Caput 9 Chapter 9 Quod Dei potentia sit eius actio That God’s power is his action Ex hoc autem ostendi potest quod potentia Dei non sit aliud quam sua actio. From this we can show that God’s power is not other than his action. Quae enim uni et eidem sunt eadem, sibi invicem sunt eadem. Divina autem potentia est eius substantia, ut ostensum est. Eius etiam actio est eius substantia, ut in primo libro ostensum est de intellectuali operatione: eadem enim ratio in aliis competit. Igitur in Deo non est aliud potentia et aliud actio. For things that are identical with one and the same thing, are identical with one another. Now God’s power is his substance, as we have proved (ch. 8), and his action is also his substance, as we showed in the first book (bk. I, ch. 45) with regard to his intellectual operation: for this applies equally to his other operations. Therefore, in God power is not distinct from action. Item. Actio alicuius rei est complementum quoddam potentiae eius: comparatur enim ad potentiam sicut actus secundus ad primum. Divina autem potentia non completur alio quam seipso: cum sit ipsa Dei essentia. In Deo igitur non est aliud potentia et aliud actio. Again. The action of a thing is a complement of its power: for it is compared to power as second act to first. Now the divine power is not completed by another than himself, since it is God’s very essence. Therefore, in God power is not distinct from action. Amplius. Sicut potentia activa est aliquid agens, ita essentia eius est aliquid ens. Sed divina potentia est eius essentia, ut ostensum est. Ergo suum agere est suum esse. Sed eius esse est sua substantia. Et sic ut prius. Moreover. Just as active power is something acting, so is its essence something being. Now God’s power is his essence, as we have proved (ch. 8). Therefore, his action is his being. But his being is his substance (bk. I, ch. 22). Therefore, God’s action is his substance, and so the same conclusion follows as before. Adhuc. Actio quae non est substantia agentis, inest ei sicut accidens subiecto: unde et actio unum inter novem praedicamenta accidentis computatur. In Deo autem non potest esse aliquid per modum accidentis. In Deo igitur sua actio non est aliud a sua substantia et sua potentia. Further. An action that is not the substance of the agent is in the agent as an accident in its subject: therefore, action is reckoned among the nine predicaments of accident. Now there can be nothing accidental in God (bk. I, ch. 23). Therefore, God’s substance is not other than his power. Caput 10 Chapter 10 Qualiter potentia in Deo dicatur In what way power is ascribed to God Quia vero nihil est sui ipsius principium, cum divina actio non sit aliud quam eius potentia, manifestum est ex praedictis quod potentia non dicitur in Deo sicut principium actionis, sed sicut principium facti. Et quia potentia respectum ad alterum importat in ratione principii, est enim potentia activa principium agendi in aliud, ut patet per Philosophum in V Metaph.; manifestum est quod potentia dicitur in Deo per respectum ad facta, secundum rei veritatem; non per respectum ad actionem nisi secundum modum intelligendi, prout intellectus noster diversis conceptionibus utrumque considerat, divinam scilicet potentiam et eius actionem. Unde, si aliquae actiones Deo conveniant quae non in aliquod factum transeant sed maneant in agente, respectu harum non dicetur in Deo potentia nisi secundum modum intelligendi, non secundum rei veritatem. Huiusmodi autem actiones sunt intelligere et velle. Potentia igitur Dei, proprie loquendo, non respicit huiusmodi actiones, sed solos effectus. Intellectus igitur et voluntas in Deo non sunt ut potentiae, sed solum ut actiones. Since, however, nothing is its own principle, and God’s action is not other than his power (ch. 9), it is clear from the foregoing that power is ascribed to God not as the principle of action, but as the principle of the thing made. And since power implies relation to something else under the aspect of its principle—for active power is the principle of acting on something else, according to the Philosopher in 5 Metaphysics—it is evident that power is ascribed to God in relation to things made, according to reality, and not in relation to action, except according to our way of understanding, insofar as our intellect considers both (the divine power and action) by different concepts. Therefore, if certain actions are becoming to God which do not pass into something made but remain in the agent, power is not ascribed to God in their respect, except according to our manner of understanding, and not according to reality. Such actions are intelligence and volition. Accordingly, God’s power, properly speaking, does not regard such actions, but only their effects. Consequently, intellect and will are in God not as powers, but only as actions. Patet etiam ex praedictis quod multitudo actionum quae Deo attribuitur, ut intelligere, velle, producere res, et similia, non sunt diversae res: cum quaelibet harum actionum in Deo sit ipsum eius esse, quod est unum et idem. Quomodo autem multiplicitas significationis unius rei veritati non praeiudicet, ex his quae in primo libro ostensa sunt, manifestum esse potest. It is also clear from the foregoing that the manifold actions ascribed to God, as intelligence, volition, the production of things, and the like, are not so many different things, since each of these actions in God is his own very being, which is one and the same thing. How one thing may remain true while having many significations may be clearly seen from what has been shown in the first book (ch. 31, 35). Caput 11 Chapter 11 Quod de Deo dicitur aliquid relative ad creaturas That something is said of God in relation to creatures Cum autem potentia Deo conveniat respectu suorum effectuum; potentia autem rationem principii habeat, ut dictum est; principium autem relative ad principiatum dicitur: manifestum est quod aliquid relative potest dici de Deo in respectu suorum effectuum. Now as power is becoming to God in relation to his effects (ch. 10), and as power conveys the notion of a principle, as we have stated (ch. 10); and since principle denotes relationship to that which proceeds from it, it is evident that something can be said of God relatively, in relation to his effects. Item. Non potest intelligi aliquid relative dici ad alterum nisi e converso illud relative diceretur ad ipsum. Sed res aliae relative dicuntur ad Deum: utpote secundum suum esse, quod a Deo habent, ut ostensum est, ab ipso dependentes. Deus igitur e converso relative ad creaturas dicetur. Again. It is inconceivable that one thing be referred to another, unless conversely the latter be referred to it. Now we speak of other things in relation to God; for example, as regards their being which they have from God they are dependent upon him, as already proved (ch. 6). Therefore, conversely we may speak of God in relation to creatures. Adhuc. Similitudo est relatio quaedam. Deus autem, sicut et cetera agentia, sibi simile agit. Dicitur igitur aliquid relative de ipso. Further. Likeness is a kind of relation. Now God produces something like himself (bk. I, ch. 29), even as do other agents. Therefore, something is said of him relatively. Amplius. Scientia ad scitum relative dicitur. Deus autem non solum sui ipsius, sed etiam aliorum scientiam habet. Igitur aliquid relative dicitur de Deo ad alia. Moreover. Knowledge denotes relation to the thing known. Now God has knowledge not only of himself, but also of other things (bk. I, ch. 49). Therefore, something is said of God in relation to other things. Adhuc. Movens dicitur relative ad motum, et agens ad factum. Deus autem est agens et movens non motum, ut ostensum est. Dicuntur igitur de ipso relationes. Again. Mover implies relation to thing moved, and agent to thing done. Now God is an agent, and an unmoved mover, as already proved (bk. I, ch. 13). Therefore, relations are predicated of him. Item. Primum relationem quandam importat similiter summum. Ostensum est autem in primo ipsum esse primum ens et summum bonum. Again. First implies some kind of relation, and so does supreme. Now it was proved in the first book (ch. 13, 41), that he is the first being and the highest good. Patet igitur quod multa de Deo relative dicuntur. It is, therefore, evident that many things are said of God relatively. Caput 12 Chapter 12 Quod relationes dictae de Deo ad creaturas non sunt realiter in Deo That relations said of God in reference to creatures are not really in God Huiusmodi autem relationes quae sunt ad suos effectus, realiter in Deo esse non possunt. These relations however which refer to his effects cannot possibly be in God. Non enim in eo esse possent sicut accidentia in subiecto: cum in ipso nullum sit accidens ut in primo libro ostensum est. Nec etiam possent esse ipsa Dei substantia. Cum enim relativa sint quae secundum suum esse ad aliud quodammodo se habent, ut Philosophus dicit in Praedicamentis, oporteret quod Dei substantia hoc ipsum quod est ad aliud diceretur. Quod autem ipsum quod est ad aliud dicitur, quodammodo ab ipso dependet: cum nec esse nec intelligi sine eo possit. Oporteret igitur quod Dei substantia ab alio extrinseco esset dependens. Et sic non esset per seipsum necesse esse, ut in primo libro ostensum est. Non sunt igitur huiusmodi relationes secundum rem in Deo. For they cannot be in him as accidents in a subject, since no accident is in him, as we proved in the first book (bk. I, ch. 23). Neither can they be God’s very substance, because, since relative terms are those which essentially refer somehow to something else, as the Philosopher says in the Categories, it would follow that God’s substance is essentially referred to something else. Now that which is essentially referred to another depends in some way on it, since it can neither exist nor be understood without it. Hence it would follow that God’s substance is dependent on something else outside it: thus it would not be of itself necessary being, as we have proved in the first book (bk. I, ch. 13). Therefore, such relations are not really in God. Item. Ostensum est in primo quod Deus omnium entium est prima mensura. Comparatur igitur Deus ad alia entia sicut scibile ad scientiam nostram, quod eius mensura est: nam ex eo quod res est vel non est, opinio et oratio vera vel falsa est, secundum Philosophum in Praedicamentis. Scibile autem licet ad scientiam relative dicatur, tamen relatio secundum rem in scibili non est, sed in scientia tantum: unde secundum Philosophum, in V Metaph., scibile dicitur relative, non quia ipsum referatur, sed quia aliud refertur ad ipsum. Dictae igitur relationes in Deo non sunt realiter. Again. It was proved in the first book (bk. I, ch. 13) that God is the first measure of all beings. Therefore, God is compared to other beings as knowable things to our knowledge, since opinion or speech is true or false according as a thing is or is not, according to the Philosopher in the Categories. Now, though a thing is said to be knowable in relation to knowledge, the relation is not really in the knowable, but only in the knowledge: hence, according to the Philosopher, in 5 Metaphysics, the knowable is so called relatively, not because it is itself related, but because something else is related to it. Therefore, the said relations are not really in God. Adhuc. Relationes praedictae dicuntur de Deo non solum respectu eorum quae sunt actu, sed respectu eorum quae sunt in potentia: quia et eorum scientiam habet, et respectu eorum dicitur et primum ens et summum bonum. Sed eius quod est actu ad id quod non est actu sed potentia, non sunt relationes reales: alias sequeretur quod essent infinitae relationes actu in eodem, cum numeri infiniti in potentia sint maiores binario, quibus omnibus ipse est prior. Deus autem non aliter refertur ad ea quae sunt actu quam ad ea quae sunt potentia: quia non mutatur ex hoc quod aliqua producit. Non igitur refertur ad alia per relationem realiter in ipso existentem. Further. The aforesaid relations are said of God not only with respect to those things that are actual, but also with respect to those that are in potency, because he both has knowledge of them, and in reference to them is called the first being and the highest good. But that which is actual has no real relation to that which is not actual but potential, otherwise it would follow that there are actually an infinite number of relations in the same subject, since potentially infinite numbers are greater than the number two, which is prior to them all. Now God is not related to actual things otherwise than to potential things, for he is not changed by the fact that he produces certain things (bk. I, ch. 82). Therefore, he is not related to other things by a relation really existing in him. Amplius. Cuicumque aliquid de novo advenit, necesse est illud mutari, vel per se vel per accidens. Relationes autem quaedam de novo dicuntur de Deo: sicut quod est dominus aut gubernator huius rei quae de novo incipit esse. Si igitur praedicaretur aliqua relatio realiter in Deo existens, sequeretur quod aliquid Deo de novo adveniret, et sic quod mutaretur vel per se vel per accidens. Cuius contrarium in primo libro ostensum est. Moreover. Whatever receives something anew must be changed, either essentially or accidentally. Now certain relations are said of God anew (for instance, that he is Lord or governor of a thing which begins anew to exist). Therefore, if a relation were predicated of God as really existing in him, it would follow that something accrues to God anew, and consequently that he is changed either essentially or accidentally: the contrary of which was proved in the first book (bk. I, ch. 13). Caput 13 Chapter 13 Quomodo praedictae relationes de Deo dicantur How the aforesaid relations are predicated of God Non autem potest dici quod relationes praedictae sint existentes exterius quasi res aliquae extra Deum. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the aforesaid relations exist extraneously as something outside God. Cum enim Deus sit primum entium et summum bonorum, oporteret ad illas etiam relationes, quae sunt aliquae res, Dei relationes alias considerare. Et si illae iterum sint res aliquae, oportebit iterum tertias relationes adinvenire. Et sic in infinitum. Non igitur relationes quibus Deus ad res alias refertur, sunt res aliquae extra Deum existentes. For, since God is the first being and highest good (bk. I, ch. 13, 41), it would be necessary to consider yet other relations of God to those relations that are realities. And if these also are realities, we shall again have to find third relations, and so on indefinitely. Therefore, the relations by which God is referred to other things are not really existing outside God. Item. Duplex est modus quo aliquid denominative praedicatur. Denominatur enim aliquid ab eo quod extra ipsum est, sicut a loco dicitur aliquis esse alicubi, et a tempore aliquando: aliquid vero denominatur ab eo quod inest, sicut ab albedine albus. A relatione vero non invenitur aliquid denominari quasi exterius existente, sed inhaerente: non enim denominatur aliquis pater nisi a paternitate quae ei inest. Non igitur potest esse quod relationes quibus Deus ad creaturas refertur, sint res aliquae extra ipsum. Again. A thing is predicated denominatively in two ways. For a thing may be denominated from that which is outside it (for instance, a person is said to be ‘somewhere’ from place, and ‘sometime’ from time), and a thing may be denominated from that which is in it (as a person is denominated ‘white’ from whiteness). On the other hand, a thing is not found to be denominated from a relation as extraneous, but as inherent: for a man is not denominated a father except from fatherhood, which is in him. Therefore, it is impossible for the relations by which God is referred to creatures to be realities outside him. Cum igitur ostensum sit quod non sint in ipso realiter, et tamen dicuntur de eo, relinquitur quod et attribuantur solum secundum intelligentiae modum, ex eo quod alia referuntur ad ipsum. Intellectus enim noster, intelligendo aliquid referri ad alterum, cointelligit relationem illius ad ipsum: quamvis secundum rem quandoque non referatur. Since, then, it has been proved (ch. 12) that they are not really in him, and yet are predicated of him (ch. 11), it remains that they are ascribed to him according only to our way of understanding, from the fact that other things are referred to him. For our intellect, in understanding one thing to be referred to another, understands at the same time that the latter is related to the former, although sometimes it is not really related at all. Et sic etiam patet quod alio modo dicuntur de Deo praedictae relationes, et alia quae de Deo praedicantur. Nam omnia alia, ut sapientia, voluntas, eius essentiam praedicant: relationes vero praedictae minime, sed secundum modum intelligendi tantum. Nec tamen intellectus est falsus. Ex hoc enim ipso quod intellectus noster intelligit relationes divinorum effectuum terminari in ipsum Deum, aliqua praedicat relative de ipso: sicut et scibile relative intelligimus et significamus ex hoc quod scientia refertur ad ipsum. Therefore, it is also evident that the aforesaid relations are not said of God in the same way as other things predicated of God. For all other things—like wisdom and will—predicate his essence, whereas the aforesaid relations predicate minimally, but solely according to our way of understanding. And yet our understanding is not false. For from the very fact that our intellect understands that the relations of the divine effects terminate in God himself, it predicates certain things of him relatively: even so we understand and express the knowable relatively from the fact that our knowledge is referred to it. Caput 14 Chapter 14 Continuatio praecedentii Continuation of the foregoing