Caput 68 Chapter 68 Qualiter substantia intellectualis possit esse forma corporis How an intellectual substance can be the form of the body Ex praemissis igitur rationibus concludere possumus quod intellectualis substantia potest uniri corpori ut forma. Accordingly, from the foregoing arguments we are able to conclude that an intellectual substance can be united to the body as its form. Si enim substantia intellectualis non unitur corpori solum ut motor, ut Plato posuit, neque continuatur ei solum per phantasmata, ut dixit Averroes, sed ut forma; neque tamen intellectus quo homo intelligit, est praeparatio in humana natura, ut dixit Alexander; neque complexio, ut Galenus; neque harmonia, ut Empedocles; neque corpus, vel sensus, vel imaginatio, ut antiqui dixerunt: relinquitur quod anima humana sit intellectualis substantia corpori unita ut forma. Quod quidem sic potest fieri manifestum. For if an intellectual substance is not united to the body merely as its mover, as Plato stated, nor is in contact with it merely by the phantasms, as Averroes held, but as its form; and if the intellect by which man understands is not a preparedness in human nature (as Alexander maintained), nor the temperament (as Galen said), nor harmony (according to Empedocles), nor a body, the senses, or imagination (as the ancients asserted), it follows that the human soul is an intellectual substance united to the body as its form. This can be made evident as follows. Ad hoc enim quod aliquid sit forma substantialis alterius, duo requiruntur. Quorum unum est, ut forma sit principium essendi substantialiter ei cuius est forma: principium autem dico, non factivum, sed formale, quo aliquid est et denominatur ens. Unde sequitur aliud, scilicet quod forma et materia conveniant in uno esse: quod non contingit de principio effectivo cum eo cui dat esse. Et hoc esse est in quo subsistit substantia composita, quae est una secundum esse, ex materia et forma constans. Non autem impeditur substantia intellectualis, per hoc quod est subsistens, ut probatum est, esse formale principium essendi materiae, quasi esse suum communicans materiae. Non est enim inconveniens quod idem sit esse in quo subsistit compositum et forma ipsa: cum compositum non sit nisi per formam, nec seorsum utrumque subsistat. For one thing to be another’s substantial form, two conditions are required. One of them is that the form be the principle of substantial being to the thing of which it is the form. I speak not of the effective but of the formal principle, by which a thing is, and is called a being. Hence follows the second condition, namely, that the form and matter combine together in one being, which is not the case with the effective principle together with that to which it gives being. This is the being in which a composite substance subsists, which is one in being, and consists of matter and form. Now an intellectual substance, as proved above (ch. 51), is not hindered by the fact that it is subsistent from being the formal principle of being to matter, as communicating its being to matter. For it is not unreasonable that the composite and its form itself should subsist in the same being, since the composite exists only by the form, nor does either subsist apart from the other. Potest autem obiici quod substantia intellectualis esse suum materiae corporali communicare non possit, ut sit unum esse substantiae intellectualis et materiae corporalis: diversorum enim generum est diversus modus essendi; et nobilioris substantiae nobilius esse. It may, however, be argued that an intellectual substance cannot communicate its being to corporeal matter, so that the intellectual substance and the corporeal matter have together one being, because different genera have different modes of being, and a more noble mode belongs to a more noble substance. Hoc autem convenienter diceretur si eodem modo illud esse materiae esset sicut est substantiae intellectualis. Non est autem ita. Est enim materiae corporalis ut recipientis et subiecti ad aliquid altius elevati: substantiae autem intellectualis ut principii, et secundum propriae naturae congruentiam. Nihil igitur prohibet substantiam intellectualem esse formam corporis humani, quae est anima humana. This would be said reasonably if this being belonged in the same way to matter as to the intellectual substance. But it is not so. For it belongs to corporeal matter as its recipient and subject raised to something higher, while it belongs to the intellectual substance as its principle, and in accordance with its very nature. Therefore, nothing prevents an intellectual substance from being the human body’s form, which is the human soul. Hoc autem modo mirabilis rerum connexio considerari potest. Semper enim invenitur infimum supremi generis contingere supremum inferioris generis: sicut quaedam infima in genere animalium parum excedunt vitam plantarum, sicut ostrea, quae sunt immobilia, et solum tactum habent, et terrae in modum plantarum adstringuntur; unde et beatus Dionysius dicit, in VII cap. De div. nom., quod divina sapientia coniungit fines superiorum principiis inferiorum. Est igitur accipere aliquid supremum in genere corporum, scilicet corpus humanum aequaliter complexionatum, quod attingit ad infimum superioris generis, scilicet ad animam humanam, quae tenet ultimum gradum in genere intellectualium substantiarum, ut ex modo intelligendi percipi potest. Et inde est quod anima intellectualis dicitur esse quasi quidam horizon et confinium corporeorum et incorporeorum, inquantum est substantia incorporea, corporis tamen forma. Non autem minus est aliquid unum ex substantia intellectuali et materia corporali quam ex forma ignis et eius materia, sed forte magis: quia quanto forma magis vincit materiam, ex ea et materia efficitur magis unum. In this way we are able to perceive the wondrous connection of things. For we always find the lowest in the higher genus touching the highest of the lower genus: thus some of the lowest of the animal kind scarcely surpass the life of plants—such as oysters, which are immovable, have only the sense of touch, and are fixed to the earth like plants. Hence blessed Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, 7, that divine wisdom has united the ends of higher things with the beginnings of the lower. Accordingly, we may consider something supreme in the genus of bodies (namely, the well-tempered human body), which touches the lowest of the higher genus (namely, the human soul), and this occupies the last degree in the genus of intellectual substances, as may be seen from its mode of understanding. Hence it is that the intellectual soul is said to be on the horizon and confines of things corporeal and incorporeal, inasmuch as it is an incorporeal substance, and yet the form of a body. And a thing composed of an intellectual substance and corporeal matter is not less one than that which results from the form of fire and its matter; but perhaps more so, since the more a form overcomes matter, the more one is that which is made from it and matter. Quamvis autem sit unum esse formae et materiae, non tamen oportet quod materia semper adaequet esse formae. Immo, quanto forma est nobilior, tanto in suo esse superexcedit materiam. Quod patet inspicienti operationes formarum, ex quarum consideratione earum naturas cognoscimus: unumquodque enim operatur secundum quod est. Unde forma cuius operatio superexcedit conditionem materiae, et ipsa secundum dignitatem sui esse superexcedit materiam. Now, though form and matter have one being, it does not follow that matter always equals the being of the form. In fact, the more noble the form, the more it surpasses matter in its being. This is clear to one who looks into the operations of forms, from the consideration of which we know their natures, since a thing operates according as it is. Consequently, a form whose operation surpasses the condition of matter also itself surpasses matter in the excellence of its being. Invenimus enim aliquas infimas formas, quae in nullam operationem possunt nisi ad quam se extendunt qualitates quae sunt dispositiones materiae, ut calidum, frigidum, humidum et siccum, rarum, densum, grave et leve, et his similia: sicut formae elementorum. Unde istae sunt formae omnino materiales, et totaliter immersae materiae. For we find certain lowest forms, which are capable of no operation except such as comes within the compass of the qualities which are the dispositions of matter—for instance, heat, cold, moisture and dryness, rarity, density, gravity and levity, and similiar others (like the elemental forms). Consequently, these forms are altogether material, and wholly merged in matter. Super has inveniuntur formae mixtorum corporum, quae licet non se extendant ad aliqua operata quae non possunt compleri per qualitates praedictas, interdum tamen operantur illos effectus altiori virtute, quam sortiuntur ex corporibus caelestibus, quae consequitur eorum speciem: sicut adamas trahit ferrum. Above these we find the forms of mixed bodies; these, although they do not extend to any operations that cannot be accomplished through the aforesaid qualities, nevertheless sometimes produce those effects by a higher power which they receive from the heavenly bodies, and which is consequent upon their species; thus the lodestone attracts iron. Super has iterum inveniuntur aliquae formae quarum operationes extenduntur ad aliqua operata quae excedunt virtutem qualitatum praedictarum, quamvis qualitates praedictae organice ad harum operationes deserviant: sicut sunt animae plantarum, quae etiam assimilantur non solum virtutibus corporum caelestium in excedendo qualitates activas et passivas, sed ipsis motoribus corporum caelestium, inquantum sunt principia motus rebus viventibus, quae movent seipsas. Again, above these we find certain forms whose operations include some which surpass the power of the aforesaid qualities, although the same qualities assist organically in their operation, such are the souls of plants. These again are like not only to the powers of heavenly bodies (in surpassing the active and passive qualities), but also to the movers of heavenly bodies, inasmuch as they are the principles of movement in living things, which move themselves. Supra has formas inveniuntur aliae formae similes superioribus substantiis non solum in movendo, sed etiam aliqualiter in cognoscendo; et sic sunt potentes in operationes ad quas nec organice qualitates praedictae deserviunt, tamen operationes huiusmodi non complentur nisi mediante organo corporali; sicut sunt animae brutorum animalium. Sentire enim et imaginari non completur calefaciendo et infrigidando: licet haec sint necessaria ad debitam organi dispositionem. Above these forms we find other forms like the higher substances not only in moving, but also in knowing—and thus they are capable of operations to which the aforesaid qualities do not help even organically. And yet these operations are not accomplished save by means of a corporeal organ; such are the souls of dumb animals. For sensation and imagination are not accomplished by heating and cooling, although these are necessary for the due disposition of the organ. Super omnes autem has formas invenitur forma similis superioribus substantiis etiam quantum ad genus cognitionis, quod est intelligere: et sic est potens in operationem quae completur absque organo corporali omnino. Et haec est anima intellectiva: nam intelligere non fit per aliquod organum corporale. Unde oportet quod illud principium quo homo intelligit, quod est anima intellectiva, et excedit conditionem materiae corporalis, non sit totaliter comprehensa a materia aut ei immersa, sicut aliae formae materiales. Quod eius operatio intellectualis ostendit, in qua non communicat materia corporalis. Quia tamen ipsum intelligere animae humanae indiget potentiis quae per quaedam organa corporalia operantur, scilicet imaginatione et sensu, ex hoc ipso declaratur quod naturaliter unitur corpori ad complendam speciem humanam. And above all these forms we find a form like the higher substances even as regards the kind of knowledge, which is intelligence: and thus it is capable of an operation which is accomplished without any corporeal organ at all. This is the intellective soul, for intelligence is not effected by a corporeal organ. Consequently, it follows that this principle by which man understands—namely, the intellective soul, which surpasses the condition of corporeal matter—is not wholly encompassed by and merged in matter, as are other material forms. This is indicated by its operation, in which corporeal matter has no part. And yet, since the human soul’s act of intelligence needs powers (namely, imagination and sense) which operate through corporeal organs, this by itself shows that the soul is naturally united to the body in order to complete the human species. Caput 69 Chapter 69 Solutio rationum quibus supra probatur quod substantia intellectualis non potest uniri corpori ut forma Solution of the arguments by which it was proved above that an intellectual substance cannot be united to the body as its form His autem consideratis, non est difficile solvere quae contra praedictam unionem supra opposita sunt. Taking the foregoing (ch. 68) into consideration, it is not difficult to solve the arguments given above (ch. 56) against the aforesaid union. In prima enim ratione falsum supponitur. Non enim corpus et anima sunt duae substantiae actu existentes, sed ex eis duobus fit una substantia actu existens: corpus enim hominis non est idem actu praesente anima, et absente; sed anima facit ipsum actu esse. In the first argument, something false is taken for granted. For body and soul are not two actually existing substances, but one actually existing substance is made from them, for man’s body is not actually the same while the soul is present and when the soul is absent, and it is the soul that makes it to be actually. Quod autem secundo obiicitur, formam et materiam in eodem genere contineri, non sic verum est quasi utrumque sit species unius generis: sed quia sunt principia eiusdem speciei. Sic igitur substantia intellectualis et corpus, quae seorsum existentia essent diversorum generum species, prout uniuntur, sunt unius generis ut principia. The statement in the second objection that form and matter belong to the same genus, is true not as though they were both species of the same genus, but because they are the principles of the same species. Accordingly, the intellectual substance and the body, which if they existed apart would be species of different genera, through being united are of the same genus as principles of it. Non autem oportet substantiam intellectualem esse formam materialem, quamvis esse eius sit in materia: ut tertia ratio procedebat. Non enim est in materia sicut materiae immersa, vel a materia totaliter comprehensa, sed alio modo, ut dictum est. Nor does it follow that the intellectual substance is a material form, although its being is in matter, as the third argument contended. For it is not in matter as merged in matter, or wholly encompassed by matter, but in another way, as stated. Nec tamen per hoc quod substantia intellectualis unitur corpori ut forma, removetur quod a philosophis dicitur, intellectum esse a corpore separatum. Est enim in anima considerare et ipsius essentiam, et potentiam eius. Secundum essentiam quidem suam dat esse tali corpori: secundum potentiam vero operationes proprias efficit. Si igitur operatio animae per organum corporale completur, oportet quod potentia animae quae est illius operationis principium, sit actus illius partis corporis per quam operatio eius completur: sicut visus est actus oculi. Si autem operatio eius non compleatur per organum corporale, potentia eius non erit actus alicuius corporis. Et per hoc dicitur intellectus esse separatus: non quin substantia animae cuius est potentia intellectus, sive anima intellectiva, sit corporis actus ut forma dans tali corpori esse. Nor does the intellectual substance being united to the body as its form prevent the intellect being separate from the body, as the philosophers say. For we must consider in the soul both its essence and its power. According to its essence, it gives being to such and such a body, while according to its power it accomplishes its proper operations. If, therefore, an operation of the soul be accomplished by means of a corporeal organ, it follows that the power which is the principle of that operation is the act of that part of the body by which its operation is accomplished: thus sight is the act of the eye. If, however, its operation be not accomplished by means of a corporeal organ, its power will not be the act of a body. It is in this sense that the intellect is said to be separate, and this does not preclude the substance of the soul of which the intellect is a power (or the intellective soul) from being the act of the body, as the form which gives being to such a body. Non est autem necessarium, si anima secundum suam substantiam est forma corporis, quod omnis eius operatio fiat per corpus, ac per hoc omnis eius virtus sit alicuius corporis actus: ut quinta ratio procedebat. Iam enim ostensum est quod anima humana non sit talis forma quae sit totaliter immersa materiae, sed est inter omnes alias formas maxime supra materiam elevata. Unde et operationem producere potest absque corpore, idest, quasi non dependens a corpore in operando: quia nec etiam in essendo dependet a corpore. And although the soul by its substance is the form of the body, it is not necessary that its every operation be performed by means of the body, and that consequently its every power be the act of a body, as the fifth argument supposed. For it has been already shown that the human soul is not such a form as is wholly merged in matter, but is of all other forms raised highest above matter. Consequently, it can produce an operation without the body, as being independent of the body in operating, since not even in being does it depend on the body. Eodem etiam modo patet quod ea quibus Averroes suam opinionem confirmare nititur, non probant substantiam intellectualem corpori non uniri ut formam. In the same way, it is clear that the reasons whereby Averroes tries to confirm his opinion (ch. 59) do not prove that the intellectual substance is not united to the body as its form. Verba enim Aristotelis quae dicit de intellectu possibili, quod est impassibilis et immixtus et separatus, non cogunt confiteri quod substantia intellectiva non sit unita corpori ut forma dans esse. Verificantur enim etiam si dicatur quod intellectiva potentia, quam Aristoteles vocat potentiam perspectivam, non sit alicuius organi actus quasi per ipsum suam exercens operationem. Et hoc etiam sua demonstratio declarat: ex operatione enim intellectuali qua omnia intelligit, ostendit ipsum immixtum esse vel separatum; operatio autem pertinet ad potentiam ut ad principium. For the expressions used by Aristotle in reference to the possible intellect, when he says that it is impassible, unmixed, and separate, do not oblige us to admit that the intellective substance is not united to the body as the form from which the latter has being. For they are also true if we say that the intellective power, which Aristotle calls the power of understanding (ch. 61), is not the act of an organ, as though it exercised its operation thereby. This is, in fact, shown by his proof, since he proves that it is unmixed and separate from its operation whereby it understands all things, and because operation belongs to a power as to its principle. Unde patet quod nec demonstratio Aristotelis hoc concludit, quod substantia intellectiva non uniatur corpori sicut forma. Si enim ponamus substantiam animae secundum esse corpori sic unitam, intellectum autem nullius organi actum esse, non sequetur quod intellectus habeat aliquam naturam, de naturis dico sensibilium: cum non ponatur harmonia, vel ratio alicuius organi, sicut de sensu dicit Aristoteles, in II De anima, quod est quaedam ratio organi. Non enim habet intellectus operationem communem cum corpore. Consequently, it is clear that neither does Aristotle’s proof show that the intellective substance is not united to the body as its form. For if we suppose that the soul’s substance is thus united to the body in being, and that the intellect is not the act of any organ, it will not follow that the intellect has a particular nature—I refer to the natures of sensibles, since it is not admitted to be a harmony (ch. 64), nor the reason of an organ—as Aristotle says of sense that it is like the reason of an organ. For the intellect does not have not a common operation with the body. Quod autem per hoc quod Aristoteles dicit intellectum esse immixtum vel separatum, non intendat excludere ipsum esse partem sive potentiam animae quae est forma totius corporis, patet per hoc quod dicit in fine primi de anima, contra illos qui dicebant animam in diversis partibus corporis diversas sui partes habere: si tota anima omne corpus continet, convenit et partium unamquamque aliquid corporis continere. Hoc autem videtur impossibile. Qualem enim partem aut quomodo intellectus continet, grave est fingere. That Aristotle, by saying that the intellect is unshackled or separate, does not mean to exclude its being a part or power of the soul which is the form of the whole body, is clear from what he says at the end of 1 De anima, against those who said that different parts of the soul are in different parts of the body: If the whole soul contains the whole body, it is fitting that each of its parts should contain some part of the body. But this seems impossible. For it is difficult to conceive what part the intellect contains, and how. Patet etiam quod, ex quo intellectus nullius partis corporis actus est, quod non sequitur receptionem eius esse receptionem materiae primae: ex quo eius receptio et operatio est omnino absque organo corporali. It is also evident, since the intellect is not the act of any part of the body, that its receptiveness is not that of prime matter, insofar as its receptiveness and operation are altogether without a corporeal organ. Nec etiam infinita virtus intellectus tollitur: cum non ponatur virtus in magnitudine, sed in substantia intellectuali fundata, ut dictum est. Nor again is the infinite power of the intellect excluded, since its power is not ascribed to a magnitude, but is founded on the intellectual substance, as stated. Caput 70 Chapter 70 Quod secundum dicta Aristotelis oportet ponere intellectum uniri corpori ut formam That according to the words of Aristotle we must say that the intellect is united to the body as its form Et quia Averroes maxime nititur suam opinionem confirmare per verba et demonstrationem Aristotelis, ostendendum restat quod necesse est dicere, secundum opinionem Aristotelis, intellectum secundum suam substantiam alicui corpori uniri ut formam. Now, since Averroes endeavors to confirm his opinion especially by appealing to the words and proof of Aristotle (ch. 59), it remains to be shown that, according to Aristotle’s opinion, we must say that the intellect as to its substance is united to a body as its form. Probat enim Aristoteles, in libro Physicorum, quod in motoribus et motis impossibile est procedere in infinitum. Unde concludit quod necesse est devenire ad aliquod primum motum, quod vel moveatur ab immobili motore, vel moveat seipsum. Et de his duobus accipit secundum, scilicet quod primum mobile moveat seipsum: ea ratione, quia quod est per se, semper est prius eo quod est per aliud. Deinde ostendit quod movens seipsum de necessitate dividitur in duas partes, quarum una est movens et alia est mota. Oportet igitur primum seipsum movens componi ex duabus partibus, quarum una est movens et alia mota. Omne autem huiusmodi est animatum. Primum igitur mobile, scilicet caelum, est animatum, secundum opinionem Aristotelis. Unde et in II De caelo dicitur expresse quod caelum est animatum, et propter hoc oportet in eo ponere differentias positionis non solum quoad nos, sed etiam secundum se. For Aristotle in the Physics proves that it is impossible to go on to infinity in movers and things moved. Hence he concludes that we must come to some first moved thing, which either is moved by an immovable mover, or moves itself. Of these two he takes the latter (namely, that the first movable moves itself) for this reason: that what is by a thing itself always precedes that which is by another. Then he shows that a self-mover is of necessity divided into two parts, one of which is mover and the other moved. Consequently, the first self-mover must consist of two parts—the one moving, the other moved. Now every such thing is animate. Therefore, the first movable (namely, the heaven) is animate according to the opinion of Aristotle. Hence in 2 De Coelo it is expressly stated that the heaven is animate, and for this reason we must ascribe to the heaven differences of position not only in relation to us, but also in relation to itself. Inquiramus igitur, secundum opinionem Aristotelis, qua anima sit caelum animatum. Let us then inquire with what kind of soul the heaven is animated, according to Aristotle’s opinion. Probat autem in XI Metaphysicae, quod in motu caeli est considerare aliquid quod movet omnino immotum, et aliquid quod movet motum. Id autem quod movet omnino immotum, movet sicut desiderabile: nec dubium quin ab eo quod movetur. Ostendit autem quod non sicut desiderabile desiderio concupiscentiae, quod est desiderium sensus, sed sicut desiderabile intellectuali desiderio: unde dicit quod primum movens non motum est desiderabile et intellectuale. Igitur id quod ab eo movetur, scilicet caelum, est desiderans et intelligens nobiliori modo quam nos, ut subsequenter probat. Est igitur caelum compositum, secundum opinionem Aristotelis, ex anima intellectuali et corpore. Et hoc significat in II De anima, ubi dicit quod quibusdam inest intellectivum et intellectus: ut hominibus, et si aliquid huiusmodi est alterum, aut honorabilius, scilicet caelum. In 11 Metaphysics, he proves that we may consider, in the heaven’s movement, something that moves and is wholly unmoved, and something that moves and is also moved. Now that which moves and is wholly unmoved moves as an object of desire: nor is there doubt that it is desirable by that which is moved. And he shows that it moves not as desirable by the desire of concupiscence, which is the desire of sense, but as desirable by intellectual desire: therefore, he says that the first unmoved mover is desirable and intellectual. Consequently, that which is moved by it (namely, the heaven) is desiring and understanding in a more noble way than we are, as he proves further on. Therefore, the heaven is composed of an intellectual soul and a body, according to Aristotle’s opinion. He refers to this when he says in 2 De anima that in certain things there is the faculty and act of understanding—for instance, in men, and in any other like or more noble things, namely, the heaven. Constat autem quod caelum non habet animam sensitivam, secundum opinionem Aristotelis: haberet enim diversa organa, quae non competunt simplicitati caeli. Et ad hoc significandum, subiungit Aristoteles quod quibus de numero corruptibilium inest intellectus, insunt omnes aliae potentiae: ut daret intelligere quod aliqua incorruptibilia habent intellectum quae non habent alias potentias animae, scilicet corpora caelestia. Now it is clear that the heaven does not have a sensitive soul, according to the opinion of Aristotle, since it would have various organs, which is not in keeping with the heaven’s simplicity. In order to point this out, Aristotle goes on to say that those corruptible things which have intellect have all the other powers, so as to imply that some incorruptible things (namely, the heavenly bodies) have intellect without the other powers of the soul. Non poterit igitur dici quod intellectus continuetur corporibus caelestibus per phantasmata: sed oportebit dicere quod intellectus secundum suam substantiam uniatur corpori caelesti ut forma. Therefore, it cannot be said that the intellect comes into contact with the heavenly bodies through phantasms: but we must say that the intellect, by its substance, is united to the heavenly body as its form.