Caput 103 Chapter 103 Quo modo substantiae spirituales aliqua mirabilia operantur, quae tamen non sunt vere miracula That spiritual substances do wonders which, however, are not miracles properly speaking Fuit autem positio Avicennae quod substantiis separatis multo magis obedit materia ad productionem alicuius effectus, quam contrariis agentibus in materia. Unde ponit quod ad apprehensionem praedictarum substantiarum sequitur interdum effectus aliquis in istis inferioribus, vel pluviarum, vel sanitatis alicuius infirmi, absque aliquo corporeo agente medio. It was the opinion of Avicenna that matter is more obedient to separate substances in the production of an effect than to contrary agents in matter. Hence he states that sometimes an effect ensues in this lower world at the apprehension of the aforesaid substances, such as rain, or the health of a sick person, without any corporeal agent intervening. Cuius quidem signum ab anima nostra accepit, quae cum fuerit fortis in sua imaginatione, ad solam apprehensionem immutatur corpus: sicut cum quis ambulans super trabem in alto positam, cadit de facili, quia imaginatur casum ex timore; non autem caderet si esset trabs illa posita super terram, unde casum timere non posset. Manifestum est etiam quod ad solam apprehensionem animae calescit corpus, sicut accidit in concupiscentibus vel iratis; aut etiam infrigidatur, sicut accidit in timentibus. Quandoque etiam immutatur ex forti apprehensione ad aliquam aegritudinem, puta febrem, vel etiam lepram. Et per hunc modum dicit quod, si anima sit pura, non subiecta corporalibus passionibus, et fortis in sua apprehensione, obedit apprehensioni eius non solum corpus proprium, sed etiam corpora exteriora: adeo quod ad eius apprehensionem sanetur aliquis infirmus, vel aliquid huiusmodi aliud accidat. Et hoc ponit esse causam fascinationis: quia scilicet anima alicuius vehementer affecta in malivolentia, habet impressionem nocumenti in aliquem, maxime puerum, qui propter corporis teneritudinem est facile susceptivus impressionis. Unde vult quod multo amplius ad apprehensionem substantiarum separatarum, quas ponit animas vel motores orbium, sequantur aliqui effectus in istis inferioribus absque actione alicuius corporalis agentis. He regards as a sign of this the fact that when our soul is of strong imagination, the body is affected by mere thought. Thus a man easily falls while walking on a plank at a height, because through fear he imagines himself to fall; he would not fall were the plank placed on the ground, so that he would not fear to fall. It is also clear that the body is heated at a mere apprehension of the soul (as happens in lustful or angry persons), or it becomes cold, as happens in those who are seized with fear. Sometimes even it is inclined to some illness through a strong apprehension (for instance, fever or even leprosy). In this way, says he, if the soul be pure and not subject to the passions of the body, and strong of apprehension, not only its own body is obedient to its apprehension, but even external bodies: so much so that a sick man is healed at its mere apprehension, or something similar. He holds this to be the cause of fascination, namely, because, being deeply affected with malevolence, a certain person’s soul exercises a baneful influence on someone, especially on a child, who by reason of the softness of the body is most impressionable. Hence he maintains that much more do certain effects result in these lower bodies without the action of a corporeal agent at the apprehension of separate substances, which, he says, are the souls or movers of the spheres. Haec autem positio satis consona est aliis suis positionibus. Ponit enim quod omnes formae substantiales effluunt in haec inferiora a substantia separata; et quod corporalia agentia non sunt nisi disponentia materiam ad suscipiendam impressionem agentis separati. Quod quidem non est verum secundum Aristotelis doctrinam, qui probat in VII Metaphys., quod formae quae sunt in materia, non sunt a formis separatis, sed a formis quae sunt in materia: sic enim invenietur similitudo inter faciens et factum. This theory is consistent enough with other opinions of his. For he holds that all substantial forms emanate from a separate substance into these lower bodies; and that corporeal agents merely dispose matter to receive the impression of the separate agent. But this is untrue according to the teaching of Aristotle, who proves that the forms which are in matter do not come from separate forms, but from forms in matter: for thus it is that we find a likeness between the maker and the thing made. Exemplum etiam quod sumitur de impressione animae in corpus, non multum adiuvat eius intentionem. Non enim ex apprehensione sequitur aliqua immutatio corporis nisi apprehensioni adiuncta fuerit affectio aliqua, ut gaudii vel timoris, aut concupiscentiae, aut alterius passionis. Huiusmodi autem passiones accidunt cum aliquo determinato motu cordis, ex quo consequitur ulterius immutatio totius corporis, vel secundum motum localem vel secundum alterationem aliquam. Unde adhuc remanet quod apprehensio substantiae spiritualis non alterat corpus nisi mediante motu locali. Moreover, the comparison with the soul’s impression on the body does not advance his theory very much. For no impression is made on the body as a result of an apprehension unless there be some emotion united to the apprehension, such of joy, fear, desire, or of some other passion. Now these passions are accompanied by a certain definite movement of the heart, the result being an impression on the entire body either as to local motion, or as to some alteration. Hence it still remains that the apprehension of a spiritual substance does not make an impression on the body, except by means of local movement. Quod autem de fascinatione inducit, non ob hoc accidit quod apprehensio unius immediate immutet corpus alterius: sed quia, mediante motu cordis, immutat corpus coniunctum; cuius immutatio pervenit ad oculum, a quo infici potest aliquid extrinsecum, praecipue si sit facile immutabile; sicut etiam oculus menstruatae inficit speculum. As to his remark about fascination, this is not due to the apprehension of one affecting immediately the body of another, but it results from that apprehension affecting the conjoined body through the movement of the heart, the influence of which reaches even to the eye, which is able to work evil on an external object, especially if it be easily impressionable. Thus the eye of a woman in her menses infects a mirror. Substantia igitur spiritualis creata propria virtute nullam formam inducere potest in materiam corporalem, quasi materia ad hoc sibi obediente ut exeat in actum alicuius formae, nisi per motum localem alicuius corporis. Est enim hoc in virtute substantiae spiritualis creatae, ut corpus obediat sibi ad motum localem. Movendo autem localiter aliquod corpus, adhibet aliqua naturaliter activa ad effectus aliquos producendos: sicut etiam ars fabrilis adhibet ignem ad mollificationem ferri. Hoc autem non est miraculosum, proprie loquendo. Unde relinquitur quod substantiae spirituales creatae non faciant miracula propria virtute. Accordingly, except through the local movement of a body, a created spiritual substance cannot, by its own power, induce any form into corporeal matter, as though matter were obedient to it in this so as to become actuated by a certain form. For it is in the power of a created spiritual substance that a body should be obedient to it in respect of local movement. And by moving a particular body locally, it applies certain natural forces to the production of certain effects: thus the art of the smith applies fire to make the iron malleable. But this is not miraculous, properly speaking. It follows, therefore, that created spiritual substances do not work miracles by their own power. Dico autem propria virtute: quia nihil prohibet huiusmodi substantias, inquantum agunt in virtute divina, miracula facere. Quod etiam ex hoc videtur, quod unus ordo angelorum specialiter deputatur, ut Gregorius dicit, ad miracula facienda. Qui etiam dicit quod quidam sancti miracula interdum faciunt ex potestate, non solum ex intercessione. And I say by their own power, because nothing prevents these substances from working miracles insofar as they work by divine power. This indeed may be seen from the fact that as Gregory states one order of angels is especially deputed to the working of miracles. He also says that certain saints sometimes work miracles by power, and not merely by intercession. Considerandum tamen est quod, cum res aliquas naturales vel angeli vel daemones adhibent ad aliquos determinatos effectus, utuntur eis quasi instrumentis quibusdam, sicut et medicus utitur ut instrumentis aliquibus herbis ad sanandum. Ex instrumento autem procedit non solum suae virtuti correspondens effectus, sed etiam ultra propriam virtutem, inquantum agit in virtute principalis agentis: serra enim, aut securis, non posset facere lectum nisi inquantum agunt ut motae ab arte ad talem effectum; nec calor naturalis posset carnem generare nisi virtute animae vegetabilis, quae utitur ipso quasi quodam instrumento. Conveniens est igitur quod ex ipsis rebus naturalibus proveniant aliqui altiores effectus ex hoc quod spirituales substantiae eis utuntur quasi instrumentis quibusdam. We must observe, however, that when angels or demons apply natural things in order to produce certain definite effects, they employ them as instruments, just as a physician uses certain herbs as instruments for the purpose of healing. Now, from an instrument there proceeds an effect not only in proportion to its power, but also in excess thereof, insofar as it acts by the power of the principal agent: thus a saw or an axe could not produce a bedstead except through being applied by craftsmanship for that particular effect, nor could natural heat produce flesh, except by the power of the vegetative soul that employs it as an instrument. It is therefore reasonable that certain higher effects should result from these same natural things through spiritual substances employing them as instruments. Sic ergo, licet tales effectus simpliciter miracula dici non possint, quia ex naturalibus causis proveniunt, mirabiles tamen nobis redduntur dupliciter. Uno modo, ex hoc quod per spirituales substantias tales causae modo nobis inconsueto ad effectus proprios apponuntur: unde et ingeniosorum artificum opera mira redduntur cum ab aliis non percipitur qualiter operantur. Alio modo, ex hoc quod causae naturales appositae ad effectus aliquos producendos, aliquid virtutis sortiuntur ex hoc quod sunt instrumenta spiritualium substantiarum. Et hoc magis accedit ad rationem miraculi. Accordingly, although such effects cannot be called miracles absolutely, since they result from natural causes, nevertheless they are wonderful to us in two ways. First, because these causes are applied for the production of their proper effects by spiritual substances in a way that is strange to us: even so the works of skillful craftsmen seem wonderful to others who do not see how the work is done. Second, because the natural causes employed for the production of certain effects are invested with a certain power through serving as instruments of spiritual substances. This comes nearer to the nature of a miracle. Caput 104 Chapter 104 Quod opera magorum non sunt solum ex impressione caelestium corporum That the works of magicians result not only from the influence of heavenly bodies Fuerunt autem quidam dicentes quod huiusmodi opera nobis mirabilia quae per artes magicas fiunt, non ab aliquibus spiritualibus substantiis fiunt, sed ex virtute caelestium corporum. Cuius signum videtur quod ab exercentibus huiusmodi opera stellarum certus situs consideratur. Adhibentur etiam quaedam herbarum et aliarum corporalium rerum auxilia, quasi ad praeparandam inferiorem materiam ad suscipiendam influentiam virtutis caelestis. Some there were who averred that such works as seem wonderful to us, being wrought by the magic art, are done not by certain spiritual substances, but by the power of the heavenly bodies. This would seem to be indicated by the fact that those who practice works of this kind observe the position of the stars, and are assisted by the employment of certain herbs and other corporeal things, for the purpose, as it were, of preparing matter of lower degree to receive the influence of the celestial power. Hoc autem expresse apparentibus adversatur. Cum enim non sit possibile ex aliquibus corporeis principiis intellectum causari, ut supra probatum est, impossibile est quod effectus qui sunt proprii intellectualis naturae, ex virtute caelestis corporis causentur. In huiusmodi autem operationibus magorum apparent quaedam quae sunt propria rationalis naturae opera: redduntur enim responsa de furtis sublatis, et de aliis huiusmodi, quod non posset fieri nisi per intellectum. Non est igitur verum omnes huiusmodi effectus ex sola virtute caelestium corporum causari. But this is in contradiction with what is apparent. For as it is impossible that an intellect be formed from corporeal principles, as we proved above, it is impossible for effects that are caused exclusively by the intellectual nature to be produced by the power of a heavenly body. Now in these works of magicians, things appear that are exclusively the work of a rational nature—for instance, answers are given about stolen goods and the like—and this could not be done except by an intelligence. Therefore, it is not true that all such effects are caused by the mere power of a heavenly body. Praeterea. Ipsa loquela proprius actus est rationalis naturae. Apparent autem aliqui colloquentes hominibus in praedictis operationibus, et ratiocinantes de diversis. Non est igitur possibile quod huiusmodi fiant sola virtute caelestium corporum. Further. Speech is an act proper to the rational nature. Now in these works people appear to men and speak to them on various matters. Therefore, such things cannot be done by the mere power of heavenly bodies. Si quis autem dicat quod huiusmodi apparentiae non sunt secundum sensum exteriorem, sed secundum imaginationem tantum: hoc quidem, primo, non videtur verum. Non enim alicui apparent formae imaginatae quasi res verae, nisi fiat alienatio ab exterioribus sensibus: quia non potest esse quod similitudinibus intendatur tanquam rebus, nisi ligato naturali iudicatorio sensus. Huiusmodi autem collocutiones et apparitiones fiunt ad homines qui utuntur libere sensibus exterioribus. Non est igitur possibile quod huiusmodi visa vel audita sint secundum imaginationem tantum. If, however, someone say that these apparitions are present not to the sensorial organ, but only to the imagination, this is, in the first place, apparently untrue. For imaginary forms do not seem real to anyone unless his external senses be suspended, since it is not possible for a person to look on a likeness as a reality unless the natural judgements of the senses are tied. Now these conversations and apparitions are addressed to those who have free use of their external senses. Therefore, these apparitions and speeches cannot be imaginary. Deinde, ex quibuscumque formis imaginatis non potest alicui provenire intellectualis cognitio ultra facultatem naturalem vel acquisitam sui intellectus: quod etiam in somniis patet, in quibus, etsi sit aliqua praesignatio futurorum, non tamen quicumque videns somnia, eorum significata intelligit. Per huiusmodi autem visa vel audita quae apparent in operibus magorum, plerumque advenit alicui intellectualis cognitio aliquorum quae sui intellectus facultatem excedunt: sicut revelatio occultorum thesaurorum, manifestatio futurorum, et quandoque etiam de aliquibus documentis scientiae alicuius vera respondentur. Oportet ergo quod vel illi apparentes et colloquentes non videantur secundum imaginationem tantum: vel saltem quod hoc fiat virtute alicuius intellectus superioris, quod homo per huiusmodi imaginationes in cognitionem talium adducatur; et non fiat hoc virtute solum caelestium corporum. Besides, no imaginary forms can lead a person to intellectual knowledge beyond the natural or acquired faculty of his intellect. This is evident in dreams, since even if they contain some indication of the future, it is not every dreamer that understands the meaning of his dreams. Now, in these apparitions and speeches that occur in the works of magicians, it frequently happens that a person obtains knowledge of things surpassing the faculty of his intelligence, such as the discovery of hidden treasure, the manifestation of the future, and sometimes even true answers are given in matters of science. Either, therefore, these apparitions or speeches are not purely imaginary, or at least it is the work of some higher intelligence, and not only of a heavenly body, that a person obtain the aforesaid knowledge through these imaginings. Adhuc. Quod virtute caelestium corporum fit, est effectus naturalis: nam formae naturales sunt quae in inferioribus causantur ex virtute caelestium corporum. Quod igitur nulli rei potest esse naturale, non potest fieri virtute caelestium corporum. Quaedam autem talia fieri dicuntur per operationes praedictas: sicut quod ad praesentiam alicuius quaecumque sera ei pandatur, quod aliquis invisibilis reddatur, et multa huiusmodi narrantur. Non est igitur possibile hoc fieri virtute caelestium corporum. Again. That which is done by the power of heavenly bodies is a natural effect, since they are natural forms that are caused in this lower world by the powers of heavenly bodies. Hence that which cannot be natural to anything cannot be caused by the power of the heavenly bodies. And yet some such things are stated to be caused by the aforesaid works: for instance, it is averred that at the mere presence of a certain person all doors are unlocked, that a certain man become invisible, and many like occurrences are related. Therefore, this cannot be done by the power of heavenly bodies. Amplius. Cuicumque virtute caelestium corporum confertur quod posterius est, confertur et ei quod prius est. Moveri autem ex se consequitur ad habere animam: animatorum enim proprium est quod moveant seipsa. Impossibile est igitur fieri virtute caelestium corporum quod aliquod inanimatum per se moveatur. Fieri autem hoc per magicas artes dicitur, quod aliqua statua per se moveatur, aut vocem emittat. Non est ergo possibile quod effectus magicarum artium fiat virtute caelesti. Further. The reception of that which follows through the power of heavenly bodies implies the reception of what precedes. Now movement, of its very nature, is the result of having a soul, since it is proper to animate things to move themselves. Therefore, it is impossible for an inanimate being to be moved by itself through the power of a heavenly body. Yet it is stated that by the magic art an image is made to move of itself, or to speak. Therefore, it is not possible for the effects of the magic art to be caused by a celestial power. Si autem dicatur quod statua illa sortitur aliquod principium vitae virtute caelestium corporum, hoc est impossibile. Principium enim vitae in omnibus viventibus est forma substantialis: vivere enim est esse viventibus, ut philosophus dicit, in II de anima. Impossibile est autem quod aliquid recipiat aliquam formam substantialem de novo nisi amittat formam quam prius habuit: generatio enim unius est corruptio alterius. In fabricatione autem alicuius statuae non abiicitur aliqua forma substantialis, sed fit transmutatio solum secundum figuram, quae est accidens: manet enim forma cupri, vel alicuius huiusmodi. Non est igitur possibile quod huiusmodi statuae sortiantur aliquod principium vitae. And if it be said that the image in question is endowed with some vital principle by the power of the heavenly bodies, this is impossible. For the principle of life in all living things is the substantial form, because in living things to be is to live, as the Philosopher says. Now, it is impossible for anything to receive anew a substantial form unless it lose the form which it had previously, since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another. But in the making of an image no substantial form is discarded, and there is only a change of shape, which is an accident, since the form of copper or something of the kind remains. Therefore, the image in question cannot possibly be endowed with the vital principle. Adhuc. Si aliquid per principium vitae moveatur, necesse est quod habeat sensum: movens enim est sensus vel intellectus. Intellectus autem in generabilibus et corruptibilibus non est sine sensu. Sensus autem non potest esse ubi non est tactus: nec tactus sine organo medie temperato. Talis autem temperies non invenitur in lapide vel cera vel metallo, ex quo fit statua. Non est igitur possibile quod huiusmodi statuae moveantur per principium vitae. Further. If anything is moved by a principle of life it necessarily has sensation, for the principle of movement is sensation or understanding. But understanding is not found without sensation in things that come to be and pass away. Now there cannot be sensation where there is not the sense of touch; nor the sense of touch without an organ of mean temperature. Such a temperature, however, is not found in the stone or wax or metal out of which the statue is made. It is not possible, therefore, that statues of this sort should be moved by a principle of life. Amplius. Viventia perfecta non solum generantur virtute caelesti, sed etiam ex semine: homo enim generat hominem et sol. Quae vero ex sola virtute caelesti sine semine generantur, sunt animalia generata ex putrefactione, quae inter alia ignobiliora sunt. Si igitur per virtutem caelestem solam huiusmodi statuae sortiuntur principium vitae, per quod moveant seipsa, oportet ea esse ignobilissima inter animalia. Quod tamen esset falsum, si per principium vitae intrinsecum operarentur: nam in earum actibus apparent nobiles operationes, cum respondeant de occultis. Non est igitur possibile quod operentur vel moveantur per principium vitae. Besides. Perfect living things are generated not only by a celestial power, but also from seed, for man and the sun generate man. Those which are generated by a celestial power alone without seed are animals formed by putrefaction; these belong to a lower grade than the others. Accordingly, if these images be endowed with the vital principle by a celestial power alone, so as to move themselves, it follows that they belong to the lowest grade of animals. And yet this would be false if they worked by an intrinsic principle of life, since among their operations some are of a high degree, for they give answers about hidden things. Therefore, it is not possible that their operations and movements proceed from a principle of life. Item. Effectum naturalem virtute caelestium corporum productum contingit inveniri absque artis operatione: etsi enim aliquo artificio aliquis operetur ad generationem ranarum, vel aliquorum huiusmodi, contingit tamen generari ranas absque omni artificio. Si ergo virtute caelestium corporum huiusmodi statuae, quae per artem nigromanticam fiunt, sortiantur principium vitae, erit invenire generationem talium absque huiusmodi arte. Hoc autem non invenitur. Manifestum est igitur quod huiusmodi statuae non habent principium vitae, neque moventur virtute caelestis corporis. Again. We find sometimes a natural effect produced by the power of heavenly bodies without the operation of art: thus, although one may produce frogs or something of the kind by means of some artifice, frogs do happen to be produced without any artifice. Consequently, if these images that are made by necromancy are endowed with the vital principle by the power of heavenly bodies, it will be possible for them to be formed without the operation of art. But this is not the case. Therefore, it is evident that such images have not the principle of life, nor are they moved by the power of heavenly bodies. Per haec autem excluditur positio Hermetis, qui sic dixit, ut Augustinus refert, VIII de civitate Dei: Deus sicut effector est deorum caelestium, ita homo fictor est deorum qui in templis sunt, humana proximitate contenti: statuas dico animatas, sensu et spiritu plenas, tantaque facientes et talia; statuas futurorum praescias; easdem de somniis et multis aliis rebus praedicentes; imbecillitates hominibus facientes, eosque curantes; tristitiam laetitiamque dantes pro meritis. Hereby we refute the opinion of Hermes who, according to Augustine, expressed himself thus: As God is the cause of the heavenly gods, so man fashions the gods that reside in temples, being satisfied to live near men. I refer to those animal images, endowed with sense and spirit, that do great and wonderful things, images gifted with knowledge of the future, and who foretell by dreams and many other things; who afflict men with ailments and heal them, who bring sorrow and joy to them according to their merits. Haec etiam positio auctoritate divina destruitur. Dicitur enim in Psalmo: simulacra gentium argentum et aurum, opera manuum hominum. Os habent et non loquentur: neque enim est spiritus in ore ipsorum. This opinion is also refuted by divine authority. For it is said in the Psalm: The idols of the nations are silver and gold, the work of men’s hands. They have mouths, but they speak not, they have eyes, but they see not, they have ears, but they hear not, nor is there any breath in their mouths (Ps 135[134]:15–17). Non videtur autem omnino negandum quin in praedictis ex virtute caelestium corporum aliquid virtutis esse possit: ad illos tamen solos effectus quos virtute caelestium corporum aliqua inferiora corpora producere possunt. Yet seemingly we must not absolutely deny the possibility of some kind of efficacy being in these things through the power of the heavenly bodies, but only for such effects as certain lower bodies are able to cause by the power of the heavenly bodies. Caput 105 Chapter 105 Unde magorum operationes efficaciam habeant Whence the works of magicians derive their efficacy Investigandum autem relinquitur unde artes magicae efficaciam habeant. Quod quidem facile perpendi potest si modus operationis earum attendatur. It remains for us to inquire whence the magic arts derive their efficacy: a question that will present no difficulty if we consider their mode of operation. In suis enim operationibus utuntur vocibus quibusdam significativis ad determinatos effectus producendos. Vox autem, inquantum est significativa, non habet virtutem nisi ex aliquo intellectu: vel ex intellectu proferentis; vel ex intellectu eius ad quem profertur. Ex proferentis quidem intellectu, sicut si aliquis intellectus sit tantae virtutis quod sua conceptione res possit causare, quam quidem conceptionem vocis officio producendis effectibus quodammodo praesentat. Ex intellectu autem eius ad quem sermo dirigitur, sicut cum per significationem vocis in intellectu receptam, audiens inducitur ad aliquid faciendum. Non autem potest dici quod voces illae significativae a magis prolatae efficaciam habeant ex intellectu proferentis. Cum enim virtus essentiam consequatur, virtutis diversitas essentialium principiorum diversitatem ostendit. Intellectus autem communiter hominum huius dispositionis invenitur quod eius cognitio ex rebus causatur, magis quam sua conceptione res causare possit. Si igitur sint aliqui homines qui verbis conceptionem sui intellectus exprimentibus res possint transmutare propria virtute, erunt alterius speciei, et dicentur aequivoce homines. For in the practice of their art they make use of certain significative words, in order to produce certain definite effects. Now, words, insofar as they signify something, have no power except as derived from some intellect, either that of the speaker or of the person to whom they are spoken. They are from the intellect of the speaker when an intellect is of such great power that it can cause things by its mere thought, the voice serving to convey, as it were, this thought to the things that are to be produced. They are from the intellect of the person to whom the words are addressed when the hearer is induced to do some particular thing through his intellect receiving the signification of those words. Now, it cannot be said that these significative words uttered by magicians derive efficacy from the intellect of the speaker. For, since power follows essence, diversity of power indicates diversity of essential principles. Moreover, man’s intellect is invariably of such a disposition that its knowledge is caused by things, rather than that it is able by its mere thought to cause things. Consequently, if there be any men that are able of their own power to transform things by words expressive of their thoughts, they will belong to another species, and it would be an equivocation to call them men. Amplius. Virtus faciendi non acquiritur per disciplinam, sed solum cognitio aliquid faciendi. Per disciplinam autem aliqui acquirunt quod huiusmodi operationes magicas efficiant. Non igitur est in eis ad huiusmodi effectus producendos virtus aliqua, sed cognitio sola. Further. By learning we acquire not the power to do a thing, but the knowledge of how to do it. Yet some, by learning, are rendered able to perform these magic works. Therefore, they must have not only knowledge but also the power to produce these effects. Si quis autem dicat quod huiusmodi homines sua nativitate, ex virtute stellarum, sortiuntur prae ceteris virtutem praedictam, ita quod, quantumcumque alii instruantur, qui hoc ex nativitate non habent, efficaces in huiusmodi operibus esse non possunt: primo quidem dicendum est quod corpora caelestia super intellectum imprimere non possunt, ut supra ostensum est. Non igitur ex virtute stellarum sortiri potest intellectus alicuius hanc virtutem quod repraesentatio suae conceptionis per vocem sit alicuius effectiva. If someone say that these men are born with the aforesaid power by the influence of the stars, while others are excluded from it, so that, however much the others who are born without this power may be instructed, they cannot succeed in performing these works; we reply first that, as shown above, heavenly bodies cannot make an impression on the intellect. Therefore, through the influence of the stars, a man’s intellect cannot receive a power whereby the vocal expression of its thoughts is productive of something. Si autem dicatur quod etiam imaginatio aliquid in prolatione vocum significativarum operatur, super quam possunt corpora caelestia imprimere, cum eius operatio sit per organum corporale: hoc non potest esse quantum ad omnes effectus qui per huiusmodi artes fiunt. Ostensum est enim quod non possunt omnes huiusmodi effectus virtute stellarum produci. Ergo neque ex virtute stellarum aliquis sortiri potest hanc virtutem ut eosdem effectus producat. And if it be said that the imagination produces an effect in the utterance of significative words, and that heavenly bodies can work on the imagination since its operation is performed by a bodily organ, this does not apply to all the results produced by this art. For we have shown that these effects cannot all be produced by the power of the stars. Neither, therefore, can anyone receive the power to produce those effects by the power of the stars. Relinquitur igitur quod effectus huiusmodi compleantur per aliquem intellectum ad quem sermo proferentis huiusmodi voces dirigitur. Huius autem signum est: nam huiusmodi significativae voces quibus magi utuntur, invocationes sunt, supplicationes, adiurationes, aut etiam imperia, quasi ad alterum colloquentis. Consequently, it follows that these effects are accomplished by an intellect to whom the discourse of the person uttering these words is addressed. We have an indication of this in the fact that the significative words employed by the magician are invocations, supplications, adjurations, or even commands as though he were addressing another. Item. In observationibus huius artis utuntur quibusdam characteribus et figuris determinatis. Figura autem nullius actionis principium est neque passionis: alias, mathematica corpora essent activa et passiva. Non ergo potest per figuras determinatas disponi materia ad aliquem effectum naturalem suscipiendum. Non ergo utuntur magi figuris aliquibus quasi dispositionibus. Relinquitur ergo quod utantur eis solum quasi signis: non enim est aliquid tertium dare. Signis autem non utimur nisi ad alios intelligentes. Habent igitur magicae artes efficaciam ab alio intelligente, ad quem sermo magi dirigitur. Again. Certain characters and definite figures are employed in the observances of this art. Now a figure cannot be the principle of either action or passion; otherwise, mathematical bodies would be active and passive. Therefore, matter cannot be disposed by definite figures to receive a certain natural effect. Therefore, magicians do not employ figures as dispositions. It remains, then, that they employ them only as signs, for there is no third solution. But we make signs only to other intelligent beings. Therefore, the magic arts derive their efficacy from another intelligent being, to whom the magician’s words are addressed.