Summa Contra Gentiles 3 Summa Contra Gentiles 3 Introductio Introduction Caput 1 Chapter 1 Prooemium Prologue Deus magnus dominus et rex magnus super omnes deos. Quoniam non repellet dominus plebem suam. Quia in manu eius sunt omnes fines terrae, et altitudines montium ipsius sunt. Quoniam ipsius est mare et ipse fecit illud, et siccam manus eius formaverunt. God is a great Lord and a great king above all gods. For the Lord will not reject his people. For in his hands are all the ends of the earth and the heights of the mountains are his. For the sea is his and he made it, and his hands formed the dry land. Psalm. 94:3–5 Psalm 94:3–5 Unum esse primum entium, totius esse perfectionem plenam possidens, quod Deum dicimus, in superioribus est ostensum, qui ex sui perfectionis abundantia omnibus existentibus esse largitur, ut non solum primum entium, sed et principium omnium esse comprobetur. Esse autem aliis tribuit non necessitate naturae, sed secundum suae arbitrium voluntatis, ut ex superioribus est manifestum. Unde consequens est ut factorum suorum sit dominus: nam super ea quae nostrae voluntati subduntur, dominamur. Hoc autem dominium super res a se productas perfectum habet, utpote qui ad eas producendas nec exterioris agentis adminiculo indiget, nec materiae fundamento: cum sit totius esse universalis effector. We have shown in the preceding books that there is one first being, possessing the full perfection of all being, whom we call God, and who bestows being on all that exists from the abundance of his perfection, so that he is proved to be not only the first of beings, but also the beginning of all. Moreover, he bestows being on others not through natural necessity, but according to the decree of his will, as we have shown above. Hence it follows that he is the Lord of the things made by him, since we dominate over those things that are subject to our will. And this is a perfect dominion that he exercises over things made by him, insofar as in their making he needs neither the help of an extrinsic agent, nor matter as the foundation of his work, since he is the universal efficient cause of all being. Eorum autem quae per voluntatem producuntur agentis, unumquodque ab agente in finem aliquem ordinatur: bonum enim et finis est obiectum proprium voluntatis, unde necesse est ut quae ex voluntate procedunt, ad finem aliquem ordinentur. Finem autem ultimum unaquaeque res per suam consequitur actionem, quam oportet in finem dirigi ab eo qui principia rebus dedit per quae agunt. Now everything that is produced through the will of an agent is directed to an end by that agent, because the good and the end are the proper object of the will. Therefore, whatever proceeds from a will must be directed to an end. And each thing attains its end by its own action, which action needs to be directed by him who endowed things with the principles by which they act. Necesse est igitur ut Deus, qui est in se universaliter perfectus et omnibus entibus ex sua potestate esse largitur, omnium entium rector existat, a nullo utique directus: nec est aliquid quod ab eius regimine excusetur, sicut nec est aliquid quod ab ipso esse non sortiatur. Est igitur, sicut perfectus in essendo et causando, ita etiam et in regendo perfectus. Consequently, God, who in himself is perfect in every way, and by his power endows all things with being, must be the ruler of all, himself ruled by none: nor is any thing to be excepted from his ruling, as neither is there any thing that does not owe its being to him. Therefore, as he is perfect in being and causing, so is he perfect in ruling. Huius vero regiminis effectus in diversis apparet diversimode, secundum differentiam naturarum. Quaedam namque sic a Deo producta sunt ut, intellectum habentia, eius similitudinem gerant et imaginem repraesentent: unde et ipsa non solum sunt directa, sed et seipsa dirigentia secundum proprias actiones in debitum finem. Quae si in sua directione divino subdantur regimini, ad ultimum finem consequendum ex divino regimine admittuntur: repelluntur autem si secus in sua directione processerint. The effect of this ruling is seen to differ in different things, according to the difference of natures. For some things are so produced by God that, being intelligent, they bear a resemblance to him and reflect his image: thus not only are they directed, but they direct themselves to their appointed end by their own actions. And if in thus directing themselves they be subject to the divine ruling, they are admitted by that divine ruling to the attainment of their last end, but are excluded from it if they direct themselves otherwise. Alia vero, intellectu carentia, seipsa in suum finem non dirigunt, sed ab alio diriguntur. Quorum quaedam, incorruptibilia existentia, sicut in esse naturali pati non possunt defectum, ita in propriis actionibus ab ordine in finem eis praestitutum nequaquam exorbitant, sed indeficienter regimini primi regentis subduntur: sicut sunt corpora caelestia, quorum motus semper uniformiter procedunt. There are others without intelligence which do not direct themselves to their end, but are directed by another. Of these some, being incorruptible, do not wander in their own action from the direction to their appointed end (even as they do not suffer defect in their natural being), but are subject without fail to the ruling of the supreme ruler. Such are the heavenly bodies, whose movements are invariable. Alia vero, corruptibilia existentia, naturalis esse pati possunt defectum, qui tamen per alterius profectum suppletur: nam, uno corrupto, aliud generatur. Et similiter in actionibus propriis a naturali ordine deficiunt, qui tamen defectus per aliquod bonum inde proveniens compensatur. Ex quo apparet quod nec illa quae ab ordine primi regiminis exorbitare videntur, potestatem primi regentis evadunt: nam et haec corruptibilia corpora, sicut ab ipso Deo condita sunt, ita potestati eius perfecte subduntur. Others, however, being corruptible, are patient of defects in their natural being; yet this defect is supplied to the advantage of another, since when one thing is corrupted, another is generated. Likewise, they fail from their natural direction in their own actions, yet this failing is compensated by some resultant good. From which it is clear that not even those things which are seen to wander from the direction of the supreme ruling escape from the power of the supreme ruler. This is so because these corruptible bodies are perfectly subject to God just as they are created by him. Hoc igitur, divino repletus spiritu, Psalmista considerans, ut nobis divinum regimen demonstraret, primo describit nobis primi regentis perfectionem: naturae quidem, in hoc quod dicit Deus, potestatis, in hoc quod dicit magnus dominus, quasi nullo indigens ad suae potestatis effectum producendum; auctoritatis, in hoc quod dicit rex magnus super omnes deos, quia, etsi sint multi regentes, omnes tamen eius regimini subduntur. Therefore, considering this, the Psalmist, filled with the divine spirit, first describes to us the perfection of the supreme governor in order to give us an illustration of the divine government—as to his nature when he says: God; as to his power, when he says: a great Lord, implying that he needs no one for his power to produce its effect; as to his authority, when he says: a great king above all gods, since, although there be many rulers, yet are all subject to his rule. Secundo autem nobis describit regiminis modum. Et quidem quantum ad intellectualia, quae, eius regimen sequentia, ab ipso consequuntur ultimum finem, qui est ipse: et ideo dicit, quia non repellet dominus plebem suam. Quantum vero ad corruptibilia, quae, etiam si exorbitent interdum a propriis actionibus, a potestate tamen primi regentis non excluduntur, dicit, quia in manu eius sunt omnes fines terrae. Quantum vero ad caelestia corpora, quae omnem altitudinem terrae excedunt, idest corruptibilium corporum, et semper rectum ordinem divini regiminis servant, dicit, et altitudines montium ipsius sunt. Second, he describes to us the manner of this government. And with regard to intellectual beings—which, if they submit to his rule, receive from him their last end which is himself—he says: For the Lord will not reject his people. As regards things corruptible—which, though at times they wander from their proper mode of action, never escape the power of the supreme ruler—he says: For in his hands are all the ends of the earth. And as regards the heavenly bodies—which transcend the highest summits of the earth (that is, of corruptible bodies), and always maintain the order of the divine government—he says: And the heights of the mountains are his. Tertio vero ipsius universalis regiminis rationem assignat: quia necesse est ut ea quae a Deo sunt condita, ab ipso etiam regantur. Et hoc est quod dicit, quoniam ipsius est mare et cetera. Third, he assigns the reason of this universal government, because the things that God made must be governed by him. To this he refers when he says: For the sea is his. Quia ergo in primo libro de perfectione divinae naturae prosecuti sumus; in secundo autem de perfectione potestatis ipsius, secundum quod est rerum omnium productor et dominus: restat in hoc tertio libro prosequi de perfecta auctoritate sive dignitate ipsius, secundum quod est rerum omnium finis et rector. Erit ergo hoc ordine procedendum: ut primo agatur de ipso secundum quod est rerum omnium finis. Secundo, de regimine universali ipsius, secundum quod omnem creaturam gubernat. Tertio, de speciali regimine, prout gubernat creaturas intellectum habentes. Since, then, in the first book we have treated of the perfection of the divine nature, and in the second of the perfection of the divine power, inasmuch as he is the Creator and Lord of all, it remains for us in this third book to treat of his perfect authority or dignity, inasmuch as he is the end and governor of all. We must therefore proceed in this order: first, to treat of him as the end of all things; second, of his universal government, inasmuch as he governs every creature; third, of that special government by which he governs creatures endowed with intelligence. Caput 2 Chapter 2 Quod omne agens agit propter finem That every agent acts for an end Ostendendum est igitur primo, quod omne agens in agendo intendit aliquem finem. Accordingly, we must first show that every agent intends an end by its action. In his enim quae manifeste propter finem agunt, hoc dicimus esse finem in quod tendit impetus agentis: hoc enim adipiscens dicitur adipisci finem, deficiens autem ab hoc dicitur deficere a fine intento; sicut patet in medico agente ad sanitatem, et homine currente ad certum terminum. Nec differt, quantum ad hoc, utrum quod tendit in finem sit cognoscens, vel non: sicut enim signum est finis sagittantis, ita est finis motus sagittae. Omnis autem agentis impetus ad aliquid certum tendit: non enim ex quacumque virtute quaevis actio procedit, sed a calore quidem calefactio, a frigore autem infrigidatio; unde et actiones secundum diversitatem activorum specie differunt. Actio vero quandoque quidem terminatur ad aliquod factum, sicut aedificatio ad domum, sanatio ad sanitatem: quandoque autem non, sicut intelligere et sentire. Et si quidem actio terminatur ad aliquod factum, impetus agentis tendit per actionem in illud factum: si autem non terminatur ad aliquod factum, impetus agentis tendit in ipsam actionem. Oportet igitur quod omne agens in agendo intendat finem: quandoque quidem actionem ipsam; quandoque aliquid per actionem factum. For in those things which clearly act for an end, we declare the end to be that towards which the movement of the agent tends. When this is reached, the end is said to be reached, and to fail in this is to fail in the end intended, as may be seen in the physician who aims at health, and in a man who runs towards an appointed goal. Nor does it matter as to this whether that which tends to an end be cognitive or not: for just as the target is the end of the archer, so is it the end of the arrow’s flight. Now the movement of every agent tends to something determinate, since it is not from any force that any action proceeds, but heating proceeds from heat, and cooling from cold; hence actions are differentiated by their active principles. Action sometimes terminates in something made (for instance, building terminates in a house, and healing ends in health), while sometimes it does not so terminate (for instance, in understanding and sensation). And if action terminates in something made, the movement of the agent tends by that action towards that thing made, while if it does not terminate in something made, the movement of the agent tends to the action itself. It follows, therefore, that every agent intends an end while acting, which end is sometimes the action itself, sometimes a thing made by the action. Adhuc. In omnibus agentibus propter finem, hoc esse ultimum finem dicimus, ultra quod agens non quaerit aliquid: sicut actio medici est usque ad sanitatem, ea vero consecuta, non conatur ad aliquid ulterius. Sed in actione cuiuslibet agentis est invenire aliquid ultra quod agens non quaerit aliquid: alias enim actiones in infinitum tenderent; quod quidem est impossibile, quia, cum infinita non sit pertransire, agens agere non inciperet; nihil enim movetur ad id ad quod impossibile est pervenire. Omne igitur agens agit propter finem. Again. In all things that act for an end, the last end is said to be that beyond which the agent seeks nothing further: thus the physician’s action goes as far as health, and this being attained, his efforts cease. But in the action of every agent, a point can be reached beyond which the agent does not desire to go. Otherwise, actions would tend to infinity, which is impossible; for, since it is not possible to pass through an infinite medium, the agent would never begin to act, because nothing moves towards what it cannot reach. Therefore, every agent acts for an end. Amplius. Si actiones agentis procedant in infinitum, oportet quod vel ex istis actionibus sequatur aliquod factum, vel non. Si quidem sequatur aliquod factum, esse illius facti sequetur post infinitas actiones. Quod autem praeexigit infinita, impossibile est esse: cum non sit infinita pertransire. Quod autem impossibile est esse, impossibile est fieri: et quod impossibile est fieri, impossibile est facere. Impossibile est igitur quod agens incipiat facere aliquod factum ad quod praeexiguntur actiones infinitae. Moreover. If the actions of an agent proceed to infinity, these actions must result either in something made, or not. If the result is something made, the being of that thing made will follow after an infinity of actions. But that which presupposes an infinity of things cannot possibly be, since an infinite medium cannot be passed through. Now impossibility of being argues impossibility of becoming, and it is impossible to make that which cannot become. Therefore, it is impossible for an agent to begin to make a thing whose making presupposes an infinity of actions. Si autem ex illis actionibus non sequitur aliquod factum, oportet ordinem huiusmodi actionum esse vel secundum ordinem virtutum activarum, sicut si homo sentit ut imaginetur, imaginatur autem ut intelligat, intelligit autem ut velit: vel secundum ordinem obiectorum, sicut considero corpus ut considerem animam, quam considero ut considerem substantiam separatam, quam considero ut considerem Deum. Non autem est possibile procedere in infinitum neque in virtutibus activis, sicut neque in formis rerum, ut probatur in II Metaph., forma enim est agendi principium: neque in obiectis, sicut neque in entibus, cum sit unum primum ens, ut supra probatum est. Non est igitur possibile quod actiones in infinitum procedant. Oportet igitur esse aliquid quo habito conatus agentis quiescat. Omne igitur agens agit propter finem. If, however, the result of such actions be not something made, the order of these actions must be either according to the order of active forces (for instance, if a man feels so as to imagine, and imagines to understand, and understands to will), or according to the order of objects (for instance, I consider the body so as to consider the soul, which I consider in order to consider a separate substance, which again I consider so that I may consider God). Now it is not possible to proceed to infinity either in active forces (as neither in the forms of things, as proved in 2 Metaphysics, since the form is the principle of activity) or in objects (as neither is this possible in beings, since there is one first being, as we have proved above). Therefore, it is not possible for agents to proceed to infinity. Consequently, there must be something where, when it is attained, the efforts of the agent cease. Therefore, every agent acts for an end. Item. In his quae agunt propter finem, omnia intermedia inter primum agens et ultimum finem sunt fines respectu priorum et principia activa respectu sequentium. Si igitur conatus agentis non est ad aliquid determinatum, sed actiones, sicut dictum est, procedunt in infinitum, oportet principia activa in infinitum procedere. Quod est impossibile, ut supra ostensum est. Necesse est igitur quod conatus agentis sit ad aliquid determinatum. Further. In things that act for an end, whatever comes between the first agent and the last end is an end in respect to what precedes, and an active principle in respect of what follows. Hence if the effort of the agent does not tend to something determinate, and if its action, as stated, proceeds to infinity, the active principles must proceed to infinity. This is impossible, as we have shown above. Therefore, the effort of the agent must of necessity tend to something determinate. Adhuc. Omne agens vel agit per naturam, vel per intellectum. De agentibus autem per intellectum non est dubium quin agant propter finem: agunt enim praeconcipientes in intellectu id quod per actionem consequuntur, et ex tali praeconceptione agunt; hoc enim est agere per intellectum. Sicut autem in intellectu praeconcipiente existit tota similitudo effectus ad quem per actiones intelligentis pervenitur, ita in agente naturali praeexistit similitudo naturalis effectus, ex qua actio ad hunc effectum determinatur: nam ignis generat ignem, et oliva olivam. Sicut igitur agens per intellectum tendit in finem determinatum per suam actionem, ita agens per naturam. Omne igitur agens agit propter finem. Again. Every agent acts either by nature or by intelligence. Now there can be no doubt that those which act by intelligence act for an end, since they act with an intellectual preconception of what they attain by their action, and act through such a preconception, for this is to act by intelligence. Now just as in the preconceiving intellect there exists the entire likeness of the effect that is attained by the action of the intellectual being, so in the natural agent there preexists the similitude of the natural effect by virtue of which the thing’s action is determined to the appointed effect: for fire begets fire, and an olive produces an olive. Therefore, even as that which acts by intelligence tends by its action to a definite end, so also does that which acts by nature. Therefore, every agent acts for an end. Amplius. Peccatum non invenitur nisi in his quae sunt propter finem: nec enim imputatur alicui ad peccatum si deficiat ab eo ad quod non est; medico enim imputatur ad peccatum si deficiat a sanando, non autem aedificatori aut grammatico. Sed peccatum invenimus in his quae fiunt secundum artem, sicut cum grammaticus non recte loquitur; et in his quae sunt secundum naturam, sicut patet in partubus monstruosis. Ergo tam agens secundum naturam, quam agens secundum artem et a proposito, agit propter finem. Moreover. Fault is not found save in those things which are for an end, for we do not find fault with one who fails in that to which he is not appointed. Thus we find fault with a physician if he fails to heal, but not with a builder or a grammarian. But we find fault in things done according to art, as when a grammarian fails to speak correctly, and in things that are ruled by nature, as in the case of monstrosities. Therefore, every agent, whether according to nature, or according to art, or acting of set purpose, acts for an end. Item. Si agens non tenderet ad aliquem effectum determinatum, omnes effectus essent ei indifferentes. Quod autem indifferenter se habet ad multa, non magis unum eorum operatur quam aliud: unde a contingente ad utrumque non sequitur aliquis effectus nisi per aliquid determinetur ad unum. Impossibile igitur esset quod ageret. Omne igitur agens tendit ad aliquem determinatum effectum, quod dicitur finis eius. Again. Were an agent not to act for a definite effect, all effects would be indifferent to it. Now that which is indifferent to many effects does not produce one rather than another: hence from that which is indifferent to either of two effects, no effect results, unless it be determined by something to one of them. Hence it would be impossible for it to act. Therefore, every agent tends to some definite effect, which is called its end. Sunt autem aliquae actiones quae non videntur esse propter finem, sicut actiones ludicrae et contemplatoriae, et actiones quae absque attentione fiunt, sicut confricatio barbae et huiusmodi: ex quibus aliquis opinari potest quod sit aliquod agens non propter finem. Sed sciendum quod actiones contemplativae non sunt propter alium finem, sed ipsae sunt finis. Actiones autem ludicrae interdum sunt finis, cum quis solum ludit propter delectationem quae in ludo est: quandoque autem sunt propter finem, ut cum ludimus ut postmodum melius studeamus. Actiones autem quae fiunt sine attentione, non sunt ab intellectu, sed ab aliqua subita imaginatione vel naturali principio: sicut inordinatio humoris pruritum excitantis est causa confricationis barbae, quae fit sine attentione intellectus. Et haec ad aliquem finem tendunt, licet praeter ordinem intellectus. There are, however, certain actions which would seem not to be for an end, such as playful and contemplative actions, and those which are done without attention (such as scratching one’s beard and the like), from which some might be led to think that there is an agent that acts not for an end. But we must observe that contemplative actions are not for another end, but are themselves an end. Playful actions are sometimes an end, when one plays for the mere pleasure of play, and sometimes they are for an end, as when we play that afterwards we may study better. Actions done without attention do not proceed from the intellect, but from some sudden act of the imagination, or some natural principle: thus a disordered humor produces an itching sensation and is the cause of a man scratching his beard, which he does without his mind attending to it. Such actions do tend to an end, although outside the order of the intellect. Per hoc autem excluditur antiquorum naturalium error; qui ponebant omnia fieri ex necessitate materiae, causam finalem a rebus penitus subtrahentes. By this is excluded the error of certain ancient natural philosophers, who maintained that all things happen by natural necessity, thus utterly banishing the final cause from things. Caput 3 Chapter 3 Quod omne agens agit propter bonum That every agent acts for a good Ex hoc autem ulterius ostendendum est quod omne agens agit propter bonum. Hence we must go on to prove that every agent acts for a good. Inde enim manifestum est omne agens agere propter finem, quia quodlibet agens tendit ad aliquod determinatum. Id autem ad quod agens determinate tendit, oportet esse conveniens ei: non enim tenderet in ipsum nisi propter aliquam convenientiam ad ipsum. Quod autem est conveniens alicui, est ei bonum. Ergo omne agens agit propter bonum. For that every agent acts for an end clearly follows from the fact that every agent tends to something definite. Now that to which an agent tends definitely must be befitting to that agent, since the latter would not tend to it save on account of some fittingness to it. But that which is befitting to a thing is good for it. Therefore, every agent acts for a good. Praeterea. Finis est in quo quiescit appetitus agentis vel moventis, et eius quod movetur. Hoc autem est de ratione boni, ut terminet appetitum: nam bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Omnis ergo actio et motus est propter bonum. Further. The end is that wherein the appetite of the agent or mover is at rest, as also the appetite of that which is moved. Now it is the very notion of good to be the term of appetite, since good is the object of every appetite. Therefore, all action and movement is for a good. Adhuc. Omnis actio et motus ad esse aliquo modo ordinari videtur: vel ut conservetur secundum speciem vel individuum; vel ut de novo acquiratur. Hoc autem ipsum quod est esse, bonum est. Et ideo omnia appetunt esse. Omnis igitur actio et motus est propter bonum. Again. All action and movement would seem to be directed in some way to being, either for the preservation of being in the species or in the individual, or for the acquisition of being. Now this existence itself is a good, and for this reason all things desire being. Therefore, all action and movement is for a good. Amplius. Omnis actio et motus est propter aliquam perfectionem. Si enim ipsa actio sit finis, manifestum est quod est perfectio secunda agentis. Si autem actio sit transmutatio exterioris materiae, manifestum est quod movens intendit aliquam perfectionem inducere in re mota; in quam etiam tendit mobile, si sit motus naturalis. Hoc autem dicimus esse bonum quod est esse perfectum. Omnis igitur actio et motus est propter bonum. Furthermore. All action and movement is for some perfection. For if the action itself be the end, it is clearly a second perfection of the agent. And if the action consist in the transformation of external matter, clearly the mover intends to induce some perfection into the thing moved, towards which perfection the movable tends if the movement be natural. Now when we say a thing is perfect, we mean that it is good. Therefore, every action and movement is for a good.