Haec autem quae praeter ordinem communiter in rebus statutum quandoque divinitus fiunt, miracula dici solent: admiramur enim aliquid cum, effectum videntes, causam ignoramus. Et quia causa una et eadem a quibusdam interdum est cognita et a quibusdam ignota, inde contingit quod videntium simul aliquem effectum, aliqui mirantur et aliqui non mirantur: astrologus enim non miratur videns eclipsim solis, quia cognoscit causam; ignarus autem huius scientiae necesse habet admirari, causam ignorans. Sic igitur est aliquid mirum quoad hunc, non autem quoad illum. Illud ergo simpliciter mirum est quod habet causam simpliciter occultam: et hoc sonat nomen miraculi, quod scilicet sit de se admiratione plenum, non quoad hunc vel illum tantum. Causa autem simpliciter occulta omni homini est Deus: probatum enim est supra quod eius essentiam nullus homo in statu huius vitae intellectu capere potest. Illa igitur proprie miracula dicenda sunt quae divinitus fiunt praeter ordinem communiter observatum in rebus.
These works that are sometimes done by God outside the usual order assigned to things are wont to be called miracles, because we are astonished (admiramur) at a thing when we see an effect without knowing the cause. And since at times one and the same cause is known to some and unknown to others, it happens that of several who see an effect, some are astonished and some not. Thus an astronomer is not astonished when he sees an eclipse of the sun, for he knows the cause, but one who is ignorant of this science must wonder since he does not know the cause. Therefore, it is wonderful to the latter but not to the former. Accordingly, a thing is simply wonderful when its cause is hidden simply, and this is what we mean by a miracle, namely, something that is wonderful in itself and not only in respect of this person or that. Now God is the cause which is hidden to every man simply: for we have proved above that in this state of life no man can comprehend him by his intellect. Therefore, properly speaking, miracles are works done by God outside the order usually observed in things.
Horum autem miraculorum diversi sunt gradus et ordines. Nam summum gradum inter miracula tenent in quibus aliquid fit a Deo quod natura nunquam facere potest: sicut quod duo corpora sint simul, quod sol retrocedat aut stet, quod mare divisum transeuntibus iter praebeat. Et inter haec etiam ordo attenditur. Nam quanto maiora sunt illa quae Deus operatur, et quanto magis sunt remota a facultate naturae, tanto miraculum maius est: sicut maius est miraculum quod sol retrocedat quam quod mare dividatur.
Of these miracles there are various degrees and orders. The highest degree in miracles comprises those works in which something is done by God that nature can never do: for instance, that two bodies occupy the same place, that the sun recede or stand still, that the sea be divided and make way to passersby. Among these there is a certain order, for the greater the work done by God, and the further it is removed from the capability of nature, the greater the miracle. Thus it is a greater miracle that the sun recede than that the waters be divided.
Secundum autem gradum in miraculis tenent illa in quibus Deus aliquid facit quod natura facere potest, sed non per illum ordinem. Opus enim naturae est quod aliquod animal vivat, videat et ambulet: sed quod post mortem vivat, post caecitatem videat, post debilitatem claudus ambulet, hoc natura facere non potest, sed Deus interdum miraculose operatur. Inter haec etiam miracula gradus attenditur, secundum quod illud quod fit, magis est a facultate naturae remotum.
The second degree in miracles belongs to those whereby God does something that nature can do, but not in the same order. Thus it is a work of nature that an animal live, see, and walk; but nature cannot make an animal live after being dead, see after being blind, walk after being lame. Yet God does these things sometimes by a miracle. Among these miracles, there are also degrees according as the thing done is further removed from the faculty of nature.
Tertius autem gradus miraculorum est cum Deus facit quod consuetum est fieri operatione naturae, tamen absque principiis naturae operantibus: sicut cum aliquis a febre curabili per naturam, divina virtute curatur; et cum pluit sine operatione principiorum naturae.
The third degree of miracles is when God does what is wont to be done by the operation of nature, but without the operation of the natural principles: for instance, when by the power of God a man is cured of a fever that nature is able to cure, or when it rains without the operation of the principles of nature.
Quod solus Deus facit miracula
That God alone works miracles
Ex praemissis autem ostendi potest quod miracula facere solus Deus potest.
From what has been said it can be shown that God alone can work miracles.
Quod enim est sub ordine totaliter constitutum, non potest supra ordinem illum operari. Omnis autem creatura constituta est sub ordine quem Deus in rebus statuit. Nulla ergo creatura potest supra hunc ordinem operari. Quod est miracula facere.
For whatever is entirely subject to an order cannot do anything above that order. Now, every creature is placed under the order established in things by God. Therefore, no creature can do anything above that order, which is to work miracles.
Item. Quando aliqua virtus finita proprium effectum operatur ad quem determinatur, non est miraculum: licet possit esse mirum alicui qui illam virtutem non comprehendit; sicut mirum videtur ignaris quod magnes trahit ferrum, vel quod aliquis parvus piscis sit retinens navem. Omnis autem creaturae potentia est limitata ad aliquem determinatum effectum, vel ad aliquos. Quicquid igitur virtute cuiuscumque creaturae fiat, non potest dici miraculum proprium, etsi sit mirum virtutem illius creaturae non comprehendenti. Quod autem fit virtute divina, quae, cum sit infinita, de se incomprehensibilis est, vere miraculum est.
Again. When a finite power produces its proper effect to which it is confined, it is not a miracle, although it may be wonderful to one who does not understand that power. Thus to an ignorant person it is wonderful that the magnet attracts iron, or that a small fish should stop a ship. Now every creature’s power is limited to one definite effect, or to some. Therefore, whatever is done by the power of any creature whatsoever cannot be properly described as a miracle, although it may be wonderful to one who does not understand the power of the creature in question. But that which is done by the power of God—which, being infinite, is incomprehensible—is truly a miracle.
Amplius. Omnis creatura in sua actione requirit subiectum aliquod in quod agat: solius enim Dei est ex nihilo aliquid facere, ut supra ostensum est. Nihil autem quod requirit in sua actione subiectum, potest agere nisi illa ad quae subiectum illud est in potentia: hoc enim agens in subiectum aliquod operatur, ut educat illud de potentia in actum. Nulla igitur creatura, sicut nec creare potest, ita nec agere in aliqua re nisi quod est in potentia illius rei. Fiunt autem multa miracula divinitus dum in re aliqua fit divina virtute quod non est in potentia illius rei: sicut quod mortuus reviviscat, quod sol retrocedat, quod duo corpora sint simul. Haec igitur miracula nulla virtute creata fieri possunt.
Moreover. Every creature requires in its action a subject on which to act: for it belongs to God alone to make something out of nothing, as we proved above. Now, that which requires a subject in its action can do nothing but those things to which that subject is in potency, since the agent acts on the subject in order to bring it from potency to act. Therefore, even as a creature cannot create, so neither can it do anything in a thing save what is in the potency of that thing. But in many miracles wrought by God, something is done in a thing that is not in that thing’s potency: for instance, that the dead live again, that the sun recede, that two bodies occupy the same place. Therefore, such miracles cannot be wrought by any created power.
Adhuc. Subiectum in quod agitur, ordinem habet et ad agens quod reducit ipsum de potentia in actum, et ad actum in quem reducitur. Sicut ergo subiectum aliquod est in potentia ad aliquem determinatum actum, et non ad quemlibet, ita non potest reduci de potentia in actum determinatum nisi per agens aliquod determinatum: requiritur enim agens diversimode ad reducendum in diversum actum; nam, cum aer sit potentia ignis et aqua, alio agente fit actu ignis, et actu aqua. Similiter etiam patet quod materia corporalis in actum aliquem perfectum non reducitur a sola virtute universali agente, sed oportet esse aliquod agens proprium, per quod determinetur impressio universalis virtutis ad determinatum effectum; in actum autem minus perfectum potest reduci materia corporalis sola virtute universali, absque particulari agente: animalia enim perfecta non generantur ex sola virtute caelesti, sed requiritur determinatum semen; ad generationem vero quorundam imperfectorum animalium sola virtus caelestis sufficit, sine semine. Effectus igitur qui in his inferioribus fiunt, si sint nati fieri a causis superioribus universalibus sine operatione causarum particularium inferiorum, non est miraculum si sic fiant: sicut non est miraculum quod animalia ex putrefactione sine semine nascantur. Si autem non sunt nati fieri per solas causas superiores, requiruntur ad eorum complementum causae inferiores particulares. Cum autem aliquis effectus producitur ab aliqua causa superiori mediantibus propriis principiis, non est miraculum. Nullo igitur modo virtute superiorum creaturarum aliqua miracula fieri possunt.
Further. The subject acted upon is ordered both to the agent that brings it from potency to act, and to the act to which it is brought. Accordingly, just as any particular subject is in potency to a particular definite act, and not to any act, so it cannot be brought from potency to a definite act except by some definite agent: for agents must differ according as they introduce different acts. Thus, though air is potentially fire or water, one agent makes it to be actually fire, and another makes it to be actually water. Likewise, it is clear that corporeal matter is not brought to a perfect act by the sole action of a universal power, and there must be some proper agent whereby the action of the universal power is determined to a definite effect. Nevertheless, corporeal matter can be brought to a less perfect act by the universal power alone, without a particular agent: thus perfect animals are not formed by the power of a heavenly body alone, but determinate seed is necessary; whereas the power of a heavenly body, without any seed, suffices for the generation of certain imperfect animals. Accordingly, effects produced among these lower things, if they be of a nature to be wrought by universal higher causes without the action of particular inferior causes, can be produced in this way without any miracle. Thus it is not a miracle that animals be formed from putrefaction without seed. But if they be not of a nature to be produced by superior causes alone, then particular inferior causes are required for their perfect formation. Now there is no miracle if an effect be produced by a higher cause, by means of its proper principles. Therefore, it is altogether impossible for miracles to be wrought by the power of the higher creatures.
Amplius. Eiusdem rationis esse videtur quod aliquid operetur ex subiecto; et quod operetur id ad quod est in potentia subiectum; et quod ordinate operetur per determinata media. Nam subiectum non fit in potentia propinqua ad ultimum nisi cum fuerit actu in media: sicut cibus non est statim potentia caro, sed cum fuerit conversus in sanguinem. Omnis autem creatura necesse habet subiecto ad hoc quod aliquid faciat: nec potest facere nisi ad quod subiectum est in potentia, ut ostensum est. Ergo non potest facere aliquid nisi subiectum reducat in actum per determinata media. Miracula igitur, quae fiunt ex hoc quod aliquis effectus producitur non illo ordine quo naturaliter fieri potest, virtute creaturae fieri non possunt.
Moreover. These seeem to amount to the same: the production of a work out of a subject, the production of that to which the subject is in potency, and the orderly production of something through definite intermediary stages. For a subject is not in proximate potency to the ultimate effect until it has arrived at the middle stage. Thus food is not in immediate potency flesh, but only when it is changed into blood. Now, every creature needs a subject in order to produce something; nor can it produce other than that to which the subject is in potency, as we have shown. Therefore, it cannot produce anything without bringing the subject to act through definite intervening stages. Therefore, miracles which consist in something being done without observing the order in which it is naturally feasible cannot be worked by the power of a creature.
Adhuc. Inter species motus ordo quidam naturalis attenditur: nam primus motuum est motus localis, unde et causa aliorum existit; primum enim in quolibet genere causa invenitur eorum quae in illo genere consequuntur. Omnis autem effectus qui in his inferioribus producitur, per aliquam generationem vel alterationem necesse est ut producatur. Oportet igitur quod per aliquid localiter motum hoc proveniat, si fiat ab aliquo agente incorporali, quod proprie localiter moveri non possit. Effectus autem qui fiunt a substantiis incorporeis per corporea instrumenta, non sunt miraculosi: corpora enim non operantur nisi naturaliter. Non igitur substantiae creatae incorporeae possunt aliqua miracula facere propria virtute. Et multo minus substantiae corporeae, quarum omnis actio naturalis est.
Also. There is a natural order to be observed in the various kinds of movement. The first is local movement; hence it is the cause of other movements, because in every genus that which is first is the cause of all that follows in that genus. Now every effect that is produced in this lower world must result from some generation or alteration: consequently, it must be caused through something that is moved locally, if it be the effect of an incorporeal agent which is incapable of local movement properly speaking. Moreover, no effect that is caused by incorporeal substances through corporeal instruments is a miracle, since bodies have no operation that is not natural. Therefore, created incorporeal substances cannot work miracles by their own power. And much less can corporeal substances, whose every action is natural.
Solius igitur Dei est miracula facere. Ipse enim est superior ordine quo universa continentur, sicut a cuius providentia totus hic ordo fluit. Eius etiam virtus, cum sit omnino infinita, non determinatur ad aliquem specialem effectum; neque ad hoc quod effectus ipsius producatur aliquo determinato modo vel ordine.
Therefore, it belongs to God alone to work miracles. For he is above the order which contains all things, as one from whose providence the whole of this order is derived. Moreover, his power, being absolutely infinite, is not confined to any special effect, nor to the producing of its effect in any particular way or order.
Hinc est quod in Psalmo dicitur de Deo: qui facit mirabilia magna solus.
Therefore, it is said of God in the Psalm: He alone does great wonders (Ps 136:4).
Quo modo substantiae spirituales aliqua mirabilia operantur, quae tamen non sunt vere miracula
That spiritual substances do wonders which, however, are not miracles properly speaking
Fuit autem positio Avicennae quod substantiis separatis multo magis obedit materia ad productionem alicuius effectus, quam contrariis agentibus in materia. Unde ponit quod ad apprehensionem praedictarum substantiarum sequitur interdum effectus aliquis in istis inferioribus, vel pluviarum, vel sanitatis alicuius infirmi, absque aliquo corporeo agente medio.
It was the opinion of Avicenna that matter is more obedient to separate substances in the production of an effect than to contrary agents in matter. Hence he states that sometimes an effect ensues in this lower world at the apprehension of the aforesaid substances, such as rain, or the health of a sick person, without any corporeal agent intervening.
Cuius quidem signum ab anima nostra accepit, quae cum fuerit fortis in sua imaginatione, ad solam apprehensionem immutatur corpus: sicut cum quis ambulans super trabem in alto positam, cadit de facili, quia imaginatur casum ex timore; non autem caderet si esset trabs illa posita super terram, unde casum timere non posset. Manifestum est etiam quod ad solam apprehensionem animae calescit corpus, sicut accidit in concupiscentibus vel iratis; aut etiam infrigidatur, sicut accidit in timentibus. Quandoque etiam immutatur ex forti apprehensione ad aliquam aegritudinem, puta febrem, vel etiam lepram. Et per hunc modum dicit quod, si anima sit pura, non subiecta corporalibus passionibus, et fortis in sua apprehensione, obedit apprehensioni eius non solum corpus proprium, sed etiam corpora exteriora: adeo quod ad eius apprehensionem sanetur aliquis infirmus, vel aliquid huiusmodi aliud accidat. Et hoc ponit esse causam fascinationis: quia scilicet anima alicuius vehementer affecta in malivolentia, habet impressionem nocumenti in aliquem, maxime puerum, qui propter corporis teneritudinem est facile susceptivus impressionis. Unde vult quod multo amplius ad apprehensionem substantiarum separatarum, quas ponit animas vel motores orbium, sequantur aliqui effectus in istis inferioribus absque actione alicuius corporalis agentis.
He regards as a sign of this the fact that when our soul is of strong imagination, the body is affected by mere thought. Thus a man easily falls while walking on a plank at a height, because through fear he imagines himself to fall; he would not fall were the plank placed on the ground, so that he would not fear to fall. It is also clear that the body is heated at a mere apprehension of the soul (as happens in lustful or angry persons), or it becomes cold, as happens in those who are seized with fear. Sometimes even it is inclined to some illness through a strong apprehension (for instance, fever or even leprosy). In this way, says he, if the soul be pure and not subject to the passions of the body, and strong of apprehension, not only its own body is obedient to its apprehension, but even external bodies: so much so that a sick man is healed at its mere apprehension, or something similar. He holds this to be the cause of fascination, namely, because, being deeply affected with malevolence, a certain person’s soul exercises a baneful influence on someone, especially on a child, who by reason of the softness of the body is most impressionable. Hence he maintains that much more do certain effects result in these lower bodies without the action of a corporeal agent at the apprehension of separate substances, which, he says, are the souls or movers of the spheres.
Haec autem positio satis consona est aliis suis positionibus. Ponit enim quod omnes formae substantiales effluunt in haec inferiora a substantia separata; et quod corporalia agentia non sunt nisi disponentia materiam ad suscipiendam impressionem agentis separati. Quod quidem non est verum secundum Aristotelis doctrinam, qui probat in VII Metaphys., quod formae quae sunt in materia, non sunt a formis separatis, sed a formis quae sunt in materia: sic enim invenietur similitudo inter faciens et factum.
This theory is consistent enough with other opinions of his. For he holds that all substantial forms emanate from a separate substance into these lower bodies; and that corporeal agents merely dispose matter to receive the impression of the separate agent. But this is untrue according to the teaching of Aristotle, who proves that the forms which are in matter do not come from separate forms, but from forms in matter: for thus it is that we find a likeness between the maker and the thing made.
Exemplum etiam quod sumitur de impressione animae in corpus, non multum adiuvat eius intentionem. Non enim ex apprehensione sequitur aliqua immutatio corporis nisi apprehensioni adiuncta fuerit affectio aliqua, ut gaudii vel timoris, aut concupiscentiae, aut alterius passionis. Huiusmodi autem passiones accidunt cum aliquo determinato motu cordis, ex quo consequitur ulterius immutatio totius corporis, vel secundum motum localem vel secundum alterationem aliquam. Unde adhuc remanet quod apprehensio substantiae spiritualis non alterat corpus nisi mediante motu locali.
Moreover, the comparison with the soul’s impression on the body does not advance his theory very much. For no impression is made on the body as a result of an apprehension unless there be some emotion united to the apprehension, such of joy, fear, desire, or of some other passion. Now these passions are accompanied by a certain definite movement of the heart, the result being an impression on the entire body either as to local motion, or as to some alteration. Hence it still remains that the apprehension of a spiritual substance does not make an impression on the body, except by means of local movement.
Quod autem de fascinatione inducit, non ob hoc accidit quod apprehensio unius immediate immutet corpus alterius: sed quia, mediante motu cordis, immutat corpus coniunctum; cuius immutatio pervenit ad oculum, a quo infici potest aliquid extrinsecum, praecipue si sit facile immutabile; sicut etiam oculus menstruatae inficit speculum.
As to his remark about fascination, this is not due to the apprehension of one affecting immediately the body of another, but it results from that apprehension affecting the conjoined body through the movement of the heart, the influence of which reaches even to the eye, which is able to work evil on an external object, especially if it be easily impressionable. Thus the eye of a woman in her menses infects a mirror.
Substantia igitur spiritualis creata propria virtute nullam formam inducere potest in materiam corporalem, quasi materia ad hoc sibi obediente ut exeat in actum alicuius formae, nisi per motum localem alicuius corporis. Est enim hoc in virtute substantiae spiritualis creatae, ut corpus obediat sibi ad motum localem. Movendo autem localiter aliquod corpus, adhibet aliqua naturaliter activa ad effectus aliquos producendos: sicut etiam ars fabrilis adhibet ignem ad mollificationem ferri. Hoc autem non est miraculosum, proprie loquendo. Unde relinquitur quod substantiae spirituales creatae non faciant miracula propria virtute.
Accordingly, except through the local movement of a body, a created spiritual substance cannot, by its own power, induce any form into corporeal matter, as though matter were obedient to it in this so as to become actuated by a certain form. For it is in the power of a created spiritual substance that a body should be obedient to it in respect of local movement. And by moving a particular body locally, it applies certain natural forces to the production of certain effects: thus the art of the smith applies fire to make the iron malleable. But this is not miraculous, properly speaking. It follows, therefore, that created spiritual substances do not work miracles by their own power.
Dico autem propria virtute: quia nihil prohibet huiusmodi substantias, inquantum agunt in virtute divina, miracula facere. Quod etiam ex hoc videtur, quod unus ordo angelorum specialiter deputatur, ut Gregorius dicit, ad miracula facienda. Qui etiam dicit quod quidam sancti miracula interdum faciunt ex potestate, non solum ex intercessione.
And I say by their own power, because nothing prevents these substances from working miracles insofar as they work by divine power. This indeed may be seen from the fact that as Gregory states one order of angels is especially deputed to the working of miracles. He also says that certain saints sometimes work miracles by power, and not merely by intercession.
Considerandum tamen est quod, cum res aliquas naturales vel angeli vel daemones adhibent ad aliquos determinatos effectus, utuntur eis quasi instrumentis quibusdam, sicut et medicus utitur ut instrumentis aliquibus herbis ad sanandum. Ex instrumento autem procedit non solum suae virtuti correspondens effectus, sed etiam ultra propriam virtutem, inquantum agit in virtute principalis agentis: serra enim, aut securis, non posset facere lectum nisi inquantum agunt ut motae ab arte ad talem effectum; nec calor naturalis posset carnem generare nisi virtute animae vegetabilis, quae utitur ipso quasi quodam instrumento. Conveniens est igitur quod ex ipsis rebus naturalibus proveniant aliqui altiores effectus ex hoc quod spirituales substantiae eis utuntur quasi instrumentis quibusdam.
We must observe, however, that when angels or demons apply natural things in order to produce certain definite effects, they employ them as instruments, just as a physician uses certain herbs as instruments for the purpose of healing. Now, from an instrument there proceeds an effect not only in proportion to its power, but also in excess thereof, insofar as it acts by the power of the principal agent: thus a saw or an axe could not produce a bedstead except through being applied by craftsmanship for that particular effect, nor could natural heat produce flesh, except by the power of the vegetative soul that employs it as an instrument. It is therefore reasonable that certain higher effects should result from these same natural things through spiritual substances employing them as instruments.
Sic ergo, licet tales effectus simpliciter miracula dici non possint, quia ex naturalibus causis proveniunt, mirabiles tamen nobis redduntur dupliciter. Uno modo, ex hoc quod per spirituales substantias tales causae modo nobis inconsueto ad effectus proprios apponuntur: unde et ingeniosorum artificum opera mira redduntur cum ab aliis non percipitur qualiter operantur. Alio modo, ex hoc quod causae naturales appositae ad effectus aliquos producendos, aliquid virtutis sortiuntur ex hoc quod sunt instrumenta spiritualium substantiarum. Et hoc magis accedit ad rationem miraculi.
Accordingly, although such effects cannot be called miracles absolutely, since they result from natural causes, nevertheless they are wonderful to us in two ways. First, because these causes are applied for the production of their proper effects by spiritual substances in a way that is strange to us: even so the works of skillful craftsmen seem wonderful to others who do not see how the work is done. Second, because the natural causes employed for the production of certain effects are invested with a certain power through serving as instruments of spiritual substances. This comes nearer to the nature of a miracle.
Quod opera magorum non sunt solum ex impressione caelestium corporum
That the works of magicians result not only from the influence of heavenly bodies
Fuerunt autem quidam dicentes quod huiusmodi opera nobis mirabilia quae per artes magicas fiunt, non ab aliquibus spiritualibus substantiis fiunt, sed ex virtute caelestium corporum. Cuius signum videtur quod ab exercentibus huiusmodi opera stellarum certus situs consideratur. Adhibentur etiam quaedam herbarum et aliarum corporalium rerum auxilia, quasi ad praeparandam inferiorem materiam ad suscipiendam influentiam virtutis caelestis.
Some there were who averred that such works as seem wonderful to us, being wrought by the magic art, are done not by certain spiritual substances, but by the power of the heavenly bodies. This would seem to be indicated by the fact that those who practice works of this kind observe the position of the stars, and are assisted by the employment of certain herbs and other corporeal things, for the purpose, as it were, of preparing matter of lower degree to receive the influence of the celestial power.
Hoc autem expresse apparentibus adversatur. Cum enim non sit possibile ex aliquibus corporeis principiis intellectum causari, ut supra probatum est, impossibile est quod effectus qui sunt proprii intellectualis naturae, ex virtute caelestis corporis causentur. In huiusmodi autem operationibus magorum apparent quaedam quae sunt propria rationalis naturae opera: redduntur enim responsa de furtis sublatis, et de aliis huiusmodi, quod non posset fieri nisi per intellectum. Non est igitur verum omnes huiusmodi effectus ex sola virtute caelestium corporum causari.
But this is in contradiction with what is apparent. For as it is impossible that an intellect be formed from corporeal principles, as we proved above, it is impossible for effects that are caused exclusively by the intellectual nature to be produced by the power of a heavenly body. Now in these works of magicians, things appear that are exclusively the work of a rational nature—for instance, answers are given about stolen goods and the like—and this could not be done except by an intelligence. Therefore, it is not true that all such effects are caused by the mere power of a heavenly body.
Praeterea. Ipsa loquela proprius actus est rationalis naturae. Apparent autem aliqui colloquentes hominibus in praedictis operationibus, et ratiocinantes de diversis. Non est igitur possibile quod huiusmodi fiant sola virtute caelestium corporum.
Further. Speech is an act proper to the rational nature. Now in these works people appear to men and speak to them on various matters. Therefore, such things cannot be done by the mere power of heavenly bodies.
Si quis autem dicat quod huiusmodi apparentiae non sunt secundum sensum exteriorem, sed secundum imaginationem tantum: hoc quidem, primo, non videtur verum. Non enim alicui apparent formae imaginatae quasi res verae, nisi fiat alienatio ab exterioribus sensibus: quia non potest esse quod similitudinibus intendatur tanquam rebus, nisi ligato naturali iudicatorio sensus. Huiusmodi autem collocutiones et apparitiones fiunt ad homines qui utuntur libere sensibus exterioribus. Non est igitur possibile quod huiusmodi visa vel audita sint secundum imaginationem tantum.
If, however, someone say that these apparitions are present not to the sensorial organ, but only to the imagination, this is, in the first place, apparently untrue. For imaginary forms do not seem real to anyone unless his external senses be suspended, since it is not possible for a person to look on a likeness as a reality unless the natural judgements of the senses are tied. Now these conversations and apparitions are addressed to those who have free use of their external senses. Therefore, these apparitions and speeches cannot be imaginary.
Deinde, ex quibuscumque formis imaginatis non potest alicui provenire intellectualis cognitio ultra facultatem naturalem vel acquisitam sui intellectus: quod etiam in somniis patet, in quibus, etsi sit aliqua praesignatio futurorum, non tamen quicumque videns somnia, eorum significata intelligit. Per huiusmodi autem visa vel audita quae apparent in operibus magorum, plerumque advenit alicui intellectualis cognitio aliquorum quae sui intellectus facultatem excedunt: sicut revelatio occultorum thesaurorum, manifestatio futurorum, et quandoque etiam de aliquibus documentis scientiae alicuius vera respondentur. Oportet ergo quod vel illi apparentes et colloquentes non videantur secundum imaginationem tantum: vel saltem quod hoc fiat virtute alicuius intellectus superioris, quod homo per huiusmodi imaginationes in cognitionem talium adducatur; et non fiat hoc virtute solum caelestium corporum.
Besides, no imaginary forms can lead a person to intellectual knowledge beyond the natural or acquired faculty of his intellect. This is evident in dreams, since even if they contain some indication of the future, it is not every dreamer that understands the meaning of his dreams. Now, in these apparitions and speeches that occur in the works of magicians, it frequently happens that a person obtains knowledge of things surpassing the faculty of his intelligence, such as the discovery of hidden treasure, the manifestation of the future, and sometimes even true answers are given in matters of science. Either, therefore, these apparitions or speeches are not purely imaginary, or at least it is the work of some higher intelligence, and not only of a heavenly body, that a person obtain the aforesaid knowledge through these imaginings.
Adhuc. Quod virtute caelestium corporum fit, est effectus naturalis: nam formae naturales sunt quae in inferioribus causantur ex virtute caelestium corporum. Quod igitur nulli rei potest esse naturale, non potest fieri virtute caelestium corporum. Quaedam autem talia fieri dicuntur per operationes praedictas: sicut quod ad praesentiam alicuius quaecumque sera ei pandatur, quod aliquis invisibilis reddatur, et multa huiusmodi narrantur. Non est igitur possibile hoc fieri virtute caelestium corporum.
Again. That which is done by the power of heavenly bodies is a natural effect, since they are natural forms that are caused in this lower world by the powers of heavenly bodies. Hence that which cannot be natural to anything cannot be caused by the power of the heavenly bodies. And yet some such things are stated to be caused by the aforesaid works: for instance, it is averred that at the mere presence of a certain person all doors are unlocked, that a certain man become invisible, and many like occurrences are related. Therefore, this cannot be done by the power of heavenly bodies.