Caput 73 Chapter 73 Quod intellectus possibilis non est unus in omnibus hominibus That there is not one possible intellect in all men Ex praemissis autem evidenter ostenditur non esse unum intellectum possibilem omnium hominum qui sunt et qui erunt et qui fuerunt: ut Averroes, in III De anima, fingit. From what has been said it is evidently shown that there is not one possible intellect of all present, future, and past men, as Averroes fancies. Ostensum est enim quod substantia intellectus unitur corpori humano ut forma. Impossibile est autem unam formam esse nisi unius materiae: quia proprius actus in propria potentia fit; sunt enim ad invicem proportionata. Non est igitur intellectus unus omnium hominum. For it has been proved that the substance of the intellect is united to the human body as its form (ch. 68). Now one form cannot possibly be in more than one matter, because the proper act is produced in its proper potency, since they are mutually proportionate. Therefore, there is not one intellect of all men. Adhuc. Unicuique motori debentur propria instrumenta: alia enim sunt instrumenta tibicinis, alia architectoris. Intellectus autem comparatur ad corpus ut motor ipsius: sicut Aristoteles determinat in III De anima. Sicut igitur impossibile est quod architector utatur instrumentis tibicinis, ita impossibile est quod intellectus unius hominis sit intellectus alterius. Again. Proper instruments are due to every mover, for the piper uses one kind of instrument, and the builder another. Now the intellect is compared to the body as the latter’s mover, as Aristotle declares in 3 De anima. Therefore, just as it is impossible for the builder to use the instruments of a piper, so is it impossible for the intellect of one man to be the intellect of another. Praeterea. Aristoteles, in I De anima, reprehendit antiquos de hoc quod, dicentes de anima, nihil de proprio susceptibili dicebant: quasi esset contingens, secundum Pythagoricas fabulas, quamlibet animam quodlibet corpus indui. Non est igitur possibile quod anima canis ingrediatur corpus lupi, vel anima hominis aliud corpus quam hominis. Sed quae est proportio animae hominis ad corpus hominis, eadem est proportio animae huius hominis ad corpus huius hominis. Non est igitur possibile animam huius hominis ingredi aliud corpus quam istius hominis. Sed anima huius hominis est per quam hic homo intelligit: homo enim per animam intelligit secundum sententiam Aristotelis in I De anima. Non est igitur unus intellectus istius et illius hominis. Further. Aristotle, in 1 De anima, reproves the ancients because, while treating of the soul, they said nothing about its proper recipient: as though it could happen that, according to the Pythagorean fables, any soul might put on any body. It is, therefore, not possible for the soul of a dog to enter the body of a wolf, or for a man’s soul to enter any body other than a man’s. Now, the proportion between man’s soul and man’s body is the same as between the soul of this man and the body of this man. Consequently, it is impossible for the soul of this man to enter a body other than this man’s. But it is the soul of this man whereby this man understands, since, according to Aristotle’s opinion, man understands by his soul. Therefore, the intellect of this and that man is not the same. Amplius. Ab eodem aliquid habet esse et unitatem: unum enim et ens se consequuntur. Sed unumquodque habet esse per suam formam. Ergo et unitas rei sequitur unitatem formae. Impossibile est igitur diversorum individuorum esse formam unam. Forma autem huius hominis est anima intellectiva. Impossibile est igitur omnium hominum esse unum intellectum. Moreover. A thing has being and unity from the same cause: for one and being are consequent upon one another. Now every thing has being through its form. Therefore, the unity of a thing is consequent upon the unity of the form. Consequently, it is impossible that there should be one form of several individuals. Now the form of this individual man is his intellective soul. Therefore, there cannot possibly be one intellect of all men. Si autem dicatur quod anima sensitiva huius hominis sit alia ab anima sensitiva illius, et pro tanto non est unus homo, licet sit unus intellectus: hoc stare non potest. Propria enim operatio cuiuslibet rei consequitur et demonstrat speciem ipsius. Sicut autem animalis propria operatio est sentire, ita hominis propria operatio est intelligere: ut Aristoteles dicit, in I Ethicorum. Unde oportet quod, sicut hoc individuum est animal propter sensum, secundum Aristotelem, in II De anima; ita sit homo propter id quo intelligit. Id autem quo intelligit anima, vel homo per animam, est intellectus possibilis, ut dicitur in III De anima. Est igitur hoc individuum homo per intellectum possibilem. Si igitur hic homo habet aliam animam sensitivam cum alio homine, non autem alium intellectum possibilem, sed unum et eundem, sequetur quod sint duo animalia, sed non duo homines. Quod patet impossibile esse. Non est igitur unus intellectus possibilis omnium hominum. If, however, it be said that the sensitive soul of this man is distinct from the sensitive soul of that one, and to that extent there is not one man, although there is one intellect; this cannot stand. For each thing’s proper operation is a consequence and an indication of its species. Now just as the proper operation of an animal is sensation, so the operation proper to man is understanding, as Aristotle says in 1 Ethics. Hence it follows that just as this individual is an animal by reason of sense, according to Aristotle in 2 De anima, so is he a man by reason of that whereby he understands. But that whereby the soul—or man through the soul—understands is the possible intellect, as stated in 3 De Anima. Therefore, this individual is a man through the possible intellect. Consequently, if this man has a distinct sensitive soul from that man’s, and yet not a distinct possible intellect, but one and the same, it will follow that they are two animals, but not two men. This is clearly impossible. Therefore, there is not one possible intellect of all men. His autem rationibus respondet Commentator praedictus, in III De anima, dicens quod intellectus possibilis continuatur nobiscum per formam suam, scilicet per speciem intelligibilem, cuius unum subiectum est phantasma in nobis existens, quod est in diversis diversum. Et sic intellectus possibilis numeratur in diversis, non ratione suae substantiae, sed ratione suae formae. The said Commentator replies to these arguments, in 3 De anima (above, ch. 59), by saying that the possible intellect comes into contact with us by its form—that is, by the intelligible species—the subject of which is the phantasma existing in us, and which is distinct in distinct subjects. Therefore, the possible intellect is individualized in different subjects not by reason of its substance, but by reason of its form. Quod autem haec responsio nulla sit, apparet per ea quae supra dicta sunt. Ostensum est enim supra quod non est possibile hominem intelligere si sic solum intellectus possibilis continuaretur nobiscum. It is clear from what has been said above that this reply is of no avail. For it was shown above (ch. 59) that it is impossible for man to understand if the possible intellect merely comes thus into contact with us. Dato autem quod praedicta continuatio sufficeret ad hoc quod homo esset intelligens, adhuc responsio dicta rationes supra dictas non solvit. Secundum enim dictam positionem, nihil ad intellectum pertinens remanebit numeratum secundum multitudinem hominum nisi solum phantasma. Et hoc ipsum phantasma non erit numeratum secundum quod est intellectum in actu: quia sic est in intellectu possibili, et est abstractum a materialibus conditionibus per intellectum agentem. Phantasma autem, secundum quod est intellectum in potentia, non excedit gradum animae sensitivae. Adhuc igitur non remanebit alius hic homo ab illo nisi per animam sensitivam. Et sequetur praedictum inconveniens, quod non sint plures homines hic et ille. And granted that the said contact were sufficient for man to have intelligence, nevertheless the reply adduced does not solve the arguments given above. For according to the opinion in question, nothing pertaining to the intellect will be individualized according to the number of men, excepting only the phantasm. And this very phantasm will not be individualized according as it is actually understood, because it is thus in the possible intellect, and abstracted from material conditions by the active intellect. Now the phantasm, as understood potentially, does not surpass the degree of the sensitive soul. Consequently, this man will still remain indistinct from that one, except as regards the sensitive soul: and there will follow the absurdity already indicated, that this and that man are not several men. Praeterea. Nihil sortitur speciem per id quod est in potentia, sed per id quod est actu. Phantasma autem, secundum quod est numeratum, est tantum in potentia ad esse intelligibile. Ergo per phantasma, secundum quod numeratur, non sortitur hoc individuum speciem animalis intellectivi, quod est ratio hominis. Et sic remanebit illud quod speciem humanam dat, non esse numeratum in diversis. Further. Nothing derives its species through that which is in potency, but by that which is in act. Now the phantasm as individualized is merely in potency to intelligible being. Therefore, this individual does not derive the species of intellective animal (that is, the nature of man) from the phantasm as individualized. And consequently it will still follow that what gives the human species is not individualized in different subjects. Adhuc. Illud per quod speciem sortitur unumquodque vivens, est perfectio prima, et non perfectio secunda: ut patet per Aristotelem, in II De anima. Phantasma autem non est perfectio prima, sed perfectio secunda: est enim phantasia motus factus a sensu secundum actum, ut dicitur in libro De anima. Non est igitur ipsum phantasma quod numeratur, a quo homo speciem habet. Again. That through which a living thing derives its species is its first and not its second perfection, as Aristotle states in 2 De anima (above, ch. 61). But the phantasm is not the first but a second perfection, because the imagination is movement caused by sense in act, as stated in De anima. Therefore, it is not from the individual phantasm that man derives his species. Amplius. Phantasmata quae sunt intellecta in potentia, diversa sunt. Illud autem quo aliquid speciem sortitur, oportet esse unum: nam species una est unius. Non igitur per phantasmata, prout ponuntur numerari in diversis, ut sunt intellecta in potentia, homo speciem sortitur. Moreover. Phantasms that are understood potentially are of various kinds. Now that from which a thing derives its species ought to be one, since of one thing there is one species. Therefore, man does not derive his species through the phantasms as individualized in various subjects, in which way they are understood potentially. Item. Illud quo homo sortitur speciem, oportet semper esse manens in eodem individuo dum durat: alias individuum non semper esset unius et eiusdem speciei, sed quandoque huius, quandoque illius. Phantasmata autem non semper eadem manent in uno homine, sed quaedam de novo adveniunt, et quaedam praeexistentia abolentur. Individuum igitur hominis neque per phantasma sortitur speciem; neque per ipsum continuatur principio suae speciei, quod est intellectus possibilis. Again. That from which a man derives his species must always remain the same in the same individual as long as the individual lasts, or else the individual would not always be of one and the same species, but sometimes of this one, and sometimes of that one. Now the phantasms do not always remain the same in one man, but some come anew while other previous ones pass away. Therefore, the human individual neither derives his species through the phantasm, nor comes by it into touch with the principle of his species, which is the possible intellect. Si autem dicatur quod hic homo non sortitur speciem ab ipsis phantasmatibus, sed a virtutibus in quibus sunt phantasmata, scilicet imaginativa, memorativa et cogitativa, quae est propria homini, quam Aristoteles in III De anima, passivum intellectum vocat: adhuc sequuntur eadem inconvenientia. Quia, cum virtus cogitativa habeat operationem solum circa particularia, quorum intentiones dividit et componit, et habeat organum corporale per quod agit, non transcendit genus animae sensitivae. Homo autem ex anima sensitiva non habet quod sit homo, sed quod sit animal. Adhuc igitur relinquitur quod numeretur in nobis solum id quod competit homini inquantum est animal. If, however, it be said that this man derives his species not from the phantasms themselves, but from the powers in which the phantasms reside—namely, those of imagination, memory, and cogitation (which latter is proper to man and is called by Aristotle in 3 De anima (above, ch. 30) the passive intellect)—still the same impossibilities follow. For, since the cogitative power has an operation only about particulars (the intentions of which it composes and divides), and has a corporeal organ by which it acts, it does not surpass the genus of the sensitive soul. Now man, by his sensitive soul, is not a man but an animal. Therefore, it still remains that the only thing which is numbered in us is that which belongs to man as an animal. Praeterea. Virtus cogitativa, cum operetur per organum, non est id quo intelligimus: cum intelligere non sit operatio alicuius organi. Id autem quo intelligimus, est illud quo homo est homo: cum intelligere sit propria operatio hominis consequens eius speciem. Non est igitur hoc individuum homo per virtutem cogitativam: neque haec virtus est id per quod homo substantialiter differt a brutis, ut Commentator praedictus fingit. Further. The cogitative power, since it operates through an organ, is not that whereby we understand, because understanding is not the operation of an organ. Now that whereby we understand is that by which man is man, because understanding is man’s proper operation consequent upon his species. Therefore, it is not by the cogitative power that this individual is a man, nor is it by this power that man differs essentially from dumb animals, as the Commentator imagines. Adhuc. Virtus cogitativa non habet ordinem ad intellectum possibilem, quo intelligit homo, nisi per suum actum quo praeparantur phantasmata ut per intellectum agentem fiant intelligibilia actu et perficientia intellectum possibilem. Operatio autem ista non semper eadem manet in nobis. Impossibile est igitur quod homo per eam vel continuetur principio speciei humanae; vel per eam habeat speciem. Sic igitur patet quod praedicta responsio omnino confutanda est. Further. The cogitative power is not directed to the possible intellect by which man understands except through its act by which the phantasms are prepared, so that by the active intellect they may be made actually intelligible, and perfect the possible intellect. Now this operation does not always remain the same in us. Consequently, it is impossible for man either to be brought by it into contact with the principle of the human species, or to receive its species from it. Therefore, it is evident that the above reply is to be utterly rejected. Item. Id quo aliquid operatur aut agit, est principium ad quod sequitur operatio non solum quantum ad esse ipsius, sed etiam quantum ad multitudinem aut unitatem: ab eodem enim calore non est nisi unum calefacere, sive una calefactio activa; quamvis possit esse multiplex calefieri, sive multae calefactiones passivae, secundum diversitatem calefactorum simul per unum calorem. Intellectus autem possibilis est quo intelligit anima: ut dicit Aristoteles in III De anima. Si igitur intellectus possibilis huius et illius hominis sit unus et idem numero, necesse erit etiam intelligere utriusque esse unum et idem. Quod patet esse impossibile: nam diversorum individuorum impossibile est esse operationem unam. Impossibile est igitur intellectum possibilem esse unum huius et illius. Again. That by which a thing operates or acts is a principle to which the operation is a sequel not only as to its being, but also in the point of multitude or unity, since from the same heat there is only one heating or active calefaction, although to be heated or passive calefaction may be manifold, according to the diversity of things heated simultaneously by the same heat. Now the possible intellect is whereby the soul understands, as Aristotle states in 3 De anima. Consequently, if the possible intellect of this and that man is one and the same in number, the act of intelligence will of necessity be one and the same in both. But this is clearly impossible, since the one operation cannot belong to different individuals. It is, therefore, impossible for this and that man to have the one possible intellect. Si autem dicatur quod ipsum intelligere multiplicatur secundum diversitatem phantasmatum: hoc stare non potest. Sicut enim dictum est, unius agentis una actio multiplicatur solum secundum diversa subiecta in quae transit illa actio. Intelligere autem et velle, et huiusmodi, non sunt actiones transeuntes in exteriorem materiam, sed manent in ipso agente quasi perfectiones ipsius agentis: ut patet per Aristotelem in IX Metaphysicae. Non potest igitur unum intelligere intellectus possibilis multiplicari per diversitatem phantasmatum. And if it be said that the very act of understanding is multiplied according to the difference of phantasms, this cannot stand. For, as we have stated, the one action of the one agent is multiplied only according to the different subjects into which that action passes. But understanding, willing, and the like are not actions that pass into outward matter, but remain in the agent himself, as perfections of that same agent, as Aristotle declares in 9 Metaphysics. Therefore, one act of understanding of the possible intellect cannot be multiplied by reason of a diversity of phantasms. Praeterea. Phantasmata se habent ad intellectum possibilem ut activum quodammodo ad passivum: secundum quod Aristoteles dicit, in III De anima, quod intelligere quoddam pati est. Pati autem ipsum patientis diversificatur secundum diversas formas activorum sive species, non secundum diversitatem eorum in numero. In uno enim passivo sequitur simul a duobus activis, scilicet calefaciente et desiccante, calefieri et desiccari: non autem a duobus calefacientibus sequitur in uno calefactibili duplex calefieri, sed unum tantum; nisi forte sint diversae species caloris. Cum enim calor duplex unius speciei non possit esse in uno subiecto; motus autem numeratur secundum terminum ad quem: si sit unius temporis et eiusdem subiecti, non poterit esse duplex calefieri in uno subiecto. Et hoc dico, nisi sit alia species caloris: sicut ponitur in semine calor ignis, caeli et animae. Ex diversitate igitur phantasmatum intellectus possibilis non multiplicatur nisi secundum diversarum specierum intelligentiam: ut dicamus quod aliud est eius intelligere prout intelligit hominem, et prout intelligit equum. Sed horum unum intelligere simul convenit omnibus hominibus. Ergo adhuc sequetur quod idem intelligere numero sit huius hominis et illius. Further. The phantasms are related to the possible intellect somewhat as agent to patient, in which sense Aristotle says in 3 De anima that to understand is in a sense to be passive. Now the passiveness of the patient is differentiated according to the different forms or species of the agents, and not according to their numerical distinction. For the one passive subject is heated and dried at the same time as the result of two active causes, namely, heating and drying. In contrast, from two heating agents there do not result two heatings in one heatable subject, but only one, unless the agents happen to differ in species. For, since two heats of the same species cannot be in one subject, and movement is counted according to the ending term: if the movement be at one time and in the same subject, there cannot be a double heating in one subject. And I say this unless there be more than one species of heat: thus in the seed there is said to be the heat of fire, of heaven, and of the soul. Therefore, the possible intellect’s act of understanding is not multiplied according to the diversity of phantasms, except in respect of its understanding various species—so that we may say that its act of understanding is different when it understands a man, and when it understands a horse—but one act of understanding these things is at the same time becoming to all men. Consequently, it will still follow that the act of understanding is identically the same in this and that man. Adhuc. Intellectus possibilis intelligit hominem, non secundum quod est hic homo, sed inquantum est homo simpliciter, secundum rationem speciei. Haec autem ratio una est, quantumcumque phantasmata hominis multiplicentur, vel in uno homine vel in diversis, secundum diversa individua hominis, quorum proprie sunt phantasmata. Multiplicatio igitur phantasmatum non potest esse causa quod multiplicetur ipsum intelligere intellectus possibilis respectu unius speciei. Et sic adhuc remanebit una actio numero diversorum hominum. Again. The possible intellect understands man, not as this man, but as man simply, as regards his specific nature. Now this nature is one, however much the phantasms of man be multiplied, whether in one man or in several, according to the various human individuals, which properly speaking the phantasms represent. Consequently, the multiplication of phantasms cannot cause the multiplication of the possible intellect’s act of understanding in respect of one species. Hence it will still follow that there is one identical act of several men. Item. Proprium subiectum habitus scientiae est intellectus possibilis: quia eius actus est considerare secundum scientiam. Accidens autem, si sit unum, non multiplicatur nisi secundum subiectum. Si igitur intellectus possibilis sit unus omnium hominum, necesse erit quod scientiae habitus idem secundum speciem, puta habitus grammaticae, sit idem numero in omnibus hominibus. Quod est inopinabile. Non est igitur intellectus possibilis unus in omnibus. Again. The possible intellect is the proper subject of the habit of science, because its act is to consider according to science. Now an accident, if it be one, is not multiplied except according to the subject. Consequently, if there be one possible intellect of all men, it will follow of necessity that the same specific habit of science (for instance, the habit of grammar) is identically the same in all men, which is unthinkable. Therefore, the possible intellect is not one in all. Sed ad hoc dicunt quod subiectum habitus scientiae non est intellectus possibilis, sed intellectus passivus et virtus cogitativa. To this, however, they reply that the subject of the habit of science is not the possible intellect, but the passive intellect and the cogitative power (ch. 60). Quod quidem esse non potest. Nam, sicut probat Aristoteles, in II Ethicorum, ex similibus actibus fiunt similes habitus, et similes etiam actus reddunt. Ex actibus autem intellectus possibilis fit habitus scientiae in nobis: et ad eosdem actus potentes sumus secundum habitum scientiae. Habitus igitur scientiae est in intellectu possibili, non passivo. But this cannot be. For, as Aristotle proves, in 2 Ethics, from like acts like habits are formed which again produce like acts. Now the habit of science is formed in us by acts of the possible intellect, and we are capable of performing the same acts according to the habit of science. Therefore, the habit of science is in the possible, not the passive, intellect. Adhuc. Scientia est de conclusionibus demonstrationum: nam demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire, ut Aristoteles dicit in I Posteriorum. Conclusiones autem demonstrationum sunt universales, sicut et principia. Erit igitur in illa virtute quae est cognoscitiva universalium. Intellectus autem passivus non est cognoscitivus universalium, sed particularium intentionum. Non est igitur subiectum habitus scientiae. Further. Science is about the conclusions of demonstrations: for a demonstration is a syllogism that makes us know scientifically, as Aristotle states in 1 Posterior Analytics. Now the conclusions of demonstrations are universal like their premises. Therefore, science will be in the power that is cognizant of universals. Now the passive intellect is not cognizant of universals, but of particular intentions. Therefore, it is not the subject of the scientific habit. Praeterea. Contra hoc sunt plures rationes adductae supra, cum de unione intellectus possibilis ad hominem ageretur. Further. This is refuted by several arguments adduced above, when we were discussing the union of the possible intellect to man (ch. 60). Videtur autem ex hoc fuisse deceptio in ponendo habitum scientiae in intellectu passivo esse, quia homines inveniuntur promptiores vel minus prompti ad scientiarum considerationes secundum diversam dispositionem virtutis cogitativae et imaginativae. Seemingly, the fallacy of placing the habit of science in the passive intellect arose from the fact that men are observed to be more or less apt for the considerations of sciences according to the various dispositions of the cogitative and imaginative powers. Sed ista promptitudo dependet ab illis virtutibus sicut ex dispositionibus remotis: prout etiam dependet a bonitate tactus et corporis complexione; secundum quod dicit Aristoteles, in II De anima, homines boni tactus et mollis carnis esse bene aptos mente. Ex habitu autem scientiae inest facultas considerandi sicut ex proximo principio actus: oportet enim quod habitus scientiae perficiat potentiam qua intelligimus, ut agat cum voluerit faciliter, sicut et alii habitus potentias in quibus sunt. But this aptitude depends on these powers as on remote dispositions, in the same way as it depends on perfection of touch and bodily temperament, in which sense Aristotle says in 2 De anima that men of perfect touch and of soft flesh are well apt of mind. But from the habit of science there results an aptitude for consideration as from the proximate principle of that action, because the habit of science must perfect the power whereby we understand, so that it act easily at will even as other habits perfect the powers in which they reside. Item. Dispositiones praedictarum virtutum sunt ex parte obiecti, scilicet phantasmatis, quod propter bonitatem harum virtutum praeparatur ad hoc quod faciliter fiat intelligibile actu per intellectum agentem. Dispositiones autem quae sunt ex parte obiectorum, non sunt habitus, sed quae sunt ex parte potentiarum: non enim dispositiones quibus terribilia fiunt toleranda, sunt habitus fortitudinis; sed dispositio qua pars animae, scilicet irascibilis, disponitur ad terribilia sustinenda. Ergo manifestum est quod habitus scientiae non est in intellectu passivo, ut Commentator praedictus dicit, sed magis in intellectu possibili. Again. The dispositions of the aforesaid powers are on the part of the object, namely of the phantasm, which, on account of the goodness of these powers, is prepared in such a way as easily to be made actually intelligible by the active intellect. Now the dispositions on the part of the objects are not habits, but those dispositions are which are on the part of the powers: for the habit of fortitude is not the disposition by which fearsome objects become objects of endurance, but a habit whereby a part of the soul—namely, the irascible—is disposed to endure fearsome objects. It is consequently evident that the habit of science is not in the passive intellect, as the said Commentator asserts, but rather in the possible intellect. Item. Si unus est intellectus possibilis omnium hominum, oportet ponere intellectum possibilem semper fuisse, si homines semper fuerunt, sicut ponunt: et multo magis intellectum agentem, quia agens est honorabilius patiente, ut Aristoteles dicit. Sed si agens est aeternum, et recipiens aeternum, oportet recepta esse aeterna. Ergo species intelligibiles ab aeterno fuerunt in intellectu possibili. Non igitur de novo recipit aliquas species intelligibiles. Ad nihil autem sensus et phantasia sunt necessaria ad intelligendum nisi ut ab eis accipiantur species intelligibiles. Sensus igitur non erit necessarius ad intelligendum, neque phantasia. Et redibit opinio Platonis, quod scientiam non acquirimus per sensus, sed ab eis excitamur ad rememorandum prius scita. Again. If there is one possible intellect for all men, it must be allowed that if, as they assert, men have been always, the possible intellect has always existed, and much more the active intellect, since the agent is more noble than the patient, as Aristotle says. Now if the agent is eternal, and the recipient eternal, the things received must be eternal. Consequently, the intelligible species were from eternity in the possible intellect. Hence it does not receive any intelligible species anew. But sense and imagination are not required for anything to be understood except that the intelligible species may be derived from them. Therefore, neither sense nor imagination will be necessary for understanding. And we shall come back to Plato’s opinion that we do not acquire knowledge from the senses, but that we are awakened by them to the recollection of things we knew before. Sed ad hoc respondet Commentator praedictus, quod species intelligibiles habent duplex subiectum: ex uno quorum habent aeternitatem, scilicet ab intellectu possibili; ab alio autem habent novitatem, scilicet a phantasmate; sicut etiam speciei visibilis subiectum est duplex, scilicet res extra animam et potentia visiva. To this the said Commentator replies that the intelligible species have a twofold subject, from one of which (namely the possible intellect) they derive eternity, while from the other (namely, the phantasm) they derive newness: even as the subject of the visible species is twofold (namely, the object outside the soul, and the faculty of sight). Haec autem responsio stare non potest. Impossibile enim est quod actio et perfectio aeterni dependeat ab aliquo temporali. Phantasmata autem temporalia sunt, de novo quotidie in nobis facta ex sensu. Impossibile est igitur quod species intelligibiles, quibus intellectus possibilis fit actu et operatur, dependeant a phantasmatibus, sicut species visibilis dependet a rebus quae sunt extra animam. But this reply cannot stand. For it is impossible that the action and perfection of an eternal thing should depend on something temporal. Now phantasms are temporal, being renewed daily by virtue of the senses. Consequently, the intelligible species by which the possible intellect is made actual and operates cannot depend on the phantasms, as the visible species depends on things that are outside the soul. Amplius. Nihil recipit quod iam habet: quia recipiens oportet esse denudatum a recepto, secundum Aristotelem. Sed species intelligibiles ante meum sentire vel tuum fuerunt in intellectu possibili: non enim qui fuerunt ante nos intellexissent, nisi intellectus possibilis fuisset reductus in actum per species intelligibiles. Nec potest dici quod species illae prius receptae in intellectu possibili, esse cessaverunt: quia intellectus possibilis non solum recipit; sed conservat quod recipit, unde in III de anima dicitur esse locus specierum. Igitur ex phantasmatibus nostris non recipiuntur species in intellectu possibili. Frustra igitur per intellectum agentem fiunt intelligibilia actu nostra phantasmata. Moreover. Nothing receives what it already has, because the recipient must be void of the thing received, according to Aristotle. Now the intelligible species, before my or your sensation, were in the possible intellect, for those who were before us would not have understood unless the possible intellect had been reduced to act by the intelligible species. Nor can it be said that these species already received into the possible intellect have ceased to exist, because the possible intellect not only receives but also keeps what it receives; hence in the 3 De anima it is called the abode of species. Consequently, species are not received from our phantasms into the possible intellect. Therefore, it were useless for our phantasms to be made actually intelligible by the active intellect. Item. Receptum est in recipiente per modum recipientis. Sed intellectus secundum se est supra motum. Ergo quod recipitur in eo, recipitur fixe et immobiliter. Again. The thing received is in the recipient according to the mode of the recipient. But the intellect is in itself above movement. Therefore, what is received into it is received fixedly and immovably. Praeterea. Cum intellectus sit superior virtus quam sensus, oportet quod sit magis unita: et ex hoc videmus quod unus intellectus habet iudicium de diversis generibus sensibilium, quae ad diversas potentias sensitivas pertinet. Unde accipere possumus quod operationes pertinentes ad diversas potentias sensitivas, in uno intellectu adunantur. Potentiarum autem sensitivarum quaedam recipiunt tantum, ut sensus: quaedam autem retinent, ut imaginatio et memoria; unde et thesauri dicuntur. Oportet igitur quod intellectus possibilis et recipiat, et retineat recepta. Further. Since the intellect is a higher power than the senses, it follows that it is more united. For this reason, we observe that one intellect exercises judgment on various kinds of sensibles which appertain to various sensitive powers. Hence we are able to gather that the operations appertaining to the various sensitive powers are united in the one intellect. Now some of the sensitive powers only receive, like the senses; while some retain, like imagination and memory; therefore, they are called storehouses. It follows, therefore, that the possible intellect both receives and retains what it has received.