De opinione Avicennae, qui posuit formas intelligibiles non conservari in intellectu possibili
Of the opinion of Avicenna, who asserted that intelligible forms are not preserved in the possible intellect
Praedictis vero rationibus obviare videntur quae Avicenna ponit. Dicit enim, in suo libro De anima, quod in intellectu possibili non remanent species intelligibiles nisi quandiu actu intelliguntur.
The position of Averroes, however, seems to clash with the arguments given above. For he says in his book De anima that the intelligible species do not remain in the possible intellect except when they are being actually understood.
Quod quidem ex hoc probare nititur, quia, quandiu formae apprehensae manent in potentia apprehensiva, actu apprehenduntur: ex hoc enim fit sensus in actu, quod est idem cum sensato in actu, et similiter intellectus in actu est intellectum in actu. Unde videtur quod, quandocumque sensus vel intellectus est factus unum cum sensato vel intellecto, secundum quod habet formam ipsius, fit apprehensio in actu per sensum vel per intellectum. Vires autem quae conservant formas non apprehensas in actu, dicit non esse vires apprehensivas, sed thesauros virtutum apprehensivarum: sicut imaginatio, quae est thesaurus formarum apprehensarum per sensum; et memoria, quae est, secundum ipsum, thesaurus intentionum apprehensarum absque sensu, sicut cum ovis apprehendit inimicitiam lupi. Hoc autem contingit huiusmodi virtutibus quod conservant formas non apprehensas actu, inquantum habent quaedam organa corporea, in quibus recipiuntur formae receptione propinqua apprehensioni. Et propter hoc, virtus apprehensiva, convertens se ad huiusmodi thesauros, apprehendit in actu. Constat autem quod intellectus possibilis est virtus apprehensiva, et quod non habet organum corporeum. Unde concludit quod impossibile est quod species intelligibiles conserventur in intellectu possibili, nisi quandiu intelligit actu. Oportet ergo quod vel ipsae species intelligibiles conserventur in aliquo organo corporeo, sive in aliqua virtute habente organum corporeum; vel oportet quod formae intelligibiles sint per se existentes, ad quas comparetur intellectus possibilis noster sicut speculum ad res quae videntur in speculo; vel oportet quod species intelligibiles fluant in intellectum possibilem de novo ab aliquo agente separato, quandocumque actu intelligit. Primum autem horum trium est impossibile: quia formae existentes in potentiis utentibus organis corporalibus, sunt intelligibiles in potentia tantum. Secundum autem est opinio Platonis, quam reprobat Aristoteles, in Metaphysica. Unde concludit tertium: quod quandocumque intelligimus actu, fluunt species intelligibiles in intellectum possibilem nostrum ab intellectu agente, quem ponit ipse quandam substantiam separatam.
He endeavors to prove this because as long as the apprehended forms remain in the apprehensive power, they are actually apprehended, since sense is made actual through being identified with the thing actually sensed, and likewise the intellect, when actual is identified with the thing actually understood. Hence it seems that whenever sense or intellect becomes one with the thing sensed or understood, through having its form, there is actual apprehension through sense or intellect. And he says that the powers which preserve the forms not actually apprehended are not apprehensive powers, but storehouses of the apprehensive faculties. For instance, according to him, the imagination, which is the storehouse of forms apprehended by the senses, and the memory, is the storehouse of intentions apprehended without the senses (as when the sheep apprehends the enmity of the wolf). And it so happens that these powers preserve forms which are not actually apprehended insofar as they have certain corporeal organs in which forms are received in a manner akin to apprehension. For which reason the apprehensive power, by turning to these store-houses, apprehends actually. Hence he concludes that it is impossible for the intelligible species to be preserved in the possible intellect, except while it understands actually. It follows then either that the intelligible species themselves are preserved in some corporeal organ or some power having a corporeal organ; or else that intelligible forms exist of themselves, and that our possible intellect is compared to them as a mirror to the things which are seen in a mirror; or again that whenever the possible intellect understands actually, the intelligible species are infused anew into the possible intellect by a separate agent. Now the first of these three is impossible, because forms existing in powers which use corporeal organs are only potentially intelligible, while the second is the opinion of Plato, which Aristotle refutes in his Metaphysics. Therefore, he concludes by accepting the third, namely that whenever we understand actually, the intelligible species are infused into our possible intellect by the active intellect, which he asserts to be a separate substance.
Si vero aliquis obiiciat contra eum quod tunc non est differentia inter hominem cum primo addiscit, et cum postmodum vult considerare in actu quae prius didicit: respondet quod addiscere nihil aliud est quam acquirere perfectam habitudinem coniungendi se intelligentiae agenti ad recipiendum ab eo formam intelligibilem. Et ideo ante addiscere est nuda potentia in homine ad talem receptionem: addiscere vero est sicut potentia adaptata.
And if anyone argues against him that then there is no difference between a man when he first learns, and when afterwards he wishes to consider actually what he has previously learnt, he replies that to learn is merely to acquire the perfect aptitude for uniting oneself with the active intelligence so as to receive the intelligible form from it. Therefore, before learning there is in man a mere potency for such a reception, and to learn is, as it were, the potency adapted.
Videtur etiam huic positioni consonare quod Aristoteles, in libro De memoria, ostendit memoriam non esse in parte intellectiva, sed in parte animae sensitiva. Ex quo videtur quod conservatio specierum intelligibilium non pertineat ad partem intellectivam.
Moreover, it would seem to be in agreement with this position that Aristotle, in his book De Memoria, 1, proves that the memory is not in the intellective faculty, but in the sensitive part of the soul. Hence it seems to follow that the preserving of the species does not belong to the intellective part.
Sed si diligenter consideretur, haec positio, quantum ad originem, parum aut nihil differt a positione Platonis. Posuit enim Plato formas intelligibiles esse quasdam substantias separatas, a quibus scientia fluebat in animas nostras. Hic autem ponit ab una substantia separata, quae est intellectus agens secundum ipsum, scientiam in animas nostras fluere. Non autem differt, quantum ad modum acquirendi scientiam, utrum ab una vel pluribus substantiis separatis scientia nostra causetur: utrobique enim sequetur quod scientia nostra non causetur a sensibilibus. Cuius contrarium apparet per hoc quod qui caret aliquo sensu, caret scientia sensibilium quae cognoscuntur per sensum illum.
Nevertheless, if we consider it carefully, this position, as regards its origin, differs little or not at all from that of Plato. For Plato asserted that intelligible forms are separate substances, from which knowledge flows into our souls, while he (Avicenna) affirms that knowledge flows into our souls from one separate substance which, according to him, is the active intellect. Now, as regards the manner of acquiring knowledge, it does not matter whether our knowledge be caused by one or several separate substances, since in either case it follows that our knowledge is not caused by sensible objects. The contrary of this is proved by the fact that a person who lacks one sense also lacks the knowledge of the sensibles known through that sense.
Dicere autem quod per hoc quod intellectus possibilis inspicit singularia quae sunt in imaginatione, illustratur luce intelligentiae agentis ad cognoscendum universale; et quod actiones virium inferiorum, scilicet imaginationis et memorativae et cogitativae, sunt aptantes animam ad recipiendam emanationem intelligentiae agentis, est novum. Videmus enim quod anima nostra tanto magis disponitur ad recipiendum a substantiis separatis, quanto magis a corporalibus et sensibilibus removetur: per recessum enim ab eo quod infra est, acceditur ad id quod supra est. Non igitur est verisimile quod per hoc quod anima respicit ad phantasmata corporalia, quod disponatur ad recipiendam influentiam intelligentiae separatae.
Moreover, it is a pure invention to say that the possible intellect is enlightened with the light of the active intellect so as to know the universal through considering singulars which are in the imagination, as is the statement that the actions of the lower powers (namely, of the imagination, memory, and cogitative powers) adapt the soul to receive the emanation of the active intellect. For we see that our soul is the more disposed to receive from separate substances according as it is further removed from corporeal and sensible things, since by withdrawing from that which is below, one approaches to that which is above. Therefore, it is not likely that the soul is disposed to receive the influence of a separate intelligence by considering corporeal phantasms.
Plato autem radicem suae positionis melius est prosecutus. Posuit enim quod sensibilia non sunt disponentia animam ad recipiendum influentiam formarum separatarum, sed solum expergefacientia intellectum ad considerandum ea quorum scientiam habebat ab exteriori causatam. Ponebat enim quod a principio a formis separatis causabatur scientia in animabus nostris omnium scibilium: unde addiscere dixit esse quoddam reminisci. Et hoc necessarium est secundum eius positionem. Nam, cum substantiae separatae sint immobiles et semper eodem modo se habentes, semper ab eis resplendet scientia rerum in anima nostra, quae est eius capax.
Plato, however, was more consistent with the principle on which his position was based. For he held that sensibles do not dispose the soul to receive the influence of separate forms, but merely arouse the intellect to consider the things the knowledge of which it had received from an external cause. For he maintained that knowledge of all things knowable was caused in our souls from the outset by separate forms; hence he said that to learn is a kind of remembering. In fact, this is a necessary consequence of his position, because since separate substances are immovable and unchangeable, the knowledge of things is always reflected from them in our soul, which is capable of that knowledge.
Amplius. Quod recipitur in aliquo, est in eo per modum recipientis. Esse autem intellectus possibilis est magis firmum quam esse materiae corporalis. Cum igitur formae fluentes in materiam corporalem ab intelligentia agente, secundum ipsum, conserventur in ea, multo magis conservantur in intellectu possibili.
Moreover. That which is received in a thing is in it according to the mode of the recipient. Now the being of the possible intellect is more stable than the being of corporeal matter. Therefore, since forms that flow into corporeal matter from the active intelligence are preserved in that matter (according to him), much more are they preserved in the possible intellect.
Adhuc. Cognitio intellectiva est perfectior sensitiva. Si igitur in sensitiva cognitione est aliquid conservans apprehensa, multo fortius hoc erit in cognitione intellectiva.
Again. Intellective knowledge is more perfect than sensitive. Therefore, if there is something to preserve things apprehended in sensitive knowledge, all the more will this be the case in intellective knowledge.
Item. Videmus quod diversa quae in inferiori ordine potentiarum pertinent ad diversas potentias, in superiori ordine pertinent ad unum: sicut sensus communis apprehendit sensata omnium sensuum propriorum. Apprehendere igitur et conservare, quae in parte animae sensitivae pertinent ad diversas potentias, oportet quod in suprema potentia, scilicet in intellectu, uniantur.
Again. We find that when various things belong to various powers in a lower order of powers, in a higher order they belong to one: thus the common sense apprehends the objects sensed by all the proper senses. Hence to apprehend and to preserve, which belong to different powers in the sensitive part of the soul, must be united in the highest power, the intellect.
Praeterea. Intelligentia agens, secundum ipsum, influit omnes scientias. Si igitur addiscere nihil est aliud quam aptari ut uniatur intelligentiae agenti, qui addiscit unam scientiam, non magis addiscit illam quam aliam. Quod patet esse falsum.
Further. The active intelligence, according to him, causes all scientific knowledge. Therefore, if to learn is merely to be adapted to union with the active intelligence, he who learns one science does not learn that one more than another: which is clearly false.
Patet etiam quod haec opinio est contra sententiam Aristotelis, qui dicit, in III De anima, quod intellectus possibilis est locus specierum: quod nihil aliud est dicere quam ipsum esse thesaurum intelligibilium specierum, ut verbis Avicennae utamur.
It is also clear that this position is in conflict with the opinion of Aristotle in 3 De anima, who says that the possible intellect is the abode of the species, which is the same as to say that it is the storehouse of intelligible species, to use the words of Avicenna.
Item. Postea subiungit quod quando intellectus possibilis acquirit scientiam, est potens operari per seipsum, licet non actu intelligat. Non igitur indiget influentia alicuius superioris agentis.
Again. He adds further on that when the possible intellect acquires knowledge, it is capable of acting by itself, although it understand not actually. Therefore, it does not need the influence of any higher agent.
Dicit etiam, in VIII Physicorum, quod ante addiscere est homo in potentia essentiali ad scientiam, et ideo indiget motore per quem reducatur in actu: non autem, postquam iam addidicit, indiget per se motore. Ergo non indiget influentia intellectus agentis.
He also says in 8 Physics that before learning, man is in essential potency to knowledge, and consequently needs a mover by which to be reduced to act; but after he has already learnt, he needs no mover essentially. Therefore, he does not need the influence of the active intellect.
Dicit etiam, in III De anima, quod phantasmata se habent ad intellectum possibilem sicut sensibilia ad sensum. Unde patet quod species intelligibiles sunt in intellectu possibili a phantasmatibus, non a substantia separata.
He also says in 3 De anima that the phantasms are to the possible intellect what sensibles are to the senses. Therefore, it is clear that the intelligible species result in the possible intellect from the phantasms and not from a separate substance.
Rationes autem quae videntur in contrarium esse, non est difficile solvere. Intellectus enim possibilis est in actu perfecto secundum species intelligibiles cum considerat actu: cum vero non considerat actu, non est in actu perfecto secundum illas species, sed se habet medio modo inter potentiam et actum. Et hoc est quod Aristoteles dicit, in III De anima, quod, cum haec pars, scilicet intellectus possibilis, unaquaeque fiat, sciens dicitur secundum actum. Hoc autem accidit cum possit operari per seipsum. Est quidem et tunc potentia similiter quodammodo, non tamen similiter et ante addiscere aut invenire.
As to the arguments which would seem to favor the contrary, it is not difficult to solve them. For the possible intellect is in perfect act in respect of the intelligible species when it considers actually, but when it does not actually consider, it is not in perfect act, but is in a state between potency and act. This is what Aristotle says in 3 De anima: when this part, the possible intellect, is identified with a thing, it is said to know it actually. And this happens when it is capable of acting by itself. Even thus it is also somewhat in potency, but not in the same way as before learning or discovering.
Memoria vero in parte sensitiva ponitur, quia est alicuius prout cadit sub determinato tempore: non est enim nisi praeteriti. Et ideo, cum non abstrahat a singularibus conditionibus, non pertinet ad partem intellectivam, quae est universalium. Sed per hoc non excluditur quin intellectus possibilis sit conservativus intelligibilium, quae abstrahunt ab omnibus conditionibus particularibus.
The memory is assigned to the sensitive part because it is of something as conditioned by a determinate time, for it is only of what is past. Consequently, since it does not abstract from singular conditions, it does not belong to the intellective part, which is of universals. Yet this does not preclude the possible intellect being able to preserve intelligibles which abstract from all particular conditions.
Solutio rationum quibus videtur probari unitas intellectus possibilis
Solution of the arguments which would seem to prove the unity of the possible intellect
Ad probandum autem unitatem intellectus possibilis quaedam rationes adducuntur, quas oportet ostendere efficaces non esse.
We must now show the inefficacy of such arguments as are adduced to prove the unity of the possible intellect.
Videtur enim quod omnis forma quae est una secundum speciem et multiplicatur secundum numerum, individuetur per materiam: quae enim sunt unum specie et multa secundum numerum, conveniunt in forma et distinguuntur secundum materiam. Si igitur intellectus possibilis in diversis hominibus sit multiplicatus secundum numerum, cum sit unus secundum speciem, oportet quod sit individuatus in hoc et in illo per materiam. Non autem per materiam quae sit pars sui: quia sic esset receptio eius de genere receptionis materiae primae, et reciperet formas individuales; quod est contra naturam intellectus. Relinquitur ergo quod individuetur per materiam quae est corpus hominis cuius ponitur forma. Omnis autem forma individuata per materiam cuius est actus, est forma materialis. Oportet enim quod esse cuiuslibet rei dependeat ab eo a quo dependet individuatio eius: sicut enim principia communia sunt de essentia speciei, ita principia individuantia sunt de essentia huius individui. Sequitur ergo quod intellectus possibilis sit forma materialis. Et per consequens quod non recipiat aliquid nec operetur sine organo corporali. Quod etiam est contra naturam intellectus possibilis. Igitur intellectus possibilis non multiplicatur in diversis hominibus, sed est unus omnium.
For seemingly every form that is one specifically and many in number is individualized by matter, since things that are one in species and many in number agree in form and differ in matter. Therefore, if the possible intellect is multiplied numerically in different men, when it is one in species, it must be individualized in this and that man by matter. This is not, however, by matter which is a part of the intellect itself, because then its reception would be of the same kind as that of prime matter, and it would receive individual forms, which is contrary to the nature of the intellect. It follows, therefore, that it is individualized by matter which is the human body of which it is supposed to be the form. Now every form that is individualized by matter of which it is the act is a material form. For the being of a thing must depend on that from which it has its individuality: for just as common principles belong to the essence of the species, so individualizing principles belong to the essence of this particular individual. Hence it follows that the possible intellect is a material form, and consequently that it neither receives anything nor operates without a corporeal organ. And this again is contrary to the nature of the possible intellect. Therefore, the possible intellect is not multiplied in different men, but is one for all.
Item. Si intellectus possibilis esset alius in hoc et in illo homine, oporteret quod species intellecta esset alia numero in hoc et in illo, una vero in specie: cum enim specierum intellectarum in actu proprium subiectum sit intellectus possibilis, oportet quod, multiplicato intellectu possibili, multiplicentur species intelligibiles secundum numerum in diversis. Species autem aut formae quae sunt eaedem secundum speciem et diversae secundum numerum, sunt formae individuales. Quae non possunt esse formae intelligibiles: quia intelligibilia sunt universalia, non particularia. Impossibile est igitur intellectum possibilem esse multiplicatum in diversis individuis hominum. Necesse est igitur quod sit unus in omnibus.
Again. If there were a different possible intellect in this and that man, it would follow that the species understood is numerically distinct in this and that man, though one specifically: for, since the possible intellect is the proper subject of species actually understood, if there be many possible intellects, the intelligible species must be multiplied numerically in different intellects. Now species or forms that are the same specifically and different numerically are individual forms. But these cannot be intelligible, since intelligibles are universal, not particular. Therefore, it is impossible for the possible intellect to be multiplied in different human individuals, and consequently it must be one in all.
Adhuc. Magister scientiam quam habet transfundit in discipulum. Aut igitur eandem numero: aut aliam numero diversam, non specie. Secundum videtur impossibile esse: quia sic magister causaret scientiam suam in discipulo sicut causat formam suam in alio generando sibi simile in specie; quod videtur pertinere ad agentia materialia. Oportet ergo quod eandem scientiam numero causet in discipulo. Quod esse non posset nisi esset unus intellectus possibilis utriusque. Necesse igitur videtur intellectum possibilem esse unum omnium hominum.
Again. The master imparts the knowledge that he possesses to his disciple. Either, then, he imparts the same knowledge numerically, or he imparts a knowledge that is different numerically but not specifically. The latter is apparently impossible, since then the master would cause his knowledge to be in his disciple, as he causes his form to be in another by begetting one like to him in species; and this would seem to apply to material agents. It follows, therefore, that he causes the same knowledge numerically to be in his disciple. But this would be impossible unless there were one possible intellect for both. Therefore, seemingly there must be but one possible intellect for all men.
Sicut autem praedicta positio veritatem non habet, ut ostensum est, ita rationes positae ad ipsam confirmandam facile solubiles sunt.
Nevertheless, just as the aforesaid position is void of truth, as we have proved (ch. 73), so the arguments adduced in support of it are easy to solve.
Confitemur enim intellectum possibilem esse unum specie in diversis hominibus, plures autem secundum numerum: ut tamen non fiat in hoc vis, quod partes hominis non ponuntur in genere vel specie secundum se, sed solum ut sunt principia totius. Nec tamen sequitur quod sit forma materialis secundum esse dependens a corpore. Sicut enim animae humanae secundum suam speciem competit quod tali corpori secundum speciem uniatur, ita haec anima differt ab illa numero solo ex hoc quod ad aliud numero corpus habitudinem habet. Et sic individuantur animae humanae, et per consequens intellectus possibilis, qui est potentia animae, secundum corpora, non quasi individuatione a corporibus causata.
For we contend that while the possible intellect is specifically one in different men, it is nevertheless many numerically, yet so as not to lay stress on the fact that the parts of a man do not by themselves belong to the genus or species, but only as principles of the whole. Nor does it follow that it is a material form dependent on the body as to its being. For just as it is competent to the human soul in respect of its species to be united to a body of a particular species, so this particular soul differs only numerically from that one through having a habitude to a numerically different body. Thus human souls are individualized—and consequently the possible intellect also which is a power of the soul—in relation to the bodies, and not as though their individuality were caused by their bodies.
Secunda vero ratio ipsius deficit, ex hoc quod non distinguit inter id quo intelligitur, et id quod intelligitur. Species enim recepta in intellectu possibili non habet se ut quod intelligitur. Cum enim de his quae intelliguntur sint omnes artes et scientiae, sequeretur quod omnes scientiae essent de speciebus existentibus in intellectu possibili. Quod patet esse falsum: nulla enim scientia de eis aliquid considerat nisi rationalis et metaphysica. Sed tamen per eas quaecumque sunt in omnibus scientiis cognoscuntur. Habet se igitur species intelligibilis recepta in intellectu possibili in intelligendo sicut id quo intelligitur, non sicut id quod intelligitur: sicut et species coloris in oculo non est id quod videtur, sed id quo videmus. Id vero quod intelligitur, est ipsa ratio rerum existentium extra animam: sicut et res extra animam existentes visu corporali videntur. Ad hoc enim inventae sunt artes et scientiae ut res in suis naturis existentes cognoscantur.
His second argument fails through not distinguishing between that by which one understands and that which is understood. For the species received into the intellect is not that which is understood. For, since all arts and sciences are about things understood, it would follow that all sciences are about species existing in the possible intellect. And this is clearly false, for no science takes any consideration of such things except logic and metaphysics. Nevertheless, whatever there is in all the sciences is known through them. Consequently, in the process of understanding, the species received into the possible intellect is as the thing by which one understands, and not as that which is understood: even as the colored image in the eye is not that which is seen, but that by which we see. On the other hand, that which is understood is the very essence of the things existing outside the soul, even as things outside the soul are seen by corporeal sight, since arts and sciences were devised for the purpose of knowing things as existing in their respective natures.
Nec tamen oportet quod, quia scientiae sunt de universalibus, quod universalia sint extra animam per se subsistentia: sicut Plato posuit. Quamvis enim ad veritatem cognitionis necesse sit ut cognitio rei respondeat, non tamen oportet ut idem sit modus cognitionis et rei. Quae enim coniuncta sunt in re, interdum divisim cognoscuntur: simul enim una res est et alba et dulcis; visus tamen cognoscit solam albedinem, et gustus solam dulcedinem. Sic etiam et intellectus intelligit lineam in materia sensibili existentem, absque materia sensibili: licet et cum materia sensibili intelligere possit. Haec autem diversitas accidit secundum diversitatem specierum intelligibilium in intellectu receptarum: quae quandoque est similitudo quantitatis tantum, quandoque vero substantiae sensibilis quantae. Similiter autem, licet natura generis et speciei nunquam sit nisi in his individuis, intelligit tamen intellectus naturam speciei et generis non intelligendo principia individuantia: et hoc est intelligere universalia. Et sic haec duo non repugnant, quod universalia non subsistant extra animam: et quod intellectus, intelligens universalia, intelligat res quae sunt extra animam. Quod autem intelligat intellectus naturam generis vel speciei denudatam a principiis individuantibus, contingit ex conditione speciei intelligibilis in ipso receptae, quae est immaterialis effecta per intellectum agentem, utpote abstracta a materia et conditionibus materiae, quibus aliquid individuatur. Et ideo potentiae sensitivae non possunt cognoscere universalia: quia non possunt recipere formam immaterialem, cum recipiant semper in organo corporali.
Nor does it follow that, because science is about universals, universals are subsistent of themselves outside the soul, as Plato maintained. For, although true knowledge requires that knowledge correspond to things, it is not necessary that knowledge and thing should have the same mode of being. Because things that are united in reality are sometimes known separately: thus a thing is at once white and sweet, yet sight knows only the whiteness, and taste only the sweetness. So too the intellect understands a line existing in sensible matter apart from the sensible matter, although it can also understand it with sensible matter. Now this difference occurs according to the difference of intelligible species received into the intellect: for the species is sometimes an image of quantity alone, and sometimes is an image of a quantitative sensible substance. In like manner, although the generic and specific natures are never save in particular individuals, yet the intellect understands the specific and generic natures without understanding the individualizing principles: and this is to understand universals. And thus these two are not incompatible, namely, that universals do not subsist outside the soul, and that the intellect understands things that are outside the soul in understanding universals. That the intellect understands the generic or specific nature apart from the individualizing principles results from the condition of the intelligible species received into it, for it is rendered immaterial by the active intellect, through being abstracted from matter and material conditions whereby a particular thing is individualized. Consequently, the sensitive powers are unable to know universals, because they cannot receive an immaterial form since they always receive in a corporeal organ.
Non igitur oportet esse numero unam speciem intelligibilem huius intelligentis et illius: ad hoc enim sequeretur esse unum intelligere numero huius et illius, cum operatio sequatur formam quae est principium speciei. Sed oportet, ad hoc quod sit unum intellectum, quod sit unius et eiusdem similitudo. Et hoc est possibile si species intelligibiles sint numero diversae: nihil enim prohibet unius rei fieri plures imagines differentes; et ex hoc contingit quod unus homo a pluribus videtur. Non igitur repugnat cognitioni universali intellectus quod sint diversae species intelligibiles in diversis.
Therefore, it does not follow that the intelligible species is numerically one in this and that person who understand: for the result of this would be that the act of understanding in this and that person is numerically one, since operation follows the form which is the principle of the species. But in order that there be one thing understood, it is necessary that there be an image of one and the same thing. And this is possible if the intelligible species be numerically distinct: for nothing prevents several distinct images being made of one thing, and this is how one man is seen by several. Hence it is not incompatible with the intellect’s knowledge of the universal that there be several intelligible species in several persons.
Nec propter hoc oportet quod, si species intelligibiles sint plures numero et eaedem specie, quod non sint intelligibiles actu, sed potentia tantum, sicut alia individua. Non enim hoc quod est esse individuum, repugnat ei quod est esse intelligibile actu: oportet enim dicere ipsum intellectum possibilem et agentem, si ponuntur quaedam substantiae separatae corpori non unitae per se subsistentes, quaedam individua esse, et tamen intelligibilia sunt. Sed id quod repugnat intelligibilitati est materialitas: cuius signum est quod, ad hoc quod fiant formae rerum materialium intelligibiles actu, oportet quod a materia abstrahantur. Et ideo in illis in quibus individuatio fit per hanc materiam signatam, individuata non sunt intelligibilia actu. Si autem individuatio fiat non per materiam, nihil prohibet ea quae sunt individua esse actu intelligibilia. Species autem intelligibiles individuantur per suum subiectum, qui est intellectus possibilis, sicut et omnes aliae formae. Unde, cum intellectus possibilis non sit materialis, non tollitur a speciebus individuatis per ipsum quin sint intelligibiles actu.
Nor does it follow from this, if intelligible species be several in number and specifically the same, that they are not actually intelligible but only potentially, like other individual things. For individuality is not incompatible with actual intelligibility, since it must be admitted that, if we suppose them to be separate substances, both possible and active intellects are individual things not united to the body and subsistent of themselves, and yet they are intelligible. But it is materiality that is incompatible with intelligibility: a sign of this is that for forms of material things to be actually intelligible, they need to be abstracted from matter. Consequently, in those things in which individualization is effected by particular signate matter, the things individualized are not actually intelligible. But if individualization is not the result of matter, nothing prevents things that are individual from being actually intelligible. Now intelligible species, like all other forms, are individualized by their subject which is the possible intellect. Therefore, since the possible intellect is not material, it does not deprive the species which it individualizes of actual intelligibility.
Praeterea. In rebus sensibilibus, sicut non sunt intelligibilia actu individua quae sunt multa in una specie, ut equi vel homines; ita nec individua quae sunt unica in sua specie, ut hic sol et haec luna. Eodem autem modo individuantur species per intellectum possibilem sive sint plures intellectus possibiles sive unus: sed non eodem modo multiplicantur in eadem specie. Nihil igitur refert, quantum ad hoc quod species receptae in intellectu possibili sint intelligibiles actu, utrum intellectus possibilis sit unus in omnibus, aut plures.
Further. In sensible things, just as individuals are not actually intelligible if there be many in one species (for instance, horses or men), so neither are those individuals which are alone in their species (like this particular sun or this particular moon). Now species are individualized in the same way by the possible intellect, whether there be several possible intellects or one, but they are not multiplied in the same way in the one species. Therefore, it does not matter whether there be one or several possible intellects in all, as regards the actual intelligibility of the species received into the possible intellect.
Item. Intellectus possibilis, secundum Commentatorem praedictum, est ultimus in ordine intelligibilium substantiarum, quae quidem secundum ipsum sunt plures. Nec potest dici quin aliquae superiorum substantiarum habeant cognitionem eorum quae intellectus possibilis cognoscit: in motoribus enim orbium, ut ipse etiam dicit, sunt formae eorum quae causantur per orbis motum. Adhuc igitur remanebit, licet intellectus possibilis sit unus, quod formae intelligibiles multiplicentur in diversis intellectibus.
Again. The possible intellect, according to the same Commentator, is the last in the order of intelligible substances, which in his opinion are several. Nor can it be denied that some of the higher substances are cognizant of the things which the possible intellect knows, since, as he says himself, the forms of the effects caused by the movement of a sphere are in the movers of the spheres. Hence it will still follow that, even if there be one possible intellect, the intelligible forms are multiplied in different intellects.
Licet autem dixerimus quod species intelligibilis in intellectu possibili recepta, non sit quod intelligitur, sed quo intelligitur; non tamen removetur quin per reflexionem quandam intellectus seipsum intelligat, et suum intelligere, et speciem qua intelligit. Suum autem intelligere intelligit dupliciter: uno modo in particulari, intelligit enim se nunc intelligere; alio modo in universali, secundum quod ratiocinatur de ipsius actus natura. Unde et intellectum et speciem intelligibilem intelligit eodem modo dupliciter: et percipiendo se esse et habere speciem intelligibilem, quod est cognoscere in particulari; et considerando suam et speciei intelligibilis naturam, quod est cognoscere in universali. Et secundum hoc de intellectu et intelligibili tractatur in scientiis.
And although we have stated that the intelligible species received into the possible intellect is not that which is understood, but that whereby one understands, this does not prevent the intellect from understanding itself, its act of intelligence, and the species by which it understands by a kind of reflexion. In fact, it understands its act of intelligence in two ways: first in particular, for it understands that it understands in a particular instance; second, in general, inasmuch as it argues about the nature of its act. Consequently, it understands both the intellect and the intelligible species in two ways: both by perceiving its own existence and that it has an intelligible species, which is a kind of particular knowledge, and by considering its own nature and that of the intelligible species, which is a kind of universal knowledge. In this latter sense, we treat of the intellect and things intelligible in sciences.
Per haec autem quae dicta sunt etiam tertiae rationis apparet solutio. Quod enim dicit scientiam in discipulo et magistro esse numero unam, partim quidem vere dicitur, partim autem non. Est enim numero una quantum ad id quod scitur: non tamen quantum ad species intelligibiles quibus scitur, neque quantum ad ipsum scientiae habitum. Non tamen oportet quod eodem modo magister causet scientiam in discipulo sicut ignis generat ignem. Non enim idem est modus eorum quae a natura generantur, et eorum quae ab arte. Ignis quidem enim generat ignem naturaliter, reducendo materiam de potentia in actum suae formae: magister vero causat scientiam in discipulo per modum artis; ad hoc enim datur ars demonstrativa, quam Aristoteles in Posterioribus tradit; demonstratio enim est syllogismus faciens scire.
From what has been said, the solution to the third argument is also evident. For his statement—that knowledge in the disciple and in the master is numerically one—is partly true and partly false. It is numerically one as regards the thing known, but not as regards the intelligible species by which it is known, nor again as regards the habit itself of knowledge. And yet it does not follow that the master causes knowledge in the disciple in the same way as fire generates fire, since things are not generated in the same way by nature as by art. For fire generates fire naturally, by reducing matter from potency to the act of its form, whereas the master causes knowledge in his disciple after the manner of art, since to this purpose is assigned the art of demonstration which Aristotle teaches in the Posterior Analytics; for a demonstration is a syllogism that makes us know.
Sciendum tamen quod, secundum quod Aristoteles in VII Metaphysicae docet, artium quaedam sunt in quarum materia non est aliquod principium agens ad effectum artis producendum, sicut patet in aedificativa: non enim est in lignis et lapidibus aliqua vis activa movens ad domus constitutionem, sed aptitudo passiva tantum. Aliqua vero est ars in cuius materia est aliquod activum principium movens ad producendum effectum artis, sicut patet in medicativa: nam in corpore infirmo est aliquod activum principium ad sanitatem. Et ideo effectum artis primi generis nunquam producit natura, sed semper fit ab arte: sicut domus omnis est ab arte. Effectus autem artis secundi generis fit et ab arte, et a natura sine arte: multi enim per operationem naturae, sine arte medicinae, sanantur. In his autem quae possunt fieri et arte et natura, ars imitatur naturam: si quis enim ex frigida causa infirmetur, natura eum calefaciendo sanat; unde et medicus, si eum curare debeat, calefaciendo sanat. Huic autem arti similis est ars docendi. In eo enim qui docetur, est principium activum ad scientiam: scilicet intellectus, et ea quae naturaliter intelliguntur, scilicet prima principia. Et ideo scientia acquiritur dupliciter: et sine doctrina, per inventionem; et per doctrinam. Docens igitur hoc modo incipit docere sicut inveniens incipit invenire: offerendo scilicet considerationi discipuli principia ab eo nota, quia omnis disciplina ex praeexistenti fit cognitione, et illa principia in conclusiones deducendo; et proponendo exempla sensibilia, ex quibus in anima discipuli formentur phantasmata necessaria ad intelligendum. Et quia exterior operatio docentis nihil operaretur nisi adesset principium intrinsecum scientiae, quod inest nobis divinitus, ideo apud theologos dicitur quod homo docet ministerium exhibendo, Deus autem interius operando: sicut et medicus dicitur naturae minister in sanando. Sic igitur causatur scientia in discipulo per magistrum, non modo naturalis actionis, sed artificialis, ut dictum est.
It must, however, be observed, in accordance with Aristotle’s teaching in 7 Metaphysics, that there are some arts in which the matter is not an active principle productive of the art’s effect. Such is the art of building, since in timber and stone there is not an active force tending to the production of a house, but merely a passive aptitude. On the other hand, there is an art whose matter is an active principle tending to produce the effect of the art. Such is the medical art, since in the sick body there is an active principle conducive to health. Consequently, the effect of an art of the first kind is never produced by nature but is always the result of the art. But the effect of an art of the second kind is the result both of art and of nature without art: for many are healed by the action of nature without the art of medicine. In those things that can be done both by art and by nature, art imitates nature; for if a person is taken ill through a cold cause, nature cures him by heating. Now the art of teaching is like this art. For in him that is taught, there is an active principle conducive to knowledge (namely, the intellect), and those things which are naturally understood (namely, first principles). Therefore knowledge is acquired in two ways, both by discovery without teaching, and by teaching. Consequently, the teacher begins to teach in the same way as the discoverer begins to discover, namely, by offering to the disciple’s consideration principles known by him (since all learning results from preexisting knowledge), and by drawing conclusions from those principles; and again by proposing sensible examples, from which there result, in the disciple’s mind, the phantasms which are necessary for his understanding. And since the outward action of the teacher would have no effect without the inward principle of knowledge, which is in us from God, among theologians it is said that man teaches by outward ministration, but God by inward operation. Even so the physician is said to minister to nature when he heals. Accordingly, knowledge is caused in the disciple by his master not by way of natural action, but after the manner of art, as stated.