Caput 90 Chapter 90 Quod nulli alii corpori nisi humano unitur substantia intellectualis ut forma That an intellectual substance is united as a form to no other than the human body Quia vero ostensum est substantiam aliquam intellectualem corpori uniri ut formam, scilicet animam humanam, inquirendum restat utrum alicui alteri corpori aliqua substantia intellectualis ut forma uniatur. Et quidem de corporibus caelestibus, quod sint animata anima intellectuali, superius, est ostensum quid de hoc Aristoteles senserit, et quod Augustinus hoc sub dubio dereliquit. Unde praesens inquisitio circa corpora elementaria versari debet. Since it has been proved that a certain intellectual substance (namely, the human soul) is united to a body as its form, it remains for us to ask whether any intellectual substance can be united as form to any other body. Indeed, as regards heavenly bodies, we have shown above what was Aristotle’s opinion as to their being animated with an intellective soul, and that Augustine leaves the question unsolved. Therefore, the present inquiry must be confined to elemental bodies. Quod autem nulli corpori elementari substantia intellectualis uniatur ut forma nisi humano, evidenter apparet. Si enim alteri corpori uniatur, aut unitur corpori mixto, aut simplici. Non autem potest uniri corpori mixto. Quia oporteret illud corpus maxime esse aequalis complexionis, secundum suum genus, inter cetera corpora mixta: cum videamus tanto corpora mixta nobiliores formas habere quanto magis ad temperamentum mixtionis perveniunt; et sic, quod habet formam nobilissimam, utpote substantiam intellectualem, si sit corpus mixtum, oportet esse temperatissimum. Unde etiam videmus quod mollities carnis et bonitas tactus, quae aequalitatem complexionis demonstrant, sunt signa boni intellectus. Complexio autem maxime aequalis est complexio corporis humani. Oportet igitur, si substantia intellectualis uniatur alicui corpori mixto, quod illud sit eiusdem naturae cum corpore humano. Forma etiam eius esset eiusdem naturae cum anima humana, si esset substantia intellectualis. Non igitur esset differentia secundum speciem inter illud animal et hominem. That an intellectual substance is not united as form to any elemental body save that of man is evidently clear. For were it united to some other, it would be united either to a mixed or to a simple body. But it cannot be united to a mixed body, because that body, in respect of its genus, would have to surpass other mixed bodies in evenness of temperament, since we see that mixed bodies have forms so much the more noble the nearer they approach to an even temperament. Thus, if that which has a most noble form (such as an intellectual substance) be a mixed body, it must have a most even temperament. For this reason we find that a soft flesh and a delicate touch are signs of a keen understanding. Now the most even temperament is that of the human body. Consequently, if an intellectual substance be united to a mixed body, the latter must have the same nature as the human body. Moreover, its form would be of the same nature as the human soul if it were an intellectual substance. Therefore, there would be no specific difference between that animal and man. Similiter autem neque corpori simplici, puta aeri aut aquae aut igni aut terrae, uniri potest substantia intellectualis ut forma. Unumquodque enim horum corporum est simile in toto et partibus: eiusdem enim naturae et speciei est pars aeris et totus aer, etenim eundem motum habet; et similiter de aliis. Similibus autem motoribus similes formae debentur. Si igitur aliqua pars alicuius dictorum corporum sit animata anima intellectuali, puta aeris, totus aer et omnes partes eius, eadem ratione, erunt animata. Hoc autem manifeste apparet falsum: nam nulla operatio vitae apparet in partibus aeris vel aliorum simplicium corporum. Non igitur alicui parti aeris, vel similium corporum, substantia intellectualis unitur ut forma. Again, neither can an intellectual substance be united as form to a simple body, such as air, water, fire, or earth. For each of these bodies is similar in the whole and in the parts, since a part of air has the same nature and species as the whole air, for it has the same movement, and the same applies to the others. Now like movers have like forms. Accordingly, if any part of any one of the aforesaid bodies (air, for instance) be animated with an intellectual soul, for the same reason the whole air and all its parts will be animated. But this is seen clearly to be false, because there is no sign of vital operations in the parts of the air or of other simple bodies. Therefore, an intellectual substance is not united as form to any part of the air or of similar bodies. Adhuc. Si alicui simplicium corporum unitur aliqua substantia intellectualis ut forma, aut habebit intellectum tantum: aut habebit alias potentias, utpote quae pertinent ad partem sensitivam aut nutritivam, sicut est in homine. Si autem habet intellectum tantum, frustra unitur corpori. Omnis enim forma corporis habet aliquam propriam operationem per corpus. Intellectus autem non habet aliquam operationem ad corpus pertinentem, nisi secundum quod movet corpus: intelligere enim ipsum non est operatio quae per organum corporis exerceatur; et eadem ratione, nec velle. Elementorum etiam motus sunt a moventibus naturalibus, scilicet a generantibus, et non movent seipsa. Unde non oportet quod, propter eorum motum, sint animata. Si autem habet substantia intellectualis quae ponitur uniri elemento aut parti eius, alias animae partes, cum partes illae sint partes aliquorum organorum, oportebit in corpore elementi invenire diversitatem organorum. Quod repugnat simplicitati ipsius. Non igitur substantia intellectualis potest uniri ut forma alicui elemento aut parti eius. Again. If an intellectual substance be united as form to one of the simple bodies, it will have either an intellect only, or it will have other powers (for instance, those which belong to the sensitive or to the nutritive part, as in man). If it have the intellect only, there is no use in its being united to the body. For every form of a body exercises a proper operation through the body. And the intellect has no operation pertaining to the body, except insofar as it moves the body: because understanding is not an operation that can be exercised by an organ of the body; nor is willing, for the same reason. Again, the movements of the elements are from natural movers—namely, their generators—and they do not move themselves. Therefore, it does not follow that they are animated because they have movement. If, on the other hand, the intellectual substance, which is supposed to be united to an element or to a part of one, have other parts of the soul, since these parts are parts of certain organs, it follows that we shall find diversity of organs in the body of the element. But this is inconsistent with its simplicity. Therefore, an intellectual substance cannot be united as form to an element or to a part of one. Amplius. Quanto aliquod corpus est propinquius materiae primae, tanto est ignobilius: utpote magis in potentia existens, et minus in actu completo. Elementa autem ipsa sunt propinquiora materiae primae quam corpora mixta: cum et ipsa sint mixtorum corporum materia proxima. Sunt igitur elementorum corpora ignobiliora secundum suam speciem corporibus mixtis. Cum igitur nobilioris corporis sit nobilior forma, impossibile est quod nobilissima forma, quae est anima intellectiva, sit unita corporibus elementorum. Moreover. The nearer a body is to prime matter, the less noble it is, according as it is more in potency and less in complete act. Now the elements are nearer than mixed bodies to prime matter, since they are the proximate matter of mixed bodies. Consequently, the elemental bodies are less noble than mixed bodies as to their species. Therefore, since the more noble bodies have more noble forms, it is impossible that the noblest form of all, which is the intellective soul, be united to the bodies of the elements. Item. Si corpora elementorum, aut aliquae partes eorum, essent animata nobilissimis animabus, quae sunt animae intellectivae, oporteret quod, quanto aliqua corpora essent viciniora elementis, essent propinquiora ad vitam. Hoc autem non apparet, sed magis contrarium: nam plantae minus habent de vita quam animalia, cum tamen sint propinquiores terrae; et mineralia, quae sunt adhuc propinquiora, nihil habent de vita. Non igitur substantia intellectualis unitur alicui elemento, vel parti eius, ut forma. Again. If the elemental bodies or any parts of them were animated by the noblest kind of soul, which is the intellective soul, it would follow that the more akin a body is to the elements, the nearer it approaches to life. Now this does not appear to be the case, but rather the contrary: for plants have less of life than animals, and yet they are more akin to earth; while minerals, which are still more akin, have no life at all. Therefore, an intellectual substance is not united as form to an element or to a part of one. Adhuc. Omnium moventium corruptibilium vita per excellentiam contrarietatis corrumpitur: nam animalia et plantae mortificantur ab excellenti calido et frigido, humido aut sicco. In corporibus autem elementorum praecipue sunt excellentiae harum contrarietatum. Non igitur est possibile quod in eis sit vita. Impossibile igitur est quod substantia intellectiva uniatur eis ut forma. Further. Exceeding contrariety is destructive of life in all corruptible movers: for excessive heat or cold, wet or dryness, are fatal to animals and plants. Now these contraries exceed especially in the elemental bodies. Therefore, life cannot possibly be in them. Therefore, it is impossible for an intellectual substance to be united to them as their form. Amplius. Elementa etsi secundum totum sint incorruptibilia, tamen singulae partes sunt corruptibiles, utpote contrarietatem habentes. Si igitur aliquae partes elementorum habeant sibi unitas substantias cognoscentes, maxime videtur quod assignetur eis vis discretiva corrumpentium. Quae quidem est sensus tactus, qui est discretivus calidi et frigidi et similium contrarietatum: propter quod et, quasi necessarius ad praeservationem a corruptione, omnibus animalibus inest. Hunc autem sensum impossibile est inesse corpori simplici: cum oporteat organum tactus non habere actu contrarietates, sed potentia; quod contingit solum in mixtis et temperatis. Non igitur est possibile aliquas partes elementorum esse animatas anima intellectiva. Moreover. Although the elements are incorruptible as a whole, each of their parts is corruptible as having contrariety. If, therefore, some parts of the elements have cognitive substances united to them, it seems that the power of discerning corruptives should especially be ascribed to them. Now this is the sense of touch, which discriminates between hot and cold and like contraries: and for this very reason it is in all animals, as though it were necessary for preservation from corruption. But this sense cannot possibly be in a simple body, since the organ of touch needs to have contraries not actually but potentially, and this is the case only in mixed and tempered bodies. Therefore, it is not possible that any parts of the elements be animated with an intellective soul. Item. Omne corpus vivens aliquo modo secundum animam localiter movetur: nam corpora caelestia, si tamen sint animata, moventur circulariter; animalia perfecta motu progressivo; ostrea autem motu dilatationis et constrictionis; plantae autem motu augmenti et decrementi, qui sunt aliquo modo secundum locum. Sed in elementis non apparet aliquis motus qui sit ab anima, sed solum motus naturales. Non sunt igitur corpora viventia. Again. Every living body has some kind of local movement proceeding from its soul: for the heavenly bodies (if indeed they be animated) have a circular movement; perfect animals a progressive movement; oysters a movement of expansion and contraction; plants a movement of increase and decrease—all of which are kinds of local movement. Whereas in the elements there is no sign of movement proceeding from a soul, but only such as is natural. Therefore, they are not living bodies. Si autem dicatur quod substantia intellectualis, etsi non uniatur corpori elementi aut parti eius ut forma, unitur tamen ei ut motor. Primum quidem, in aere hoc dici impossibile est. Cum enim pars aeris non sit per seipsam terminabilis, non potest aliqua pars eius determinata motum proprium habere, propter quem sibi substantia intellectualis uniatur. If, however, it be said that although an intellectual substance be not united as a form to an elemental body or part thereof, yet it is united to it as its mover, the first is impossible if applied to the air. For, since a part of the air has no bounds of its own, no determinate part of the air can have its own proper movement on account of which an intellectual substance be united to it. Praeterea. Si aliqua substantia intellectualis unitur alicui corpori naturaliter sicut motor proprio mobili, oportet virtutem motivam illius substantiae limitari ad corpus mobile cui naturaliter unitur: nam cuiuslibet motoris proprii virtus non excedit in movendo proprium mobile. Ridiculum autem videtur dicere quod virtus alicuius substantiae intellectualis non excedat in movendo aliquam determinatam partem alicuius elementi, aut aliquod corpus mixtum. Non videtur igitur dicendum quod aliqua substantia intellectualis uniatur alicui corpori elementari naturaliter ut motor, nisi sibi etiam uniatur ut forma. Moreover. If an intellectual substance be naturally united to a body as a mover to its proper movable, the motive power of that substance must be confined to the movable body to which it is naturally united; since the power of every proper mover does not, in moving, go beyond its proper movable. Now it seems absurd to say that the power of an intellectual substance does not, in moving, exceed a determinate part of an element, or some mixed body. Therefore, it seems that an intellectual substance must not be said to be naturally united to an elemental body as its mover, unless it be united to it also as its form. Item. Motus corporis elementaris potest ex aliis principiis causari quam ex substantia intellectuali. Superfluum igitur esset propter huiusmodi motus naturaliter substantias intellectuales corporibus elementaribus uniri. Again. The movement of an elemental body can proceed from other principles besides an intellectual substance. Therefore, this movement is not a sufficient reason for intellectual substances to be naturally united to elemental bodies. Per hoc autem excluditur opinio Apuleii, et quorundam Platonicorum, qui dixerunt daemonia esse animalia corpore aerea, mente rationabilia, animo passiva, tempore aeterna; et quorundam gentilium ponentium elementa esse animata, unde et eis cultum divinum instituebant. Excluditur etiam opinio dicens angelos et daemones habere corpora naturaliter sibi unita, de natura superiorum vel inferiorum elementorum. By this is excluded the opinion of Apuleius and certain Platonists, who asserted that the demons are animals with an aerial body, a rational mind, passive in soul, and eternal in duration, and that of certain heathens who held the elements to be animated (and thus they offered them divine worship). Again, the opinion is refuted of those who said that angels and demons have bodies naturally united to them, which respectively partake of the nature of the higher or lower elements. Substantiae separatae Separate substances Caput 91 Chapter 91 Quod sunt aliquae substantiae intellectuales corporibus non unitae That there are some intellectual substances which are not united to bodies Ex praemissis autem ostendi potest esse aliquas substantias intellectuales corporibus penitus non unitas. It may be shown from the foregoing that there are some intellectual substances which are in no way united to bodies. Ostensum est enim supra, corporibus corruptis, intellectus substantiam, quasi perpetuam, remanere. Et si quidem substantia intellectus quae remanet, sit una omnium, sicut quidam dicunt, de necessitate consequitur eam esse secundum suum esse a corpore separatum. Et sic habetur propositum, quod substantia intellectualis aliqua sine corpore subsistat. Si autem plures animae intellectivae remaneant, corporibus destructis, conveniet aliquibus substantiis intellectualibus absque corpore subsistere: praesertim cum ostensum sit quod animae non transeant de corpore ad corpus. Convenit autem animabus esse a corporibus separatas per accidens: cum naturaliter sint formae corporum. Eo autem quod est per accidens, oportet prius esse id quod est per se. Sunt igitur aliquae substantiae intellectuales, animabus secundum naturam priores, quibus per se inest sine corporibus subsistere. For it has been proved above that when the body perishes, the substance of the intellect remains inasmuch as it is everlasting. And if the substance of the intellect which remains be one in all, as some assert, it follows of necessity that it is, in its being, separate from the body. And thus our point is proved, namely, that some intellectual substance subsists apart from a body. If, however, many intellectual souls survive the destruction of bodies, it will be competent to some intellectual substances to subsist apart from a body: especially since it has been proved that souls do not pass from one body to another. Now this separation from bodies is accidentally competent to souls, since they are naturally forms of bodies. But that which is accidental must be preceded by that which is essential. Therefore, there are some intellectual substances, naturally prior to souls, to which it is essentially competent to subsist apart from a body. Amplius. Omne quod est de ratione generis, oportet de ratione speciei esse: sunt autem quaedam quae sunt de ratione speciei, non autem de ratione generis; sicut rationale est de ratione hominis, non autem de ratione animalis. Quicquid autem est de ratione speciei, non autem de ratione generis, non est necesse omnibus speciebus generis inesse: multae enim species sunt irrationabilium animalium. Substantiae autem intellectuali secundum suum genus convenit quod sit per se subsistens, cum habeat per se operationem: sicut superius est ostensum. De ratione autem rei per se subsistentis non est quod alteri uniatur. Non est igitur de ratione substantiae intellectualis secundum suum genus quod sit corpori unita: etsi sit hoc de ratione alicuius intellectualis substantiae, quae est anima. Sunt igitur aliquae substantiae intellectuales corporibus non unitae. Moreover. Whatever belongs to the generic nature must belong to the specific nature: whereas certain things belong to the specific nature which are not in the generic nature. Thus ‘rational’ belongs to the essence of man, but not to the essence of animal. Now that which belongs to the specific nature and not to the generic nature does not of necessity belong to every species of the genus: for there are many species of irrational animals. And it belongs to the intellectual substance, by reason of its genus, to be essentially subsistent, since it has an essential operation, as we have shown above. Now it belongs to the nature of an essentially subsistent thing not to be united to another. Therefore, it does not belong to the nature of an intellectual substance to be united to another, although it does belong to the nature of some intellectual substance (namely, the soul). Therefore, there are some intellectual substances that are not united to a body. Adhuc. Natura superior in suo infimo contingit naturam inferiorem in eius supremo. Natura autem intellectualis est superior corporali. Attingit autem eam secundum aliquam partem sui, quae est anima intellectiva. Oportet igitur quod, sicut corpus perfectum per animam intellectivam est supremum in genere corporum, ita anima intellectiva, quae unitur corpori, sit infima in genere substantiarum intellectualium. Sunt igitur aliquae substantiae intellectuales non unitae corporibus, superiores secundum naturae ordinem anima. Again. The higher nature in its lowest degree touches the lower nature in its highest degree. Now the intellectual nature is higher than the corporeal: and it touches it in respect of one of its parts, namely the intellective soul. Therefore, it follows that, just as the body that is perfected by the intellective soul is the highest in the genus of bodies, so the intellective soul that is united to a body is the lowest in the genus of intellectual substances. Therefore, there are some intellectual substances not united to bodies which, in the order of nature, are higher than the soul. Item. Si est aliquid imperfectum in aliquo genere, invenitur ante illud, secundum naturae ordinem, aliquid in genere illo perfectum: perfectum enim natura prius est imperfecto. Formae autem quae sunt in materiis, sunt actus imperfecti: quia non habent esse completum. Sunt igitur aliquae formae quae sunt actus completi per se subsistentes, et speciem completam habentes. Omnis autem forma per se subsistens absque materia, est substantia intellectualis: immunitas enim materiae confert esse intelligibile, ut ex praemissis patet. Sunt ergo aliquae substantiae intellectuales corporibus non unitae: omne enim corpus materiam habet. Again. If, in a genus, there be something imperfect, we find that there is something above it which in the order of nature is perfect in that genus. Now forms that are in matter are imperfect acts, since they have not complete being. Therefore, there are some forms that are complete acts, subsistent in themselves, and having a complete species. But every form that subsists in itself without matter is an intellectual substance, since immunity from matter gives intellectual being, as was shown above. Therefore, there are some intellectual substances that are not united to bodies: for every body is material. Amplius. Substantia potest esse sine quantitate, licet quantitas sine substantia esse non possit: substantia enim aliorum generum prima est tempore, ratione et cognitione. Sed nulla substantia corporea est sine quantitate. Possunt igitur esse quaedam in genere substantiae omnino absque corpore. Omnes autem naturae possibiles in rerum ordine inveniuntur: aliter enim esset universum imperfectum. In sempiternis etiam non differt esse et posse. Sunt igitur aliquae substantiae absque corporibus subsistentes; post primam substantiam, quae Deus est, qui non est in genere, ut supra ostensum est; et supra animam, quae est corpori unita. Moreover. Substance can be without quantity, although there cannot be quantity apart from substance: because substance precedes the other genera in time, idea, and knowledge. But no corporeal substance is without quantity. Therefore, there can be some things in the genus of substance that are altogether without a body. Now all possible natures are found in the order of things: otherwise the universe would be imperfect. Moreover, in everlasting things there is no difference between actual and possible being. Therefore, there are some substances subsistent apart from a body, below the first substance, which is God (who is in no genus, as we proved above), and above the soul which is united to a body. Adhuc. Si ex aliquibus duobus invenitur aliquid compositum; et alterum eorum invenitur per se quod est minus perfectum: et alterum, quod est magis perfectum et minus reliquo indigens, per se invenitur. Invenitur autem aliqua substantia composita ex substantia intellectuali et corpore, ut ex praemissis patet. Corpus autem invenitur per se: sicut patet in omnibus corporibus inanimatis. Multo igitur fortius inveniuntur substantiae intellectuales corporibus non unitae. Further. If we find a thing composed of two, and one of these, which is the less perfect, be found to exist by itself, the one which is more perfect and less dependent on the other is also to be found by itself. Now a certain substance is found to be composed of an intellectual substance and a body, as shown above. And a body is found existing by itself, as evidenced in all inordinate bodies. Much more, therefore, are some intellectual substances found existing without being united to bodies. Item. Substantiam rei oportet esse proportionatam suae operationi: quia operatio est actus et bonum substantiae operantis. Sed intelligere est propria operatio substantiae intellectualis. Oportet igitur substantiam intellectualem talem esse quae competat praedictae operationi. Intelligere autem, cum sit operatio per organum corporeum non exercita, non indiget corpore nisi inquantum intelligibilia sumuntur a sensibilibus. Hic autem est imperfectus modus intelligendi: perfectus enim modus intelligendi est ut intelligantur ea quae sunt secundum naturam suam intelligibilia; quod autem non intelligantur nisi ea quae non sunt secundum se intelligibilia, sed fiunt intelligibilia per intellectum, est imperfectus modus intelligendi. Si igitur ante omne imperfectum oportet esse perfectum aliquid in genere illo, oportet quod ante animas humanas, quae intelligunt accipiendo a phantasmatibus, sint aliquae intellectuales substantiae intelligentes ea quae sunt secundum se intelligibilia, non accipientes cognitionem a sensibilibus, ac per hoc omnino a corporibus secundum suam naturam separatae. Again. The substance of a thing should be proportionate to its operation, because operation is the act and the good of the operator’s substance. Now understanding is the proper operation of an intellectual substance. Therefore, an intellectual substance should be such as is competent to exercise the aforesaid operation. But since understanding is an operation that is not exercised by means of a corporeal organ, it does not need the body except insofar as intelligible objects are taken from sensibles. Yet this is an imperfect way of understanding, since the perfect way of understanding is to understand things that are intelligible by their nature. That only those things be understood which are not intelligible in themselves, but are rendered intelligible by the intellect, is an imperfect way of understanding. Therefore, if before every imperfect thing there must be something perfect in the same genus, it follows that above human souls, which understand by receiving from phantasms, there are some intellectual substances which understand things that are intelligible in themselves, without receiving knowledge from sensibles, and for this reason are by their nature altogether separate from bodies. Praeterea. Aristoteles argumentatur sic in XI metaphysicae. Motum continuum, regularem et, quantum in se est, indeficientem, oportet esse a motore qui non movetur neque per se neque per accidens, ut supra probatum est. Plures etiam motus oportet a pluribus motoribus esse. Motus autem caeli est continuus, regularis, et, quantum in se est, indeficiens est: et praeter primum motum, sunt multi tales motus in caelo, sicut per considerationes astrologorum probatur. Oportet igitur esse plures motores qui non moveantur neque per se neque per accidens. Nullum autem corpus movet nisi motum, ut supra probatum est. Motor autem incorporeus unitus corpori, movetur per accidens ad motum corporis: sicut patet de anima. Oportet igitur esse plures motores qui neque sint corpora neque sint corporibus uniti. Motus autem caelestes sunt ab aliquo intellectu, ut supra probatum est. Sunt igitur plures substantiae intellectuales corporibus non unitae. Further. Aristotle argues as follows. A movement that is continuous, regular, and unfailing in itself must be from a mover which is not moved, neither essentially nor accidentally, as we have proved above. Also, several movements must proceed from several movers. Now the movement of the heaven is continuous, regular, and so far as it is concerned, unfailing: and besides the first movement, there are many such movements in the heaven, as is proved by the observations of astronomers. Hence there must be several movers who are not moved, neither essentially nor accidentally. But no body moves unless itself be moved, as we proved above. Moreover, an incorporeal mover united to a body is moved accidentally according as the body is moved, as instanced by the soul. Therefore, there must be several movers that are neither bodies nor united to bodies. Now the heavenly movements proceed from an intellect, as was shown above. Therefore, there are several intellectual substances that are not united to bodies. His autem concordat sententia Dionysii, IV cap. de Div. Nom., dicentis de angelis quod, sicut immateriales, et incorporei intelliguntur. This agrees with the opinion of Dionysius who says, in speaking of the angels, that they are understood to be immaterial and incorporeal. Per hoc autem excluditur error Sadducaeorum, qui dicebant spiritum non esse. Et positio antiquorum naturalium, qui dicebant omnem substantiam corpoream esse. Positio etiam Origenis qui dixit quod nulla substantia, post Trinitatem divinam, absque corpore potest subsistere. Et omnium aliorum ponentium omnes angelos, bonos et malos, habere corpora naturaliter sibi unita. By this is refuted the error of the Sadducees who said that there is no spirit (Acts 23:8); as also the assertion of the philosophers of old who said that every substance is corporeal; and the opinion of Origen who said that (with the exception of the divine Trinity) no substance can subsist apart from a body; and of all those others who hold that all the angels, both good and bad, have bodies naturally united to them. Caput 92 Chapter 92 De multitudine substantiarum separatarum Of the great number of separate substances Sciendum est autem quod Aristoteles probare nititur non solum esse aliquas substantias intellectuales absque corpore, sed quod sunt eiusdem numeri cuius sunt motus deprehensi in caelo, neque pauciores. It must here be noted that Aristotle attempts to prove that not only some intellectual substances exist apart from a body, but also that they are of the same number, neither more nor less, as the movements observed in the heaven. Probat enim quod non sunt aliqui motus in caelo qui a nobis deprehendi non possint, per hoc quod omnis motus qui est in caelo, est propter motum alicuius stellae, quae sensibilis est: orbes enim deferunt stellas; motus autem deferentis est propter motum delati. Item probat quod non sunt aliquae substantiae separatae a quibus non proveniant aliqui motus in caelo: quia, cum motus caelestes ordinentur ad substantias separatas sicut ad fines, si essent aliae substantiae separatae quam illae quas numerat, essent aliqui motus in eas ordinati sicut in fines; aliter essent motus imperfecti. Unde ex his concludit quod non sunt plures substantiae separatae quam motus deprehensi, et qui possunt deprehendi, in caelo: praesertim cum non sint plura corpora caelestia eiusdem speciei, ut sic etiam possint esse plures motus nobis incogniti. Thus, he proves that in the heaven there are no movements that cannot be observed by us, from the fact that every movement in the heaven is on account of the movement of some star, which is perceptible to the senses, since the spheres carry the stars and the movement of the carrier is on account of the movement of the carried. Again, he proves that there are no separate substances from which some movement does not result in the heaven, For, since the heavenly movements are directed to the separate substances as their respective ends, if there were any separate substances besides those which he enumerates, there would be certain movements directed to them as an end. Otherwise, such movements would be imperfect. Therefore, he concludes from these premises that separate substances are not more numerous than the movements that are and can be observed in the heaven, and all the more so since there are not several heavenly bodies within the same species, so that there might also be several movements unknown to us. Haec autem probatio non habet necessitatem. In his enim quae sunt ad finem, sumitur necessitas ex fine, sicut ipsemet docet in II physicorum: non autem e converso. Unde, si motus caelestes ordinantur in substantias separatas sicut in fines, ut ipsemet dicit, non potest concludi necessario numerus substantiarum praedictarum ex numero motuum. Potest enim dici quod sunt aliquae substantiae separatae altioris naturae quam illae quae sunt proximi fines motuum caelestium: sicut, si instrumenta artificialia sunt propter homines qui per ea operantur, nihil prohibet esse alios homines qui per instrumenta huiusmodi non operantur immediate, sed imperant operantibus. Et ideo ipse Aristoteles hanc rationem non inducit quasi necessariam, sed tanquam probabilem: dicit enim: quare substantias et principia immobilia rationabile est tot aestimare: necessarium enim dimittatur fortioribus dicere. But this argument is not cogent. For in things directed to an end, necessity depends on the end, as he himself teaches, and not vice versa. Therefore, if (as he states) the heavenly movements are directed to separate substances as their respective ends, we cannot necessarily conclude the number of the aforesaid substances from the number of the movements. For it might be said that there are some separate substances of a higher nature than those which are the proximate ends of the heavenly movements, even as, if tools be on account of the men who work by means of them, this does not hinder there being other men who do not work immediately with those tools, but direct the workers. Hence Aristotle himself adduces this argument not as necessary, but as probable: for he says: Therefore, it is reasonable to reckon such to be the number of unchangeable substances and principles: for we may leave it to more capable persons to decide the point with certainty. Restat igitur ostendendum quod sunt multo plures substantiae intellectuales a corporibus separatae quam sint motus caelestes. It remains, then, to be shown that the intellectual substances that are separate from bodies are far more numerous than the heavenly movements. Substantiae enim intellectuales secundum suum genus transcendunt omnem naturam corpoream. Oportet igitur accipere gradum in praedictis substantiis secundum elevationem earum supra corpoream naturam. Sunt autem quaedam intellectuales substantiae elevatae supra corpoream substantiam secundum sui generis naturam tantum, quae tamen corporibus uniuntur ut formae, ut ex praemissis patet. Et quia esse substantiarum intellectualium secundum suum genus nullam a corpore dependentiam habet, ut supra probatum est, invenitur altior gradus dictarum substantiarum, quae etsi non uniantur corporibus ut formae, sunt tamen proprii motores aliquorum corporum determinatorum. Similiter autem natura substantiae intellectualis non dependet a movendo: cum movere sit consequens ad principalem eorum operationem, quae est intelligere. Erit igitur et aliquis gradus altior substantiarum intellectualium, quae non sunt proprii motores aliquorum corporum, sed superiores motoribus. For intellectual substances transcend all corporeal nature in their genus. Therefore, we must mark the degrees of the aforesaid substances according to their transcendency above corporeal nature. Now some intellectual substances are raised above corporeal substance in their generic nature alone, and are nevertheless united to bodies as forms, as shown above. And since the being of intellectual substances, as regards its genus, is in no way dependent on a body, as we have proved, we find a higher grade of the aforesaid substances, which, though not united to bodies as forms, are nevertheless the proper movers of certain definite bodies. In like manner, the nature of an intellectual substance does not depend on its causing movement, since to move is consequent upon their principal operation which is to understand. Hence there will be a yet higher grade of intellectual substances which are not the proper movers of certain bodies, but are raised above movers.