophers that the intellect is separate from the body, and that it is neither a body nor a power in a body. Therefore, an intellectual substance is not the form of a body, for thus its being would be in a body. Adhuc. Cuius esse est commune corpori, oportet et operationem corpori communem esse: unumquodque enim agit secundum quod est ens; nec virtus operativa rei potest esse sublimior quam eius essentia, cum virtus essentiae principia consequatur. Si autem substantia intellectualis sit forma corporis, oportet quod esse eius sit sibi et corpori commune: ex forma enim et materia fit aliquid unum simpliciter, quod est secundum esse unum. Erit igitur et operatio substantiae intellectualis communis corpori, et virtus eius virtus in corpore. Quod ex praemissis patet esse impossibile. Further. That which has its being in common with a body must have its operation in common with a body, because a thing acts inasmuch as it is a being: nor can the active power of a thing surpass its essence, since power results from the essential principles. But if an intellectual substance be the form of a body, its being must be common to it and the body, because from form and matter there results one thing simply, that exists by one being. Consequently, an intellectual substance will have its operation in common with the body, and its power will be a power in a body, which has been proved to be impossible (ch. 49). Caput 57 Chapter 57 Positio Platonis de unione animae intellectualis ad corpus The opinion of Plato concerning the union of the intellectual soul with the body Ex his autem et similibus rationibus aliqui moti, dixerunt quod nulla substantia intellectualis potest esse forma corporis. Sed quia huic positioni ipsa hominis natura contradicere videbatur, qui ex anima intellectuali et corpore videtur esse compositus, excogitaverunt quasdam vias per quas naturam hominis salvarent. Moved by these and like reasons, some have asserted that no intellectual substance can be the form of a body. But since man’s very nature seemed to controvert this opinion, in that he appears to be composed of intellectual soul and body, they devised certain solutions so as to save the nature of man. Plato igitur posuit, et eius sequaces, quod anima intellectualis non unitur corpori sicut forma materiae, sed solum sicut motor mobili, dicens animam esse in corpore sicut nautam in navi. Et sic unio animae et corporis non esset nisi per contactum virtutis, de quo supra dictum est. Accordingly, Plato and his school held that the intellectual soul is not united to the body as form to matter, but only as mover to movable, for he said that the soul is in the body as a sailor in a boat. In this way, the union of soul and body would only be by virtual contact, of which we have spoken above (ch. 56). Hoc autem videtur inconveniens. Secundum praedictum enim contactum non fit aliquid unum simpliciter, ut ostensum est. Ex unione autem animae et corporis fit homo. Relinquitur igitur quod homo non sit unum simpliciter: et per consequens nec ens simpliciter, sed ens per accidens. But this would seem inadmissible. For according to the contact in question, there does not result one thing simply, as we have proved (ch. 56). However, there results a man from the union of soul and body. It follows, then, that a man is not one simply, and neither consequently a being simply, but accidentally. Ad hoc autem evitandum, Plato posuit quod homo non sit aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore: sed quod ipsa anima utens corpore sit homo; sicut Petrus non est aliquid compositum ex homine et indumento, sed homo utens indumento. In order to avoid this, Plato said that a man is not a thing composed of soul and body, but that the soul itself using a body is a man: thus Peter is not a thing composed of man and clothes, but a man using clothes. Hoc autem esse impossibile ostenditur. Animal enim et homo sunt quaedam sensibilia et naturalia. Hoc autem non esset si corpus et eius partes non essent de essentia hominis et animalis, sed tota essentia utriusque esset anima, secundum positionem praedictam: anima enim non est aliquid sensibile neque materiale. Impossibile est igitur hominem et animal esse animam utentem corpore, non autem aliquid ex corpore et anima compositum. But this is shown to be impossible. For animal and man are sensible and natural things. But this would not be the case if the body and its parts were not of the essence of man and animal, and the soul were the whole essence of both, as the aforesaid opinion holds: for the soul is neither a sensible nor a material thing. Consequently, it is impossible for man and animal to be a soul using a body, and not a thing composed of body and soul. Item. Impossibile est quod eorum quae sunt diversa secundum esse, sit operatio una. Dico autem operationem unam, non ex parte eius in quod terminatur actio, sed secundum quod egreditur ab agente: multi enim trahentes navim unam actionem faciunt ex parte operati, quod est unum, sed tamen ex parte trahentium sunt multae actiones, quia sunt diversi impulsus ad trahendum, cum enim actio consequatur formam et virtutem, oportet quorum sunt diversae formae et virtutes, esse et actiones diversas. Quamvis autem animae sit aliqua operatio propria, in qua non communicat corpus, sicut intelligere; sunt tamen aliquae operationes communes sibi et corpori, ut timere et irasci et sentire et huiusmodi: haec enim accidunt secundum aliquam transmutationem alicuius determinatae partis corporis, ex quo patet quod simul sunt animae et corporis operationes. Oportet igitur ex anima et corpore unum fieri, et quod non sint secundum esse diversa. Again. It is impossible that there be one operation of things diverse in being. And in speaking of an operation being one, I refer not to that in which the action terminates, but to the manner in which it proceeds from the agent: for many persons rowing one boat make one action on the part of the thing done, which is one, but on the part of the rowers there are many actions, for there are many strokes of the oar. For it follows that things differing in forms and powers differ in action, since action is consequent upon form and power. Now, though the soul has a proper operation in which the body has no share (namely, intelligence), there are nevertheless certain operations common to it and the body, such as fear, anger, sensation, and so forth; for these happen by reason of a certain transmutation in a determinate part of the body, which proves that they are operations of the soul and body together. Therefore, from the soul and body there must result one thing, and they have not each a distinct being. Huic autem rationi secundum Platonis sententiam obviatur. Nihil enim inconveniens est moventis et moti, quamvis secundum esse diversorum, esse eundem actum: nam motus est idem actus moventis sicut a quo est, moti autem sicut in quo est. Sic igitur Plato posuit praemissas operationes esse animae corporique communes: ut videlicet sint animae sicut moventis et corporis sicut moti. According to the opinion of Plato, this argument may be rebutted. For it is not impossible for mover and moved, though different in being, to have the same act, because the same act belongs to the mover as that from which it is, and to the moved as that in which it is. Therefore, Plato held that the aforesaid operations are common to the soul and body, namely, so that they are the soul’s as mover and the body’s as moved. Sed hoc esse non potest. Quia, ut probat Philosophus in II De anima, sentire accidit in ipso moveri a sensibilibus exterioribus. Unde non potest homo sentire absque exteriori sensibili: sicut non potest aliquid moveri absque movente. Organum igitur sensus movetur et patitur in sentiendo, sed ab exteriori sensibili. Illud autem quo patitur est sensus; quod ex hoc patet, quia carentia sensu non patiuntur a sensibilibus tali modo passionis. Sensus igitur est virtus passiva ipsius organi. Anima igitur sensitiva non se habet in sentiendo sicut movens et agens, sed sicut id quo patiens patitur. Quod impossibile est esse diversum secundum esse a patiente. Non est igitur anima sensibilis secundum esse diversa a corpore animato. But this cannot be. For as the Philosopher proves in 2 De anima: sensation results from our being moved by exterior sensibles. Therefore, a man cannot sense without an exterior sensible, just as a thing cannot be moved without a mover. Consequently, the organ of sense is moved and passive in sensing, but this is owing to the external sensible. And that by which it is passive is the sense, which is proved by the fact that things devoid of sense are not passive to sensibles by the same kind of passion. Therefore, sense is the passive power of the organ. Consequently, the sensitive soul is not as mover and agent in sensing, but as that by which the patient is passive. And this cannot have a distinct being from the patient. Therefore, the sensitive soul has not a distinct being from the animate body. Praeterea. Licet motus sit communis actus moventis et moti, tamen alia operatio est facere motum et recipere motum: unde et duo praedicamenta ponuntur facere et pati. Si igitur in sentiendo anima sensitiva se habet ut agens et corpus ut patiens, alia erit operatio animae et alia corporis. Anima igitur sensitiva habebit aliquam operationem propriam. Habebit igitur et subsistentiam propriam. Non igitur, destructo corpore, esse desinet. Animae igitur sensitivae, etiam irrationabilium animalium, erunt immortales. Quod quidem improbabile videtur. Tamen a Platonis opinione non discordat, sed de hoc infra erit locus quaerendi. Further. Although movement is the common act of mover and moved, yet it is one operation to cause movement and another to receive movement; hence we have two predicaments, action and passion. Accordingly, if the sensitive soul is in the position of agent in sensing, and the body in that of patient, the operation of the soul will be other than the operation of the body. Consequently, the sensitive soul will have an operation proper to it: and therefore it will have its proper subsistence. Hence when the body is destroyed, it will not cease to exist. Therefore, sensitive souls even of irrational animals will be immortal: which seems improbable. And yet it is not out of keeping with Plato’s opinion. But there will be a place for inquiring into this further on (ch. 82). Amplius. Mobile non sortitur speciem a suo motore. Si igitur anima non coniungitur corpori nisi sicut motor mobili, corpus et partes eius non consequuntur speciem ab anima. Abeunte igitur anima, remanebit corpus et partes eius eiusdem speciei. Hoc autem est manifeste falsum: nam caro et os et manus et huiusmodi partes post abscessum animae non dicuntur nisi aequivoce; cum nulli harum partium propria operatio adsit, quae speciem consequitur. Non igitur unitur anima corpori solum sicut motor mobili, vel sicut homo vestimento. Moreover. The movable does not derive its species from its mover. Consequently, if the soul is not united to the body except as mover to movable, the body and its parts do not take their species from the soul. Therefore, at the soul’s departure, the body and its parts will remain of the same species. Yet this is clearly false: for flesh, bone, hands, and like parts are so called only equivocally after the soul’s departure, since none of these parts retains its proper operation that results from the species. Therefore, the soul is not united to the body merely as mover to movable, or as man to his clothes. Adhuc. Mobile non habet esse per suum motorem, sed solummodo motum. Si igitur anima uniatur corpori solummodo ut motor, corpus movebitur quidem ab anima, sed non habebit esse per eam. Vivere autem est quoddam esse viventis. Non igitur corpus vivet per animam. Further. The movable does not have being through its mover, but only movement. Consequently, if the soul be united to the body merely as its mover, the body will indeed be moved by the soul, but will not have being through it. But in the living thing to live is to be. Therefore, the body would not live through the soul. Item. Mobile neque generatur per applicationem motoris ad ipsum, neque per eius separationem corrumpitur: cum non dependeat mobile a motore secundum esse, sed secundum moveri tantum. Si igitur anima uniatur corpori solum ut motor, sequetur quod in unione animae et corporis non erit aliqua generatio, neque in separatione corruptio. Et sic mors, quae consistit in separatione animae et corporis, non erit corruptio animalis. Quod est manifeste falsum. Again. The movable is neither generated through the mover’s application to it nor corrupted by being separated from it, since the movable depends not on the mover for its being, but only in the point of being moved. If, then, the soul be united to the body merely as its mover, it will follow that neither in the union of soul and body will there be generation, nor corruption in their separation. And thus death, which consists in the separation of soul and body, will not be the corruption of an animal, which is clearly false. Praeterea. Omne movens seipsum ita se habet quod in ipso est moveri et non moveri, et movere et non movere. Sed anima, secundum Platonis opinionem, movet corpus sicut movens seipsum. Est ergo in potestate animae movere corpus vel non movere. Si igitur non unitur ei nisi sicut motor mobili, erit in potestate animae separari a corpore cum voluerit, et iterum uniri ei cum voluerit. Quod patet esse falsum. Further. Every self-mover is such that it is in it to be moved and not to be moved, to move and not to move. Now the soul, according to Plato’s opinion, moves the body as a self-mover. Consequently, it is in the soul’s power to move the body and not to move it. Therefore, if it be united to it merely as mover to movable, it will be in the soul’s power to be separated from the body at will, and to be reunited to it at will: which is clearly false. Quod autem ut forma propria anima corpori uniatur, sic probatur. Illud quo aliquid fit de potentia ente actu ens, est forma et actus ipsius. Corpus autem per animam fit actu ens de potentia existente: vivere enim est esse viventis; semen autem ante animationem est vivens solum in potentia, per animam autem fit vivens actu. Est igitur anima forma corporis animati. That the soul is united to the body as its proper form is proved thus. That by which a thing, from being potentially, is made an actual being, is its form and act. Now the body is made by the soul an actual being from existing potentially, since to live is the being of a living thing. But the seed before animation is only a living thing in potency, and is made an actually living thing by the soul. Therefore, the soul is the form of the animated body.