Caput 75 Chapter 75 Solutio rationum quibus videtur probari unitas intellectus possibilis Solution of the arguments which would seem to prove the unity of the possible intellect Ad probandum autem unitatem intellectus possibilis quaedam rationes adducuntur, quas oportet ostendere efficaces non esse. We must now show the inefficacy of such arguments as are adduced to prove the unity of the possible intellect. Videtur enim quod omnis forma quae est una secundum speciem et multiplicatur secundum numerum, individuetur per materiam: quae enim sunt unum specie et multa secundum numerum, conveniunt in forma et distinguuntur secundum materiam. Si igitur intellectus possibilis in diversis hominibus sit multiplicatus secundum numerum, cum sit unus secundum speciem, oportet quod sit individuatus in hoc et in illo per materiam. Non autem per materiam quae sit pars sui: quia sic esset receptio eius de genere receptionis materiae primae, et reciperet formas individuales; quod est contra naturam intellectus. Relinquitur ergo quod individuetur per materiam quae est corpus hominis cuius ponitur forma. Omnis autem forma individuata per materiam cuius est actus, est forma materialis. Oportet enim quod esse cuiuslibet rei dependeat ab eo a quo dependet individuatio eius: sicut enim principia communia sunt de essentia speciei, ita principia individuantia sunt de essentia huius individui. Sequitur ergo quod intellectus possibilis sit forma materialis. Et per consequens quod non recipiat aliquid nec operetur sine organo corporali. Quod etiam est contra naturam intellectus possibilis. Igitur intellectus possibilis non multiplicatur in diversis hominibus, sed est unus omnium. For seemingly every form that is one specifically and many in number is individualized by matter, since things that are one in species and many in number agree in form and differ in matter. Therefore, if the possible intellect is multiplied numerically in different men, when it is one in species, it must be individualized in this and that man by matter. This is not, however, by matter which is a part of the intellect itself, because then its reception would be of the same kind as that of prime matter, and it would receive individual forms, which is contrary to the nature of the intellect. It follows, therefore, that it is individualized by matter which is the human body of which it is supposed to be the form. Now every form that is individualized by matter of which it is the act is a material form. For the being of a thing must depend on that from which it has its individuality: for just as common principles belong to the essence of the species, so individualizing principles belong to the essence of this particular individual. Hence it follows that the possible intellect is a material form, and consequently that it neither receives anything nor operates without a corporeal organ. And this again is contrary to the nature of the possible intellect. Therefore, the possible intellect is not multiplied in different men, but is one for all. Item. Si intellectus possibilis esset alius in hoc et in illo homine, oporteret quod species intellecta esset alia numero in hoc et in illo, una vero in specie: cum enim specierum intellectarum in actu proprium subiectum sit intellectus possibilis, oportet quod, multiplicato intellectu possibili, multiplicentur species intelligibiles secundum numerum in diversis. Species autem aut formae quae sunt eaedem secundum speciem et diversae secundum numerum, sunt formae individuales. Quae non possunt esse formae intelligibiles: quia intelligibilia sunt universalia, non particularia. Impossibile est igitur intellectum possibilem esse multiplicatum in diversis individuis hominum. Necesse est igitur quod sit unus in omnibus. Again. If there were a different possible intellect in this and that man, it would follow that the species understood is numerically distinct in this and that man, though one specifically: for, since the possible intellect is the proper subject of species actually understood, if there be many possible intellects, the intelligible species must be multiplied numerically in different intellects. Now species or forms that are the same specifically and different numerically are individual forms. But these cannot be intelligible, since intelligibles are universal, not particular. Therefore, it is impossible for the possible intellect to be multiplied in different human individuals, and consequently it must be one in all. Adhuc. Magister scientiam quam habet transfundit in discipulum. Aut igitur eandem numero: aut aliam numero diversam, non specie. Secundum videtur impossibile esse: quia sic magister causaret scientiam suam in discipulo sicut causat formam suam in alio generando sibi simile in specie; quod videtur pertinere ad agentia materialia. Oportet ergo quod eandem scientiam numero causet in discipulo. Quod esse non posset nisi esset unus intellectus possibilis utriusque. Necesse igitur videtur intellectum possibilem esse unum omnium hominum. Again. The master imparts the knowledge that he possesses to his disciple. Either, then, he imparts the same knowledge numerically, or he imparts a knowledge that is different numerically but not specifically. The latter is apparently impossible, since then the master would cause his knowledge to be in his disciple, as he causes his form to be in another by begetting one like to him in species; and this would seem to apply to material agents. It follows, therefore, that he causes the same knowledge numerically to be in his disciple. But this would be impossible unless there were one possible intellect for both. Therefore, seemingly there must be but one possible intellect for all men. Sicut autem praedicta positio veritatem non habet, ut ostensum est, ita rationes positae ad ipsam confirmandam facile solubiles sunt. Nevertheless, just as the aforesaid position is void of truth, as we have proved (ch. 73), so the arguments adduced in support of it are easy to solve. Confitemur enim intellectum possibilem esse unum specie in diversis hominibus, plures autem secundum numerum: ut tamen non fiat in hoc vis, quod partes hominis non ponuntur in genere vel specie secundum se, sed solum ut sunt principia totius. Nec tamen sequitur quod sit forma materialis secundum esse dependens a corpore. Sicut enim animae humanae secundum suam speciem competit quod tali corpori secundum speciem uniatur, ita haec anima differt ab illa numero solo ex hoc quod ad aliud numero corpus habitudinem habet. Et sic individuantur animae humanae, et per consequens intellectus possibilis, qui est potentia animae, secundum corpora, non quasi individuatione a corporibus causata. For we contend that while the possible intellect is specifically one in different men, it is nevertheless many numerically, yet so as not to lay stress on the fact that the parts of a man do not by themselves belong to the genus or species, but only as principles of the whole. Nor does it follow that it is a material form dependent on the body as to its being. For just as it is competent to the human soul in respect of its species to be united to a body of a particular species, so this particular soul differs only numerically from that one through having a habitude to a numerically different body. Thus human souls are individualized—and consequently the possible intellect also which is a power of the soul—in relation to the bodies, and not as though their individuality were caused by their bodies. Secunda vero ratio ipsius deficit, ex hoc quod non distinguit inter id quo intelligitur, et id quod intelligitur. Species enim recepta in intellectu possibili non habet se ut quod intelligitur. Cum enim de his quae intelliguntur sint omnes artes et scientiae, sequeretur quod omnes scientiae essent de speciebus existentibus in intellectu possibili. Quod patet esse falsum: nulla enim scientia de eis aliquid considerat nisi rationalis et metaphysica. Sed tamen per eas quaecumque sunt in omnibus scientiis cognoscuntur. Habet se igitur species intelligibilis recepta in intellectu possibili in intelligendo sicut id quo intelligitur, non sicut id quod intelligitur: sicut et species coloris in oculo non est id quod videtur, sed id quo videmus. Id vero quod intelligitur, est ipsa ratio rerum existentium extra animam: sicut et res extra animam existentes visu corporali videntur. Ad hoc enim inventae sunt artes et scientiae ut res in suis naturis existentes cognoscantur. His second argument fails through not distinguishing between that by which one understands and that which is understood. For the species received into the intellect is not that which is understood. For, since all arts and sciences are about things understood, it would follow that all sciences are about species existing in the possible intellect. And this is clearly false, for no science takes any consideration of such things except logic and metaphysics. Nevertheless, whatever there is in all the sciences is known through them. Consequently, in the process of understanding, the species received into the possible intellect is as the thing by which one understands, and not as that which is understood: even as the colored image in the eye is not that which is seen, but that by which we see. On the other hand, that which is understood is the very essence of the things existing outside the soul, even as things outside the soul are seen by corporeal sight, since arts and sciences were devised for the purpose of knowing things as existing in their respective natures. Nec tamen oportet quod, quia scientiae sunt de universalibus, quod universalia sint extra animam per se subsistentia: sicut Plato posuit. Quamvis enim ad veritatem cognitionis necesse sit ut cognitio rei respondeat, non tamen oportet ut idem sit modus cognitionis et rei. Quae enim coniuncta sunt in re, interdum divisim cognoscuntur: simul enim una res est et alba et dulcis; visus tamen cognoscit solam albedinem, et gustus solam dulcedinem. Sic etiam et intellectus intelligit lineam in materia sensibili existentem, absque materia sensibili: licet et cum materia sensibili intelligere possit. Haec autem diversitas accidit secundum diversitatem specierum intelligibilium in intellectu receptarum: quae quandoque est similitudo quantitatis tantum, quandoque vero substantiae sensibilis quantae. Similiter autem, licet natura generis et speciei nunquam sit nisi in his individuis, intelligit tamen intellectus naturam speciei et generis non intelligendo principia individuantia: et hoc est intelligere universalia. Et sic haec duo non repugnant, quod universalia non subsistant extra animam: et quod intellectus, intelligens universalia, intelligat res quae sunt extra animam. Quod autem intelligat intellectus naturam generis vel speciei denudatam a principiis individuantibus, contingit ex conditione speciei intelligibilis in ipso receptae, quae est immaterialis effecta per intellectum agentem, utpote abstracta a materia et conditionibus materiae, quibus aliquid individuatur. Et ideo potentiae sensitivae non possunt cognoscere universalia: quia non possunt recipere formam immaterialem, cum recipiant semper in organo corporali. Nor does it follow that, because science is about universals, universals are subsistent of themselves outside the soul, as Plato maintained. For, although true knowledge requires that knowledge correspond to things, it is not necessary that knowledge and thing should have the same mode of being. Because things that are united in reality are sometimes known separately: thus a thing is at once white and sweet, yet sight knows only the whiteness, and taste only the sweetness. So too the intellect understands a line existing in sensible matter apart from the sensible matter, although it can also understand it with sensible matter. Now this difference occurs according to the difference of intelligible species received into the intellect: for the species is sometimes an image of quantity alone, and sometimes is an image of a quantitative sensible substance. In like manner, although the generic and specific natures are never save in particular individuals, yet the intellect understands the specific and generic natures without understanding the individualizing principles: and this is to understand universals. And thus these two are not incompatible, namely, that universals do not subsist outside the soul, and that the intellect understands things that are outside the soul in understanding universals. That the intellect understands the generic or specific nature apart from the individualizing principles results from the condition of the intelligible species received into it, for it is rendered immaterial by the active intellect, through being abstracted from matter and material conditions whereby a particular thing is individualized. Consequently, the sensitive powers are unable to know universals, because they cannot receive an immaterial form since they always receive in a corporeal organ. Non igitur oportet esse numero unam speciem intelligibilem huius intelligentis et illius: ad hoc enim sequeretur esse unum intelligere numero huius et illius, cum operatio sequatur formam quae est principium speciei. Sed oportet, ad hoc quod sit unum intellectum, quod sit unius et eiusdem similitudo. Et hoc est possibile si species intelligibiles sint numero diversae: nihil enim prohibet unius rei fieri plures imagines differentes; et ex hoc contingit quod unus homo a pluribus videtur. Non igitur repugnat cognitioni universali intellectus quod sint diversae species intelligibiles in diversis. Therefore, it does not follow that the intelligible species is numerically one in this and that person who understand: for the result of this would be that the act of understanding in this and that person is numerically one, since operation follows the form which is the principle of the species. But in order that there be one thing understood, it is necessary that there be an image of one and the same thing. And this is possible if the intelligible species be numerically distinct: for nothing prevents several distinct images being made of one thing, and this is how one man is seen by several. Hence it is not incompatible with the intellect’s knowledge of the universal that there be several intelligible species in several persons. Nec propter hoc oportet quod, si species intelligibiles sint plures numero et eaedem specie, quod non sint intelligibiles actu, sed potentia tantum, sicut alia individua. Non enim hoc quod est esse individuum, repugnat ei quod est esse intelligibile actu: oportet enim dicere ipsum intellectum possibilem et agentem, si ponuntur quaedam substantiae separatae corpori non unitae per se subsistentes, quaedam individua esse, et tamen intelligibilia sunt. Sed id quod repugnat intelligibilitati est materialitas: cuius signum est quod, ad hoc quod fiant formae rerum materialium intelligibiles actu, oportet quod a materia abstrahantur. Et ideo in illis in quibus individuatio fit per hanc materiam signatam, individuata non sunt intelligibilia actu. Si autem individuatio fiat non per materiam, nihil prohibet ea quae sunt individua esse actu intelligibilia. Species autem intelligibiles individuantur per suum subiectum, qui est intellectus possibilis, sicut et omnes aliae formae. Unde, cum intellectus possibilis non sit materialis, non tollitur a speciebus individuatis per ipsum quin sint intelligibiles actu. Nor does it follow from this, if intelligible species be several in number and specifically the same, that they are not actually intelligible but only potentially, like other individual things. For individuality is not incompatible with actual intelligibility, since it must be admitted that, if we suppose them to be separate substances, both possible and active intellects are individual things not united to the body and subsistent of themselves, and yet they are intelligible. But it is materiality that is incompatible with intelligibility: a sign of this is that for forms of material things to be actually intelligible, they need to be abstracted from matter. Consequently, in those things in which individualization is effected by particular signate matter, the things individualized are not actually intelligible. But if individualization is not the result of matter, nothing prevents things that are individual from being actually intelligible. Now intelligible species, like all other forms, are individualized by their subject which is the possible intellect. Therefore, since the possible intellect is not material, it does not deprive the species which it individualizes of actual intelligibility. Praeterea. In rebus sensibilibus, sicut non sunt intelligibilia actu individua quae sunt multa in una specie, ut equi vel homines; ita nec individua quae sunt unica in sua specie, ut hic sol et haec luna. Eodem autem modo individuantur species per intellectum possibilem sive sint plures intellectus possibiles sive unus: sed non eodem modo multiplicantur in eadem specie. Nihil igitur refert, quantum ad hoc quod species receptae in intellectu possibili sint intelligibiles actu, utrum intellectus possibilis sit unus in omnibus, aut plures. Further. In sensible things, just as individuals are not actually intelligible if there be many in one species (for instance, horses or men), so neither are those individuals which are alone in their species (like this particular sun or this particular moon). Now species are individualized in the same way by the possible intellect, whether there be several possible intellects or one, but they are not multiplied in the same way in the one species. Therefore, it does not matter whether there be one or several possible intellects in all, as regards the actual intelligibility of the species received into the possible intellect. Item. Intellectus possibilis, secundum Commentatorem praedictum, est ultimus in ordine intelligibilium substantiarum, quae quidem secundum ipsum sunt plures. Nec potest dici quin aliquae superiorum substantiarum habeant cognitionem eorum quae intellectus possibilis cognoscit: in motoribus enim orbium, ut ipse etiam dicit, sunt formae eorum quae causantur per orbis motum. Adhuc igitur remanebit, licet intellectus possibilis sit unus, quod formae intelligibiles multiplicentur in diversis intellectibus. Again. The possible intellect, according to the same Commentator, is the last in the order of intelligible substances, which in his opinion are several. Nor can it be denied that some of the higher substances are cognizant of the things which the possible intellect knows, since, as he says himself, the forms of the effects caused by the movement of a sphere are in the movers of the spheres. Hence it will still follow that, even if there be one possible intellect, the intelligible forms are multiplied in different intellects. Licet autem dixerimus quod species intelligibilis in intellectu possibili recepta, non sit quod intelligitur, sed quo intelligitur; non tamen removetur quin per reflexionem quandam intellectus seipsum intelligat, et suum intelligere, et speciem qua intelligit. Suum autem intelligere intelligit dupliciter: uno modo in particulari, intelligit enim se nunc intelligere; alio modo in universali, secundum quod ratiocinatur de ipsius actus natura. Unde et intellectum et speciem intelligibilem intelligit eodem modo dupliciter: et percipiendo se esse et habere speciem intelligibilem, quod est cognoscere in particulari; et considerando suam et speciei intelligibilis naturam, quod est cognoscere in universali. Et secundum hoc de intellectu et intelligibili tractatur in scientiis. And although we have stated that the intelligible species received into the possible intellect is not that which is understood, but that whereby one understands, this does not prevent the intellect from understanding itself, its act of intelligence, and the species by which it understands by a kind of reflexion. In fact, it understands its act of intelligence in two ways: first in particular, for it understands that it understands in a particular instance; second, in general, inasmuch as it argues about the nature of its act. Consequently, it understands both the intellect and the intelligible species in two ways: both by perceiving its own existence and that it has an intelligible species, which is a kind of particular knowledge, and by considering its own nature and that of the intelligible species, which is a kind of universal knowledge. In this latter sense, we treat of the intellect and things intelligible in sciences. Per haec autem quae dicta sunt etiam tertiae rationis apparet solutio. Quod enim dicit scientiam in discipulo et magistro esse numero unam, partim quidem vere dicitur, partim autem non. Est enim numero una quantum ad id quod scitur: non tamen quantum ad species intelligibiles quibus scitur, neque quantum ad ipsum scientiae habitum. Non tamen oportet quod eodem modo magister causet scientiam in discipulo sicut ignis generat ignem. Non enim idem est modus eorum quae a natura generantur, et eorum quae ab arte. Ignis quidem enim generat ignem naturaliter, reducendo materiam de potentia in actum suae formae: magister vero causat scientiam in discipulo per modum artis; ad hoc enim datur ars demonstrativa, quam Aristoteles in Posterioribus tradit; demonstratio enim est syllogismus faciens scire. From what has been said, the solution to the third argument is also evident. For his statement—that knowledge in the disciple and in the master is numerically one—is partly true and partly false. It is numerically one as regards the thing known, but not as regards the intelligible species by which it is known, nor again as regards the habit itself of knowledge. And yet it does not follow that the master causes knowledge in the disciple in the same way as fire generates fire, since things are not generated in the same way by nature as by art. For fire generates fire naturally, by reducing matter from potency to the act of its form, whereas the master causes knowledge in his disciple after the manner of art, since to this purpose is assigned the art of demonstration which Aristotle teaches in the Posterior Analytics; for a demonstration is a syllogism that makes us know. Sciendum tamen quod, secundum quod Aristoteles in VII Metaphysicae docet, artium quaedam sunt in quarum materia non est aliquod principium agens ad effectum artis producendum, sicut patet in aedificativa: non enim est in lignis et lapidibus aliqua vis activa movens ad domus constitutionem, sed aptitudo passiva tantum. Aliqua vero est ars in cuius materia est aliquod activum principium movens ad producendum effectum artis, sicut patet in medicativa: nam in corpore infirmo est aliquod activum principium ad sanitatem. Et ideo effectum artis primi generis nunquam producit natura, sed semper fit ab arte: sicut domus omnis est ab arte. Effectus autem artis secundi generis fit et ab arte, et a natura sine arte: multi enim per operationem naturae, sine arte medicinae, sanantur. In his autem quae possunt fieri et arte et natura, ars imitatur naturam: si quis enim ex frigida causa infirmetur, natura eum calefaciendo sanat; unde et medicus, si eum curare debeat, calefaciendo sanat. Huic autem arti similis est ars docendi. In eo enim qui docetur, est principium activum ad scientiam: scilicet intellectus, et ea quae naturaliter intelliguntur, scilicet prima principia. Et ideo scientia acquiritur dupliciter: et sine doctrina, per inventionem; et per doctrinam. Docens igitur hoc modo incipit docere sicut inveniens incipit invenire: offerendo scilicet considerationi discipuli principia ab eo nota, quia omnis disciplina ex praeexistenti fit cognitione, et illa principia in conclusiones deducendo; et proponendo exempla sensibilia, ex quibus in anima discipuli formentur phantasmata necessaria ad intelligendum. Et quia exterior operatio docentis nihil operaretur nisi adesset principium intrinsecum scientiae, quod inest nobis divinitus, ideo apud theologos dicitur quod homo docet ministerium exhibendo, Deus autem interius operando: sicut et medicus dicitur naturae minister in sanando. Sic igitur causatur scientia in discipulo per magistrum, non modo naturalis actionis, sed artificialis, ut dictum est. It must, however, be observed, in accordance with Aristotle’s teaching in 7 Metaphysics, that there are some arts in which the matter is not an active principle productive of the art’s effect. Such is the art of building, since in timber and stone there is not an active force tending to the production of a house, but merely a passive aptitude. On the other hand, there is an art whose matter is an active principle tending to produce the effect of the art. Such is the medical art, since in the sick body there is an active principle conducive to health. Consequently, the effect of an art of the first kind is never produced by nature but is always the result of the art. But the effect of an art of the second kind is the result both of art and of nature without art: for many are healed by the action of nature without the art of medicine. In those things that can be done both by art and by nature, art imitates nature; for if a person is taken ill through a cold cause, nature cures him by heating. Now the art of teaching is like this art. For in him that is taught, there is an active principle conducive to knowledge (namely, the intellect), and those things which are naturally understood (namely, first principles). Therefore knowledge is acquired in two ways, both by discovery without teaching, and by teaching. Consequently, the teacher begins to teach in the same way as the discoverer begins to discover, namely, by offering to the disciple’s consideration principles known by him (since all learning results from preexisting knowledge), and by drawing conclusions from those principles; and again by proposing sensible examples, from which there result, in the disciple’s mind, the phantasms which are necessary for his understanding. And since the outward action of the teacher would have no effect without the inward principle of knowledge, which is in us from God, among theologians it is said that man teaches by outward ministration, but God by inward operation. Even so the physician is said to minister to nature when he heals. Accordingly, knowledge is caused in the disciple by his master not by way of natural action, but after the manner of art, as stated. Praeterea, cum Commentator praedictus ponat habitus scientiarum esse in intellectu passivo sicut in subiecto, unitas intellectus possibilis nihil facit ad hoc quod sit una scientia numero in discipulo et magistro. Intellectum enim passivum constat non esse eundem in diversis: cum sit potentia materialis. Unde haec ratio non est ad propositum, secundum eius positionem. Further. Since the same Commentator places the habits of science in the passive intellect as their subject, the unity of the possible intellect in no way causes numerical unity of knowledge in disciple and master. For it is evident that the passive intellect is not the same in different individuals, since it is a material power. Consequently, this argument is not to the point following his position. Caput 76 Chapter 76 Quod intellectus agens non sit substantia separata, sed aliquid animae That the active intellect is not a separate substance but part of the soul Ex his etiam concludi potest quod nec intellectus agens est unus in omnibus, ut Alexander etiam ponit, et Avicenna, qui non ponunt intellectum possibilem esse unum omnium. From the foregoing we may also conclude that neither is there one active intellect in all, as Alexander and Avicenna maintained, who do not hold that there is one possible intellect in all. Cum enim agens et recipiens sint proportionata, oportet quod unicuique passivo respondeat proprium activum. Intellectus autem possibilis comparatur ad agentem ut proprium passivum sive susceptivum ipsius: habet enim se ad eum agens sicut ars ad materiam, ut dicitur in III De anima. Si igitur intellectus possibilis est aliquid animae humanae, multiplicatum secundum multitudinem individuorum, ut ostensum est; et intellectus agens erit etiam eiusmodi, et non erit unus omnium. For, since agent and recipient are mutually proportionate, it follows that to every patient there corresponds a proper agent. Now the possible intellect is compared to the active as the proper patient or recipient of the latter, since it is related to it as art to matter, as stated in 3 De anima. Hence if the possible intellect is part of the human soul, and multiplied according to the number of individuals, as we have shown (ch. 73), the active intellect also will be the like, and not one for all. Adhuc. Intellectus agens non facit species intelligibiles actu ut ipse per eas intelligat, maxime sicut substantia separata, cum non sit in potentia: sed ut per eas intelligat intellectus possibilis. Non igitur facit eas nisi tales quales competunt intellectui possibili ad intelligendum. Tales autem facit eas qualis est ipse: nam omne agens agit sibi simile. Est igitur intellectus agens proportionatus intellectui possibili. Et sic, cum intellectus possibilis sit pars animae, intellectus agens non erit substantia separata. Again. The active intellect makes the species to be actually intelligible not so that it itself may understand by them (especially as a separate substance), since it is not in potency, but so that the possible intellect may understand by them. Therefore, it does not make them otherwise than as required by the possible intellect so that it may understand. But it makes them to be such as it is itself, since every agent produces its like. Therefore, the active intellect is proportionate to the possible intellect: consequently, since the possible intellect is a part of the soul, the active intellect is not a separate substance. Amplius. Sicut materia prima perficitur per formas naturales, quae sunt extra animam, ita intellectus possibilis perficitur per formas intellectas in actu. Sed formae naturales recipiuntur in materia prima, non per actionem alicuius substantiae separatae tantum, sed per actionem formae eiusdem generis, scilicet quae est in materia: sicut haec caro generatur per formam quae est in his carnibus et in his ossibus, ut probat Aristoteles in VII Metaphysicae. Si igitur intellectus possibilis sit pars animae et non sit substantia separata, ut probatum est, intellectus agens, per cuius actionem fiunt species intelligibiles in ipso, non erit aliqua substantia separata, sed aliqua virtus activa animae. Moreover. Just as prime matter is perfected by natural forms which are outside the soul, so the possible intellect is perfected by forms actually understood. Now natural forms are received into prime matter not by the action of only one separate substance, but by the action of a form of the same kind—namely, of a form that is in matter—even as this particular flesh is begotten through a form that is in this particular flesh and bones, as Aristotle proves in 7 Metaphysics. Consequently, if the possible intellect is a part of the soul and not a separate substance, as we have shown (ch. 59), the active intellect, by whose action the intelligible species result in it, will not be a separate substance, but an active force of the soul. Item. Plato posuit scientiam in nobis causari ab ideis, quas ponebat esse quasdam substantias separatas: quam quidem positionem Aristoteles improbat in I Metaphysicae. Constat autem quod scientia nostra dependet ab intellectu agente sicut ex primo principio. Si igitur intellectus agens esset quaedam substantia separata, nulla esset vel modica differentia inter opinionem istam et Platonicam a Philosopho improbatam. Again. Plato held that knowledge in us is caused by ideas, which he affirmed to be separate substances; and Aristotle refutes this opinion in 1 Metaphysics. Now it is clear that our knowledge depends on the active intellect as its first principle. If, then, the active intellect were a separate substance, there would be little or no difference between this opinion and Plato’s, which was refuted by the Philosopher. Adhuc. Si intellectus agens est quaedam substantia separata, oportet quod eius actio sit continua et non intercisa: vel saltem oportet dicere quod non continuetur et intercidatur ad nostrum arbitrium. Actio autem eius est facere phantasmata intelligibilia actu. Aut igitur hoc semper faciet, aut non semper: si non semper, non tamen hoc faciet ad arbitrium nostrum. Sed tunc intelligimus actu quando phantasmata fiunt intelligibilia actu. Ergo oportet quod vel semper intelligamus; vel quod non sit in potestate nostra actu intelligere. Again. If the active intellect be a separate substance, its action must be continuous and uninterrupted, or at least we must say that it is not continued or interrupted at our will. Now its action is to make phantasms actually intelligible. Either, therefore, it will do this always, or not always. If not always, this will nevertheless not be at our discretion. Now, we understand actually when the phantasms are made actually intelligible. Consequently, it follows that either we always understand, or that it is not in our power to understand actually. Praeterea. Comparatio substantiae separatae ad omnia phantasmata quae sunt in quibuscumque hominibus, est una: sicut comparatio solis est una ad omnes colores. Res autem sensibiles similiter sentiunt scientes et inscii: et per consequens eadem phantasmata sunt in utrisque. Similiter igitur fient intelligibilia ab intellectu agente. Uterque ergo similiter intelliget. Further. A separate substance stands in the same relation to all the phantasms that are in any men whatsoever, even as the sun stands in the same relation to all colors. Now sensible things are perceived by those who know as well as by those who are ignorant, and consequently the same phantasms are in both. Hence they will be made intelligible by the active intellect in either case: consequently, both will equally understand. Potest autem dici quod intellectus agens semper agit quantum in se est, sed non semper phantasmata fiunt intelligibilia actu, sed solum quando sunt ad hoc disposita. Disponuntur autem ad hoc per actum cogitativae virtutis, cuius usus est in nostra potestate. Et ideo intelligere actu est in nostra potestate. Et ob hoc etiam contingit quod non omnes homines intelligunt ea quorum habent phantasmata: quia non omnes habent actum virtutis cogitativae convenientem, sed solum qui sunt instructi et consueti. It may be said, however, that the active intellect for its own part is always active, but that the phantasms are not always made actually intelligible, but only when they are disposed to it. Now, they are disposed to it by the act of the cogitative power, the use of which is in our power. Consequently, to understand actually is in our power. It is for this reason that not all men understand the things of which they have the phantasms, since not all have the requisite act of the cogitative power, but only those who are instructed and accustomed. Videtur autem quod haec responsio non sit omnino sufficiens. Haec enim dispositio quae fit per cogitativam ad intelligendum, oportet quod sit vel dispositio intellectus possibilis ad recipiendum formas intelligibiles ab intellectu agente fluentes, ut Avicenna dicit, vel quia disponuntur phantasmata ut fiant intelligibilia actu, sicut Averroes et Alexander dicunt. Primum autem horum non videtur esse conveniens. Quia intellectus possibilis secundum suam naturam est in potentia ad species intelligibiles actu: unde comparatur ad eas sicut diaphanum ad lucem vel ad species coloris. Non autem indiget aliquid in cuius natura est recipere formam aliquam, disponi ulterius ad formam illam: nisi forte sint in eo contrariae dispositiones, sicut materia aquae disponitur ad formam aeris per remotionem frigiditatis et densitatis. Nihil autem contrarium est in intellectu possibili quod possit impedire cuiuscumque speciei intelligibilis susceptionem: nam species intelligibiles etiam contrariorum in intellectu non sunt contrariae, ut probat Aristoteles in VII Metaphysicae, cum unum sit ratio cognoscendi aliud. Falsitas autem quae accidit in iudicio intellectus componentis et dividentis, provenit, non ex eo quod in intellectu possibili sint aliqua intellecta, sed ex eo quod ei aliqua desunt. Non igitur, quantum in se est, intellectus possibilis indiget aliqua praeparatione ut suscipiat species intelligibiles ab intellectu agente fluentes. Nevertheless, this reply seems not quite sufficient. For this disposition to understand, which is effected by the cogitative power, must either be a disposition of the possible intellect to receive intelligible forms emanating from the active intellect, as Avicenna maintains, or a disposition of the phantasms to be made actually intelligible, as Averroes and Alexander assert. Now, the former would seem improbable. Because the possible intellect by its very nature is in potency with regard to species actually intelligible; hence it stands in the same relation to them as a transparent body to light or to colored images. And if a thing by its very nature is capable of receiving a certain form, it needs no further disposition to that form, unless perhaps it contain contrary dispositions, as the matter of water is disposed to the form of air by the removal of cold and density. But there is nothing contrary in the possible intellect to prevent it receiving any intelligible species whatsoever, since the intelligible species even of contraries are not themselves contrary in the intellect, as Aristotle proves in 7 Metaphysics, for one is the reason for knowing the other. And the falsity which is incidental to the intellect’s judgment in composition and division does not result from the presence in the intellect of certain things understood, but from its lack of certain things. Therefore, the possible intellect, for its own part, requires no preparation in order to receive the intelligible species emanating from the active intellect. Praeterea. Colores facti visibiles actu per lucem pro certo imprimunt suam similitudinem in diaphano, et per consequens in visum. Si igitur ipsa phantasmata illustrata ab intellectu agente non imprimerent suas similitudines in intellectum possibilem, sed solum disponunt ipsum ad recipiendum; non esset comparatio phantasmatum ad intellectum possibilem sicut colorum ad visum, ut Aristoteles ponit. Further. Colors which light has made actually visible without doubt fail impress their likeness on the diaphanous body, and consequently on the sight. Consequently, if the phantasms themselves on which the active intellect has shed its light did not impress their likeness on the possible intellect, but merely disposed it to receive them, the phantasms would not stand in the same relation to the possible intellect as colors to the sight, as Aristotle asserts. Item. Secundum hoc phantasmata non essent per se necessaria ad intelligendum, et per consequens nec sensus: sed solum per accidens, quasi excitantia et praeparantia intellectum possibilem ad recipiendum. Quod est opinionis Platonicae, et contra ordinem generationis artis et scientiae quem ponit Aristoteles, in I Metaph. et ult. Poster., dicens quod ex sensu fit memoria, ex multis memoriis unum experimentum; ex multis experimentis universalis acceptio, quae est principium scientiae et artis. Again. According to this the phantasms, and consequently the senses, would not be of themselves necessary for us to understand, but only accidentally, as it were inciting and preparing the possible intellect to receive. This is part of the Platonist theory, and contrary to the order which Aristotle assigns to the generation of art and science, in the first book of Metaphysics and the last book of Posterior Analytics, where he says that memory results from sensation; experience from many memories; from many memories the universal apprehension, which is the beginning of science and art. Est autem haec positio Avicennae consona his quae de generatione rerum naturalium dicit. Ponit enim quod omnia agentia inferiora solum per suas actiones praeparant materiam ad suscipiendas formas quae effluunt in materias ab intelligentia agente separata. Unde et, eadem ratione, ponit quod phantasmata praeparant intellectum possibilem, formae autem intelligibiles fluunt a substantia separata. This opinion of Avicenna, however, is in keeping with what he says about the generation of natural things. For he holds that all lower agents, by their actions, prepare matter to receive the forms which emanate from a separate active intelligence into their respective matters. Hence for the same reason he also holds that the phantasms prepare the possible intellect; and that the intelligible forms emanate from a separate substance. Similiter autem quod per cogitativam disponuntur phantasmata ad hoc quod fiant intelligibilia actu et moventia intellectum possibilem, conveniens non videtur si intellectus agens ponatur substantia separata. Hoc enim videtur esse conforme positioni dicentium quod inferiora agentia sunt solum disponentia ad ultimam perfectionem, ultima autem perfectio est ab agente separato: quod est contra sententiam Aristotelis in VII Metaphysicae. Non enim videtur imperfectius se habere anima humana ad intelligendum, quam inferiora naturae ad proprias operationes. In like manner, if it be supposed that the active intellect is a separate substance, it seems unreasonable that the phantasms should be prepared by the cogitative power in order that they be actually intelligible and move the possible intellect. For this is seemingly in keeping with the opinion of those who say that the lower agents merely dispose to the ultimate perfection, and that this ultimate perfection is caused by a separate agent. This is contrary to the opinion of Aristotle in 7 Metaphysics. For it would seem that the human soul is not less perfectly equipped for understanding than the lower things of nature for their proper operations. Amplius. Effectus nobiliores in istis inferioribus producuntur non solum ab agentibus superioribus, sed requirunt agentia sui generis: hominem enim generat sol et homo. Et similiter videmus in aliis animalibus perfectis quod quaedam ignobilia animalia ex solis tantum actione generantur, absque principio activo sui generis: sicut patet in animalibus generatis ex putrefactione. Intelligere autem est nobilissimus effectus qui est in istis inferioribus. Non igitur sufficit ponere ad ipsum agens remotum, nisi etiam ponatur agens proximum. Haec tamen ratio contra Avicennam non procedit: nam ipse ponit omne animal posse generari absque semine. Moreover. In this lower world, the more noble effects are produced not by higher agents alone, but also require agents of their own genus, for the sun and man generate a man. In like manner, we observe that in other perfect animals, some of the lower animals are generated by the mere action of the sun, without an active principle of their own genus (for instance, animals engendered of putrefaction). Now understanding is the most noble effect that takes place in this lower world. Therefore, it is not enough to ascribe it to a remote agent, unless we suppose it to have also a proximate cause. This argument, however, does not avail against Avicenna, because he holds that any animal can be generated without seed. Adhuc. Intentio effectus demonstrat agentem. Unde animalia generata ex putrefactione non sunt ex intentione naturae inferioris, sed superioris tantum, quia producuntur ab agente superiori tantum: propter quod Aristoteles, in VII Metaph., dicit ea fieri casu. Animalia autem quae fiunt ex semine, sunt ex intentione naturae superioris et inferioris. Hic autem effectus qui est abstrahere formas universales a phantasmatibus, est in intentione nostra, non solum in intentione agentis remoti. Igitur oportet in nobis ponere aliquod proximum principium talis effectus. Hoc autem est intellectus agens. Non est igitur substantia separata, sed aliqua virtus animae nostrae. Again. The intention of the effect shows the agent. Therefore, animals engendered of putrefaction are not intended by a lower nature but only by a higher, since they are produced by a higher nature only: for which reason Aristotle in 7 Metaphysics says that they are effects of chance. In contrast, animals that are produced from seed are intended both by the higher and the lower nature. But this effect—which is to abstract universal forms from the phantasms—is in our intention, and not merely in the intention of the remote agent. Therefore, it follows that in us there must be a proximate principle of such an effect: and this is the active intellect. Therefore, it is not a separate substance, but a power of our soul. Item. In natura cuiuslibet moventis est principium sufficiens ad operationem naturalem eiusdem: et si quidem operatio illa consistat in actione, adest ei principium activum, sicut patet de potentiis animae nutritivae in plantis; si vero operatio illa consistat in passione, adest ei principium passivum, sicut patet de potentiis sensitivis in animalibus. Homo autem est perfectissimus inter omnia inferiora moventia. Eius autem propria et naturalis operatio est intelligere: quae non completur sine passione quadam, inquantum intellectus patitur ab intelligibili; et etiam sine actione, inquantum intellectus facit intelligibilia in potentia esse intelligibilia in actu. Oportet igitur in natura hominis esse utriusque proprium principium scilicet intellectum agentem et possibilem; et neutrum secundum esse ab anima hominis separatum esse. Again. The nature of every mover includes a principle sufficient for its natural operation: and if this operation consists in an action, that nature includes an active principle, as appears in the powers of the nutritive soul of plants; but if this operation is a passion, it includes a passive principle, as appears in the sensitive powers of animals. Now man is the most perfect of all lower movers. And his proper and natural operation is to understand, which is not completed without some passion, insofar as the intellect is passive to the intelligible; nor again without action, insofar as the intellect makes things that are potentially intelligible to be intelligible actually. Therefore, the respective principles of both (namely, the active and possible intellects), must be in man’s nature, and neither of these must be separate from the soul of man as to its being.